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ABSTRACT 
This research aims to explain current high levels of political disaffection among Chilean 
youth, to understand why youths in Chile are particularly more disaffected than other 
groups, and to comprehend the apparent new way of doing politics that would be 
emerging among this group. Since the return to democracy in 1990 Chile has 
experienced good levels of economic development and political stability. However, 
with the pass of years, Chilean citizens, and particularly young people, have increased 
their levels of political disaffection. Moreover, lately these feelings have begun to be 
expressed through strong social movements. This thesis argues that this phenomenon 
can be principally explained by a large disconnection between the political class and 
common citizens in Chile, which would be founded on both several institutional and 
socio-economic legacies of the dictatorship and the way the political transition was 
made. The relationship between youths and the political system in Chile is analyzed 
through both quantitative and qualitative analyses. This is done first through the direct 
analysis of the association between indicators of political disaffection and perceptions 
about the way of functioning of the Chilean Political system. Moreover, several case 
studies that express these feelings of disaffection are also analyzed in order to deepen 
the argument. First, an analysis of the lack of a youth public policy is done in order to 
describe a specific case that shows that the political system is particularly more 
disconnected regarding young people. Additionally, the success among youths of the 
independent presidential candidature of Marco Enriquez-Ominami in 2009 and the 
educational movements of 2006 and 2011-2012 are also analyzed. This is done also to 
more deeply comprehend the engenderment of feelings of disaffection but also in 
order to examine an apparent new way of doing politics that may be emerging among 
young people. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction, literature review and methodology 
 1.1 The dilemma of youth political disaffection in a democratic context of 
improved wellbeing and political stability  
Among the countries that were part of the third wave of democratisation 
(Huntington, 1990), and particularly within the Latin American context, Chile has been 
highlighted by many scholars as one of the most successful in achieving both economic 
success and political stability after its transition to a democratic regime (Angell, 2007, 
Oxhorn, 1999).  
Chile recovered its democracy after the realisation of a plebiscite in 1988, when 
the majority of citizens opted to carry out elections to choose the next president and 
parliament instead of the continuation of Pinochet until 1997. It is remarkable that, 
since the first democratic government headed by Patricio Aylwin in 1990, high levels of 
economic development, and a stable democracy based on a proper functioning of its 
political institutions, have been permanent features of Chilean democracy. For 
instance, Alan Angell argues that “on most measures, party government in Chile since 
1990 has been a success – a long period of sustained economic growth, political 
stability and increasing average earnings" (Angell, 2007: 167).  
Concerning Chilean economy, political authorities assented during the agreed 
transition to avoid the modification of the neoliberal socio-economic model installed 
during the military government (E. Silva, 1993). This meant continuing with 
conservative fiscal and monetary policies and an open economy, which seems to have 
allowed Chile to make considerable progress. From 1990 until 2008, Chile had an 
average rate of economic growth (percentage of GDP growth) of 5.4% (World Bank, 
2008). Moreover, there have been very low rates of inflation and moderate levels of 
unemployment. The greatest impact of this performance has been on the reduction of 
the percentage of people living below the poverty line. In 1990 38.6% of the Chilean 
population lived below the poverty line, while in 2006 this percentage decreased to 
13.7% (CASEN, 1990, 2006).  
 The only major outstanding economic issue has been income inequality. The new 
democracy inherited huge levels of inequality that have not been significantly reduced 
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to date (Friedman, 2008, Larrañaga, 2009). Chile has been qualified as one of the most 
unequal countries in Latin America, which is in turn the most unequal region in the 
world. According to the Gini coefficient, Chile was ranked in 2010 as the fourteenth 
most unequal country in the world (CIA World Factbook, 2010).  
Alongside this apparent economic success, high levels of political stability have 
been the other main Chilean achievement of the last twenty years. In relation to that, 
Chilean democracy has been positively highlighted for its high levels of democratic 
governance in a difficult context as it is the re-inauguration of a democratic regime 
(Angell, 2005). Since the return to democracy, all elections have been fair and free, 
with an active role of political parties within a stable political environment. This good 
performance can be observed in Chile’s scores of the Freedom House Political Rights 
and the Freedom House Civil Liberties indexes. Since 2004, Chile has boasted the 
highest score in both indexes. This means the country enjoys a wide range of “political 
rights, including free and fair elections" and “civil liberties, including freedom of 
expression, assembly, association, education, and religion" (Freedom House, 2010). 
It is possible, then, to observe that apart from economic success there has been a 
positive evolution of Chilean democratic institutions since the transition. Currently, 
Chile presents an impressive democratic stability based on the good performance of its 
political institutions.1 This situation is also shown in the World Bank Governance Index, 
where Chile performs much better than the Latin American average and is not far from 
the United States and the United Kingdom.  
In summary, from a quick glance at Chile’s economic and political achievements of 
the last twenty years, it is possible to note that, despite some difficulties, there have 
been relevant improvements with respect to economic and political development. The 
problematic issue is that, regardless of these positive accomplishments, Chilean 
citizens, and particularly the youth, are showing high and increasing levels of political 
                                                          
1
 It is important to highlight that this good performance is just based on formal aspects of democracy and not on 
substantial matters.  
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disengagement and distrust regarding central political institutions, which have led to 
describe them as being politically disaffected.2   
Similar phenomena have taken place in several parts of the world, including both 
developed and developing countries. In fact, the study of political support is currently 
one of the most relevant topics of study in the fields of political science and political 
sociology (Inglehart, 1990, Norris, 1999, Nye et.al, 1997, Mainwaring, 2004). 
Nevertheless, it seems the Chilean case presents unique characteristics that merit a 
deeper study. This is because disaffection has not only been expressed through 
feelings of distrust and political disengagement, but also through much more active 
forms, which have challenged previous analyses that described these groups as 
apathetic people. These new forms highlight strong popular mobilisations during 2006 
and 2011-2012 and the support of an outsider candidate with a critical political 
discourse, as in the case of the presidential candidacy of Marco Enriquez-Ominami 
(ME-O) in 2009. 
Concerning these apparent levels of political disaffection, it is possible to observe 
that they have been expressed both through decreasing turnout rates and political 
attitudes declared in public opinion surveys. Voter turnout has fallen significantly since 
the return to democracy. For example, the percentage of valid votes from the voting-
age population for the first presidential election in 1990 was 84% and in the last 
election it was just 57%. This drop is even more significant for young people. The 
percentage of people between 18 and 29 years old registered to vote for the plebiscite 
in 1988 was 90% and those youths registered in 2008 totalled just 20% (INE, 2009, 
SERVEL, 2010).  
In specific relation to young people, public opinion polls also show high levels of 
political discontent. For example, according to a survey conducted by the CEP in 1990, 
almost 80% of polled youths identified with a political party. However, in 2009, those 
identified were less than 50% (CEP, 2010). Moreover, some indicators also show less 
political support in Chile when comparing Chilean youth with other Latin American 
                                                          
2
 This thesis understands political disaffection as a rejection of formal politics. This concept will be further 
developed in the next section. The fact that youths are politically disaffected rather than just disengaged regarding 
formal politics will be also tested in a subsequent chapter. However, before those analyses are done it will be 
supposed that what Chilean youths are expressing is principally disaffection rather than disengagement.  
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countries. The most worrying indicator is confidence in political parties. In 1996 29% of 
Chilean youths declared they have confidence in political parties, while in 2008 this 
percentage was only 13% (Latinobarómetro 1996-2008). More worrisome is the fact 
that  when comparing Chile with the region it is possible to observe that between 1996 
and 2008 Chile dropped from fifth to bottom position (out of seventeen countries) 
regarding levels of confidence in political parties among youth. 
It is clear, then, that there is a discrepancy between the country’s good economic 
and political performance and youth’s discontent with the political system. The 
citizenry, and particularly the youth, have become more disaffected despite some 
relevant political and economic achievements. This situation has become even more 
alarming as it was stated that in recent times strong popular mobilisations have 
expressed these feelings of discontent. For example, it has been argued that the 
educational movement of 2011-2012 has challenged the current Chilean political and 
socio-economic system as it represents the politicisation of previously passive feelings 
of unrest (Mayol and Azócar, 2011). In this sense, what seems to be happening is that, 
as people perceive that formal mechanisms of participation are not useful, they have 
sought other unconventional mechanisms of participation to express their discontent 
(Jácome, 2010). Moreover, the high level of youth support obtained by ME-O has also 
been described as an expression of disaffection. In this sense, it is possible to observe 
that Chile is currently witnessing different expressions of political discontent, covering 
formal and informal political spaces. 
It is based on those facts that several scholars and even politicians have argued 
that Chile is presently experiencing a crisis of political representation, which would be 
much deeper among youth generations (Mira, 2011, Garretón 2012). Moreover, other 
authors have been even more drastic as they have claimed present mobilisations could 
imply the collapse of the current Chilean socio-economic and political model (Mayol, 
2012a). In this regard, it is also possible to suggest that Chile would be following a 
regional tendency of political crisis, as several Latin American countries have been 
experiencing similar processes (Mainwaring, 2004, Levitsky and Roberts, 2011, Tanaka 
and Jácome, 2010).  
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There is, therefore, a dilemma in Chilean society that is worth trying to 
understand. To describe it as a dilemma is justified by the fact that several studies 
have shown an association between good economic and political performance and 
levels of political support. Norris (1999) found there is a relationship between the 
extension of political and civil liberties and citizens’ evaluations of the political system. 
Moreover, Miller et al., based on an empirical analysis, argue that “failed 
governmental performances directly contribute to declining public support for 
governmental institutions and for politicians even after controlling for economic 
conditions" (1999: 211). The relationship between good economic and political 
performance has also been highlighted for the Latin American context. Mainwaring 
(2004) concluded that the primary cause of the crisis of representation in the region is 
that states have failed to resolve problems such as income inequality and poverty, and 
have not generated more jobs and a sustained economic growth.  
Based upon the foregoing, the fact that despite Chile’s good political and economic 
performance, Chilean citizens, and particularly the youth, are showing high levels of 
political disaffection, allows us to describe Chile as an anomaly or as a paradoxical 
case. This paradox would be particularly strong among young people, which justifies 
focusing this research specifically on this social group. 
In this sense, the central research question that guides this study is the following:   
Why does the Chilean youth exhibit such high levels of political disaffection, in spite 
of Chile’s good political and economic performance, since its return to democracy? 
This research is focused, then, particularly on young people, as it is one of the 
most politically disaffected social groups in Chilean society. In this sense, given that the 
problem is raised as a paradoxical case to be studied in a specific group, this 
dissertation’s central hypothesis is essentially focused on finding an explanation based 
on particular historical and institutional aspects of recent Chilean political history. To 
this effect, this research intends to bring an institutional explanation to this 
phenomenon, as it is principally focused on observing how significant changes in the 
political process may have widened the gap between citizens and the state (Norris, 
1999).  
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Apart from understanding current sources of youth political disaffection, this 
research also intends to understand why levels of political disaffection are higher 
among young people. Moreover, it also attempts to comprehend new active political 
expressions that have recently emerged among youths. In relation to this last point, it 
attempts to understand whether an apparent new way of doing politics is emerging 
among Chilean youths, the central elements of these new political forms and the main 
implications of these facts regarding the future of Chilean democracy. All these 
objectives should be accomplished by directly analysing the relationship between 
youth perceptions and feelings of political disaffection, and by examining several case 
studies that can also shed light on the relationship between youth and politics.  
 1.2 Youth political disaffection: definitions, implications and possible 
explanations  
1.2.1 The concept of political disaffection  
The phenomenon of political disaffection has historically been understood in 
several different ways, and as having diverse implications. Despite some divergences 
there is, however, a certain consensus about understanding it as a negative 
relationship between citizens and the political system which is expressed through 
attitudes and behaviours of the citizenry.  
Apart from the use of the concept of political disaffection (Di Palma, 1970, Torcal, 
2003), negative relationships between citizens and the political system have been 
discussed and named under other concepts such as political disenchantment (Hay, 
2007, Stoker, 2006), political disengagement (Howe, 2006), political discontent (Craig 
and Maggioto, 1981), Political Alienation (Citrin, et al. 1975), Political dissatisfaction 
(Posner, 1999) and Political support (Norris, 1999, Dalton, 1998). These concepts can 
be more or less differentiated since, for example, political disengagement makes more 
reference to distancing from formal ways of participation, and political discontent 
refers more to reactions to specific public policies. However, this is not always the 
case, since sometimes similar situations, such as declining levels of electoral 
participation, are sometimes understood as constitutive elements of different 
concepts. 
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The use of similar indicators to conceptualise different phenomena makes it 
necessary to precisely define what will and what won’t be understood as political 
disaffection in this thesis. In this sense, this research understands Political Disaffection 
as a relatively enduring feeling of hostility toward the prevailing institutions, 
processes and values of the political system, which is expressed through negative 
attitudes and/or non-participative (conventional) behaviours.  
As is stated in this definition, this feeling is expressed through both attitudes and 
behaviours. This distinction defines the two dimensions of the concept. The first 
dimension refers only to citizens’ attitudes towards the political system and will be 
called ‘attitudinal disaffection’. This dimension is defined as a feeling of general 
distrust in central political institutions and lack of adherence to the substantive values 
of the political system. The second dimension refers to relevant political behaviours 
that express this feeling of hostility. This dimension will be called ‘behavioural 
disaffection’ and is defined as the action of withdrawing from participating in 
conventional political channels given by the political system.  
This concept is based on the classic conception of diffuse support provided by 
David Easton (1975). Easton distinguishes between specific and diffuse support. 
Regarding the first type of support: “Its uniqueness lies in its relationship to the 
satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs 
and performance of the political authorities" (Easton, 1975: 437). On the other hand, 
diffuse support consists of a “reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that helps 
members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of 
which they see as damaging to their wants"(Easton, 1975: 444).   
Once this distinction is clear it can be argued that the concept of political 
disaffection to be used in this research refers only to diffuse support, given that it only 
consigns enduring feelings of hostility and it does not make any reference to the 
evaluation of any specific policy. Evaluations of authorities’ performances are relevant 
for this conception but only when a perceived negative performance erodes feelings of 
attachment to the political regime.   
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This definition is complemented by a second distinction regarding the nature of 
support. Klingemann (1999), taking into account Easton’s definition, argues that as 
well as from types of support we can distinguish between objects of support. Easton 
differentiates three objects of support: the political community, the regime and the 
incumbent authorities. In this thesis definition, only the regime, which is constituted 
according to Klingemann (1999) of “those principles, processes, and formal institutions 
that persist and transcend particular incumbents" (Ibid. 33), is taken into account. 
Support for the political community is not considered since it is understood as feeling 
proud of having a particular nationality, which is not related to political disaffection. 
Incumbent authorities are also not considered, since they are objects of specific rather 
than diffuse support.  
Political disaffection is, then, related to diffuse support and it is directed to three 
aspects of the political regime: its principles, processes and institutions. Since Chile is a 
democratic country, disaffection with the principles of the regime will make reference 
to disaffection with democracy as a form of government. Disaffection with the 
processes and institutions will be understood as a distrust of central political 
institutions. For this purpose, trust is understood in Gamson’s term, that is, as “the 
probability that the political system will produce outcomes even if left untended" 
(Gamson, 1968).  
Apart from attitudes towards the principles, processes and institutions of a 
democratic political regime, this concept also refers to behaviours expressing these 
feelings of hostility. When Easton (1975) defines political support he argues that the 
way a person orients himself to some objects can be either through attitudes or 
behaviours. Mainwaring (2004) also states that political support has to be understood 
in its subjective and behavioural levels. Thus, the inclusion of this second dimension 
seems to be justified since politically relevant behaviours such as declining levels of 
formal participation can be understood as part of the same syndrome of disaffection 
with the political system that is expressed in negative attitudes.3 
                                                          
3
 The inclusion of political behaviours as part of a definition of political disaffection assumes that the fact of 
rejecting formal channels of participation is part of syndrome of discontentment with the political system. This 
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In summary, political disaffection implies feelings of hostility towards the political 
system. It is important to highlight that these feelings are expressed through a variety 
of forms that include both attitudes and behaviours. This means that it is not a one-
dimensional phenomenon but it can be expressed through a variety of forms that do 
not necessarily have to come together.  
After defining the concept of political disaffection it is also necessary to indicate 
what this concept is not about. It was already stated that political disaffection is not 
dissatisfaction with particular policies or with people who momentarily hold office, 
since that is linked to specific support. Other distinctions, however, are necessary.  
First, it has to be clear that the way political disaffection is being understood in this 
thesis has nothing to do with a lack of interest in politics or feelings of political apathy. 
This distinction differentiates the concept used here from others that state one of the 
symptoms of political disaffection is a lack of interest in politics (Montero et al., 1998). 
Interest in politics could be linked to disaffection, but it is not a constitutive element of 
it since this concept only refers to a rejection of the current political system. To reject 
formal political institutions and formal channels of participation is different to rejecting 
anything related to politics. Youths could have high feelings of hostility towards the 
prevailing political system but still be politically involved. In fact, this last situation is 
what Chile has witnessed, since recent popular mobilisations have strongly criticised 
the country’s political system.  
To be clearer about the difference between political disaffection and lack of 
interests in politics, the distinction made by Mouffe (1993) between ‘politics’ and the 
‘political’ can be very helpful. She argues that ‘politics’ is the ensemble of practices, 
discourses and institutions that seek to establish a sense of social order and 
organisation, while ‘the political’ is the antagonistic dimension of human societies that 
can be observed in the struggles of several groups for power and resources. In this 
sense, this concept of political disaffection only implies a rejection of ‘politics’ or 
                                                                                                                                                                          
assumption, however, has to be tested since low turnouts could also be explained by conformity or disinterest with 
the system. The assumption will be tested later in the thesis.   
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‘formal politics’ and not the rejection of the political, understood as an interest to 
improve the fate of society.  
Secondly, this concept of political disaffection neither means feelings of political 
inefficacy or powerlessness. Di Palma defines political disaffection as the “subjective 
feeling of powerlessness, cynicism and lack of confidence in the political process, 
politicians and democratic constitutions, but not questioning of the political regime" 
(1970: 6). Feelings of powerlessness are possible explanatory factors rather than 
constitutive elements of political disaffection, in the sense that you can develop 
feelings of hostility because you are unable to produce relevant changes in the political 
system.  
Finally, it is necessary to argue that this concept is not also the same as the 
concept of political alienation understood as the sense of estrangement of the 
prevailing political system (Citrin et al., 1975). This concept also shows a negative 
relationship between citizens and the political system, but it is different to feel 
estranged than to feel hostility. 
1.2.2 The implications of having high levels of political disaffection within a 
democratic regime 
After having conceptually defined the phenomenon to be studied, it is necessary 
to discuss the main implications of having high levels of political disaffection. The 
interest in political disaffection is, above all, a concern about the type of democracy 
where politically disaffected people live and about how this situation can undermine 
the basis of a democratic regime’s legitimacy. Since the early studies of political culture 
the interest in political attitudes and behaviours has been based on a preoccupation 
about the quality and stability of a democratic regime (Almond and Verba, 1963).  
Within this debate, the main discrepancy is about whether or not a highly 
disaffected citizenry can create the conditions for undermining the legitimacy of a 
democratic regime. The so-called ‘Miller-Citrin debate’ was one of the first relevant 
discussions about this situation. Miller (1974) argued that low levels of trust are 
indicators of diffuse support that can have a great impact on the political system. On 
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the other hand, Citrin (1974) believes that low levels of trust only express authorities’ 
evaluations as the relationship between political cynicism and support for disruptive 
actions disappears when you control for policy dissatisfaction.  
Other optimistic views about the implications of high levels of political disaffection 
can be found in the ideas of Dalton (2006), Inglehart (1990a) and Norris (1999). They 
argue that higher levels of disaffection in post-industrial societies are associated with 
the increase in critical citizens who have greater expectations and promote a new style 
of citizen politics. This situation would not be bad for democracy since this new style of 
politics, rather than challenging the legitimacy of a democratic regime, “is a sign of 
vitality and opportunity for these societies to make further progress toward their 
democratic goals" (Dalton, 2006: 10).  
Going beyond these unresolved discussions, this research assumes high levels of 
political disaffection are by no means healthy for democracy. Without necessarily 
believing that they could destroy a democratic regime, it is considered that political 
disaffection is always a problematic issue. This is because positive attitudes towards 
the political regime and the use of conventional participative channels are 
fundamental for holding political authorities accountable and for demanding more 
representativeness. As Philip (2003: 38) argues “for a democracy to be consolidated 
and healthy, its political institutions have to be seen as legitimate both by participants 
in the political process and by the general public”.  
The consolidation of democracy must not only be constitutional, then, but should 
also imply the public’s behaviours and attitudes are supportive of the regime (Ibid.). 
Regarding this issue, Putnam argues that “the political process undoubtedly faces 
strains when an increasing number of people distrust those individuals who are 
running the institutions of democratic governance" (Putnam et al., 2000). Moreover, 
these tensions are higher when people stop using formal channels given by the 
political system, since that situation considerably decreases the chances of being 
heard.  
It could be the case that disaffected citizens are more critical democrats and that 
they could increase the quality of the regime. However, while this is happening these 
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issues cannot be left unattended in anticipation of more democratic outcomes in the 
future. In fact, highly disaffected people can easily become attracted by other political 
forms that might not necessarily be democratic. In this sense, it is possible to argue 
that high levels of political disaffection are always a negative situation because they 
can lead to a crisis of political representation, possibly resulting in a variety of 
outcomes that are not always desirable.4  
Regarding youth political disaffection, the argument is essentially the same. If 
young people do not participate, and if they have enduring feelings of hostility towards 
the values, processes and institutions of the political regime, the whole democratic 
process becomes weakened. Their demands will be taken into account less and they 
will have fewer chances to hold authorities accountable. Moreover, high levels of 
disaffection among youths have a more relevant upcoming challenge: the existence of 
a future political system based on the exclusion of its citizens.  
In relation to the case of electoral withdrawal among Chilean youth, a report of 
the UNDP argues that “among the principal consequences of the exclusion of groups 
like this one from the political system we can find the impact that this absence can 
have over electoral results and, therefore, in the composition and representativeness 
of the government organs; and the fact that, by not forming part of the electoral 
process, the interests of the group become outside of that process. That is how a 
vicious circle can be generated where this segment is ignored in the moment where 
decisions are taken, which marginalises it even more from the political system"(UNDP, 
2010: 8).  
It is observed, then, that particularly for the case of Chilean youths, to study 
current high levels of political disaffection is of extreme importance since their 
rejection of formal institutions seems to have resulted in even higher levels of 
exclusion for this social group.  
In summary, it can be argued that reduced levels of political disaffection are 
extremely relevant for the functioning of democracy, since that allows a more vibrant 
                                                          
4
According to this thesis, a crisis of political representation occurs when “patterns of representation are unstable 
and citizens believe that they are not well represented” (Mainwaring, 2004: 15).  
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citizen participation that finally enriches the democratic process through increasing 
levels of accountability and the capacity to have citizens’ demands represented. It is 
this situation, therefore, that justifies the study of this phenomenon for the case of 
Chilean youths.  
1.2.3 Explaining youth political disaffection in a democratic context of improved 
wellbeing and political stability  
In this section, three possible explanations for the existence of high levels of youth 
political disaffection are discussed. The first two are global explanations that intend to 
understand political disaffection in contexts of improved political and economic 
conditions, while the third is based on particular historical-institutional aspects of 
recent Chilean political history. As stated above, this research’s main hypothesis is 
focused on finding an explanation based on particular aspects of the Chilean political 
system. In this sense, these two global explanations are initially discussed to present 
the third explanation as the main hypothetical argument of this research later on.  
1.2.3.1 The growth of post-materialist critical citizens  
The first explanation to be developed, of which the main representatives are 
Inglehart (1990a) and Dalton (2006, 2007), has been almost exclusively associated with 
the emergence of feelings of political disaffection among developed countries, since it 
is based on the fact that people living in those countries have achieved high levels of 
education and physical security.  
The central premise of this approach is that a better standard of living, a higher 
level of education and the expansion of mass communications have brought a “growth 
of more critical citizens, who value democracy as an ideal yet who remain dissatisfied 
with the performance of their political systems and particularly the core institutions of 
representative governments" (Norris, 1999: 26). These citizens are better-informed, 
less deferential and more realistic in their expectations of government and politics and 
therefore more ready to display their dissatisfaction, either through electoral non-
participation or alternative channels of political protest (Hay, 2007).   
26 
 
Political disaffection is explained, then, by understanding how broad socio-
economic transformations have changed the nature of politics in advanced industrial 
societies (Dalton, 2006). The first thing to understand is that system-level changes 
have had consequences at the individual level, which have eventually affected levels of 
political disaffection. The main system-level changes have been an increased economic 
and technological development and raising levels of education in conjunction with the 
expansion of mass communications (Inglehart, 1990a, Dalton, 2006). 
To understand this explanation each of these connections has to be developed 
more profoundly. The first link to understand is how high levels of economic 
development have changed citizens’ value orientations and how this has affected 
levels of political disaffection. In relation to this issue, Inglehart (1990a) argues that 
value priorities of western public have been changing from a materialist emphasis 
toward a post-materialist one as people “have for a number of years experienced 
exceptionally high levels of economic and physical security" (Inglehart, 1990b: 248). 
Economic development then changes the value priorities of the public, since whole 
generations are raised in unprecedented conditions of prosperity and economic 
security (Inglehart, 1990a).  
The main source of disaffection linked to the rise of post-materialist citizens is 
based on the fact that party systems are not adapting themselves to a new political 
environment where the post-materialist political cleavage begins to have more 
relevance (Inglehart 1977, 1990a). Dalton (2006) agrees with Inglehart about this point 
as he argues that the process of value change has produced an alteration in the issues 
of political debate. “Concerns about environmental protection, individual freedom, 
social equality, participation, and the quality of life have been added to the traditional 
political agenda of economic and security issues" (Ibid: 96). If the political system, 
then, does not take these new concerns into account, “the post-materialist minority is 
apt to find itself being overruled on matters that are important to them. As a general 
rule, we would expect those with post-materialist values to be relatively dissatisfied 
with their political system" (Inglehart, 1977: 458).  
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There is another way through which levels of political disaffection are expected to 
increase with the rise of post-material values. This second argument is based on the 
fact that post-materialists are sceptical of authority and formal hierarchical procedures 
of organisations such as elections and political parties. Post-materialists give a great 
emphasis to quality of life and subjective wellbeing. Therefore, they believe 
hierarchical organisations with strong authorities are not adequate for their purposes 
and they favour more participatory forms of political organisations, which make them 
withdraw from participation in conventional political channels (Dalton, 2006). This 
scepticism of hierarchical organisations is also reflected in the attitudes of post-
materialists. Inglehart (1999) argues that the rise of post-materialist values brings a 
move away from acceptance of both traditional authority and state authority, which 
leads to declining confidence in hierarchical institutions such as political parties and 
the parliament.   
The second system-level transformation that helps us to understand increasing 
levels of political disaffection is the process by which rising levels of education and the 
expansion of mass communication increases the political skills of the public. The core 
idea of this second transformation is that the process of cognitive mobilisation, which 
is defined by Inglehart as the “process where the dissemination of skills needed to 
cope with an extensive political community grow" (Inglehart, 1990a: 337), is 
transforming citizens’ expectations of the democratic process. Dalton (2006) argues 
that increase in education, accompanied by parallel increases in information resources 
such as electronic media, television, books and magazines, have produced a growth of 
skills and resources, which creates the most sophisticated public in the history of 
democracy.  
The two core elements of the cognitive mobilisation process are the declining cost 
of acquiring information about politics and an increase of the ability to process 
information due to higher levels of education (Ibid.). The result of these two 
developments is the existence of citizens with more resources and skills to deal with 
the complexities of politics. This process of political sophistication is linked to 
increasing levels of political disaffection, since if citizens are more politically involved 
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and have more political skills they will evaluate the functioning of their political system 
with higher standards.  
Apart from generating feelings of hostility towards the political system as part of a 
more critical attitude, the cognitive mobilisation process also affects levels of political 
disaffection by sophisticating the political means citizens use. Inglehart (1990a) argues 
that people with higher skills have the potential to participate in politics in more active 
and issue–specific ways than in the past. Critical citizens are more sophisticated and 
they prefer forms of democratic participation where they can have more influence on 
the political process. This situation affects levels of behavioural disaffection, since 
formal channels of participation are seen as a means where input is limited. 
Is this explanation appropriate in the case of Chilean youths?5  
Despite the fact that this explanation appears to be highly suitable for contexts of 
improved economic and political conditions, it is argued it does not fit properly in the 
context of Chilean youths. This is basically because Chilean levels of development are 
quite distant from those in post-industrialised countries and because the type of 
disaffection of Chilean youths seems to be different.  
Although Chile has achieved greater economic development, it is quite far from 
the living standards of post-industrial countries. Moreover, current high levels of 
inequality also imply the effects of economic development have not been fairly 
distributed, which means a great proportion of Chilean youths are not being raised in 
conditions of prosperity and economic security. The Chilean youths of today live in 
better conditions than their parents. However, this does not mean feelings of 
economic security are widespread within the whole youth population.  
Moreover, when the specific conditions of Chilean youths are analysed it is 
possible to observe that the development of youth public polices has been one of the 
most unattended issues by the Chilean political system after the return to democracy 
(Asún, 2006, Krauskopf, 2011). One example of that is the instauration of a high-quality 
                                                          
5
The appropriateness of this explanation and the social capital one will be also empirically tested in further 
chapters.   
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educational system. Rates of education have risen considerably during twenty years of 
democracy. Nevertheless, the quality of public education is lower than in several other 
Latin American countries and much lower than in developed countries (OCDE, 2010). In 
this sense, Chilean youths are far from living in the conditions that would let them 
develop post-materialist orientations and the high political skills that would finally 
increase their levels of political disaffection.  
The inappropriateness of this explanation can also be justified by analysing how 
the kind of disaffection of Chilean youths differs from the one this explanation 
describes. Chilean youths are today more critical and active than in past generations. 
However, post-materialist issues do not seem to dominate their value orientations and 
they do not seem to be rejecting hierarchical institutions. This can be observed, for 
example, by the fact that the biggest youth mobilisation was about improving 
education, which is clearly a materialist issue. Moreover, it is observed that despite 
distrusting parties and using informal mechanisms of participation, they are not 
rejecting political parties and electoral participation as valid political means but they 
simply dislike the way these institutions are currently functioning. This can be seen, for 
example, by the support obtained by an independent candidate such as ME-O in the 
last presidential elections and by the fact that youths are now forming political 
organisations.  
1.2.3.2 Political dissatisfaction as a matter of lack of social cohesion  
The second explanation for political disaffection to be described is also based on 
cultural changes, but it is more related to faults in civil society that motivate political 
engagement rather than the emergence of a specific type of citizen. The main 
representative of this perspective is Robert Putnam. He argues that one of the most 
relevant social phenomena to have occurred in recent decades is a decline of social 
capital (Putnam, 2000, 1994a). This situation has several economic, political and social 
consequences. One of them seems to be strictly related to increasing levels of political 
disaffection.  
 Putnam understands social capital as “features of social life – networks, norms, 
and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared 
30 
 
objectives" (Putnam, 1995: 665). The two central elements of the concept are the 
networks where individuals interact and the norms of reciprocity people develop 
within their networks. The problem is that a series of sources strongly suggests 
America’s stock of social capital has been shrinking for more than a quarter of a 
century. One of its effects has been on the increase of levels of political disaffection, 
which can be observed through three different mechanisms.  
The first is related specifically to the main indicator of behavioural disaffection: 
electoral participation. Putnam argues that “declining electoral participation is merely 
the most visible symptom of a broader disengagement from community life" (Ibid. 35). 
According to Putnam, low turnout rates are not themselves a consequence of declining 
levels of social capital, rather just one of several symptoms of a much broader societal 
malaise.  
The second way low levels of social capital are associated with political disaffection 
is linked to features of governmental performance. The argument is that participation 
and involvement in voluntary activities creates social trust, cooperation, civic-
mindedness and reciprocity, which are all relevant to creating strong governmental 
institutions. Without a strong civil society, there is more likelihood of a decreased 
institutional performance, which finally affects people’s confidence in relevant political 
institutions (Mansbridge, 1997).   
The last way to connect these two phenomena is based on the idea that a 
democratic regime needs high levels of social capital since voluntary associations are 
the main way of expressing demands to governments and protecting ordinary citizens 
from political power. The argument is that low levels of social capital would be 
associated with increasing levels of political disaffection since by participating less in 
civic communities and by trusting less in our fellow citizens, we lose our capacity and 
willingness to work cooperatively to solve any kind of problem (Stoker, 2006).  
Putnam (1994b) also argues that successful collaboration in one endeavour 
generates connections and trust that facilitate future collaboration in other unrelated 
tasks. In this sense, if people are not connecting themselves for simple tasks and do 
not trust their fellows, it is quite likely they will not engage politically since they will fail 
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to develop a sense that their objectives are more reachable if they act together. If 
citizens are not socialised in this way, they will not realize the importance of political 
activities. Therefore, a general feeling of rejection to the political system is expected.  
Is this second explanation appropriate for the case of Chilean youths?  
This second explanation clearly gives some relevant insights if sources of political 
disaffection are to be understood. However, it is believed that this cannot be the main 
argument to explain this phenomenon in the case of Chilean youths. The main reason 
to rule out this explanation is that it is too general and it does not offer much insight to 
particular mechanisms that explain the case. Moreover, current popular mobilisations 
have also shown Chilean youths do seem to have the capacity and willingness to work 
cooperatively to achieve certain goals.  
The main objective of this research is to understand political disaffection in a 
specific group. In this sense, it is not possible to understand the situation if only broad 
societal changes that have some particular political consequences are taken into 
account. This explanation is too general and it is unclear about the particular situation 
that explains high levels of disaffection. Putnam argues that declining levels of 
electoral participation are just one syndrome of a broader social malaise. In this sense, 
to explain the changes in political participation in terms of variations in levels of social 
capital is to re-describe the phenomenon to be explained and not to deeply 
understand its sources (Hay, 2007).  
This explanation, then, only gives us an insight about what can co-exist with 
political disaffection rather than a proper explanation of the problem. Moreover, the 
evidence indicates that this lack of social capital and political disaffection are not 
coming together. Strong youth mobilisations and even the high support of young 
people obtained by ME-O shows youths are not socially apathetic, but that they are 
part of social networks and are aware of the importance of political activities.  
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1.2.3.3 Political disaffection as a side effect of the development of Chile's post-
authoritarian political system6   
The third and last explanation highlights the importance of national-historical 
contexts regarding the development of certain political phenomena. This explanation 
understands high levels of youth political disaffection as a consequence of the 
particular development of Chile's post-authoritarian political system as it is argued that 
the existing large disconnection between youth and politics would be founded on 
central features of contemporary Chilean politics. The solely discussion of these 
features for the Chilean case, however, does not mean that the association between 
certain political features and the emergence of political disaffection is something 
unique to Chile. In fact, there are several aspects of Chile's post-authoritarian politics, 
such having a two-party/coalition political system or the demobilisation of civil society, 
that have been also central features of other Latin-American democracies with similar 
political consequences (Coppedege, 1994, Tanaka and Vera, 2011 and Philip and 
Panizza, 2011,). In this sense, the fact that this section develops some arguments 
about Chilean politics does not necessarily mean that they might not also be applicable 
in other countries.7  
The central argument is that, based on several institutional and socio-economic 
legacies from the military government and the way the political transition was made, 
the Chilean Political System (CPS) developed in such a way that the gap between the 
citizenry and the political system increased a great deal. This situation has produced, 
particularly among young people, increasing feelings of lack of representation and 
political inefficacy, which have finally generated high levels of political disaffection.    
To develop this explanation the main legacies of the military government and the 
political transition are first discussed. After that, the way the nature of the CPS has 
                                                          
6
 This explanation is founded on several essayistic and empirical studies about the Chilean reality. Thus, the purpose 
of this section is to develop an explanation for Chilean Political Disaffection that define broad hypothesis to be later 
tested and deepened. In this sense, the intention of the empirical analysis will be to deepen the understanding of 
several mechanisms that explain disaffection as well as to find new elements that might not be yet fully described in 
the literature.  
7
 In order to discuss more accurately the uniqueness of this thesis’s arguments, the examination of the empirical 
evidence will try to incorporate some comparative analyses whenever it is possible.  
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affected the relationship between the citizenry and the political is described. Finally, 
the form through which this last process has increased levels of political disaffection 
and the facts that explain that youths are more disaffected than other groups is 
analysed.  
What are the main legacies of the military government and the democratic transition 
that have shaped the nature of the CPS? 
The way the military government shaped the nature of the new Chilean democracy 
has been a highly-discussed topic (Garretón, 2004, Huneeus, 2003). It is undeniable 
that several political and economic reforms made in this regime, as well as the 
agreements made during the political transition, heavily shaped the new Chilean 
democratic regime. Within these legacies it is possible to broadly distinguish between 
institutional legacies and socio-economic legacies.   
Regarding institutional legacies, the most relevant is undoubtedly the political 
constitution of 1980. Despite some relevant reforms that have eliminated several 
authoritarian enclaves, it is possible to argue that the current Chilean political 
constitution is still the one that was established during the military government. In 
relation to the importance of that constitution, Loveman argues that: “Unlike the 
transitions in the rest of Latin America, however, the outgoing authoritarian 
government of General Augusto Pinochet left a new constitution in Chile. (…) Thus, the 
incoming civilian government in Chile was forced to operate within the limits of a new 
political system intended to institutionalise what its creators called ‘protected 
democracy’" (1991: 36). 
This constitution was created to institutionalise a particular type of democracy. Its 
main objective was to create a political system based on the convergence of moderate 
positions (Baño, 1993). This meant political institutions were designed in such a way 
that, for every relevant change to be made, large majorities were necessary. Thus, 
every political decision had to be agreed between major political forces.  
The most relevant political institution that reproduces this form of doing politics is 
the electoral system designed to choose members of the parliament. This system, 
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named as the binominal system, was designed during the dictatorship and continues 
today without any relevant change. According to this system, the country is divided 
into districts and for each district two candidates are elected. Parties or coalitions have 
to present lists with a candidate for each of the two seats to be filled. The first seat is 
awarded to the party or coalition with a plurality of votes. However, the list of the 
coalition that obtains the first seat must receive twice the votes of the second-placed 
list in order to take the second seat. This means that those lists that receive the two 
highest shares of votes obtain the two seats available in each district, and if a coalition 
wants to obtain the two seats it has to have more than the double of votes than the 
second coalition. 
The most important effect of this electoral system is that it reproduces a party 
system based on two big, moderate, very similar, and strongly institutionalised 
coalitions, which blur ideological profiles of political parties (Ibid.). This does not mean, 
however, that both coalitions do not differ regarding some topics since there are 
relevant divergences about some post-material issues such as gay marriage and 
abortion, where the Concertación has a more liberal vision than the Alianza. However, 
despite of these differences, the literature has described these coalitions as being 
ideologically similar since both have supported a socio-economic model founded on 
market mechanisms (Posner, 2008, Angell, 2007).  
This two-coalition system is also reproduced by the fact that this electoral system 
excludes actors because it reduces them to a few parties organised into these two 
stable coalitions, which discriminates against third parties outside these two main 
conglomerates. 
The consequences of having a parliament based on a political draw goes beyond 
the type of party system and its representational characteristics. This is because this 
tie is reproduced in several institutions whose members are proposed or decided by 
the parliament (Judges of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional tribunal, the Central 
Bank, Public Television, etc.) (Garretón, 2010).  
This moderate way of doing politics finds its complement in a consensual-elitist 
mode of government originated during the democratic transition. In this way of doing 
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politics, all sensitive policy issues are resolved through negotiation and agreement 
between the leaders of both political coalitions and powerful economic actors, where 
the need for a rapid consensus is always the main principle of action (Rindefjall, 2009). 
The origins of what has been called the ‘democracia de los acuerdos’ (Democracy 
by Agreement) can be traced to the transition negotiations. Roberts (1998) sustains 
that the transition in Chile was only possible after reducing mobilisations to the elite’s 
pacts so the current government did not feel threatened. In this sense, political parties 
of the opposition coalition “sought to keep popular pressures in check and channels 
grass root participation unto less threatening forms of electoral mobilisations" (Ibid: 
139). In this sense, it can be observed that the fact Chile had a ‘agreed transition’ 
heavily influenced the new regime’s way of doing politics as these pacts implicated the 
demobilisation of people and the concentration of power (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
1986). As Ruiz (1991) argues, the conception of democracy during the transition was 
based on an elitist idea where decisions had to be concentrated in several formal 
institutions. This conception implied a monopolisation of politics that isolates political 
activities from daily life, as it is only manifested in the search for agreement and 
consensus among certain privileged political actors. 
This type of democracy, based on elite agreements and the demobilisation of 
common citizens, has continued almost intact until today, since every political decision 
to be made is negotiated only between the elites of these two moderated coalitions. 
Camargo (2007) argues that one of the central principles to have followed Chilean 
political elites since 1990 is “consensualism”, which is “the almost dogmatic 
adscription to privileged political consensus (and when it is possible, socials) in the 
exercise of government" (Ibid. 16). In fact, the way the 2006 secondary movement was 
channelled by the Chilean political system, an event that will be analysed later, is one 
of the most recent expressions of this kind of politics.   
One of the main attributes of current Chilean democracy is, then, a kind of 
aversion for political conflict. This is also expressed in the avoidance of certain topics, 
such as the type of socio-economic model (Angell, 2007) due to political elites always 
seeking accommodation and compromise over conflict in key areas of policy (Scully, 
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1995). This means that apart from processes of demobilisation, Chilean democracy has 
also reproduced processes of depoliticisation, which can be understood as the process 
by which certain issues previously subject to formal public deliberation and 
accountability are displaced to other arenas (Hay, 2007). This is problematic since 
when elites limit the scope of the political process to certain issues that are innocuous 
to them, they are also excessively exercising power in order to safeguard their 
interests (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). In fact, this feature of Chilean politics has been 
discussed as a negative thing as an absence of mobilised conflicts promoted by political 
parties contributes to the decreasing importance of programmatic links with the 
political system and to depoliticising common citizens (Luna, 2008, P. Silva, 2004). 
The second main inheritance the CPS received from the military government is the 
socio–economic legacy. This legacy is related to the type of socio-economic model 
inherited from the dictatorship and the particular style of policy-making associated 
with it. As it is well known, during the military government Chile experienced radical 
economic reforms that imposed a neoliberal socio-economic model that, among other 
things, privatised several public services, opened Chilean economy and established 
conservative fiscal and monetary policies. This model continued after the transition, 
since during its negotiations the opposition coalition committed itself to it for 
acquiescence to political change (E. Silva, 1993). Moreover, all the following 
democratic regimes since have continued with its central premises.  
The main effects of this situation on the current Chilean political system are given 
by the technocratic style of policy-making associated with this model and the relevant 
changes it has introduced to the balance of power regarding the main actors involved 
in policy-making processes.  
In relation to these issues, P. Silva (2006) argues that since the beginning of the 
1990s the technocratic ideology has been mixed with the democratic idea in Chile. The 
effect of this has been the development of a technocratic democracy where social 
problems are traduced in technical terms and where depolitisation has become a 
central element of Chilean society. Moreover, he argues that the continuation of this 
style of doing politics was what guaranteed the continuation of sectorial policies 
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associated with the neoliberal model (P. Silva, 1991). Public policies are considered, 
then, as technical, which means they are unique responses to complex problems 
without considering political factors or judgments of value in their evaluation 
(Huneeus, 2003). Likewise, this way of policy-making has also meant the almost total 
exclusion of the citizenry from decision-making processes.  
Even though the primordial role of technocrats was inherited from the military 
government, new democratic governments have further developed this principle (P. 
Silva, 1991). P.Silva (2007) highlights, for example, that Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) 
had a relevant technocratic orientation in her government under the support of the 
think tank Expansiva. Camargo (2007) also highlights this technocratic approach to 
policy-making but adds that there is something specific about the technocratic 
approach of the last twenty years of centre-left governments, since what we see more 
than an autonomous dominance of technocrats is a technocratisation of politicians 
themselves. 
A second relevant element of the style of policy-making inherited from the 
dictatorship is related to the balance of power regarding policy discussions. A main 
characteristic of the current Chilean democracy is the great political power of big 
entrepreneurs and a weak labour movement that has almost no real political power 
(Posner, 2008, Sandbrook, et al., 2007, Taylor, 2004). Whenever a significant policy has 
to be discussed, entrepreneurs voice their interests very effectively through sectorial 
business associations, as any relevant policy has to be first consulted and coordinated 
with them.  
This particular relationship between the business community and the government 
started during the dictatorship, when the entrepreneurial class played a relevant role 
in the 1980s economic global crisis (Posner, 2008). Since that episode a highly unified 
business community has been able to defend its particular interests, which are mainly 
the perpetuation of neoliberal economic and social policies (Ibid.). In this sense, it can 
be argued that this attribute implies a democratic deficit as Huber and Stephens (1997) 
argue that a democratic regime needs a delicate class balance between pressures from 
below and threat perception at the top. This is apparently not happening in Chile as 
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there seems to be an imbalance of power that favours upper classes, at least regarding 
political influences, which would imply a problematic situation.  
The institutional and transitional legacies and the socio-economic inheritances are, 
then, central elements that have shaped the current CPS. It is relevant to emphasise 
that both legacies are associated. This is because it has been argued that the stability 
of Chilean democracy is not only based on certain rules but that there is also a 
consensus about the ends this democracy should follow. This is the agreement about 
the continuation of the neoliberal socio-economic model (Ruiz, 1991, Durán 2006).  
This idea that Chilean democracy is based on an agreement about both means and 
ends coincides with Bachrach’s vision of an elitist-pluralist model of democracy, as he 
argues that in those types of regimes “it is not a question of elites transcending their 
vested interests to reach a consensus on procedural norms, but rather to reach a 
consensus on the substantive issues underlying the procedural norms" (1969: 53). 
Post-authoritarian Chilean democracy can arguably be based on a consensus that 
includes both the instauration of an elitist democracy regarding its means and the 
continuation of the neoliberal model regarding its ends. That is why both processes do 
not have to be understood separately. In fact, Garretón argues that the neoliberal 
model is set in the proper constitution and that this model generated a social 
rearrangement that implied the emergence of the entrepreneurial actor and the 
dissolution of popular social actors (Garretón, 2004).  
In summary, the legacies of the military government and the political transition 
have highly shaped the nature of the CPS. The main features of this system can be 
summarised as following: a moderated party system based on two big coalitions with 
no clear ideological differences and incentives for competition (especially concerning 
economic policies), a style of politics where the need for a rapid consensus among 
political elites based on processes of demobilisation and depoliticisation is always the 
main principle, and a technocratic style of policy-making based on the reproduction of 
the neoliberal economic model where the entrepreneurial class has a privileged 
participation.  
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This type of political system is quite specific. Even though it can be assimilated to 
some ideal types elitist systems found in the literature such as the Elitist–Pluralist 
model of Bacharach (1967), the Equilibrium Democracy of Macpherson (1978) or the 
Consociational Democracy of Lijphart (1968), it is believed that the confluence of 
current attributes is something particular of the Chilean case. Chilean democracy is not 
just an elitist democracy. It is based on the principles of elitism but it is a kind that is 
deeply institutionalised and so has particular characteristics, such as the moderation of 
the elites and the fact that the business community is politically powerful. These 
features reproduce other processes, like the demobilisation of common citizens and 
the depolitisation of certain discussion topics, which without doubt are to have further 
political consequences.   
How has the nature of the CPS affected the relationship between the citizenry and 
the political system? 
After having discussed the main features of the CPS and how they were shaped by 
the legacies of the dictatorship, it is necessary to analyse them regarding their 
influence over the relationship between citizens and the political system.  
The features already described, and particularly the moderate way of doing 
politics, have been highlighted by several authors as positive attributes. It is argued 
that it is because of them that Chile has attained quite impressive levels of political 
stability and democratic governance (Angell, 2007, Scully, 1995, Boenigner, 1998). 
However, without underestimating these achievements, this research argues that 
these same features have also had a negative consequence: the increase of the gap 
between the Chilean citizenry and the political system.  
 This gap increase is based on two parallel and inter-related processes that are 
explained by the current features of the CPS. On the one hand, since the system brings 
a moderate and homogenous political offer, the representational links between the 
political system and the citizenry become blurred. On the other hand, the proper 
citizenry, based on the processes of demobilisation and depolitisation already 
discussed, takes distance from the political system as politics loses its sense, which 
generates the feeling that relevant changes are impossible.   
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Regarding the first process, Garretón (2007) argues that the homogenous political 
offer of the CPS does not allow the presence of diversity nor the adequate expression 
of majorities. The problem is that a political system structure based on moderate and 
similar parties hampers the social representation of interests. This means the central 
features of the CPS undermine the role of political parties as agents of representation, 
since their main principle of action is the achievement of consensus among elites in 
order to generate a stable political regime and not to canalise social conflicts. 
Regarding this same topic, Baño (1993) argues that in the Chilean case it is true that 
greater political homogeneity is associated with calm and stability. However, at the 
same time, it also means a progressive separation between politics and society due to 
society not being homogenous, which make normal people feel they are not 
represented.  
Within the CPS there is a limitation of public decision due to its elitist character, 
and because political elites are not incentivised to be more connected to the citizenry 
regarding its demands. The binominal electoral system is, in this sense, one of the 
most responsible for this blurring of representational links. Posner argues that: “The 
practice of coalition formation induced by the binominal system has promoted political 
consensus and stability; it has also shifted the expression of natural conflicts and acute 
programmatic differences among coalition partners. It thereby undercuts the role of 
political parties as agents of representation" (2008: 83). 
Under this electoral system the significance of the vote is reduced; citizens 
practically only ratify candidates proposed by coalitions because as soon as they are 
selected by their parties they are virtually guaranteed to win (Arriagada, 1997). This 
situation clearly creates a disincentive for political authorities regarding the 
representation of interests, which increase the gap between the citizenry and the 
political authorities.   
Problems of representativeness, however, are not only explained by electoral 
mechanisms. All other features already describing the CPS also contribute to the 
weakening of representational links. The demobilisation of the citizenry contributes by 
making the political class more autonomous from citizens’ pressures. Furthermore, the 
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depolitisation of certain topics, which is explained by the technocratic approach to 
policy-making and the privileged power positions of the business community, also 
limits the kind of political supply offered to the citizenry.  
In summary, within the current Chilean political landscape the gap between the 
citizenry and the political system is wide since central political actors have weakened 
their representational role by presenting a quite homogeneous political offer. This 
does not mean however, that political authorities are completely disconnected from 
the needs of the citizenry since in the last twenty years there have been relevant social 
achievements. In fact, Navia (2009) and Roberts (2009) argue that the base of Chilean 
political stability is found in the attempts of the Concertación’s governments to 
address social problems through several public programs. The problem is that this 
connection has decreased because the political class is acting within narrow limits 
imposed by the proper functioning of the political system, and people feel they could 
be much better represented.  
The second process by which the gap between the citizenry and the political 
system has become wider is more specifically related to citizens’ attitudes with respect 
to the importance they give to political issues. What is being argued is that the 
processes of citizen demobilisation and the depolitisation of relevant issues made the 
citizenry take distance from the political system as politics itself loses its meaning. 
Therefore, citizens do not feel they can produce any relevant change within the 
system.  
The fact is that as you develop yourself as a citizen in a political system where 
there is deep demobilisation of citizens and a depolitisation of certain issues, as well as 
great influences of extra political-powers such as entrepreneurial unions, you are likely 
to be distanced from the political system. This is due to politics is not “representing the 
main vehicle to struggle for improvements in the living conditions of the population" 
(P.Silva, 2004). In this sense, as you become socialised in a politically-deactivated 
society, your interest in formal politics is quite likely to be low since the political 
system feels alien to you. In relation to this issue, Moulian (2002) argues the politics of 
consensus in Chile among political elites (and its homogenising character) have created 
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an environment where “politics does not exist any longer as the struggle for 
alternatives, as historicity, it only exists as a history of small variations, adjustments, 
and changes in aspects that do not compromise the global dynamic" (Ibid: 44).  
Garretón (2007) also argues that the way of doing politics in Chile is alien to 
common citizens and that this situation is linked to the lack of interest in formal 
politics that can be observed in Chile. In addition, he links the current situation to the 
impossibility of the political class to change a political order inherited from the 
dictatorship. In relation to this same issue, Walter (2008) argues that the fact that the 
public agenda in Chile is restricted to issues that can be settled through elite 
agreements has led the public to perceive it has little opportunity for concerns to be 
heard. Indeed, educational mobilisations of 2006 and 2011-2012 demonstrate this 
point as one of the main criticisms made by students was precisely the fact that 
education is not being improved, since political elites restricted the debate by 
imposing their own positions.  
Citizens are, then, aware that politics is not about producing relevant changes, 
since many issues are not discussed or their resolutions are predetermined by non-
democratic forces. Moreover, they also have less interest in formal politics because 
they are not mobilised by the system to produce relevant changes. This situation 
makes them develop symptoms of political inefficacy, which can be defined as the 
feeling that individual political action cannot have an impact upon the political process 
(Campbell et.al, 1954).  
In summary, it is possible to argue that, based on several attributes that Chile’s 
post-authoritarian democracy inherited from both the dictatorship and the agreed 
transition, the gap between the citizenry and the political system has widened. This 
process takes particularly more relevance in the Chilean case since Chile has 
historically developed a party democracy where the party system has been the main 
constituent dimension of collective action (Garretón, 2008). In other countries in the 
region there have been other forms of political representation. However, in Chile the 
predominant and hegemonic form of political representation has been always based 
on political parties (Panizza, 2009).   
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How has the increase of the gap between the citizenry and the political system 
produced higher levels of political disaffection? 
The main connection between a wider gap between citizens and the political 
system and high levels of political disaffection is given by the fact that an increased gap 
engenders feelings of lack of representation or responsiveness and political inefficacy, 
which are highly associated with feelings of hostility towards the political system. 
These links can be observed with the help of several theoretical approaches.  
If responsiveness is understood as “the collective property of a democratic ruling 
class which guarantees that citizen needs will be met and, hence that the exercise of 
public power will be legitimated" (Schmitter, 1983), it is clear citizens will have high 
levels of perception of lack of responsiveness if central political institutions do not act 
as agents of representation. If a political system is not really competitive, which is 
reflected in a homogeneous political offer, it should be expected that high levels of 
perception of lack of responsiveness. This condition is expected to be associated with 
high levels of political disaffection.  
Stoker (2006) states that when there is no real political competition, the full range 
of society is not going to be well-represented, and this creates disaffection. Moreover, 
he argues that having more socially representative politicians helps to build trust 
between the elected representatives and citizens. Avendaño (2008) claims citizens 
have to feel politicians represent them since representation is the basis and 
foundation of modern democratic systems and it defines the methods of insertion and 
connection with the political community. Mouffe (1993) also refers to problems of 
representation as she states that the homogenisation of politics fosters dissatisfaction, 
as politics should express social conflicts rather than deny them. Finally, Luna and 
Zechmeister (2005), making reference to the Latin American context, claim a lack of 
representation affects citizens’ support for a system, as the shallower the connection 
between elites and the mass public, the less committed the mass public will be to the 
democratic regime.  
Perceptions of lack of representation generate attitudinal as well as behavioural 
disaffection. Stoker (2006) argues that when people perceive they are not being 
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represented, their confidence in political authorities is reduced (Stoker, 2006). 
Moreover, Macpherson (1976) states that feeling unrepresented also prompts people 
to recede their electoral participation, because they feel there is no real choice 
between the candidates given that they have blurred some issues and diminished their 
responsibility to electorates.  
The second way a broad gap between the citizens and the political system 
produces political disaffection is linked to levels of political inefficacy originating at a 
feeling that politics has lost its meaning. The argument is basically that, if citizens do 
not feel they can influence the political process, political participation is not seen as 
worthy as it would not produce any difference in participation with respect to the 
achievement of their demands. Moreover, this condition is also expected to generate 
distrust and even a lack of adherence to the main values of democracy.  
This line of argument can be seen with authors like Pateman (1970). To be able to 
feel you have an impact upon the political process is important for understanding 
political disaffection, since “people who have a sense of political efficacy are more 
likely to participate in politics than those in whom this feeling is lacking" (Pateman, 
1970: 46). In this sense, the rejection of mechanisms of participation can be based on 
the belief that whatever we do will not have a relevant political impact. That is why 
Pateman also highlights that authentic mechanisms of participation are necessary, 
since experiencing a participatory structure can both generate feelings of political 
efficacy and diminish tendencies towards non-democratic attitudes. David Easton 
(1975) also makes reference to this topic as he argues that “We would expect that, as 
people come to feel politically powerless or inefficacious, perceive politics as 
normalness or feel isolated and estranged, they will also become prime subjects for 
acquiring negative sentiments about political objects" (1975: 456).  
This association between political disaffection and political efficacy has also been 
linked to a general current trend of depoliticising areas of public policy. This link is 
established because the fact that people are unable to produce any relevant change is 
also explained by a political system that avoids the political discussion of certain 
significant topics. In this context, Hay (2007) argues that the depolitisation of whole 
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areas of public policy, which is done by presenting contentious issues as purely 
technical matters, diminishes the realm of formal public political deliberation. This is 
what would finally explain high levels of political dissatisfaction and disengagement, at 
least from formal politics.  
There are theoretical reasons, then, to believe that the consequences of a wider 
gap between citizens and the political system described for the Chilean case produce 
high levels of political disaffection. Nye and Zelikow (1997) argue that a decline of the 
role of political parties as mediators between the government and citizens is what 
explains disaffection. In this sense, as it was observed that this disconnection in Chile 
generates perceptions of lack of representation and feelings of political inefficacy, is 
that these kinds of perceptions are hypothetically defined in the thesis as the main 
sources of this phenomenon.  
Why have these particular effects been stronger for Chilean youths than for the rest 
of the Chilean population? 
Given that this research is based on Chilean youths it is necessary to clarify why 
the explanation already described is particularly useful to understand political 
disaffection in this specific social group. The main argument is that both processes 
through which the gap between the citizenry and the political system has extended 
have had a greater effect on youths than on the rest of the population. In this sense,  
The first process that has widened the gap between the citizenry and the political 
system is related to the weakening of representational links between both 
components. It is believed here that young people are to be particularly more affected 
by the fact that the political system has undercut its role as agents of representation. If 
the system is not representative of the main interests of society, it would be even 
more difficult that it is representative of particular interests. This means that, in a 
system with a homogeneous political offer and with no clear representational links, 
youths are to be more disadvantaged since they have more specific interests that are 
less likely to be canalised and represented. 
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Garretón (1991) argues that processes of political elitisation within the CPS are to 
especially affect young people. He states that after the transition to democracy in 
Chile, the political forms of social representation that the social conflict acquires are 
not quite clear. This situation “affects all social sectors, but especially the youth sector 
that, apart from belonging to a social group, is part of a cultural and age category that 
is very sensitive in our society" (Ibid: 19).  
Chilean youths, then, should be more politically disaffected than adults because 
the lack of representation they experience is greater. This situation is expressed, for 
example, by the fact that the instauration of a coherent youth public policy is currently 
one of the mayor deficits of the Chilean political system (Asún, 2006, Krauskopf, 2011). 
In relation to this issue, a report from the National Institute of the Youth (INJUV) 
argues that “Chilean society has strategic difficulties to get a series of social rights 
guaranteed and met for significant groups of young people. Linked to this, the Chilean 
state has not been able to clearly capitalise a policy on youth matters and to ensure 
minimum rights for this segment" (INJUV, 2010:17). 
Higher perceptions of lack of representation among youths would then be the 
expression of the Chilean institutional set-up that seems to be somehow exclusionary 
of their interests. The particular interests of Chilean youths are not being adequately 
institutionally represented and this situation would be generating higher levels of 
political disaffection among them.8 
The second process through which the gap between citizens and the political 
system has increased is when distance from the system occurs since politics loses its 
meaning. This process should also more particularly affect youths as they are expected 
to distance themselves from the political system more than adults because they have 
socialised themselves completely in this demobilised and depoliticised society.  
All people under thirty in Chile were at most ten years old at the beginning of the 
democratic regime in 1990. This means they were completely politically socialised in 
an environment where politics was not representing a vehicle to struggle for social 
                                                          
8
 A whole chapter will be dedicated to analysing the relationship between feelings of political disaffection and the 
lack of a coherent youth public policy.  
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improvements. Therefore, they should feel more alien to the political system and it 
should be expected that they will develop higher levels of political inefficacy that will 
finally be expressed in higher levels of political disaffection.  
Garretón (1999) argues there is a structural distance between youths and the 
political system in Chile, and that the reasons for that phenomenon can be found in 
the characteristics of this new democratic era that is tangled in a fake consensus 
politics that masks cupular negotiations and an entrapment in the institutions of the 
dictatorship. These characteristics are different to those of previous democracies as 
those regimes had a political culture where voting was believed to be a mechanism of 
real change and where the party system played a relevant role, not only as a channel 
of social and political integration but also as a producer of socio-cultural identities 
(Ibid.).  
This change should affect levels of political disaffection of the whole citizenry but 
particularly youths’ levels, since older people were politically socialised in conditions 
where a different vision of politics prevailed. Young people developed themselves 
living entirely in a political environment where practices of demobilisation and 
depoliticisation prevailed. It is in this sense that Eyssautieur and Palma state that 
“Chilean youths have opted to remain outside conventional politics because this has in 
practice neglected the execution of a plan that promotes the deep, communitarian, 
collective and common welfare, that does not focus on specific situations" (2006: 13).  
Young people would then be more attracted to a more meaningful style of politics 
that intend to truly incorporate them. This can be, for example, reflected in the fact 
that the only outsider candidate of the last Chilean presidential election (Marco 
Enriquez-Ominami), whose speech centred on a new way of doing politics, was 
exceptionally appealing to young people.9 Moreover, an attraction to more meaningful 
styles of doing politics was also observed in students’ mobilisations of 2006 and 2011-
2012, since they internally developed democratic mechanisms of decision-making but 
also criticised the way the political system functions. What is being argued is that 
Chilean youths have been largely political and socially excluded and that their current 
                                                          
9
 This candidate obtained 20% of the votes but according to the CEP survey (2010) voting intention was 37% from 
people between 18 and 24 years old and 30% for those between 25 and 34 years old.  
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activation seems to be an expression of the discontent that this exclusion generates. In 
this sense, it is possible to hypothesize that recent student mobilizations would not be 
just the manifestation of idealistic attitudes typical of the youth condition (Lipset, 
1966) but would be expressing discontent with a situation of exclusion.  
In summary, the main hypothesis of this thesis to explain current high levels of 
political disaffection among young people is that central features of the CPS have 
particularly widened the gap between youths and the political system. In Siavellis’s 
terms, elites and the governed are out of face, since elites continue to operate under 
the transitional model of democracy while citizens demand new political forms (2009). 
These attributes have already been connected with the engenderment of feelings of 
distrust and disengagement (Garretón, 2008, Ruiz, 1991). However, it becomes 
necessary to observe the way the empirical evidence can test these hypotheses and to 
observe how the evidence can elucidate new sources explaining this phenomenon that 
can complement what was established in this section. This is to be done by directly 
analysing the link between feelings of political disaffection and perceptions about the 
CPS, and by examining several case studies such as the candidacy of ME-O and the 
educational movements of 2006 and 2011-2012 as they clearly expressed the kind of 
feelings that are supposedly generating feelings of political disaffection.  
1.2.4 Other useful concepts for this research 
This last section of the theoretical framework develops two concepts that are very 
useful in order to analyse further evidence. These are the concepts of political 
representation and a theoretical approach to explaining the emergence of social 
movements.  
1.2.4.1   The concept of political representation 
Since problems of political representation are being hypothesised in this thesis as 
one of the major issues associated with current high levels of political disaffection 
among Chilean youths, it becomes necessary to properly define this concept. This will 
be mainly done using the theoretical approach of Hanna Pitkin. Moreover, this 
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discussion will be complemented with contributions from other authors that stress the 
role of participation regarding substantive representation. 
 The four dimensions of representation of Hanna Pitkin  
Hanna Pitkin (1967) argues that four main views of the concept of representation 
have been developed and used by several theorists: formal, descriptive, symbolic and 
substantive representation. Moreover, she states that none of these views can tell the 
whole story about representation, as they are just partial views of the phenomenon. 
The first dimension is formal representation where it is possible to distinguish 
between the authorisation and the accountability views. Regarding the authorisation 
view, Pitkin argues that a representative is someone that has been authorised to act. 
Representation is defined in terms of the giving and having of authority since the 
represented “has been given a right to act which he did not have before, while the 
represented has become responsible for the consequences of that action as if he had 
done it himself" (Ibid: 39).  
According the accountability view, the process of representation mostly has to do 
with holding representatives to account for their actions. Pitkin argues that this vision 
of representation is opposed to the previous one, but that is equally formal. A 
representative is “someone who is to be held to account, who will have to answer to 
another for what he does. The man or men to whom he most eventually accounts are 
those whom he represents" (Ibid. 55).  
The second dimension of political representation is descriptive representation. In 
this case representation is associated with a process where the representative does 
not act for others but stands for them by correspondence. Representation means the 
making present of something by resemble or reflection. The central idea is that a 
representative body is truly representative when it is an accurate reflection of the 
variety of interests of society. True representation depends on “the representative's 
characteristics, on what he is or is like, on being something rather than doing 
something" (Ibid: 61). Classic examples of descriptive representation are black people 
and women being represented by black and woman rulers. 
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This dimension has been highly developed by other authors. Dovi (2002) argues 
that to have a fully democratic society, groups that have been denied full political 
membership have to be included in the political life. Mansbridge (1999) also justifies 
the existence of descriptive representation but without dismissing the central 
importance of substantive representation. He states that there are four benefits, 
based on four different contexts, that the representation of disadvantaged groups by 
descriptive representatives brings. These benefits and their respective contexts are: 1) 
to generate an adequate communication in contexts of mistrust, 2) to innovate 
thinking in contexts of uncrystallised interests, 3) to create a social meaning of ability 
to rule in contexts where this was not the case, and 4) to increase the polity’s de facto 
legitimacy in contexts of past discrimination. 
The third dimension defined by Pitkin is symbolic representation. A political 
representative is understood here as a flag that represents the nation, or as a monarch 
that stands for the unity of the nation, representing the statehood. To say that 
something symbolises something else means that it evokes feelings or attitudes, such 
as the identified meaning of the symbol it is representing. In relation to the political 
field, a political leader can be considered to represent symbolically when he is believed 
in, and that belief can be fostered or created.  
The fourth and last dimension Pitkin develops is substantive representation. In 
this case, representation is defined by what the representative does and how he/she 
does it. The representative’s duty is to accurately reflect the wishes and opinions of 
those he represents, since when he is representing he is acting in the interests of the 
represented. This dimension, therefore, highlights the nature of the activity of 
representing. To represent, then, means to promote the interests of the represented. 
In this sense, only this view provides standards for deciding whether some political 
authorities are representing well or badly.  
The mandate/independence controversy  
Once the concept of representation is clear, it is necessary to develop the issue of 
how the process of accurately reflecting the opinions of the represented is developed, 
regarding how independent or dependent the representative is with respect to the 
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represented. Regarding this topic, it is possible to identify two main poles. According 
to the first pole, representatives should be trustees that are completely independent 
and free to act to pursue constituents’ welfare. The second pole, by its parts, 
understands representatives as delegates that are bound by mandates and that have 
to do everything the represented want (Pitkin, 1967).  
Pitkin states that neither complete independence nor full dependence are what 
really constitute an activity of representation. Her solution to this controversy is to 
argue that: “The substance of the activity of representing seems to consist in 
promoting the interest of the represented, in a context where the latter is conceived 
as capable of action and judgment, but in such a way that he does not object to what is 
done in his name" (Ibid: 155). 
The mandate/independence controversy has been also discussed by several 
authors who have criticised Pitkin’s vision. Runciman (2007) argues that Pitkin cannot 
explain how it is possible to represent people since there are situations of tyranny 
when absence of objections cannot be taken as a form of assent, since they are the 
result of coercion. Urbanity and Warren (2008) and Plotke (1997) also criticise Pitkin, 
specifically the role she assigns to mechanisms of participation regarding the process 
of representation. While the former argues that Pitkin “did not enquire more broadly 
into the kind of political participation that representation brings about in a democratic 
society" (Urbanity and Warren, 2008: 393), the latter criticizes the fact that presence 
and representation are mainly opposites according to Pitkin.  
The necessity of mechanisms of participation  
In relation to these criticisms, the most relevant to the main objective of this thesis 
is about the role of participation. About this issue, the position of this thesis is closer to 
Urbanity and Warren’s point of view. This is because even though Pitkin opens a space 
for the existence of citizen participation in the process of representation she does not 
develop it sufficiently. She believes it is necessary to have some machinery through 
which people can express their concerns. Nevertheless, it is not possible to clearly 
observe from her approach how representation and participation are to be connected. 
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The association between representative democracy and mechanisms of 
participation has been developed by several authors that can enrich Pitkin’s approach. 
The main idea is that the opposite of representation is not participation, but exclusion. 
Plotke (1997) argues that to have an effective, open and fair process of political 
representation, it is necessary to improve representative practices where the inclusion 
of citizens through mechanisms of participation are essential. People gain political 
representation when the authorised representative tries to achieve their political aims, 
and those aims have to be subject to dialogue between both parts.  
Urbanati (2000) has a similar view as he states that representation and 
participation are not two alternative forms of democracy, but related forms that are 
part of the continuum of political action in modern democracy. Political 
representation, then, cannot be understood without the existence of representatives 
who are connected through spaces of participation, since it is only in this way that 
bodies such as parliament can be expected to accurately reflect the interests and 
opinions of common citizens. In this sense, other spaces of participation, like formal 
electoral participation, would come to complement these other instances as they build 
on-going processes of action and reactions between institutions and society (Urbanity 
and Warren, 2008). 
The relevance of authentic mechanisms of participation within representative 
institutions is also justified by the fact that if these institutions are not sufficiently 
connected with common citizens, negative situations, such as the emergence of a 
partyarchy, can take place. A partyarchy is a political system where political parties 
completely dominate political activities in a tyrannical way, concentrating all political 
power. Coppedge (1994) argues that in a partyarchy political parties monopolise 
electoral processes, dominate the legislative process and penetrate politically relevant 
organisations. Moreover, party domination also blocks informal channels of 
representation such as interest groups, the media and independent opinion leaders. 
Partyarchies don’t then have effective channels for the representation of citizens’ 
interests, which generates feelings of disenchantment.  
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In summary, Pitkin’s approach is very relevant for the aim of this thesis as it fully 
describes several forms of political representation. Nevertheless, she does not fully 
shed light on the role of participation in this activity and that is why her view has to be 
complemented with other authors’. The only way to make common people able to 
object representatives’ decisions and make them express their opinions is through 
authentic participation. That is why no definition of substantive representation has to 
avoid this crucial element, since the lack of authentic mechanisms of participation can 
generate harmful political systems such as a partyarchies. Representation does not 
occur only when people do not object to some decisions, but when they have been 
part of the process through which those decisions were taken.  
1.2.4.2 The emergence and development of social movements 
Since this thesis includes the analyses of two social movements, it becomes 
necessary to incorporate some theoretical approaches regarding the emergence and 
development of these phenomena. Social movements have, historically, been studied 
from different perspectives and today it does not seem to be a consensus regarding 
the form to analyse them. Among these several approaches there is, however, a very 
useful perspective for the aim of this thesis, as it tries to synthesise in a 
complementary way some of the most relevant approaches that have emerged in the 
last decades (McAdam et al., 1996 and McAdam et al., 1997). This perspective argues 
that social movements have to be analysed taking into account three main elements: 
the structure of political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes.   
The Political Opportunities Structure (POS) 
The first element makes reference to the relevance of the structure of political 
opportunities and constraints with respect to the emergence, development and impact 
of social movements. The central idea of this approach is that movements arise, 
change, succeed or fail as a function of changes in the political opportunities they face 
(McAdam et al., 1996).  
One of the main exponents of this perspective is Sidney Tarrow (1994, 1997). He 
defines a political opportunity structure as “Consistent but not necessarily formal, 
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permanent or national dimensions of the political environment which either 
encourage or discourage people from using collective action" (Tarrow, 1994: 85). Social 
movements form when common citizens respond to several changes in opportunities 
that lower the cost of collective action, reveal potential allies, and show where elites 
and authorities are vulnerable (Tarrow, 1994). In this sense, changes in the POS 
become relevant for collective action since they reduce the power of disparity of a 
given challenging group and the state (McAdam, 1996).  
With respect to which elements of the political structure are relevant for the 
prosperity of social movements Tarrow (1994) highlights four main dimensions: a) 
opening up access of participation, b) shifts in ruling alignments c) availability of 
influential allies, and d) cleavages within and among elites. Rutch (1996) also defines 
four variables of the POS that are relevant for collective mobilisation. These variables 
are: a) access to the party system and policy decision, b) the power of authorities to 
implement policies regardless of resistance, c) the configuration of allies and d) the 
configuration of opponents able to undermine social mobilisation.  
Apart from these dimensions, several authors have highlighted other elements 
that are relevant for the emergence and development of social movements. Della 
Porta (1996) argues that protest policing can be an important barometer of the 
political opportunities available for social movements. Gamson and Meyer (1996) 
underline the opening of media system as a relevant element of the POS since it is a 
site where symbolic contests are carried out among competing sponsors of meaning. 
Finally, Tarrow (1994) argues that the proper structure of the state is relevant, as it can 
predict whether and where movements will find opportunities to engage in collective 
action.  
One last element to be developed regarding this perspective is the fact that 
movements can also make and diffuse opportunities. Tarrow (1994) argues that 
movements can open opportunities as contentious collective action demonstrates the 
possibilities of action to others and because it exposes opponents’ points of weakness 
that might not be evident until they are challenged. Moreover, they are able to create 
opportunities too by revealing previously passive elites, either within or outside the 
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system, and by enquiring about the openness of institutional barriers through which 
the demands of others will pour. McAdam (1996) also highlights this element as he 
states that the actions of some groups are likely to affect the legislature or other forms 
of change that serve to restructure the legal and institutional basis of the political 
system.  
Mobilising structures 
The second perspective to be developed has to do with the organisational 
resources of movements. The main idea of this perspective is that the fate of 
mobilisations is mainly determined by the various kinds of mobilising structures 
through which groups seek to organise (McAdam et al., 1996). McCarthy defines 
mobilising structures as: “those agreed upon ways of engaging in collective action 
which include particular tactical repertoires, particular social movement organisational 
form and modular social movement" (McCarthy, 1996: 141).  
One of the most important approaches to come from this theoretical perspective 
is the resource mobilisation theory of McCarthy and Zald (1977). They argue that 
analyses of social movements have wrongly assumed a close link between grievances 
and the growth and decline of movement activity. Against this vision, they argue that 
the emphasis has to be on “the variety and sources of resources, the relationship of 
social movements to the media, authorities and other parties and the interaction 
among movement organisations" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1212). The main focus, 
then, is on the dynamics and tactics taken by social movements where societal support 
and constraint toward movements is very relevant.  
Jenkins (1983) argues that, according to this vision, the formation of movements is 
linked to improvements in the status of aggrieved groups. However, this is not because 
of grievances created by the revolution of rising expectations but since these changes 
come to reduce the costs of mobilisation and improve the likelihood of success. The 
main issues to be focused on are the resources controlled by the group prior to 
mobilisation; those processes by which the group pools resources and directs them 
towards social change and the extent to which outsiders increase the pool of resources 
(Ibid.).  
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Another relevant issue highlighted by Jenkins is the relevance of the type of 
organisations regarding the success of movements. The resource mobilisation theory 
had argued that centralised and formally structured movements were more effective 
regarding the mobilisation of resources. However, this assumption has been 
questioned with the emergence of decentralised movements such as several student 
movements (Jenkins, 1983). This is explained by the fact that “often decentralised 
structures are a product of deliberative choices by redemptive or personal change 
movements attempting to embody ideals in the hope these will serve as models for 
emulation" (Ibid: 541).  
The last element to be highlighted regarding these resources is the tactical 
repertoires or forms of collective action used by movements. McCarthy (1996) states 
that in any concrete social setting there is a range of mobilising structural elements 
more or less available to activists when they attempt to create and nurture 
movements. Social movements use concrete patterns of mobilisation that are available 
to activists, but they can also invent new ones to achieve their collective purposes. 
Tarrow (1994) argues it is possible to distinguish between conventional and disruptive 
forms of collective action. Conventional collective forms are those that are well-known 
by the authorities, such as strikes or demonstrations. Disruptive forms, on the other 
hand, are new forms that obstruct the routine activities of opponents, bystanders or 
authorities. They broaden the circle of conflict and they can be seen as the concrete 
expression of a movement determination.  
Framing processes  
The third and last perspective to be described regarding the development of social 
movements puts emphasis on the role of cultural elements and on the construction of 
collective identities through collective action. It is argued that grievances and identities 
are not natural and that social movements “have to shape reality for their potential 
supporters, identifying injustices and attributing them to the system or to antagonistic 
others and providing positive symbols around which ordinary, and often timid people, 
could come together" (McAdam, et al., 1997: 149). The concept that is used to 
describe this phenomenon is framing processes, which is defined as “collective 
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processes of interpretation, attribution and social construction that mediate between 
opportunity and action" (McAdam, et al., 1996: 3). In this sense, one of the major tasks 
of movements would be to find symbols that will be familiar enough to mobilise 
people around them (Tarrow, 1994).  
The main proponent of this perspective is David Snow. He claims it is necessary to 
elaborate a perspective that links together social psychological and 
structural/organisational factors. It is argued that common interpretive problems are 
particularly relevant to comprehend the functioning of social movement organisations 
and the generation of support and participation in their activities. In order to 
understand the participation processes it is central to pay attention to the 
interpretation of grievances and other ideational elements such as values and 
supportive beliefs (Snow et al., 1986).  
Movements require the existence of what Snow calls collective action frames, 
which are “action-oriented sets of belief and meaning that inspire and legitimate the 
activities and campaigns of a social movement organisation" (Benford and Snow, 2000: 
614). It is based on these frames that movements are capable of generating support 
and participation. They operate based on core frame tasks. Among these tasks, it is 
possible to identify the diagnostic framing where some attributions regarding the 
responsibility of a situation that need to be changed are made. Another relevant core 
task is the prognostic framing, where an alternative set of arrangements to solve the 
problem is articulated and the motivational framing that urges others to act to affect 
change (Ibid.).  
Another element highlighted by this perspective is the existence of different types 
of framing alignment processes. These are: “strategic efforts made by social 
movements to link their interests and interpretation frames with those of prospective 
constituents and actual or prospective resource providers" (Benford and Snow, 2000: 
624). There are four types of framing alignment processes: a) frame bridging: linkage 
of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally congruent frames regarding a 
particular issue, b) frame amplification: clarification and invigoration of an 
interpretative frame that bears in a particular issue, c) frame extension: extension of 
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the boundaries of its primary framework to encompass the interests of potential 
adherents, and d) frame transformation: change values when they are not accepted 
for being considered unconventional (Snow et al., 1986).  
The last thing to be highlighted with respect to this perspective is the role the 
media plays in framing processes. As it was stated, movements make efforts to 
promote their collective frames in order to gain adherents. Concerning this process, 
the role the mass media play is particularly relevant. Zald (1996) argues that framing 
contests occur in face-to-face interactions and also through several media, as when 
movements have to mobilise bystanders, many of the public only know about the 
movement through the media. Media channels, however, are not neutral to this 
process, and in capitalist democracies, apart from reporting the news, have to respond 
to their owners’ wishes and to market demands. In this sense, each change in 
technology modifies the framing potential of movements’ demands.  
 1.3 Research design 
1.3.1 Research questions 
The essential problem to be studied in this research is the apparent contradiction 
between Chile's high levels of economic and political development and the high levels 
of political disaffection among young people. In this sense, the core research question 
that directs this investigation is the following:   
Why does the Chilean youth exhibit such high levels of political disaffection, in 
spite of Chile's good political and economic performance, since its return to 
democracy? 
The main focus of the thesis is, then, on finding an explanation for this paradoxical 
case. This means to try to understand why a country that has had good levels of 
economic and political development in the last decades presents these high levels of 
youth political disaffection that have recently started to be expressed through much 
more active ways.  
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The fact that youths are more disaffected than other groups, and that they seem 
to be much more active regarding the expression of their feelings of political 
disaffection, define the other two main research questions being approached in this 
thesis.  
 Why have Chilean youths developed particularly high levels of political 
disaffection comparing with other groups of Chilean society?  
 Is a new way of doing politics emerging among Chilean youths? If so, which 
are its main elements and implications for the future of Chilean democracy?  
The second research question refers to the fact that it is necessary to understand 
why Chilean youths are more politically disaffected. Currently this group has the 
lowest levels of electoral participation and confidence in political parties in Chile. This 
situation merits an explanation. Therefore, this research specifically attempts to 
understand the relationship between youths and politics, taking into consideration 
that youths are more disaffected than other groups.  
The third research question makes reference to the activation of Chilean youths 
that Chile has witnessed in recent times through the support for an independent 
candidate, as in the presidential candidacy of ME-O, and the educational movements 
of 2006 and 2011-2012. These experiences seem to indicate that youths are not 
apathetic but they are only rejecting formal politics and not ‘the political’, understood 
as an interest in the fate of society. Moreover, they have also demonstrated that 
youths are attracted to new political forms. For example, in both movements youths 
have promoted the existence of democratic mechanisms of participation, to be 
executed both within the movement itself and when they have to negotiate with 
political authorities. In this sense, this thesis also attempts to understand the apparent 
new way of doing politics that could be emerging among Chilean youths.  
These three questions are mostly analysed based on particular historical-
institutional aspects of contemporary Chilean politics. That is why it was argued that 
this research proposes to give an institutional explanation to the questions raised, as it 
is based on analysing the relevance of changes to the political process affecting the 
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relationship between common citizens and politics (Norris, 1999). Therefore, most of 
the analyses are derived from the central hypothesis previously described that 
understands feelings of political disaffection as a consequence or side-effect of the 
development of Chile's post-authoritarian political system.  
The main approach to be followed to bring an institutional explanation comes 
from the political sociology field. This is because the main focus of this research is to 
understand those political processes that generate political disaffection mostly 
focusing on the society level by analysing how common citizens perceive their relations 
with formal politics.  
Sartori (1969) argues that political sociology is an interdisciplinary attempt to 
combine both political and non-political reasons to understand why people act the way 
they do in political life. For example, a political sociologist who intends to study parties 
should simultaneously explore how parties are conditioned by the society and how the 
society is conditioned by parties. That is exactly what is intended through this 
research, since the main objective is to understand a political phenomenon not only 
focusing on how several political institutions generated it, but also observing how the 
public perceive these political processes and how they react against them. For 
example, it will not only be analysed how the political system conditions political 
behaviours and attitudes but also how society responds by conditioning the 
development of the political system. This last thing, for example, is to be principally 
examined through the analyses of social movements.  
The way to implement this political sociology approach will be by analysing the 
links between political disaffection and several perceptions about the functioning of 
the Chilean political system that are relevant according to the suggested hypotheses. 
This approach also allows the finding of new elements that could also be associated 
with the engenderment of political disaffection helping us to more profoundly 
comprehend this phenomenon. All these links are initially directly analysed through 
quantitative and qualitative material. Afterwards, the comprehension of these 
associations is deepened through the analysis of several case studies, mostly based on 
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qualitative and archive material that also shows how youth perceptions are to be 
associated with feelings of political disaffection.10 
1.3.2 Research methods  
This research combines quantitative and qualitative methods with archive 
examination to answer the proposed questions. All quantitative analyses are based on 
secondary data taken from several public opinion polls that include youths’ political 
and social attitudes. The qualitative part is taken from 68 in-depth interviews 
personally executed with relevant actors, such as politically involved youths, 
politicians, youth experts, members of social movements and people who participated 
in the negotiation processes with social movements. Archive examination mainly 
consisted in the analysis of relevant documents that allowed a better understanding of 
each of the case studies, such as the proposals of both movements and the political 
program of ME-O.  
The combination of these three central methods is crucial to understanding 
political disaffection, focusing on particular historical-institutional aspects of the recent 
Chilean political history, based on a political sociology approach. This is because the 
only way to understand how the public feel and react regarding their relations with the 
political processes, and to comprehend how people´s perceptions can engender 
feelings of disaffection, is by directly asking them.  
The epistemological basis of this claim is that people´s behaviour is primarily 
determined by the way they perceive reality, irrespective of whether these 
perceptions are real or not and that the most efficient and effective way to understand 
how people perceive things is by asking them directly. This research assumes, 
therefore, that even if some people have erroneous conceptions of reality, their own 
conceptions do have real consequences. To this effect, it can be argued that this thesis 
adopts "Thomas`s theorem" that “If men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences” (Thomas, 1928, quoted in Merton, 1995). This is because it is assumed 
                                                          
10
 It is necessary to highlight that by perceptions this thesis refers to a way of understanding or interpreting 
something no matter if those understandings are accurate or not.  
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that it is essential to comprehend what people believe through their own words as the 
interpretation of some situations is what predominantly determinates people`s 
behaviours. 
In this sense, the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is essential.  
While quantitative methods allows the generalisation of some propositions regarding 
the types of perception generating disaffection, qualitative methods permit a deep 
understanding of these propositions through the proper words of the studied group. 
Additionally, archive examination permits a better contextualisation of those analysed 
associations, which is what finally allows us to link them to general attributes of 
Chilean democracy. Moreover, the use of these methods is also central to examining 
several case studies that deepen the understanding of the links between people’s 
perceptions and feelings of political disaffection. For example, the use of qualitative 
and archive material to analyse the emergence and development of two social 
movements are the best way to understand both how participants of those 
movements felt when they were negotiating with political authorities and how they 
finally conditioned the development of the political system.   
Ethics, Reflexivity, Sampling and Analysis of the Qualitative Material  
As in-depth interviews were the only applied method where the researcher had  
direct contact with those being researched, it is also necessary to discuss how this 
research attempted to be rigorous along with meeting the standards set by ethical 
principles, reflexivity, data selection and the analysis and interpretation of the  
material.  
Regarding the first issue, in order to respect ethical principles while researching 
human subjects, the purposes and methods of the research were carefully explained 
before every interview. Moreover, this thesis also dealt with the issue of 
confidentiality. All interviews with politically involved youth, politicians and ME-O´s 
supporters were strictly confidential and it was made clear to the interviewee that 
their real names would not be disclosed in the thesis. However, the names of youth 
and education experts, and those of student leaders were included with their   
permission. In this case, all interviewees but one accepted stating their real names.  
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With regard to reflexivity, it was intended to reduce to the minimum the effect 
that the researcher’s positions, values and intellectual biases could have on 
participant’s views. Interview questions were therefore designed with the objective 
that every interviewee’s positions were treated as valid and that the interviewer did 
not impose or indicated his point of view.   
Finally, concerning data selection and analysis, several strategies were adopted to 
deal with these issues. With respect to the interviewee’s selection, after identifying all 
categories to be interviewed in each stage, the main strategy was to find individuals 
following the snow-ball method. 11 Moreover, after every interview, interviewees were 
asked if they could help in contacting some people. This process was further 
supplemented by directly contacting some people through emails, and social networks 
such as Facebook or Twitter.  
With respect to ensuring rigour in the analysis of the qualitative material, all the 
interviews were personally transcribed and analysed with the help of the software 
Nvivo. This analysis basically consisted of looking for different categories that could 
help organize the data and writing synthesis paragraphs considering all the quotations 
of each created category. Then, within every chapter, when a specific topic was 
discussed, the most representative quotations were selected highlighting the material 
of the whole discussed category. To this effect, the views expressed through the 
citations displayed in every chapter cannot be generalized to the entire interviewee 
category theses citations are making reference. They are just good illustrative 
examples of the views of some specific actor regarding some particular topic. 
In sum, care was taken in the collection and analysis of the qualitative material, 
with various strategies adopted to ensure rigour.  A description of each of the research 
phases that applied these strategies regarding the qualitative material and other 
strategies for the other used methods follow. 
 
 
                                                          
11
 All the identified categories are later explained in this chapter.  
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First phase 
This phase of the research consisted on the collection of secondary quantitative 
data about political attitudes and behaviours of Chilean youths. The data are obtained 
from several databases, available from different representative opinion poll surveys 
conducted in Chile since 1988. The surveys used for this process are the following: 
 Chilean National Institute of Youth (INJUV) Survey from 1994 to 2009.  
 Latinobarómetro Survey from 1995 to 2009.  
 Auditoría a la Democracia Survey from 2010 to 2012.  
 Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) Survey from 1990 to 2009. 
 Universidad Diego Portales (UDP) youth Survey of 2009.  
 World Values Survey of 2005.  
The collected material from these surveys is complemented with other official 
sources in order to size up historical levels of electoral participation. For this purpose, 
information about Chilean population is collected from the Chilean national institute of 
statistics (INE) and information about the numbers of registered youths is collected 
from the Chilean national electoral service (SERVEL).  
All these data are used to initially map current patterns of youth political 
disaffection analysing historical trends, comparisons among Latin American countries 
and relationships between feelings of political disaffection and socio-demographic 
variables. Moreover, these data are also used to perform a descriptive quantitative 
analysis to find several factors associated with feelings of political disaffection. Finally, 
the data are used to do binary logistic regressions, where several indicators of political 
disaffection are used as dependent variables and some perceptions about the 
functioning of the Chilean political system, along with some socio-demographic 
variables, are used as independent variables.  
Second phase 
The second stage of the fieldwork consists of in-depth semi-structured interviews 
with politically involved Chilean youths and politicians. The main focuses of the 
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interviews are interviewees’ perceptions about the existence of current high levels of 
youth political disaffection and its main sources12.  
With the initial quantitative analysis it is possible to test the link between 
particular perceptions about the functioning of the political system and indicators of 
political disaffection. However, this analysis only brings a broad picture of the problem. 
Therefore, by doing a qualitative analysis based on youths’ representations, it is 
possible to complement quantitative analyses and have a much clearer account of the 
phenomenon. To this effect, it has to be clear that the qualitative material presented 
in this chapter is only used to deepen the understanding of associations found with 
quantitative material that is representative of the whole youth population and do not 
pretend to generalize propositions. In order to deal with the issue of the 
representativeness of the qualitative data, the presented material intends to show the 
variety of positions regarding every topic paying special attention when there are 
conflicting visions.  
This use of qualitative methods is then essential for this research, since it is 
indispensable to understand the main mechanisms behind quantitatively tested links. 
This means it is necessary to delve more deeply into youths’ perceptions about the 
political system that are associated with the engenderment of feelings of political 
disaffection; such feelings of lack of political representation and political inefficacy. For 
example, if an association between indicators of political disaffection and feelings of 
lack of representation are found, it is also necessary to comprehend what the meaning 
of feeling unrepresented is according to youths’ beliefs. If it is possible to comprehend 
young peoples’ own beliefs, representations and interpretations of the political 
process, the understanding of the link between the way the political system works and 
the emergence of feelings of political disaffection becomes much greater.  
                                                          
12
 The reason why only politically involved youths are interviewed is that it is necessary to understand perceptions 
that are based on particular experiences. In this sense, apart from general perceptions about the functioning of the 
political system, the interviews also enquired on topics such as the difficulties, needs and challenges that youths 
experience when they are politically involved. The fact of interviewing only politically involved youth is clearly a 
limitation of this thesis. However, this decision is justified by the fact that the qualitative material is only used to 
complement previously found links with quantitative data that comes from national representative samples. In this 
sense, the qualitative data are not used in order to generalise propositions, but only to deepen the understanding 
of previously-quantitatively tested links that can be generalised for the whole youth population.  
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Since qualitative research involves the maximisation of the variety of 
representations based on the extension of social strata, functions or categories (Bauer 
and Gaskell, 2007), it is necessary to define the categories that segment the population 
of politically involved youths. The first category is the kind of political organisation they 
participate in. The main distinction here is between those who participate in youth 
divisions of traditional political parties and those who participate in informal political 
organisations, such as political collectives.13 Among youths who participate in political 
parties, it is possible to distinguish between three sectors defined by the three main 
political coalitions of the country: Concertación, Alianza por Chile and Juntos Podemos. 
Those youths involved in informal political organisations are distinguished between 
those who belong to organisations with materialist interests and those who belong to 
organisations with post-materialist interests.14 Moreover, it was also intended to have 
gender parity among interviewed youths. In total, 21 interviews were executed with 
politically-involved youths. Table 1.1 summarises these interviews according to each 
category.   
Table 1.1 - Distribution of Interviewed Politically Involved Youth15 
                                                          
13
 Political collectives are small and informal political organisations that intend to modify certain public situations.  
14
 Even though the post-materialist explanation for political disaffection was not defined as the main hypothesis of 
this thesis, the fact that many Chilean youths belong to organisations, such as environmental groups, justifies the 
inclusion of this variable for the aim of maximising the variety of representations among Chilean politically-involved 
youths.  
15
 As it was previously stated, all interviews conducted for this section were anonymous. The material of each of 
them is presented in further chapters with fakes names.  
 Organization Gender Type 
1 Member of the Youth Division of the UDI M Political Parties – Alianza 
2 President of the Youth Division of RN M Political Parties – Alianza 
3 Member of the youth division of RN F Political Parties – Alianza 
4 Member of the youth division of the PDC F Political Parties – Concertación 
5 Member of the youth division of the PPD M Political Parties – Concertación 
6 President of the Youth Division of the PPD M Political Parties – Concertación 
7 General Secretary of the Youth Division of the PS F Political Parties – Concertación 
8 General Secretary of the Youth Division of the PC M Political Parties – Juntos Podemos 
9 Member of the youth division of the PC F Political Parties – Juntos Podemos 
10 
Member of a youth organisation  whose main principle is the 
defence of  public health 
F Materialist 
11 Member of an educational political collective M Materialist 
12 Member of an university political collective M Materialist 
13 Member of a Left Wing youth Political Organization M Materialist 
14 Member of a youth organisation  linked to the gremialist movement F Materialist 
67 
 
 
With respect to the politicians interviewed, the same selective criterion used for 
politically-involved youth members of traditional political parties was used. People 
from the three main political coalitions were interviewed, trying to achieve gender 
parity as well. Moreover, it was also prioritised the fact that these politicians have 
previously participated in commissions dedicated to youth or educational issues. Table 
1.2 summarizes interviewed politicians according to each category.  
Table 1.2 - Distribution of Interviewed Politicians 
Third phase 
The third phase of the research consists of a deep exploration of the Chilean 
institutional set-up for young people in terms of analysing the relationship between 
the deficiencies of the youth public offer and the engenderment of feelings of political 
disaffection. Based on the examination of archives and the execution of in-depth 
interviews with key actors regarding this field, the idea was to understand a particular 
situation that seems to indicate the CPS is especially more reticent regarding the 
representation of youths’ interest.  
interests 
15 Member of an organisation  than defends the interests of workers. M Materialist 
16 Member of a pro-participation and ecologist youth organisation  M Post-materialist 
17 Member of a pro-participation and ecologist youth organisation  F Post-materialist 
18 Member of an ecologist organisation  F Post-materialist 
19 Member of a Youth Citizen Movement M Post-materialist 
20 Member of a youth organisation  that defends liberal principles F Post-materialist 
21 Member of a Lesbian Collective M Post-materialist 
 Party Gender Type 
1 Deputy of RN F Alianza 
2 Deputy of  RN F Alianza 
3 
Deputy of  UDI and member of the education commission of the 
congress 
M Alianza 
4 
Ex-deputy of PPD and ex member of the youth commission of the 
congress. 
M Concertación 
5 Deputy of the PS M Concertación 
6 
Deputy of the PPD and ex-member of the youth commission of the 
congress. 
M Concertación 
7 
Deputy of the DC and ex-president of the youth commission of the 
congress. 
F Concertación 
8 Deputy of the PC M Juntos Podemos 
9 
Ex-Minister of Education and ex presidential candidate (2009) for 
the Juntos Podemos. 
M Juntos Podemos 
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The first part of this phase consisted in the examination of archives that allowed 
observations of the main channels through which youths’ interests are intended to be 
represented. This implied, among other things, an analysis of the functioning of 
government institutions particularly focused on youths’ interests and to analyse 
specific polices on youth matters. These analyses were complemented with seven in-
depth and semi-structured interviews with key actors of the field. These actors were 
policy-makers specialising on youth matters, such as former directors of the INJUV 
from the current and previous governments. Moreover, the material of these 
interviews was complemented with material from the second phase, since both 
politically-involved youths and politicians were also asked about these issues. Finally, 
some secondary quantitative material was also used in order to analyse youths’ 
perceptions about the current youth public offer. 
In all these interviews, apart from getting information about particular polices or 
governmental programmes offered to the youth, the idea was also to inquire about 
the perceptions of central actors of the relationship between the way the political 
system includes young people and their current high levels of political disaffection. 
Table 1.3 summarises all interviews executed regarding this section.  
Table 1.3 - Distribution of Interviewed Youth Experts16 
Fourth phase  
The fourth stage of the fieldwork consists in the analysis of the emergence of the 
independent presidential candidacy of Marco Enriquez-Ominami (ME-O) in 2009 and 
the subsequent development of a new political party (The PRO), and how these events 
could appeal to several politically disaffected youths. Based on several archives and in-
                                                          
16
 These interviews were not anonymous since all interviewed people agreed to be identified with their official 
names.  
 Interviewed person Gender 
1 Juan Faúndez – Former director of the INJUV M 
2 Eugenio Ravinet  - Former director of the INJUV M 
3 Ignacio Naudón - Former director of the INJUV M 
4 Oscar Dávila  - Director of a Youth research centre F 
5 Raúl Zarzuri - Director of an youth university research centre of the Youth M 
6 Mario Sandoval - Director of a youth university research centre M 
7 Dina  Krauskopf - Ex-director of a Youth Latin-American Program of the FLACSO M 
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depth interviews with youths who voted for this candidate and important participants 
of both the campaign and the new party, the plan was to comprehend the 
attractiveness to young people of a project that was very critical of the current Chilean 
political system.  
The initial part of this phase was about examining several archives that allowed an 
understanding of the emergence of this candidate and the subsequent formation of a 
new party. Some of the observed documents were the political programme of the 
presidential candidacy, political analyses of the internal disputes within the 
Concertación that ended in the resignation of ME-O from the PS in order to present an 
independent candidacy and the new party statute. After that, twelve in-depth 
interviews were conducted with youths who voted for this candidate and with 
important members of the campaign and the PRO. With respect to the selection of the 
interviewees, the main criterions were to cover several areas of the campaign and 
gender parity. Regarding youth voters, another specific criterion was used, as four 
interviews were conducted with youths who are currently part of the PRO and four 
with voters who are not part of the PRO. 17 
The interviews inquired about the reasons behind the apparent success of these 
projects as well as the limitations people perceived to have emerged during the 
campaign and at the time the party was being established. Moreover, a special 
emphasis was put on particular reasons that explain the special appeal this candidacy 
had among young people. The analysis of the limitations was also complemented with 
the qualitative material of the second phase, as politically-involved youths were also 
asked about their opinions of these projects. Moreover, some quantitative secondary 
data were also employed to observe if this candidacy was more attractive to 
disaffected people and to observe which issues appealed more to ME-O’s voters. Table 
1.4 summarises the interviews conducted for this section.  
                                                          
17
 In order to analyse the attractiveness of this candidate, it would have been better to have a representative 
sample of those youth that voted for him. However, this was not possible to be obtained. In this sense, the 
qualitative material of this chapter should be only understood as showing the variety of opinions of MEO's voters 
and not as data from where it can be generalized about the distribution of these opinions.  
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Table 1.4 - Distribution of interviewed MEO's voters and members of his campaign18 
Fifth Phase 
The last phase of the research was about analysing two social movements to have 
taken place in recent times in Chile: the 2006 secondary student movement and the 
still-active 2011-2012 educational movement. The main purpose of reviewing these 
case studies was to observe two situations where several demands emerged from 
Chilean civil society and were then channelled by the Chilean political system.  
Within these analyses, the main focuses are on the factors that determined the 
emergence of both movements, and the understanding of how the way the political 
system functions regarding the channelisation of several demands is connected to the 
engenderment of feelings of political disaffection among youths. All these events were 
mainly analysed through the examination of archives, newspaper articles and the 
execution of 19 interviews with members of the movements and relevant political 
actors involved in the negotiation processes.  
Regarding the 2006 movement, the initial methods used were archive and 
newspaper articles examinations such as the old and new laws of education, students’ 
proposals and reports from the presidential committee. This information was 
                                                          
18
 Regarding these interviews, members of the campaign agreed to be referred with their official names while with 
youth voters the agreement was to have anonymous interviews.  
 Interviewed person Gender Type 
1 Marco Enríquez-Ominami  - president of the PRO M Campaigner 
2 
Cristían Warner - General Secretary of the PRO that also 
participated in the campaign 
M Campaigner 
3 
Alejandra Botinelli - Vice president of the PRO  that also 
participated in the campaign 
F Campaigner 
4 
Javier Sajuria  - Person in charge of the digital strategy of 
the campaign 
M Campaigner 
5 Youth Voter  and current member of the party M Party Member 
6 Youth Voter  and current member of the party F Party Member 
7 Youth Voter  and current member of the party F Party Member 
8 Youth Voter  and current member of the party M Party Member 
9 Youth Voter F Voter 
10 Youth Voter F Voter 
11 Youth Voter M Voter 
12 Youth Voter M Voter 
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complemented with the realisation of twelve interviews. Six of them were with 
movement leaders, and six with adults who participated in the negotiation processes. 
In order to select students to be interviewed, two main criterions were used: their 
political affiliation and gender. Regarding political affiliation, it was also distinguished 
between those who belonged to traditional parties and those who were part of other 
political organisations. Moreover, their political positions were also considered. 
Regarding those adults interviewed, it was distinguished between representatives of 
three sectors: the Alianza, the Concertación and the Bloque Social (a group of 
organisations supporting the movement).  
Within the interviews, the main focus was on conversing about the movement 
emergence, the negotiation processes and evaluations of the final policy outcomes. 
Moreover, it was also asked how youth perceptions regarding the channelisation of 
their demands can be connected with broader processes regarding the relationship 
between youths and the political system. Table 1.5 summarises the interviews 
executed concerning the 2006 movement.  
Table 1.5 - Distribution of 2006 movement interviewees 19 
 
                                                          
19
 All interviewees of this section but one right-wing representative of the 2006 committee agreed to be referred 
with their official names.  
 Interviewed Person Gender Type 
1 Vanessa Bolla - Youth that participated in the movement F Independent 
2 Isaac Stevens - Youth that participated in the education committee. M Right-Wing Friendly 
3 Julio Isamit - Youth that was spokesman of the movement M Right-Wing Friendly 
4 Juan Carlos Herrera - Youth that participated in the education committee. M Left-Wing Friendly 
5 Cesar Valenzuela - Youth that was spokesman of the movement M Member of the PS 
6 Pablo Orellana - Youth that participated in the education committee. M Member of the PC 
7 
Jorge Pavéz - Ex director of the teacher´s organisation  that participated in the 
education committee. 
M Bloque Social 
8 
Ismael Calderón - Ex director of the parent´s organisation  that   participated in 
the education committee. 
M Bloque Social 
9 
Ex member of a right-wing think tank that participated in the education 
committee. 
F Right-Wing 
10 
Carolina Velasco – ex member of a right-wing think tank that participated in the 
education committee. 
F Right-Wing 
11 
Cristían Cox - Academic associated with the Concertación  that participated in the 
education committee. 
M Concertación 
12 
Juan Eduardo Garcia-Huidobro - Academic associated with the Concertación that 
was the president of the council of education created after the movement. 
M Concertación 
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With respect to the 2011-2012 movement, a different kind of analysis was applied. 
This is because, unlike the 2006 movement, in this case there is not already a complete 
policy-making process where demands were absorbed and then expressed in policy 
outcomes. Thus, the analysis of this last case was only limited to the conditions that 
favoured its emergence and its future political implications. This last element was of 
extreme importance since the movement is not only demanding educational reforms 
but also broader social and political changes. That is why, for example, it has been 
described as the politicisation of discontent (Mayol and Azócar, 2011). 
The methods used were archive examinations, qualitative interviews and 
secondary quantitative analysis. Regarding archives, extensive documents were 
observed that allowed a much better understanding of the movement. Among them 
are students’ proposals, documents that reveal students’ demands for broader 
changes and some reactions from the political world. This information was 
complemented by seven interviews with leaders of the movement. These members 
were distinguished by gender, type of education and political organisation. Finally, 
some quantitative secondary material was used to analyse if movements’ demands 
were also supported by larger sectors of the population. The main focus on the data 
collection was about understanding the conditions that determined the emergence of 
the movement and the apparent process of activation of previously passive feelings of 
disaffection among youths. Regarding this last point, it is also analysed if a new way of 
doing politics might be emerging among youths. Table 1.6 summarises students from 
the 2011-2012 movement interviewed.  
Table 1.6 - Distribution of 2011-2102 movement interviewees 
 Interviewed Person Gender Organization 
1 Nataly Espinoza – Student from the Universidad de Valparaiso F CONFECH 
2 Laura Palma -  Student from the Universidad de La Serena F CONFECH 
3 
Recardedo Gálvez – Student from the Universidad de 
Concepción. 
M CONFECH 
4 Alfredo Vielma – Secondary Student M ACES 
5 Laura Ortiz  - Secondary Student F ACES 
6 Daniela Isla – Secondary Student F CONES 
7 Rodrigo Rivera – Secondary Student M CONES 
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1.3.3 Organization of the chapters  
Based on the previously-defined phases of the research the following division of 
the chapters is presented.  
 Chapter 2: Evolution of the patterns and forms of political disaffection among 
Chilean youths.  
 Chapter 3: Analysing the link between youths' perceptions of their relationship 
with the CPS and feelings of political disaffection with  the use of 
quantitative and qualitative data.  
 Chapter 4: Analysing the relationship between the lack of a Youth Public Policy 
and the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection.  
 Chapter 5: The emergence of the presidential candidacy of ME-O and  the 
PRO and their attractiveness for politically-disaffected youth.  
 Chapter 6: The 2006 Secondary Student Movement: analysing the application 
of a way of doing politics.  
 Chapter 7: The 2011-2012 Student Movement: the activation of  politically-
disaffected youths.  
 Chapter 8: Conclusions. 
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Chapter 2: How can Chilean youth political disaffection be described? 
  2.1 Introduction  
To have a clear understanding of the sources of current high levels of youth 
political disaffection, it is first necessary to comprehend the proper phenomenon 
under study. This means, that before analysing the possible explanatory factors of 
political disaffection it is first required to map its patterns and forms. In this sense, the 
main goal of this chapter is to size up existing levels of political disaffection and their 
historical changes among Chilean youths. This chapter involves, then, a deep 
examination of this dissertation dependent variable based on an extensive body of 
comparative survey research, which brings evidence to test the main assumption of 
this research: that Chilean youths have rather high levels of political disaffection and 
they are not just disengaged from formal politics.  
The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first one analyses patterns and 
forms of political disaffection based on secondary quantitative data. Several indicators 
are used to analyse their current levels and historical trends, some comparisons with 
Latin American countries and their associations with some socio-demographic 
variables. The second section discusses whether Chilean youths can also be described 
as being politically apathetic using secondary quantitative data and primary qualitative 
material.  
 2.2 Mapping the patterns and forms of political disaffection 
In this section, the evolution and comparisons of the indicators of behavioural 
disaffection is first shown. Later on, to see if these indicators can be seen as part of a 
more general syndrome of political disaffection, the link between the rejection of 
formal channels of participation and negative attitudes towards the political system is 
tested. Finally, the evolution and comparisons of indicators of attitudinal disaffection 
are displayed.  
2.2.1 Behavioural disaffection indicators 
The first dimension to be analysed is behavioural disaffection. This is constituted of 
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three indicators: electoral participation, partisan membership and party identification. 
Whenever the data allows it, these indicators are analysed regarding their historical 
trends, their comparison with Latin American countries and their associations with 
some socio-demographic variables.   
Electoral participation  
Regarding electoral participation, the first issue that can be analysed is the 
evolution of registration rates. From 1988 until 2012, you had to be at least 18 years 
old in Chile to vote and voting was compulsory after you voluntary register yourself in 
the electoral registers.20 Therefore, the best way to comprehend this trend is to 
observe the evolution of the percentage of registered people over the total 
population.   
In figure 2.1, the evolution of Chilean population registration rates can be 
examined. It is first observed that the percentage of people between 18 and 29 years 
registered in 1988 was 90% and that for the last presidential election it was just 23%. It 
can also be observed from this figure that this declining trend has taken place in each 
of the three age groups of youth analysed. Moreover, it is possible to observe too that 
this declining trend has not taken place among Chileans older than 30 years since rates 
of participation have remained high with the pass of years in this group (at least 85% in 
every election). These data would be indicating, then, that Chilean youth are more 
behaviourally disaffected than other Chilean age groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 This system was recently changed for one with automatic registration and voluntary voting. This change is not 
going to be highly analysed, either in this chapter or in following ones, since all the data for the analysis were 
collected before even the new system was approved. It is only relevant to argue that the new system did not 
change the trends to be analysed in this chapter.   
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Figure 2.1 - Electoral Participation in Chilean People (+18) by Age groups (% Registered) 
           
Source: www.servel.cl www.ine.cl  
These trends can be also examined in absolute terms regarding youth. As table 2.1 
indicates, in 1988 2,676,878 youths were registered to vote, and in the last presidential 
election in 2009 those registered numbered only 762,349. This means the percentage 
of registered youths in 2009 represented only a 28% of those registered in 1988. It can 
be also observed that this declining trend is higher for younger people. The absolute 
number of registered youths has only increased in the last two presidential elections. 
This increase, however, seems to be explained by the fact that presidential elections 
have a more appealing character because after the presidential election in 2004, the 
number of registered youths declined again. 
Table 2.1 - Evolution of the Electoral Roll in Youth by Age groups 
90% 
23% 
0%
20%
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80%
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18-19
20-24
24-29
29+
Elections/Age group 18-29 18-19 20-24 24-29 
Plebiscite - 1988 2,676,878 409,109 1,164,656 1,103,113 
President - 1989 2,526,872 223,516 1,156,767 1,146,589 
Mayor - 1992 2,348,099 211,185 955,920 1,180,994 
President - 1993 2,310,660 243,979 888,343 1,178,338 
Mayor- 1996 1,798,274 99,001 638,906 1,060,367 
Deputies -1997 1,605,232 85,586 545,080 974,566 
President - 1999 1,297,821 77,652 391,672 828,497 
Mayor - 2000 1,177,961 71,692 338,143 768,126 
Deputies - 2001 1,051,368 55,479 317,263 678,626 
Mayor - 2004 714,956 38,758 224,402 451,796 
President- 2005 797,991 87,861 281,153 428,977 
Mayor - 2008 654,639 46,045 237,161 371,433 
President  - 2009 762,349 87,289 286,505 388,555 
% Last Election/Plebiscite 1988 28% 21% 25% 35% 
Source: www.servel.cl     
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Another interesting trend to be analysed is the percentage of registered youths 
with respect to the voting age population registered. As shown in Figure 2.2, the 
percentage of people from 18 to 29 years registered in 1988 represented 36% of the 
voting age population registered. This situation has also dramatically changed during 
the last twenty years since in 2009 youths represented just 9% of the voting age 
population registered. Therefore, it can be observed that there is an aging of the 
electoral roll, which is also an indication that Chilean youth are comparatively more 
behaviourally disaffected than other age groups.  
Figure 2.2 - Electoral Participation among Chilean Youth (18-29) by Age groups (% of 
Registered Youth /Voting Age Population Registered) 
 
            Source: www.servel.cl www.ine.cl 
The fact that it is known that youths only represent a small portion of the electoral 
roll has been precisely argued as one relevant factor associated with the 
engenderment of feelings of political disaffection. A report from the UNDP states that 
the fact that youths are not voting generates a vicious circle since, as they do not vote, 
politicians ignore them, which further marginalises this group (UNDP, 2010). The fact 
that as youth do not vote they become more excluded would be reproducing, then, 
higher levels of disaffection that would be later reproduced in even lower rates of 
electoral participation.21 
Rates of electoral participation can be also compared with Latin American 
countries. In the 2008 Latinobarómetro survey it was asked whether one had voted or 
not in the last presidential election. Therefore, it is possible to compare how many 
                                                          
21
 One of the effects of this vicious circle is the lack of youth public policies. This issue will be further developed in a 
chapter of this thesis.  
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people declared to have voted among the whole continent. As shown in figure 2.3, 
Chile is by far the country where the least youths declared to have voted. Just 24% of 
Chilean youths said they voted. On the other hand, in all the other countries more than 
the half of the youth population affirmed that they participated in the elections. If 
Chile is compared with the average of Latin America, there is a difference of more than 
40% with respect to the percentage of youths who declared to have voted.  
Figure 2.3 - Percentage of Latin-American people (+18) who declared to have voted in the 
last presidential election by age groups (2008) 
 
       Source: Latinobarómetro, 2008. n: 6736. 
Another relevant thing that is possible to be examined from this chart is the 
difference between the percentage of adults (+29) and youths (18-29) that declared to 
have voted. Regarding this issue, it is observed that, although in every country adults 
have higher participation rates than youths, the difference between these two groups 
is far bigger in Chile than in the rest of the continent. Chile is the Latin-American 
country with the biggest difference between the percentage of adults and youths that 
declare to have voted in the last presidential election, which indicates that Chile is the 
country of the region where youth are comparatively more behaviourally disaffected in 
comparison with older people.  
It has to be clear, however, that these percentages are difficult to compare, since 
each country has specific electoral laws that affect the number of people who vote. In 
fact, the electoral law that Chile had until 2012 has been precisely criticised because it 
exacerbated the disinterestedness of citizens, and particularly those of young people, 
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as it was based on voluntary registration and compulsory voting (Faundez, 2008). Thus, 
lower turnout levels in Chile could also be explained by this situation. Nevertheless, 
despite this fact, it is quite clear these figures show a trend that indicates that 
comparatively, Chilean youths have higher levels of behavioural disaffection than the 
rest of the continent. This statement can be also confirmed by the fact that in the last 
municipal election in 2012, where a new system based on automatic registration and 
voluntary voting was used, levels of participation declined even more. A study of La 
Tercera (2012a) indicates that among the new voting tables, which are those that 
mostly include previously unregistered young people, only 15% of voters voted. 
One last thing that can be analysed regarding electoral participation is the 
association between having declared to be registered to vote and some socio-
demographic variables. In figure 2.4 the data of the UDP’s youth survey can be 
observed. First, it is clear that there are great differences concerning vote registration 
with respect to Socio-Economic Status (SES)22. According to these data, the percentage 
of people from the high SES who declared to be registered is more than double the 
percentage of people from the low SES. It can be also observed that the older you are, 
the more likely you are to register to vote.23 Finally, it is also possible to notice that 
there is no difference in gender regarding voting.24  
Figure 2.4 - Registered Youths (18-29) by SES, Age group and Gender
 
            Source: UDP, 2009a. n: 1000. 
                                                          
22
 After applying a proportional difference test it is observed that the differences among the percentages of all the 
SES are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.  
23
 Proportional difference tests were also applied to compare age groups. It was found that all differences between 
them are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance except the one between youths from 18 to 19 and 
those between 20 and 24 years old.  
24
 The proportional difference test found that the difference between men and women regarding being registered 
to vote was not a significant one.  
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In summary, after analysing the trends and patterns of the first indicator of 
behavioural disaffection it can be stated that Chilean youths have quite low levels of 
electoral participation. This trend indicates, then, that they are expressing their 
disaffection with the political system by not exercising their democratic rights. This 
situation has worsened with the passing of years, and it is also comparatively worse 
when Chile is contrasted with other Latin American countries. Regarding the 
association between this indicator and socio-demographic variables, the most relevant 
association is the one between SES and registering to vote, which indicates that there 
is in Chile a process of gentrification of the vote (INJUV, 2008).   
Partisan membership  
The second indicator of behavioural disaffection to be analysed is partisan 
membership. The first thing that can be observed by looking at table 2.2 is that since 
the return to democracy, partisan membership has been extremely low among young 
people with declining tendencies. Nowadays, less than 1% of Chilean youths 
participate in political parties, which shows great levels of disaffection regarding this 
political institution.  
Table 2.2 - Partisan membership among Chilean Youths (15-29) 
 
 
  
 
Source: INJUV 2
nd
 - 4
th
 National Survey of Youth 
Partisan membership among Chilean youths can also be examined through data 
showing the evolution of the percentage of youths among party members within 
Chilean traditional political parties. As shown in Figure 2.5, the percentage of youths 
among party militants has dramatically declined from 1990 until today. For example, 
the PPD had 36% of youth militants in 1990 and only 2% in 2010. Moreover, it is also 
observed that currently no party has more than 5% of youth militants. These data 
Year % 
1994 2.2% 
1997 2.1% 
2000 0.9% 
2003 0.7% 
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imply that Chilean parties have clearly not been renovated themselves with the 
passing of years, as they are not appealing to new youth militants and because party 
activity is mostly dominated by adult groups. 
Figure 2.5 - percentage of Chilean Youths (18-29) among party member
s 
          Source: SERVEL (2009).  
The lack of renovation among party elites has been precisely highlighted by some 
scholars as a factor that is associated with the engenderment of feelings of political 
disaffection among youths (Dominguez, 2012). Moreover, the fact that ME-O was 
young was also argued as a relevant factor to have attracted disaffected youths as he 
embodied a message of renovation (Bunker and Navia, 2010). Therefore, it is possible 
to argue that a lack of youth descriptive representation, that is to say, lack of youth 
politicians within representative political institutions, could be a relevant source of 
current high levels of youth political disaffection.  
Finally, levels of partisan membership can be also compared among Latin 
American countries. In table 2.3 percentages of youths that declared that they 
participate in political parties can be examined. It is observed that Chile is one of the 
Latin American countries with the lowest levels of partisan membership. Only 
Argentina has a lower percentage. The average Latin American youth partisan 
membership is 18% with some countries’ rates of participation over 40%. In contrast, 
in Chile less than 4% of youths use these conventional political channels.  
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Table 2.3 - Partisan membership among Latin American youths (18-29)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In summary, it is clear there are high levels of political disaffection in Chile if this 
situation is observed through indicators of partisan membership. Participation rates 
are very low, and have declined with the passing of years. Moreover, when comparing 
with the rest of Latin America the Chilean situation can be qualified as being more 
worrisome, as it is one of the countries with lowest rates of partisan membership.25  
Party Identification   
The third and last indicator of behavioural disaffection to be analysed are levels of 
party identification. In relation to that, Figure 2.6 shows the historical trend of this 
indicator. As it is possible to observe, since 1990 until today this indicator trend has 
clearly been a declining one. The percentage of youths who declared to be identified 
with a political party was around 80% at the start of the 1990s and it is around 50% 
                                                          
25
 The fact than no more than 3% of Chilean youth participate in political parties generated the decision to exclude 
this indicator from the quantitative analysis of subsequent chapters, since a more equitable distribution within the 
answers of this question is needed to do multivariate quantitative analysis.  
Country Partisan Membership 
Paraguay 44.3% 
Dom. Republic 40.2% 
Venezuela 36.6% 
Honduras 34.1% 
Nicaragua 29.8% 
Panama 19.7% 
Colombia 17.1% 
El Salvador 16.3% 
Uruguay 16.2% 
Guatemala 12.6% 
Costa Rica 12.0% 
Bolivia 11.1% 
Mexico 10.4% 
Brazil 7.5% 
Peru 7.3% 
Ecuador 4.8% 
Chile 3.5% 
Argentina 3.4% 
Latin America 18.4% 
Ranking (Chile) 17th 
Source: Latinobarometro (2007). 
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nowadays. Moreover, it is also possible to notice that levels of identification are not 
altogether different among age groups, and between youths and the whole population 
over 18, which means that according to this indicator youths will not be more 
behaviourally disaffected than adults. Another interesting trend observed is that party 
identification is higher in times of presidential elections, as was the case in 2005 and 
2009.  
Figure 2.6 - Historical evolution of party identification by age groups in Chile
 
                      Source: CEP (1990-2009) 
Levels of party identification can also be analysed by examining differences in the 
categories of socio-demographic variables with respect to this indicator. In table 2.4 it 
is possible to notice that concerning this indicator, youths from lower SES are those 
most politically disaffected. Medium and low SES have similar levels of identification 
but the high SES is the one with highest rates. Regarding age groups, the main 
difference is between those from 25 to 29 years, being the oldest ones those most 
identified. Finally, with respect to gender it seems there are no differences.  
Table 2.4 - Party identification by SES, age group and gender in Chilean youth (2003)26 
 
                                                          
26
 For these associations it was not possible to do proportional differences tests since the weight variable of this 
data base is based on an expansion factor. This situation does not allow to know the sample size of each of the 
groups which are necessary to do the tests.  
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2.2.2 Linking behavioural and attitudinal Disaffection 
Even though patterns and forms of indicators of attitudinal disaffection have not 
yet been analysed, it is necessary to now test if the already described variables that 
measure behavioural disaffection are associated with indicators of attitudinal 
disaffection. It was already observed that Chilean youths are quite disengaged. 
Therefore, it is now necessary to test if disengagement is an expression of feelings of 
discontent, as rejecting formal channels of participation could be also an expression of 
feelings of conformity or disinterest. This assumption is tested especially because 
some scholars have claimed that in some societies, low turnout levels might be 
explained because when countries become more democratically stable and generate 
sustained growth, there are less important things at stake in politics and it loses 
relevance (Lehman, 1998).  
Since the return to democracy, Chile has had high rates of economic growth and a 
remarkable democratic stability. Therefore, it could be the case that low political 
participation is explained more by citizens’ conformity rather than by feelings of 
disaffection. Moreover, low levels of behavioural disaffection could also be explained 
by feelings of disinterest that do not carry critical opinions of the political system. 
 The way to test this assumption is by observing whether there is any association 
between being registered to vote and indicators of attitudinal disaffection. If 
associations are found between these variables, it could be then surmised that people 
are principally not voting because there is discontent rather than because they are 
complacent or uninterested. This is tested by conducting a binary logistic regression 
with the answer to the question about being registered to vote as the dependent 
variable, and indicators of attitudinal disaffection and some control variables as the 
independent variables.  
The data are taken from youths between 18 and 29 years old who responded the 
fifth national survey of the INJUV. As shown in table 2.5, controlling for gender, SES 
and age, the three indicators of attitudinal disaffection are significantly associated at 
the 99% confidence level with the probability of being registered to vote. The three 
associations are also in the expected direction; that is to say, the more attitudinal 
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disaffection you have, the less likely you are to register yourself to vote. It can be 
argued, then, that the more confidence you have in political parties and congress, the 
more likely it is that you will register yourself to vote. Moreover, people who support 
democracy have more chances to participate in elections than those who do not 
support it. 
Table 2.5 - Binary logistic regression model for electoral registration in Chilean youths 
(2006)27 
 
  
 
 
 
Since both measures of confidence in political institutions are ordinal variables, the 
probabilities of registering to vote can be also examined through some fitted 
probabilities that fix the values of the other variables. In figure 2.7 it can be graphically 
observed that, controlling for the other independent variables, when youths increase 
their confidence in either political parties or congress, the probability of registering to 
vote increases. Moreover, it can be also seen that the effect of confidence in political 
parties is higher than the one of confidence in the congress.  
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 The dependent variable is based on the question of registration to vote where 1 is being registered and 0 not 
being registered. Among variables measuring confidence the higher the score the more confidence you have. In the 
case of  the variable measuring satisfaction with democracy the higher the score the more satisfied you are. Finally, 
the variable support for democracy was recoded into a dummy variable where 1 means that the respondent 
supports democracy and 0 that he/she does not support it.  
28
 The symbol * means that the association is significant at the 99% level of confidence.  
Variables B Exp(B) P value
28
 
Attitudinal Disaffection 
Confidence - Pol. Parties 0.436 1.547 < 0.001* 
Confidence - Congress 0.148 1.160 0.001* 
Dem. Support 0.264 1.302 0.001* 
Control Variables 
Gender -0.064 0.938 0.376 
Age 0.196 1.216 < 0.001* 
SES -0.297 0.743 < 0.001* 
Constant -5.638 0.004 < 0.001* 
Source: INJUV, 2006. n: 4846. 
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Figure 2.7 - Fitted probabilities of Chilean youths (18-29) of registering to vote at different 
levels of confidence in political parties and the congress 29
 
            Source: INJUV, 2006. n: 4846 
The evidence suggests, then, that in the case of Chilean youths the rejection of 
formal channels of participation shows feelings of disaffection rather than feelings of 
conformity or disinterest. People who do not vote also orient themselves negatively to 
the political system. Therefore, it is not the case that they are principally not voting 
because things are going well or because they are not interested in the fate of society. 
In this sense, these indicators of behavioural disaffection can be observed as part of a 
general pattern of political disaffection that includes both behaviours and attitudes.  
2.2.3 Attitudinal disaffection indicators 
The next section analyses trends and forms of three indicators of attitudinal 
disaffection: confidence in political parties, confidence in the congress and democracy 
support. Each of them is examined through its historical evolution, comparisons with 
other Latin American countries and associations with socio-demographic variables.  
The first issue to be analysed is the historical evolution of these three indicators. In 
figure 2.8 it is possible to first observe that levels of democracy support declined 
sharply since 1999 and increased since 2001. By 2008, this measure of disaffection 
seems to exhibit similar levels to the ones at the beginning of the new democratic 
regime. Therefore, despite some fluctuations, it cannot be stated that with the passing 
                                                          
29
 For this figure and for all the analysis based on the Latinobarómetro survey the indicators are summarised in the 
following form: The percentage of democracy support refers to those ones who believe that “Democracy is 
preferable to any other kind of government”. For both variables measuring confidence the percentage is based on 
those youth who have some or a lot confidence in a four-point scale of confidence.  
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of years, Chilean youths have increased their levels of disaffection with democratic 
values.  
Figure 2.8 - Evolution of the indicators of attitudinal disaffection in Chilean youths (18-29) 
between 1995 and 200830
 
              Source: Latinobarómetro (1995-2008) 
The same conclusion cannot be made, however, about the two measures of 
confidence in political institutions. Confidence in both political parties and the 
congress declined strongly from 1997 until 2003, after which the two indicators 
increased their levels but only until the mid 2000s. After that, while confidence in the 
congress stabilised since 2005 at significantly lower levels than those of the mid-1990s, 
confidence in political parties declined again. It is observed then that, in general terms, 
there have been declining trends in these two indicators since 1995. The most negative 
tendency, however, has been the one of confidence in political parties. In 1995, for 
example, 31% of youths declared they have confidence in political parties, whereas in 
2008 this percentage was only 13.  
These three measures of attitudinal disaffection can be also analysed by 
comparing Chilean youths with other Latin American countries. Table 2.6 shows 
measures of these four indicators. The first thing to highlight is that in none of the 
measures are Chilean youths well-ranked.  
 
                                                          
30
 For this figure and for all the analysis based on the Latinobarómetro survey the indicators are summarised in the 
following form: The percentage of democracy support refers to those ones who believe that “Democracy is 
preferable to any other kind of government”. For both variables measuring confidence the percentage is based on 
those youth who have some or a lot confidence in a four point scale of confidence.  
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Table 2.6 - Indicators of attitudinal disaffection in Latin American youths (18-29)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The indicator that shows the most negative results is again confidence in political 
parties as Chile in 2008 was the lowest ranked country of the continent regarding 
confidence in this political institution. With respect to disaffection with the values of a 
democratic regime, Chile ranks a little better since it is the eleventh placed country for 
democratic support. However, this percentage is not close to the continent’s average 
of 60%. Finally, regarding confidence in the congress, Chile has a similar score to the 
whole continent and is ranked eighth out of 17 countries.  
Indicators of confidence in political institutions can be also compared with 
countries across the whole world with the data of the World Values Survey (WVS).31 
According the last wave of this survey in 2005, Chile is ranked 39 among 54 countries 
regarding confidence in the congress among people from 18 to 29. For the case of 
political parties, Chile occupies the 42nd position out of 55 countries.  
                                                          
31
 This survey does not have questions related to democracy support, so Chile cannot be compared worldwide 
regarding this indicator. 
 
 
Conf. 
Pol. Parties 
Conf. 
Congress 
Democracy 
Support 
El Salvador 39.6% 52.3% 57.6% 
Uruguay 36.4% 52.4% 76.4% 
Venezuela 31.9% 38.8% 79.6% 
Guatemala 28.7% 27.9% 43.6% 
Colombia 26.4% 27.5% 60.1% 
Paraguay 23.1% 42.8% 49.9% 
Costa Rica 22.5% 31.3% 65.7% 
Nicaragua 20.5% 24.6% 58.7% 
Honduras 18.3% 30.3% 47.1% 
Brazil 17.9% 31.8% 52.4% 
Mexico 16.1% 34.7% 45.5% 
Panama 15.7% 16.7% 63.7% 
Argentina 15.5% 35.6% 58.5% 
Ecuador 15.0% 38.0% 65.7% 
Peru 14.3% 12.9% 49.4% 
Bolivia 13.8% 27.8% 74.1% 
Chile 12.9% 33.4% 54.2% 
Latin America 21.8% 33.2% 59.9% 
Ranking (Chile) 17th 8th 11
th
 
Source: Latinobarómetro, 2008.n:6736. 
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Since Chile comparatively has the lowest levels of confidence in political parties on 
the continent, it is necessary to conduct a deeper analysis of this situation. This is done 
through the comparison between Chile and other Latin American countries regarding 
their historical levels of this indicator and their differences between youths and adults 
concerning this disaffection's measure.  
In relation to the first issue, it can be observed in table 2.7 that in 1996 Chile was 
well-placed among Latin American countries, being the 5th country with most 
confidence. However, this is far from the present situation as Chile declined to the 
10th position in 2002 and to 17th position in 2008. The evidence suggests, then, that 
Chile has not historically had the worst levels of confidence in political parties of the 
region and the situation of 2008 is the product of a declining tendency that started in 
the mid-1990s.  
Table 2.7 - Evolution of political party confidence in Latin American youths (18-29)  
 
 
 
Another interesting issue that can be observed from this table is that those 
countries with the lowest levels of confidence in 1996 and in 2002 were undergoing 
 1996 2002 2008 
Paraguay 36.1% 7.6% 23.1% 
Nicaragua 32.8% 13.6% 20.5% 
Uruguay 31.4% 21.6% 36.4% 
El Salvador 30.2% 18.2% 39.6% 
Chile 28.5% 12.5% 12.9% 
Guatemala 25.6% 9.8% 28.7% 
Panama 24.5% 15.5% 15.7% 
Honduras 23.9% 21.8% 18.3% 
Peru 22.7% 16.1% 14.3% 
Ecuador 20.2% 8.1% 15.0% 
Mexico 19.2% 9.4% 16.1% 
Bolivia 18.8% 10.5% 13.8% 
Costa Rica 16.8% 26.9% 22.5% 
Brazil 14.9% 12.8% 17.9% 
Colombia 14.5% 10.3% 26.4% 
Argentina 13.2% 4.1% 15.5% 
Venezuela 10.6% 17.1% 31.9% 
Latin America 22.4% 13.8% 21.8% 
Ranking (Chile) 5th 10th 17
th
 
Source: Latinobarómetro (1996-2008). 
90 
 
relevant crises of political representation during those time periods (Venezuela and 
Argentina). For example, it is shown that only 10.6% of Venezuelan youths had 
confidence in political parties in 1996, which is congruent with several analyses of 
Venezuelan democracy that argue that there was an important political and social 
crisis during the 1990s. Coppedege (1994) argues that in this period people began to 
criticize Venezuela’s two-party political system as they felt that politicians only cared 
about power and that they were not promoting a fair distribution of the country’s 
wealth, which led to questioning one of the most stable democracies of the region at 
that time. The Chilean case is clearly different. However, the fact that Chile’s 
confidence levels are similar and that the causes of those crises also appear to mirror 
what has been argued to be happening in Chile today should give cause for concern.  
Table 2.8 - Confidence in Political Parties in Latin-American countries by age group32 
 
 
 
Concerning the comparison between youths and adult’s levels of confidence in 
political parties, it is observed in table 2.8 that Chile is the Latin-American country with 
                                                          
32
 After applying a proportional difference test for each country it is observed that only in Chile, Perú and Colombia 
the difference between adults and youths are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.  
Country Youth (18-29) Adults (+29) (Adults - Youth) 
Chile 13% 18% 5%* 
Nicaragua 20% 25% 5% 
Honduras 18% 22% 4% 
Brasil 18% 22% 4% 
El Salvador 40% 42% 3% 
Uruguay 36% 39% 2% 
México 16% 18% 2% 
Panamá 16% 17% 1% 
Paraguay 23% 24% 1% 
Venezuela 32% 33% 1% 
Ecuador 15% 15% % 
Dom. Republic 28% 27% -1% 
Bolivia 14% 12% -2% 
Costa Rica 23% 20% -3% 
Argentina 15% 13% -3% 
Guatemala 29% 24% -5% 
Perú 14% 9% -5%* 
Colombia 26% 18% -8%* 
Latin-America 22% 22% 0% 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2008) n:6736 
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the biggest difference between these two groups in favour of adults. Moreover, it is 
also observed that among those countries where youths have less confidence than 
adults Chile is the only one where this difference is statistically significant at the 5% 
level of significance. To this effect, these data would come to support too the 
statement that Chilean youths are particularly more disaffected than other age groups 
of Chilean society.  
Table 2.9 - Indicators of attitudinal disaffection in Chilean youths (15-29) by SEG, age group 
and gender 33 
The last analysis to be made about the indicators of this second dimension is about 
possible associations between them and some socio-demographic variables. In table 
2.9, levels of democracy support at different socio-economic groups (SEG) can be 
firstly observed. There is a clear association between these two variables since the two 
highest SEG have much higher levels of democracy support.34 Those youths in the C2 
group have 11% more democracy support than the youth average and those in the 
lowest group have 10% less than the average. Therefore, social deprivation seems to 
play an important role in determining youth support for the values of democracy. It is 
also possible to notice there is not clear tendency regarding age groups and that 
                                                          
33
 For the analysis based on the surveys of the INJUV, the indicators are summarised in the following form: the 
percentage of democracy support refers to those ones who believe that “democracy is preferable to any other kind 
of government”. The percentage of democracy satisfaction is based on the sum of those who are satisfied and very 
satisfied in a three-point scale of satisfaction. Finally, for both variables measuring confidence, the percentage is 
based on those youths who have total confidence in a five-point scale of confidence. These scales are different to 
the ones of the Latinobarómetro survey, so both surveys cannot be directly compared regarding these indicators.  
34
 After applying a proportional difference test it was observed that differences among the percentages of the 
groups ABC1 and C2 and all the others SEGs are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.  
 
 
 SEG Age Gender 
Indicators Total ABC1 C2 C3 D E 15-19 20-24 25-29 Men Women 
Democracy 
Support 
64,0% 72,5% 74,8% 
63,8
% 
57,8% 53,7% 62,5% 66,1% 63,5% 64,8% 63,3% 
Conf. 
Congress 
9.8% 12.6% 9.9% 9.1% 9.1% 12.3% 10.2% 9.2% 10.1% 11.4% 8.3% 
Conf. 
Pol. Parties 
7.2% 8.9% 7.4% 7.0% 6.4% 9.1% 8.0% 7.1% 6.4% 7.8% 6.6% 
Source: INJUV, 2006. n: 4846. 
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gender does not make a difference with respect to this indicator. 35  
In relation to the association between SEG and confidence in the congress, a 
strange situation occurs since the highest percentages of confidence are in the highest 
and in the lowest SEG. There are differences, then, between SEGs regarding this 
measure of disaffection but the tendency is not the same one found for the other 
indicators. Youths from the E SEG have quite high levels of confidence in the congress 
and those ones with the lowest confidence are in the C3 and D group.36 Age groups 
again do not seem to show differences among them with respect to this indicator of 
disaffection. It is also observed that men seem to have more confidence in the 
congress than women.37  
Finally, the indicator of confidence of political parties also shows some 
associations with socio-demographic variables. With the exception of youths from the 
E group, it can be seen that the lower your SEG, the lower your confidence in political 
parties. Moreover, the older you are the less confidence you have in this institution. 
Finally, women seem to have less confidence than men38.  
The evidence suggests even more strongly, therefore, that Chilean youths are 
principally expressing political disaffection rather than just disengagement or 
conformity since they also show high levels of attitudinal disaffection.  What is also 
important to highlight is the fact these attitudes are not expressed in the same 
magnitude regarding each of the elements of the political regime. Levels of attitudinal 
disaffection are much higher with respect to the institutions than to the principles of 
the regime. Moreover, among institutions it was examined that political parties are the 
most rejected one.  
                                                          
35
 After applying proportional difference tests the only statistically significant difference at the 5%  level of 
significance is the one between youths who are between 15 and 19 years old and those one who are between 20 
and 24 years old.  
36
 After applying a proportional difference test it was found that the only statistically significant differences at the 
5% level of significance were the ones between the percentages of the groups ABC1 and C3 and D and between 
youth from the SES E and C3 and D groups.  
37
 There are no statistically significant differences between age groups and a statistically significant difference 5% 
level of significance was found between men and women.  
38
 Despite of these tendencies, no statistically significant differences were found regarding to SES and gender. The 
only statistically significant difference at the 5% level of significance found was the one between youth who are 
between 15 and 19 years and youths who are between 24 and 29 years old.  
93 
 
 2.3 Testing the apathy hypothesis 
Throughout all the examined evidence, it was concluded that Chilean youths are 
highly politically disaffected and not only disengaged. One last issue that merits more 
analysis is to observe if Chilean youths can be also described as politically apathetic in 
order to understand what kind of political disaffection is currently being developed in 
Chile. This is necessary to be analysed, since youths might be expressing a lot of 
hostility towards the political system but without expressing interest in the fate of 
society. Moreover, as the main hypothesis of this thesis is that political disaffection is 
associated with a particular way of functioning of the current political system, it 
necessary to observe, using Mouffe’s terms, if they are rejecting just a particular way 
of doing politics or also ‘the political’. That is to say, to understand if youths are 
interested in the collective will of society or not.39 The apathy hypothesis is tested in 
this section by analysing indicators of non-conventional political participation, social 
participation, willingness of participation and critical visions of current elements of the 
political system. Moreover, some perceptions of politically-involved youths and 
politicians regarding this same issue are also presented based on qualitative data. 40 
The first issue to be analysed is the indicators of non-conventional political 
participation. The inclusion of these indicators is justified based on Collin Hay’s 
statement that alternative modes of political participation "are an indication that we 
cannot simply read disaffection or disengagement from formal politics as an index 
either of political apathy or of the demise of politics itself" (2006: 27).   
 
 
 
                                                          
39
 Political apathy is relevant to be tested in the case of Chilean youths since the beginning of the 90s in Chile there 
has been a relevant academic trend that has been expended to the rest of society claiming that Chilean youths are 
totally apathetic by using the phrase “ellos no están ni ahí”, which literally means “they are not even there” and 
that indicates an attitude of indifference and disinterest.   
40
 Apart from this section, the fact that Chilean youths are interested in the wellbeing of society and that they 
advocate for a different way of doing politics will be also examined through three case studies to be developed in 
subsequent chapters: a) the presidential candidature of Marco Enriquez-Ominami in 2009, b) the secondary 
movement of 2006 and c) the education movement of 2011-2012.  
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Table 2.10 - Percentage of Latin American youths (16-29) that have done or would do some 
non-conventional political activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In table 2.10 it is possible to check current rates of non-conventional participation 
and the participatory potential of them with two indicators. It can be observed that 
Chile is poorly ranked (15th) regarding percentage of youths who have signed a 
petition. However, it is relevant to highlight that 50% of Chilean youths have signed a 
petition or would do this action, which is near the continent’s average and brings 
positive evidence to indicate that Chilean youths are not totally apathetic. Regarding 
the second indicator, Chile is the sixth-placed country in the region in terms of rate of 
participation in authorised demonstrations. Moreover, Chileans’ current participation 
in protests, as well as the sum of the rate of participation and its potential are over the 
media of Latin America, which also somehow supports the statement that Chilean 
youths are not apathetic.  
Table 2.11 also brings valuable data about non-conventional participation among 
Chilean youths that supports the statement that they are not apathetic. These data are 
 Signing a petition 
Taking part in authorized 
demonstrations 
Country Have done 
Have Done 
+ 
Would Do 
Have done 
Have Done 
+ 
Would Do 
Uruguay 25.3% 63.3% 16.9% 51.9% 
Argentina 23.8% 73.7% 12.8% 54.2% 
Venezuela 23.1% 57.3% 16.6% 44.5% 
Mexico 20.7% 66.9% 8.9% 50.9% 
Colombia 18.4% 63.8% 21.8% 59.9% 
Panama 18.3% 51.5% 6.1% 46.1% 
Peru 14.4% 55.6% 10.1% 50.7% 
Costa Rica 14.3% 45.9% 14.3% 42.1% 
El Salvador 13.9% 24.1% 3.1% 19.0% 
Guatemala 13.7% 52.6% 8.4% 47.1% 
Bolivia 13.5% 41.2% 10.0% 38.3% 
Brazil 13.5% 62.2% 17.1% 68.2% 
Paraguay 13.3% 72.0% 10.8% 63.5% 
Honduras 12.5% 34.2% 7.2% 30.2% 
Chile 11.7% 49.5% 13.0% 46.2% 
Nicaragua 11.2% 33.0% 8.6% 33.6% 
Ecuador 8.6% 39.3% 7.7% 33.3% 
Dom. Republic 5.7% 37.5% 2.4% 24.7% 
Latin America 15.0% 51.0% 10.8% 44.7% 
Ranking Chile 15
th
 11
th
 6
th
 9
th
 
Source: Latinobarómetro, 2008. n:6736.  
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particularly relevant since they include both information about new ways of 
participation that are relevant to youths linked to online participation and updated 
information, since it was collected after the beginning of massive education protests 
that have taken place in Chile since 2011. 
Table 2.11 - Percentage of Chilean youths (18-29) who have been involved in non-
conventional political activities in the last year by SES, age group and gender 
The first thing observed is that almost half of Chilean youths have expressed an 
opinion about public issues through social networks. Moreover, approximately a third 
of them have participated in public manifestations, joined political causes in social 
networks and expressed their opinions regarding public issues in blogs. It is also 
possible to observe that for the last three issues, youths from higher SES are more 
participative. This evidence generates the conclusion that a not insignificant number of 
Chilean youths might not have used these means of participation, not because they are 
not interested in social issues but because they don’t have the resources to do so. A 
similar conclusion can be made when it is observed that older youths have participated 
much less in public manifestations over the last year, as this fact might also be 
explained by a matter of time rather than indifference.  
Social participation can also be a way of observing if Chilean youths are apathetic 
or not in the sense that, if they would be participating in several organisations, this 
would indicate that they are not individualistic and that they are not uninterested 
about what is happening in their social environment.  
 SES Age group Gender 
Activities Total ABC1 C2 C3 D-E 18-19 20-24 25-29 Men Women 
Has expressed an opinion 
about an issue or public 
interest event through social 
networks 
44.0 48.3% 53.5% 39.3% 43.3% 49.4% 43.4% 42.5% 46.3% 41.5% 
Has participated in public 
manifestations 
31.6 37.9% 42.1% 26.6% 28.8% 43.0% 32.7% 25.9% 34.2% 29.1% 
Has joined political, public or 
citizen's causes in social 
networks 
29.3 40.0% 40.9% 23.3% 26.9% 36.7% 27.9% 27.6% 29.8% 28.8% 
Has expressed an opinion 
about an issue or public 
interest event through a blog 
27.0 37.9% 33.9% 25.0% 20.2% 25.6% 25.7% 28.5% 32.8% 21.2% 
Source: UDP, 2011, n: 477. 
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Table 2.12- Social Participation in Chilean Youth (15-29) by SES, Age group and Gender 
By looking at the percentages of table 2.12 it is possible to state that rates of social 
participation are not low for Chilean youths. The fact that 56% participate at least in 
one organisation suggests that they are involved in social networks and that they are 
not mostly individualistic. This percentage takes more relevance if it is compared with 
rates of formal participation. The percentage of youths who are socially involved is 
more than double the percentage of Chilean youths that are registered to vote (23%). 
This indicates that the rejection of some formal means of participation is clearly not 
merely the expression of apathetic youths. Likewise, it also brings evidence against the 
social cohesion explanation for political disaffection. The fact that youths prefer more 
social than political organisations can be further ratified by the fact that political 
parties have the lowest rate of participation among the organisations included in this 
survey.  
Another relevant thing to state is that, as it was observed in the case of non-
conventional participation, the potential for larger social participation seems to be also 
important. Youths from older age groups and from lower SES participate significantly 
 SES Age group Gender 
Type of Organization Total ABC1 C2 C3 D E 15-19 20-24 25-29 Men Women 
Sports club 25.6% 30.7% 24.3% 26.7% 25.2% 25.1% 29.6% 22.7% 24.0% 38.3% 12.6% 
Virtual Community 12.5% 13.5% 15.7% 13.7% 9.9% 6.2% 15.5% 12.3% 9.3% 13.2% 11.9% 
Cultural or artistic 
organisation 
11.8% 17.3% 15.0% 10.7% 8.7% 8.6% 15.4% 10.6% 8.8% 11.9% 11.7% 
Group that helps other 
people 
9.9% 20.3% 11.7% 8.0% 8.2% 5.7% 9.8% 10.2% 9.8% 9.0% 10.8% 
Football supporters 8.9% 6.6% 9.7% 9.1% 8.9% 7.2% 11.5% 7.5% 7.5% 13.1% 4.7% 
Hobbie or  playgroup 7.2% 9.8% 8.90% 8.8% 4.6% 4.5% 10.4% 6.5% 4.4% 9.5% 4.9% 
Student centre  7.0% 15.7% 8.3% 5.6% 5.1% 5.6% 12.8% 5.1% 2.4% 7.0% 7.1% 
Group or urban tribe 6.5% 7.2% 7.2% 6.3% 6.2% 4.2% 11.5% 5.0% 2.3% 8.4% 4.5% 
Group that is organised to 
fight for a specific current 
cause 
5.9% 11.0% 7.3% 4.4% 4.5% 5.1% 9.1% 5.6% 2.4% 6.4% 5.3% 
Organisation that advocates  
a cause or ideal 
5.4% 12.2% 6.5% 5.0% 3.2% 4.8% 5.2% 5.6% 5.4% 5.1% 5.7% 
Neighborhood organisation 4.3% 3.0% 4.0% 2.9% 5.7% 4.5% 2.6% 3.7% 6.8% 3.5% 5.0% 
Scouts 4.0% 8.8% 4.9% 3.6% 2.8% 1.7% 5.5% 3.4% 2.8% 4.0% 4.0% 
Union or profesional 
organisation 
2.9% 5.4% 3.4% 2.8% 2.2% 1.4% 0.6% 1.9% 6.6% 3.9% 1.8% 
Political party 1.4% 3.3% 2.0% 0.5% 1.0% 0.8% 1.2% 1.4% 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% 
Participate  in at least one 
organisation 
55.5% 66.9% 60.6% 53.7% 51.5% 45.0% 63.1% 52.5% 49.9% 64.6% 46.1% 
Source: INJUV, 2009.n:5235. 
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less than other groups, which indicates that with more resources social participation 
should also increase.  
The last types of quantitative indicators that can contribute to generating evidence 
to test the apathy hypothesis are questions that ask about the willingness of political 
participation and opinions about current elements of the political system. This part 
especially brings evidence to observe whether Chilean youths would be interested in 
formal politics if it were developed differently.  
In table 2.13 some indicators about the willingness of Chilean youths to participate 
in political organisations can be observed. The interest in being part of a political party 
is very low (9.2%) and has to be interpreted as an indicator of political disaffection, 
rather than apathy. The percentage of youths who would participate in organisations 
that advocate a social cause, on the other hand, is quite high. 57% of respondents 
would participate in a political organisation if a broad definition of ‘the political’ is 
used. It is also observed from this table that there are differences among SES, age 
groups and gender regarding this indicator. However, the fact that in every group more 
than the half of youths has the willingness to participate in organisations that advocate 
a social cause is very remarkable. The analysis of this indicator strongly suggests, then, 
that Chilean youths are not apathetic. 
Table 2.13 - Percentage of Chilean youths (15-29) who would do some political actions and 
have critical political opinions by SES, age group, and gender 
 SES Age group Gender 
 Total ABC1 C2 C3 D E 15-19 20-24 25-29 Men Women 
Interested of being part of a 
Political Party 
9.2% 15.2% 11.6% 8.7% 5.9% 8.3% 8.3% 8.7% 10.8% 9.6% 8.8% 
Would participate in 
organisation s that advocate 
a social cause (Volunteer 
Work, Environment, Human 
Rights, Women´s rights, etc.) 
56.7% 72.9% 61.3% 53.2% 51.5% 52.2% 56.2% 60.7% 52.5% 53.2% 60.2% 
It is necessary to make 
changes to the Political 
Electoral System 
69.0% 75.5% 75.0% 68.3% 64.2% 57.5% 63.2% 71.2% 73.0% 68.1% 69.9% 
Would like Civic Education to 
be improved 
85.7% 84.9% 87.9% 86.8% 84.0% 80.6% 84.7% 88.3% 83.8% 85.2% 86.2% 
Source: INJUV, 2009. n:5235. 
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One last thing to highlight about these two indicators is the fact that just 9% of 
respondents would participate in a political party and 57% would participate in an 
organisation interested in advocating social causes. This fact clearly evidences that 
Chilean youths do not perceive that political parties are organisations where social 
causes can be advocated and they prefer to organise themselves through different 
mechanisms. Indeed, these facts became evident in the case studies that will be later 
analysed to deepen the idea that youths are not apathetic. This is because in the 2011-
2012 movement people heavily rejected political parties, demanding more 
autonomous organisations, and since one of the main proposals of ME-O was to break 
with a duopolic political system that prevents the generation of substantive changes.  
From table 2.13 percentages of youths who manifest critical opinions of a couple 
of elements of the political system can be also checked. It is observed that almost 70% 
of them would make changes to the political electoral system, which is quite relevant 
because this system has been one of the most criticised elements of the current 
Chilean democracy. In this sense, the fact that a very high proportion of Chilean youths 
criticise this system shows they are not apathetic but that they are just rejecting a 
particular way of doing politics. Moreover, the fact that the higher the SES, the more 
critical the attitude regarding the electoral system, might also suggest there would be 
more criticisms if all youths had the capacity to acquire similar political information.  
The second element criticised by youths has to do with the improvement of civic 
education. Civic education in Chile was removed from the compulsory curriculums of 
secondary education in the mid 90s during the government of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 
and its quality is currently very poor. Therefore, the fact that 86% of Chilean youths 
would like to improve civic education, and that this percentage is over 80% in every 
social group, evidently suggests they are interested in what is happening in their 
society. Chilean youths perceive that civic education is quite bad today, and that its 
improvement is of vital importance, which indicates that they are not apathetic.  
The analyses of these two last indicators suggest Chilean youths are advocating for 
a different kind of politics. Moreover, they also indicate that the sources of political 
disaffection have to be found in the proper functioning of the CPS. A youth survey 
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from the Diego Portales University also provides evidence in favour of this statement. 
The results of the study show, for example, that 87% of youths think the fact that 
authorities convoke to plebiscites to solve important matters is fundamental for the 
functioning of democracy. Furthermore, 79% of the youth population also think that it 
is fundamental for democracy that any person can present law projects to be discussed 
in the Congress (UDP, 2010a). These two things are quite far from being elements of 
the current Chilean democracy and the fact that Chilean youths believe they are very 
important indicates some relevant elements of a way of doing politics that would be 
more appealing to them. In fact, several of these new elements have been part of 
political forms that have already appealed to disaffected youths as both the 2011-2012 
movement and MEO’s candidacy promoted more direct mechanisms of participation 
such as the existence of plebiscites to decide important social matters.  
By observing all this quantitative data it can be argued that Chilean youths are not 
quite apathetic. When qualitative data are also analysed the same conclusion can be 
obtained, since both politically-involved youths and politicians believe Chilean youths 
are just rejecting formal politics, and particularly political parties, and that it is not the 
case that they are not worried about the fate of society. 
"I would say that young people are "not even there" with parties rather than with 
politics. So, I would not say that young people disagree with participating in politics. 
An expression of this is that in student movements when important things are 
achieved, many youth are added. Many students with none political militancy link 
themselves to the movement as a product of general interest." Mariano, member 
of a left-wing youth organisation.  
"I do not think that young people are "not even there" with politics. They are not 
even there with parties but they are there with politics. I think that if you talk to 
young people they are able to problematise about the challenges that Chile is 
facing. They are involved in pastoral work. They participate in sports issues. They 
participate a lot in issues of volunteering." Hugo, member of the youth division of 
the PPD.  
Politically-involved youths perceive a rejection towards ‘politics’ and not towards 
‘the political’, using Chantal Mouffe’s distinction. They perceive that many youths 
participate in several organisations such as student movements or sportive 
associations. Moreover, it is also believed that common youths do have opinions of 
relevant public issues. In this sense, Chilean youths would be interested in the 
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wellbeing of society but opt to channel these concerns through more informal 
organisations rather than through traditional political parties.  
The political class itself has also the impression that Chilean youths are not 
apathetic, as it is believed they are aware of what is happening currently in Chile and 
they participate in other types of organisations. There is also the perception that a 
portion of young people have apathetic feelings. However, these feelings would not be 
the majority.  
"I have the feeling that young people are very interested in politics. They are ‘not 
even there’ about being in a political party or with politicians. They give opinions of 
what happens, of what politicians do and the decisions taken by the government. I 
think they do politics every day." Woman, deputy of RN.  
"Many young people have activities that we would have to categorise as political 
because they are young people involved in social movements, youths participating 
in protests, young people involved in human rights institutions, gender, sexual 
diversity. I think it is more a rejection of formal politics. There is a segment of young 
people and society that expresses nihilism and indifference. But I do not think that 
is the most representative phenomenon." Jorge Arrate, ex presidential candidate 
of the non-parliamentary left wing.   
In summary, the evidence observed suggests political apathy is not something that 
affects the great majority of Chilean youths. Without doubt there is an important 
proportion of apathetic youth. However, apathy levels are by no means higher than 
political disaffection levels. Therefore, it is not possible to argue that political 
disaffection is explained by a disinterest of the youth in the fate of society. Chilean 
youths are showing their interest in ‘the political’ by using other methods of 
participation, through the participation in social organisations and by having the 
willingness to be more socially active. Moreover, they are also very critical of certain 
elements of the current political system. These situations indicate that Chilean youths 
would be more interested in formal politics if it functioned differently, which 
demonstrates that political disaffection is associated with the proper way the CPS is 
working. This statement is also demonstrated by the fact that diverse movements in 
the last time have been able to attract youths and that is why they will be analysed in 
subsequent chapters in order to develop this argument.   
 2.4 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to map the patterns and forms of political 
101 
 
disaffection among Chilean youths since the return to democracy in 1990, and to 
observe if Chilean youths are also apathetic. This chapter fits the main goal of this 
research, since one necessary step to understand the factors associated with political 
disaffection is to comprehend descriptively the phenomenon being studied.  
The first main observation from the analyses is that Chilean youths present quite 
high levels of behavioural disaffection and that their levels are comparatively higher 
than the one of other age groups. It was observed that youths are the group that are 
using less the channels of participation given by the formal structures of the political 
system as they have very low rates of voting registration, partisan membership and 
party identification. Furthermore, it was observed that these levels are low, even when 
compared with some other Latin American countries, and that they are the product of 
a declining tendency that started in the mid-1990s.  
Low levels of political participation have been a highly-discussed topic in Chile. 
There are several positions that analyse these same trends and that also try to 
determine how worrisome this situation is. There are some authors who argue that 
this phenomenon is not as negative as it could be thought, because it might reflect 
feelings of contentment with a system that has provided political and economic 
development (Lehmann, 1999). Other positions believe the electoral law explains 
much of this situation (INJUV, 2008). Finally, other scholars state that low participation 
is undoubtedly reflecting feelings of hostility (Carlin, 2006, 2004).   
These findings contribute to this discussion given that the analysed evidence also 
suggests associations between indicators of attitudinal disaffection and the fact of 
being registered to vote. In this sense, the results obtained could confirm the 
assumption that rejecting formal channels of participation can be understood as 
expressions of feelings of hostility towards the political system. Current low levels of 
participation could be also explained by the effects of electoral law and by the fact that 
rates were previously higher due to the historical moment Chile experienced in 1988 
with the transition. However, based on the results of the regression analyses, the 
observation that Chilean levels are much lower than those of other Latin American 
countries, and the fact that a new electoral system produced even less participation, it 
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cannot be denied that low rates of participation are expressing political disaffection 
and not conformity or disinterest with the political system.  
With respect to attitudinal disaffection, it was observed that current levels are also 
quite low. In relation to this issue, it is interesting to highlight that there are great 
differences regarding the patterns of their diverse forms. Although levels of democracy 
support are not high, they have not decreased since the return to democracy. On the 
other hand, levels of confidence in the congress, and especially in political parties, are 
currently very low and have declined sharply with the passing of years. 
Chilean youths are also expressing then through their attitudes high feelings of 
hostility towards the political system, with political parties the element at which these 
feelings are principally directed. Chile has the lowest rate of youth confidence in 
political parties in Latin America and the highest difference between youths and 
adult’s levels of confidence in favour of adults. Moreover, it was also observed that 
this indicator is the one with the strongest association with levels of electoral 
participation. This situation is particularly interesting since political parties are 
comparatively more relevant to the Chilean case than for other Latin American 
countries. Political parties are the most important form of political representation in 
Chile as other forms of representation are absent in the Chilean context (Panizza, 
2009). They have historically been the central institution of the political system in 
Chile, and their role in achieving today’s high levels of political and economic stability 
has been crucial.  
Other relevant findings obtained from these analyses were associations found 
between socio-demographic variables and indicators of both dimensions of political 
disaffection. SES was associated with almost all indicators in the direction that people 
from lower SES were found to be more disaffected. Regarding some indicators of 
attitudinal disaffection, something unexpected arose since youths from the lowest SES 
were less disaffected than youths from other status. This fact might be explained by 
the focalised social policies that have been followed by Chilean governments which 
have reached only the poorest sectors of society.  
Age was also associated with several measures of political disaffection. Something 
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peculiar also occurred, as younger youths tended to be more behaviourally disaffected 
but less attitudinally disaffected than older youths. Concerning associations between 
gender and political disaffection, it was only found that for some indicators of 
attitudinal disaffection, women were more disaffected than men. 
Finally, this chapter also discussed evidence to observe if, apart from being 
described as disaffected, Chilean youths can be also characterised as being apathetic. 
In this sense, the evidence suggested that Chilean youths are not apathetic on the 
whole, since they are participating in other types of organisations and because they 
use non-conventional means of participation. Moreover, it was also found that they 
have critical opinions, which shows they are interested in the fate of society. 
Therefore, it can be argued that youth political disaffection cannot be explained by 
feelings of lack of interest. To this effect, this finding can be argued to be the first step 
in testing the main hypothesis of this thesis to be developed in further chapters as the 
fact that youths are not apathetic means they are politically disaffected due to a 
particular way of functioning that the Chilean political system has developed.   
All in all, by doing this chapter it was possible to have a deep understanding of the 
main assumption of this research: that Chilean youths are currently highly disaffected 
with formal political structures. The evidence strongly suggested that despite Chile’s 
economic and political achievements of last twenty years, Chilean youths are 
expressing feelings of hostility towards the political system through behaviours and 
attitudes. In this sense, based on the obtained findings it can be reaffirmed that, at 
least concerning young people, Chile is currently experiencing a crisis of political 
representation. In Mainwaring’s terms, it can be stated that Chile is living a situation 
where patterns of representation are unstable and citizens believe they are not well-
represented (2004). This situation is quite worrisome as it was stated that the 
consolidation of a democracy should not be only constitutional, but also behavioural 
and attitudinal, as formal rules have to be internalised, accepted and valued by the 
public (Philip, 2001). Chilean democracy seems to be working formally and 
constitutionally well. However, Chilean citizens are not sufficiently supporting their 
institutions, which is what finally justifies a deep analysis regarding the main sources 
that explain this phenomenon.  
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Chapter 3: Youth political disaffection and perceptions about the way 
the Chilean political system works: a quantitative – qualitative analysis 
 3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the evidence strongly suggested that Chilean youths are 
highly politically disaffected. Moreover, it was also observed that they are showing an 
interest in the fate of society, which allowed the statement that they are not 
predominantly apathetic but that they are mostly rejecting the way Chilean politics is 
currently being executed. It is now necessary to take a step forward and start analysing 
the main features of Chilean politics associated with these feelings of hostility towards 
the political system. In this sense, the main objective of this chapter is to start 
developing an explanation of the phenomenon under study through several 
quantitative and qualitative analyses of the relationship between political disaffection 
and youths’ perceptions of the way the Chilean political system (CPS) works.  
This chapter, then, is the first approximation to the testing of the main hypothesis 
of this thesis: that Chilean youths’ political disaffection can be mainly explained by the 
particular way the CPS has worked after the transition, which has increased the gap 
between young people and the political system generating feelings of lack of 
representation and political inefficacy. 41 
In order to accomplish this objective, this chapter is divided into three main 
sections. The first analyses some alternative explanations that were found to not be 
theoretically relevant in the case of Chilean youths. The second examines descriptive 
quantitative data that brings a first approximation of some perceptions that are 
generating political disaffection. Finally, the third analyses links between perceptions 
about the political system and political disaffection combining multivariate 
quantitative analyses with the analysis of primary qualitative data.  
                                                          
41 
It is a first approximation since these links and a deeper understanding of them are complemented with the 
analysis of cases studies that will also show how the Chilean political system works and how Chilean youths perceive 
its functioning.   
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 3.2 Analysing alternative explanations   
The first thing to do in order to develop an account for Chilean youths’ political 
disaffection is to empirically analyse some alternative explanation of this phenomenon 
that does not seem to be adequately interpreting the Chilean case. These explanations 
were deeply developed and discussed in the theoretical framework, and it is now 
necessary to empirically test them.42  
The first explanation to be analysed is the one associated with the rise of critical 
citizens with post-material values. The main argument of this explanation is that a 
better standard of living, higher levels of education and the expansion of mass 
communication have brought more critical citizens with post-materialist orientations. 
This is to be linked to political disaffection, since party systems would not be adapting 
themselves to these new orientations and because these citizens tend to be more 
sceptical of authority and hierarchical procedures (Inglehart 1990, Dalton, 2006, 2007).  
The first thing to do in order to analyse this explanation is to observe those issues 
that Chilean youths declare are the most relevant to be solved in Chile. As shown in 
table 3.1, when Chilean youths are asked about this issue, almost 80% refer to 
materialist issues. The most relevant issues are improvements on health, 
unemployment and poverty conditions. In this sense, these data clearly indicates that 
Chilean youths have not developed post-materialist orientations, on the whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42
 The analysis is mostly based on quantitative data since, as these explanations were not appropriate in the case of 
Chilean youths, the qualitative material does not bring almost any reference regarding them. 
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Table 3.1 - Most relevant issues to be solved in Chile according to Chilean youths (15-29) 43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second way this explanation can be tested is by observing fitted probabilities 
based on regression analysis, where indicators of political disaffection are tested 
against an indicator of value orientations.44 With respect to that, it can be observed in 
figure 3.1 that, controlling for some socio-demographic variables and other 
explanatory variables, there are not significant associations between these variables. 
The only significant difference is the one between materialist youths and those with 
mixed orientations regarding the probability of having confidence in political parties. 
However, the direction of this association is in the opposite direction of what should 
be expected to confirm this explanation, since youths with materialist orientations 
have less confidence than post-materialist youths. In this sense, beyond the reasons 
previously stated to rule out this explanation, it can be argued now, based on empirical 
data, that Chilean youths’ political disaffection is not being entirely explained by the 
rise of more critical citizens with post-material values.  
 
                                                          
43
 This question is based on respondents’ three mentions that were rounded to percentages.  
4
 All fitted probabilities to be shown in this section are based on logistic regression models where indicators of these 
alternative explanations were added to those variables associated with  explanations for political disaffection that 
were observed to be significantly associated with the dependent variables. The rest of the variables of the models 
were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a woman, aged 23, who is fairly interested in 
politics, that believes that the congress represent well people’s interests and who does not agree neither disagree 
with the statements “Political Parties do not give voters a real choice between alternative public policies”, “I don't 
think that the government cares much what people like me think” and “Political Parties do not give voters a real 
choice between alternative public policies”. To see which variables were included in each model check the appendix 
1 where the coefficients of all the models are presented.  
Issues % 
To improve health conditions of people 18.5 
To reduce unemployment 17.9 
To reduce poverty 17.6 
To improve the distribution of wealth 11.7 
To eliminate child exploitation 9.0 
To increase literacy rates 4.2 
MATERIALIST  ISSUES 78.9 
To assert human rights 11.7 
To improve the environment 6.8 
To work for the peace 2.6 
POSTMATERIALIST  ISSUES 21.1 
Source: INJUV, 2009. n: 7570.  
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Figure 3.1 - Fitted probabilities of several indicators of political disaffection for Chilean Youth 
(18-29) with different value orientations 
 
      Source: Latinobarómetro, 2008, n: 309. 
The second explanation to be analysed has to do with the association between 
problems of social cohesion and the emergence of feelings of political disaffection 
where it is argued that political disaffection is one of many consequences of a decline 
of social capital to have occurred in recent decades (Putnam, 2000). This account is 
also tested through regression analyses where it can be tested if those youths with less 
social capital are more politically disaffected.  
In figure 3.2 it is possible to observe that, controlling for some socio-demographic 
variables and other explanatory variables, there are a couple of significant associations 
between indicators of political disaffection and levels of social capital. However, their 
interpretations are quite confusing since the directions of these associations are not 
the same. Those youths with more social capital are supporting more democracy as a 
form of government, but at the same time they have less confidence in the congress. 
Regarding electoral participation and confidence in the congress, it can be observed 
that they are not associated with levels of social capital.  
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Figure 3.2 - Fitted probabilities of several indicators of political disaffection for Chilean 
youths (18-29) with different levels of social capital
 
           Source: Latinobarómetro, 2008, n: 309. 
If this explanation is to be accurate it should be expected that those youths with 
less social capital were those most politically disaffected. This is clearly not the case, 
since it was only found that those more disaffected regarding the values of democracy 
have less social capital and an opposite association was even found. Moreover, the 
effect of social capital on electoral participation, where this approach has mostly 
focused, is null. These data reconfirms, then, analyses of the previous chapter, where it 
was observed that levels of social participation are much higher than levels of formal 
political participation. In this sense, based on empirical data, it can also be argued that 
problems of social cohesion are not the main determinants of Chilean youths’ political 
disaffection.  
Finally, a couple of explanations related to political perceptions can be tested. The 
first is the association between feelings of hostility and perceiving high levels of 
corruption among political parties. This association is also tested using fitted 
probabilities based on regression analyses, where several indicators of political 
disaffection were tested against an indicator of this explanation. 
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Figure 3.3 - Fitted probabilities of several indicators of political disaffection for Chilean 
youths (18-29) with different opinions regarding corruption spreading in political parties
 
              Source: Auditoria a la Democracia, 2010, n: 331. 
From the four associations tested using these indicators, only the ones regarding 
electoral registration and democracy support were found to be statistically significant. 
However, as it can be observed from figure 3.3, the directions of these associations are 
in the opposite direction of what should be expected. Those youths perceiving more 
corruption have higher probabilities of electoral participation and higher probabilities 
of supporting democracy. Therefore, youth political disaffection cannot be also 
attributed to the perception of high levels of corruption. This situation is also 
expectable since Chile has been highlighted as the country in the continent with the 
lowest level of corruption perception (Transparency International, 2010).  
Finally, it can be tested whether political disaffection is associated with what has 
been called ‘internal political efficacy’, which is the belief that one can understand 
politics and therefore participate in politics. If this explanation was appropriated, it 
should find that those youths who feel they have a low understanding of politics are 
more politically disaffected.  
This explanation was also tested through regression analyses and it can be 
observed from figure 3.4 that, controlling for some socio-demographic variables and 
other explanatory variables, there are no significant associations between the way in 
which the way an understanding of politics is perceived and indicators of political 
disaffection. Those youths who feel they do not have a good understanding of relevant 
political issues are not expressing more hostility towards the political system.  
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Figure 3.4 - Fitted probabilities of several indicators of political disaffection for Chilean 
youths (18-29) with different opinions regarding the understanding of political issues
 
      Source: Auditoria a la Democracia, 2010, n: 331. 
This association is also relevant to some findings of the qualitative data, since from 
interviews with both politically-involved youths and politicians a deep perception was 
found that current high levels of disaffection regarding the values of democracy are 
associated with a lack of civic education. The evidence analysed suggested that levels 
of democracy support are not higher among youths who perceive to a bad 
understanding of political issues. However, it is quite clear that this finding does not 
completely discard the association between a lack of civic education and low support 
for democratic values. This is an issue that should be more extensively tested through, 
for example, the analysis of associations between indicators of democracy support and 
questions that measure political knowledge. Unfortunately, those indicators were not 
available in the surveys analysed, which limits the analysis of the determinants of 
political disaffection somewhat. 
In summary, it could be observed that these alternative explanations cannot 
properly account for high levels of Chilean youths’ political disaffection. They did not 
also have a counterpart in the qualitative data. The only issues that appeared were 
links between individualism and political disaffection, where it was argued young 
people do not involve themselves politically as they do not care about each other’s 
problems, and links between lack of civic education and feelings of political 
disaffection. This associations, however, do not seem to be accurate when quantitative 
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empirical data is was analysed since it was already  observed that Chilean youths’ are 
not mainly apathetic and that feelings of internal efficacy are not associated with 
feelings of political disaffection.  
 3.3 Linking political disaffection with the way the Chilean political system 
works 
Descriptive quantitative analysis 
In this section descriptive quantitative data taken from surveys measuring political 
attitudes among Chilean youths are analysed in order to gain an initial idea about 
central perceptions of the CPS that generate feelings of hostility towards the political 
system.  
The first useful data for this purpose is the distribution of reasons for not being 
registered to vote.  On table 3.2, it is first possible to observe that the great majority of 
respondents (69%) give reasons associated with negative evaluations of the CPS when 
they are asked why they are not registered. The evidence indicates, then, that this 
indicator of behavioural disaffection cannot be explained by current electoral rules. 
Moreover, it also suggests that Chilean youths are mostly disaffected rather than 
disengaged from politics. Indeed, the fact that with a new registration system based on 
automatic registration and voluntary voting it was estimated that only 15% of new 
voters voted in the last municipal election in 2012 reaffirm this statement (La Tercera, 
2012a).  
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Table 3.2 - Reasons for not being registered in the electoral registers for Chilean Youth (18-
29) who are not registered by SES, Age group and Gender 
 
Regarding perceptions about the CPS that are associated with feelings of political 
disaffection, it is possible to observe that youths who perceive that politics is not 
meaningful and who have perceptions of lack of representation clearly have less 
chance of registering to vote. Believing that politics does not solve people’s problems 
is particularly more relevant for youths from lower SES and women, while feelings of 
lack of representation seem to be more relevant for youths from higher SES and 
men.45  
The second way some perceptions about the CPS that are associated with political 
disaffection can be identified is by analysing youth perceptions of defects of political 
parties. As shown in table 3.3, the most stated defect is that political parties favour 
their interests over the interests of the country. This defect, alongside the perception 
that political parties do not represent people’s interests (the third-highest frequency), 
                                                          
45
 Two of the reasons for not voting, lack of interest in politics and distrust, cannot be analysed since they are 
indicators of political disaffection rather than possible determinants of it.  
 SES Age group Gender 
Reasons Total ABC1 C2 C3 D E 18-19 20-24 25-29 Men Women 
Because I am not interested 
in politics 
35.5% 25.5% 31.7% 38.2% 38.7% 37.3% 39.3% 37.1% 31.6% 37.0% 34.2% 
Because I think that politics 
does not solve people's 
problems 
10.7% 6.9% 9.0% 11.9% 11.8% 12.5% 8.5% 10.4% 12.3% 9.0% 12.4% 
Because I do not feel 
represented by any political 
sector 
10.3% 13.0% 14.2% 9.8% 8.0% 4.6% 7.7% 9.8% 12.3% 11.2% 9.4% 
Because I distrust the 
political class 
8.3% 5.6% 10.1% 9.3% 6.7% 6.7% 5.6% 7.9% 10.2% 8.7% 7.9% 
Because I feel that my 
opinion does not count 
3.4% 2.2% 3.3% 2.7% 3.8% 5.0% 3.6% 2.7% 4.2% 3.7% 3.2% 
Reasons related to hostility 
toward the political system 
68.3% 53.2% 68.2% 71.8% 69.1% 66.1% 64.7% 67.9% 70.6% 69.6% 67.0% 
Because I have not had the 
opportunity to register 
13.9% 23.8% 14.4% 11.2% 13.3% 14.2% 22.1% 14.6% 8.6% 13.1% 14.6% 
Because I don't like to be 
forced to vote 
10.6% 8.7% 11.2% 9.4% 10.1% 14.2% 7.1% 10.8% 12.3% 10.8% 10.4% 
Because it is a complicated 
process 
3.8% 6.5% 2.8% 4.4% 4.1% 3.4% 2.4% 4.0% 4.2% 3.0% 4.6% 
Reasons related to the 
electoral process 
28.3% 39.0% 28.5% 25.1% 27.5% 31.7% 31.7% 29.5% 25.0% 27.0% 29.6% 
Other 3.4% 7.8% 3.3% 3.1% 3.4% 2.2% 3.6% 2.6% 4.4% 3.4% 3.4% 
Source: INJUV, 2009. n: 5235. 
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are clearly associated with one of the features observed in the previous table about 
problems of representation. Chilean youths are therefore of the opinion that their 
interests are not being represented by political parties, which makes them reject them 
as well as withdraw from formal instances of political participation. They seem to feel 
that their interests are not being represented because politicians prefer to favour their 
own interests instead of the interests of the population. 
Table 3.3 - Defects of political parties according to Chilean youths (18-29)                                                          
by, SES, age group and gender46 
 
Other important defects that can be observed are that political parties have a lot 
of internal fighting and often select bad candidates. These two issues are related to 
how youths perceive the internal functioning of political parties. In this sense, it can be 
observed that, apart from feelings of lack of representation and the inefficacy of 
politics, the manner in which political parties work internally is also engendering 
political disaffection. Another issue to highlight is that corruption is the defect with the 
lowest percentage, which reaffirms previous evidence that this problem would not be 
associated with feelings of political disaffection.  
                                                          
46
 The numbers of the following table are based on three mentions of the respondents that were rounded to 
percentages.  
  SES Age group Gender 
 Total High Medium Low 18-19 20-24 25 -29 Men Women 
They favour their interests over 
the interests of the country 
23.4% 23.8% 25.0% 21.4% 22.8% 21.4% 25.7% 24.1% 22.7% 
They are sharply divided in groups, 
there is  in-fighting 
21.1% 4.8% 23.0% 19.6% 19.6% 21.4% 21.6% 22.2% 19.9% 
They do not represent people's  
interests 
15.4% 28.6% 13.7% 16.7% 13.2% 16.9% 15.0% 13.1% 17.7% 
They select bad candidates for 
elections 
11.1% 14.3% 10.1% 12.2% 7.6% 11.3% 12.7% 11.5% 10.7% 
They hamper decision-making in 
the government 
10.0% 4.8% 8.4% 12.0% 14.4% 9.4% 8.0% 9.4% 10.5% 
They monopolise public discussion 9.2% 4.8% 10.4% 8.0% 7.6% 9.4% 10.5% 8.7% 9.8% 
They  facilitate corruption in the 
state 
7.1% 19.0% 7.4% 6.3% 9.2% 7.7% 5.5% 8.0% 6.1% 
I don't see any defect 2.7% 0.0% 2.0% 3.7% 5.6% 2.6% 1.1% 2.8% 2.6% 
Source: Auditoria a la Democracia, 2010  n: 331. 
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With respect to socio-demographic variables, the only variable that creates a 
difference is SES. Among youths from the high SES, lack of representation and 
corruption come up for mentions as the main defects while in-fighting seems to be 
more relevant for youths from the medium and low SES.  
The third and last descriptive way hostile perceptions about the CPS can be 
analysed is through the observation of those situations that would make apathetic 
youths be more interested in politics.47 These data are useful since politics is clearly 
understood here as formal politics. Therefore, these situations can be analysed as 
conditions that would make youths less politically disaffected.  
 The first interesting thing to observe from table 3.4 is that more than three 
quarters of apathetic youths would be more interested in politics if something 
changed. This evidence contributes to the prior assumption that Chilean youths are 
not totally apathetic, as even those youths qualified as being the most apathetic would 
be interested in politics if it were developed differently.  
Table 3.4 - Situations that would make apathetic Chilean youths (15-29) more interested in 
politics by SES, age group and gender48 
                                                          
47 Apathetic youths are young people who don’t show any political interest in participating in any kind of 
organisation, who don’t talk about politics and who don’t have critical opinions of certain elements of the Chilean 
political system. This question is only analysed in this group because it was only asked to it in the analysed survey.  
48
 The numbers of the following table are based on two mentions and the sum of the percentages is not equal to 
100% since several respondents mentioned only one situation.   
 SES Age group Gender 
 Total ABC1 C2 C3 D E 15-19 20-24 25-29 Men Women 
If political activity were more 
transparent 
54.5% 63.5% 57.6% 54.5% 51.1% 52.0% 46.6% 51.1% 64.4% 59.3% 49.2% 
If  I had any personal benefit 28.1% 28.8% 22.0% 20.7% 34.8% 31.6% 26.0% 24.7% 32.4% 27.3% 29.0% 
If I felt that politics could do 
something to build a better society 
24.5% 11.5% 29.3% 32.4% 20.7% 20.4% 24.4% 31.1% 19.6% 26.5% 22.4% 
If I didn't  feel that power is the only 
objective that drives the political 
class 
19.2% 32.7% 26.7% 18.6% 15.6% 7.1% 14.5% 19.2% 23.5% 23.0% 14.9% 
If I understood how laws that are 
discussed in the congress affect me 
12.5% 9.6% 10.5% 12.4% 12.3% 18.4% 18.7% 11.4% 7.1% 10.3% 14.9% 
None 23.9% 25.0% 22.0% 22.1% 26.1% 24.5% 26.3% 23.7% 21.7% 21.3% 26.8% 
Source: INJUV, 2009 n: 763. 
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Looking at the percentages of table 3.4, it is possible to affirm that transparency in 
political activity is the most important situation that what would make apathetic 
youths more interested in politics. This table reaffirms, then, that the internal 
functioning of political parties is being perceived as problematic by Chilean youths and 
that it is a feature of current Chilean politics that is associated with disaffection. The 
second and third situations with the highest percentages are related, since both are 
associated with considering politics as meaningless. More than half of youths then 
would be less politically disaffected if politics had a real sense of change for them. 
About the fourth situation, the fact that young people would be more interested in 
politics if they didn’t feel politicians are only driven by power can be connected with 
feelings of lack of representation observed in previous tables. It can be seen from the 
evidence that it seems Chilean youths feel the political class favours its interests over 
the country’s interests and that those favoured interests are strongly associated with 
the attainment of power at the expense of citizens’ interests.  
Regarding associations between socio-demographic variables and these situations, 
it can be observed that more transparency, and not feeling that power is the only aim 
that drives politicians, will specially make youths from higher SES, older age groups and 
males be more interested in politics. Increasing feelings of political meaningfulness 
regarding the whole society are more relevant for middle class youths, while political 
meaningfulness for personal benefits is more important to youths from the lowest SES.  
Overall, from all the evidence analysed from descriptive quantitative data, it is 
possible to broadly identify three main types of perceptions about the CPS that are 
associated with feelings of political disaffection: feelings of lack of representation, 
political inefficacy and perceptions about the internal functioning of political parties. It 
is important to note that the first two features coincide with central assumptions of 
this thesis, as it was previously hypothesised that youths’ political disaffection can be 
mostly explained by a disconnection between common citizens and formal politics 
expressed through feelings of lack of representation and political inefficacy. In this 
sense, perceptions about the internal functioning of political parties emerge as a new 
attribute to be considered in further analyses that complement previous hypothesis 
regarding the disconnection between citizens and politics. 
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Multivariate quantitative and qualitative analyses  
In this section a much deeper analysis of linkages between perceptions about the 
way the political system works and feelings of political disaffection triangulating 
quantitative with qualitative data is carried out. The structure of the analysis is based 
on findings of the previous part where links between each of the three types of 
perceptions and feelings of political disaffection are separately analysed.49 For each 
one quantitative data is first analysed using logistic regression models. Afterwards, 
qualitative data collected from interviews conducted with politically-involved youths 
and politicians is used to deepen those findings in order to understand those 
mechanisms behind the observed associations.50  
3.3.1 Feelings of lack of representation  
The first type of perception about the CPS to be analysed regarding its associations 
with political disaffection is the feeling of lack of representation. These feelings are 
understood as feelings of lack of substantive representation, as this is the only 
dimension of representation that provides standards for deciding if politicians are 
representing well or badly (Pitkin, 1967). This was hypothesised as one of the main 
determinants of this phenomenon, as central features of the CPS, such as the 
homogenisation and moderation of politics, are supposedly generating 
representativeness problems (Garretón, 2007, Baño, 1993). Moreover, in the 
descriptive part it was observed that problems of representation were relevant issues 
regarding the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection. It is necessary now to 
complement these analyses in order to observe whether other evidence can support 
more strongly the statement that Chilean youths’ disaffection is associated with 
feelings of lack of representation.  
                                                          
49 The separation of these three aspects is merely an analytical distinction since they are clearly associated as they 
are all elements that express a disconnection between the political world and young people. These three aspects 
are presented separately but in the last part of the chapter there is a discussion where they are integrated in order 
to generate a coherent argument. 
50 All quantitative analyses are based on binary logistic regression models where indicators of political disaffection 
(electoral participation, confidence in political parties and the congress and democracy support) were analysed 
against possible explanatory variables controlling for some socio-demographic variables (age, gender and SES). This 
section only shows fitted probabilities of those models where only significant associations were plotted. To see the 
results of regressions models more detailed go to appendix two.  
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In figure 3.5 it is possible to notice that, controlling for some relevant socio-
demographic variables and other explanatory variables51, the way youths perceive how 
the congress represents people’s interests is significantly associated with confidence in 
both political parties and the congress. The better one thinks the congress represents 
people’s interests, the higher the probability of having confidence in both institutions. 
Moreover, it can be observed that this association is stronger in the case of confidence 
in political parties. Therefore, using Pitkin’s concept of substantive representation 
(1967), it can be argued that when youths do not feel people’s wishes and opinions are 
being accurately reflected by representatives they tend to develop feelings of political 
disaffection. This evidence confirms, then, in the case of Chilean youths, that the level 
of representation affects citizens’ support for the system in the sense that when 
people perceive that they are not well-represented they tend to reduce their political 
support (Luna and Zechmeister, 2005, Stoker, 2006).  
Figure 3.5 - Fitted probabilities of having confidence in political institutions for Chilean 
youths (18-29) with different opinions regarding the way the congress represents people's 
interests 52 
 
                             Source: Auditoria a la Democracia, 2010, n: 331. 
                                                          
51
What this statement and other similar statements of this chapter means by "controlling for other explanatory 
variables" can be observed in the appendix 2 where the regression coefficients of every variable included  in each 
model are presented. 
52
 The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a 
man, aged 23, who is fairly interested in politics and who does not agree neither disagree with the statements 
“Political parties do not give voters a real choice between alternative public policies”, “Political parties encourage 
people to be active in politics” and “I don't think the government cares much what people like me think”. This last 
variable was only used for the calculation of the fitted probabilities regarding confidence in the congress since it 
was not significantly associated with the variable measuring confidence in political parties. 
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Youth public policy 
The association between not feeling substantively represented and a rejection of 
formal politics can be more deeply understood with the help of qualitative data. One 
of the main issues arising from the interviews was the perception that the political 
system is not implementing public policies for the youth population since they are not 
a priority because young people are not voting. It is also observed that Chilean youths 
express hostility towards the political system, not only because they don’t obtain 
material returns but also because they realise that what explains this situation is the 
existence of a pragmatic political class that does not benefit itself by implementing 
youth public policies. 
"I have friends who are leaders of the UDI and RN and we have the same criticism. 
Political parties have focused on making policies for themselves and not for young 
people. You perceive that as a young citizen. You perceive how politics is done. The 
decision-making. How you see if a politician is lying. Those are political forms that do 
much damage." Eugenia, militant of the youth division of the PS. 
"In general, the youth is not linked to political parties because they do not represent 
them. They don’t see themselves as represented since they do not legislate around 
youth, and since most young people do not vote, they do not worry about them." 
Mariano, member of a left-wing political organisation. 
This perception is linked to the whole political class and can be found among 
youths who participate in political parties and in other types of organisations. Young 
people feel that politicians are particularly disinterested with respect to youth issues. 
Moreover, they perceive that this disinterest is expressed not only by a lack of policies 
but also in the way politicians try to generate ties with them. They don’t feel 
captivated by politicians in any sense, either by policies or by the spaces that formal 
politics offer them to be politically integrated. As shown in the following quotes, these 
perceptions are also shared by politicians from different sectors that have been 
involved in youth legislation issues.  
"The fact of not feeling represented has to do with the inability of the political world to 
create an attractive youth offer. From how you communicate, which spaces are used 
by the political activity or how you ascribe as a politician to involve young people. 
From there until getting to the theme of public policy and legislation." Woman, deputy 
of the PDC, member of the last youth commission of the congress.  
"Politicians think that the young do not vote, and I do not care. In all political sectors I 
feel that you speak about youth and it’s like "ok, goodbye”. So, obviously if you have 
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that disposition they see it." Woman, deputy of RN, and member of the last youth 
commission of the congress.  
The data imply that there are no incentives for young people to participate in 
formal politics since the political class is particularly disconnected from them, mostly 
by the fact that they are not registered to vote. This disconnection is expressed in a 
lack of policies as well in the way politicians approach young people. This situation is 
perceived by youths themselves and it seems to create a vicious circle. The less 
connected the political class is with respect to youth issues, the less formal political 
participation by this group, which finally increases the gap between both parts even 
more.  
 The absence of youth public policies described has previously been highlighted by 
several authors in Chile (Asún, 2006, Dávila, 2008). The main argument is that the 
Chilean state lacks both a youth public policy that guides state institutions and youth 
institutions able to influence the actions of the state. Moreover, it is argued that youth 
polices are also difficult establish, since there are not consultative and deliberative 
instances where youths can be represented.53 In this sense, it can be observed that 
deficiencies regarding policy response for young people contribute to understanding 
the meaning of feelings of lack of representation among youths. Moreover, it is 
necessary to highlight that this is a particularly interesting finding, as this issue also 
explains why youths are particularly more disaffected than other groups.  
Representation of powerful interests  
A second issue that can be analysed regarding problems of representation is the 
perception that the political system has represented powerful interests more strongly 
than the interests of the whole citizenry. This topic is relevant to be analysed as it was 
previously hypothesised that one of the main features of the current Chilean 
democracy generating problems of representation is a lack of power balance that 
favours business interests (Garretón, 2007, Taylor, 2004). In table 3.5 it is possible to 
observe fitted probabilities of several indicators of political disaffection regarding their 
                                                          
53
 The relation between a lack of youth public policy and feelings of political disaffection is developed later in a 
whole chapter of the thesis.  
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opinion of the biggest beneficiaries of the form Chile is governed by, specified by SES 
for those indicators where interaction terms were found to be statistically significant.  
Table 3.5 - Fitted probabilities of several indicators of political disaffection for Chilean youths 
(18-29) with different opinions of the form Chile is governed with respect to its biggest 
beneficiaries and with different SES 54 
As shown in table 3.5, controlling for some socio-demographic variables and other 
explanatory variables, opinions regarding the way Chile is governed are clearly 
significantly associated with electoral participation among youths from the low and 
high status. The directions of these associations, however, are not the same. While 
youths from lower classes increase their probability of voting when they believe that 
Chile is governed for the good of all, youths from the high status decrease it. Regarding 
confidence in the congress, a similar situation is observed with the differences that the 
association between these two variables is weaker among youths from the high status, 
and that there is also an association among youths from the medium status, which is in 
the same direction than that of low class youths.  
With respect to confidence in political parties, the effect of this opinion on it does 
not vary across socio-economic statuses, and it is only possible to observe that taking 
the whole youth population, there is a significant association between these two 
variables in the sense that those who believe Chile is governed for the good of all have 
more confidence in political parties.  
                                                          
54
 The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a 
man, aged 23 and that believe that the best way to contribute to change things is to participate in protest 
movements. For the case of confidence in political parties the interaction between the opinion regarding how Chile 
is governed and SES was not significantly associated with the dependent variable. Therefore it was not analysed 
taking into account SES. The SES of those fitted probabilities was fixed at a person from the medium SES.   
 
Probability of voting  
in the elections 
Probability of having confidence 
 in the congress 
Probability of having 
confidence in Political 
parties 
Opinion / SES Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Whole Youth 
Population 
Chile is governed for the 
good of all 
0.69 0.25 0.05 0.88 0.7 0.42 0.25 
Chile is governed for the 
benefit of a few powerful 
interests 
0.07 0.22 0.52 0.2 0.48 0.77 0.14 
Source: Latinobarometro, 2008, n: 309. 
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The evidence indicates, then, that there is an association between believing that 
the political system benefits powerful interests and behavioural and attitudinal 
disaffection in most of the cases. It is also interesting to observe that class seems to 
play an important role, since richer youths are less disaffected when they believe 
powerful interests are being favoured. This could hypothetically mean that when rich 
youths see their interests being favoured they tend to reduce their hostility towards 
the political system. Poorer youths, on the other hand, are those who most increase 
their hostility when they feel powerful interests are benefited by the way the country 
is governed.  
When the qualitative data is analysed in order to understand what youths 
understand as powerful interests, the first figures identified are big entrepreneurs, 
which somehow reaffirms previous hypotheses about this issue. It is observed that, 
especially among youths who are not part of political parties, there is the perception 
that some politicians from both central coalitions often opt to represent the interests 
of big entrepreneurs rather than those of the whole citizenry. The role that political 
lobbyism plays in this situation is also perceived when they observe that members of 
the political class are directly involved in the defence of these powerful interests, 
which provokes dissolution and a loss of confidence in the political system. 
"I got into an organisation against Pascualama and I realised that Frei had sold the 
country in relation to mining issues. I saw that the daughters of Belisario Velasco were 
carrying the image cleaning of Barrick. So, with that level of nastiness, how can you 
trust someone? And Bachelet promised that she would not sign Pascualama and Lagos 
signed in the transition. From then until now I do not vote and I regret being 
registered. I lost my confidence of any person who is in politics." Francisca, member of 
an ecologist organisation
55
.  
Feelings of distrust, which also seem to increase levels of behavioural disaffection, 
arise, then, when youths observe that politicians use their influences to favour 
powerful interests. A rejection to this political practice has been particularly relevant 
recently, since many youths went to the streets early in 2011 to protest against the 
installation of thermoelectric plants in the Patagonia for the megaproject Hidroaysén.  
The main argument to reject this project was based on ecological issues but they were 
                                                          
55 
To contextualize the quote is important to state that Belisario Velasco is an important member of the PDC and 
that Barrick is a Canadian company that is in charge of a mining project in the north of Chile called Pascualama.  
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also claiming that the project would increase the power of big companies. Moreover, 
they argued that both political coalitions have not had the will to oppose the project, 
but have favoured it despite much opposition of citizens’ groups. Additionally, the 
present-day educational social movement has claimed that the current educational 
system benefits big entrepreneurs, as one of its main pillars is the existence of 
unregulated private universities whose owners illegally use to profit.  
The evidence suggests, then, that the hypothesised association between an 
imbalance of power and feelings of lack of representation that finally engender 
political disaffection seems to be accurate. A central attribute of the post-authoritarian 
CPS has been a technocratic style of policy-making, where the privileged participation 
of powerful entrepreneurial associations have prevented several debates such as 
discussing alternatives to the current neoliberal socio-economic model (Rindfjall, 2009, 
P. Silva, 2006, Camargo, 2007).  In this sense, the data suggest Chilean youths are 
expressing a rejection to that way of doing politics since they feel excluded in a context 
where relevant societal input is limited to business associations. The rejection of the 
Hidroaysén project alongside current educational mobilisations would be the main 
recent examples of these situations, as both movements have criticised the fact that 
decisions are only made by few people, which finally only reproduces the interests of 
powerful groups.  
Representation of the interests of the political class 
Another issue that can contribute to understanding current youth feelings of lack 
of representation is also related to those interests that are favoured by the way Chile is 
governed. From the qualitative data it is possible to observe that Chilean youths 
strongly perceive that the political class is more interested in representing their own 
interests than those of common citizens. In the first section of this chapter it was 
observed that Chilean youths argue this was the major defect of political parties and 
with the help of the interview material, this affirmation can now be more deeply 
understood. What is observed is that youths perceive that the main principle driving 
the actions of the political class is to reproduce their power positions, which finally 
limits the representation of common citizen interests.    
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"A feeling of disenchantment arises when you see that politicians are people who are 
only watching out for their things or their group and not for the good of the country. 
That is the impression I have of why we have that level of disenchantment with more 
traditional political parties." Marcelo, member of an ecologist organisation.  
"Definitely some practices of political parties do not identify with the youth. I think 
that is the basis of disaffection. They are political practices where party interests take 
precedence over the common good. In political parties, before the common good to 
take care, the good of the party and their own egos have priority." Woman, deputy of 
RN.  
The political class is therefore perceived as reproducing a style of politics where 
the common good of society is not the first priority, but the defence of corporative 
interests. This is clearly problematic since the impression is that politics is currently 
only about a struggle for power rather than for the wellbeing of citizens, which reduces 
its usefulness. Moreover, it is believed that since politicians are more dedicated to 
struggling for their own interests, it is relevant issues such as high levels of inequality 
are not approached, which would generate feelings of hostility towards the political 
system.  
This finding can be also connected with some hypothesised features of Chilean 
democracy that increase the gap between common citizens and the political system. It 
was previously argued that since 1990 the spectrum of political discussion has been 
strongly reduced in order to avoid political conflict (Garretón, 2007, Moulian, 2002). 
The evidence now suggests that this style of politics is somehow being perceived by 
Chilean youths as they feel politics is not an arena of relevant discussion and that 
relevant debates, such as social inequality, are excluded. This last fact indicates that 
youths seem to be aware of the process described by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) 
where elites limit the scope of the political process to topics that are innocuous to 
them. To this effect, current high levels of income inequality of Chilean society would 
be an expression of a political class that, as it is disconnected from common people, 
avoids the discussion of relevant issues.  
What can be added to these monographic descriptions is that Chilean youths 
perceive that the avoidance of these topics is also based on the fact that politicians are 
more worried about their own power interests, rather than those of common citizens. 
The fact that youths perceive that one of the main elements of current politics is the 
reproduction of power positions at the expense of citizens’ interests can be described 
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as a new element that can be added to those features of Chilean politics that generate 
political disaffection. In this sense, using Coppedge’s term (1994), it can be argued that 
youths perceive that Chilean democracy has elements of a partyarchy since it is 
believed that citizens’ interests are not being adequately represented because there is 
a style of politics where politicians tend to concentrate all political power in order to 
reproduce their positions 
Participation Spaces  
Another relevant issue to be discussed with respect to the relationship between 
feelings of lack of representation and political disaffection has to do with how young 
people perceive the way the political system generates channels of participation. This 
is a relevant issue because Chile has been described as having an elitist democracy 
based on a technocratic style of policy-making where political parties tend to 
demobilise citizens rather than generating authentic spaces of participation (Huneeus, 
2003, P. Silva, 2004).  
In figure 3.6 it is possible to observe the association between indicators of political 
disaffection and perceptions about how the government worries about what the 
people believe. The first thing to observe is that, controlling for some socio-
demographic variables and other relevant independent variables, there is a significant 
association between believing the government does not care what people think and 
confidence in the congress and democracy support. The more you agree with the 
statement "I don't think that the government cares much what people like me think”, 
the less confidence you have in the congress and the less you support democracy. It 
can be also observed that the effect of this perception on democracy support is 
stronger for youths from higher SES.  
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Figure 3.6 - Fitted probabilities of supporting democracy and having confidence in the 
congress for Chilean youths (18-29) with different levels of agreement regarding 
Government Indifference and with different SES 56
 
                    Source: Auditoria a la Democracia, 2010, n: 331. 
The perception that the political system is not connected with the citizenry to 
enable them to be politically represented can be also deepened with the aid of the 
interview material. The main idea observed is that representation is weak since there 
are no spaces to exercise it. This would be explained by the fact that political parties 
are closed to societal inputs, as they only care about reproducing their power 
positions. Within this context, young people would be again the most affected since it 
is perceived that youth organisations are those ones less appealed by the political 
class.  
"I think we have not been able to create a mechanism that gives expression to what is 
happening with adults as well as with young people. The main problem has to do with 
the fact that we worried more about being a government than a political party. We 
moved away from the citizenry. We moved away from the neighbourhood councils and 
social organisations and we dedicated to govern." Hugo, member of the youth division 
of the PPD.  
"Politics is something done behind people's backs that they later have to support. 
Therefore, how young people will rely on political parties when they see that they exist 
for the vote but they do not exist for decisions. They do not exist for participation. It is 
something that is simply from top to bottom but never from bottom to top."  Héctor, 
member of a left wing organisation.   
                                                          
56
 The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a 
man, aged 23, who thinks that corruption is somehow widespread among political parties for the fitted probabilities 
of democracy support. For the fitted probabilities of having confidence in the congress the values where a man, 
aged 23, from the medium SES, who is fairly interested in politics, that believes that the congress represent people´s 
interests well and who does not agree or disagree with the statements “Political parties do not give voters a real 
choice between alternative public policies” and “Political parties encourage people to be active in politics”. 
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The responsibility of this closeness is believed to be more in the Concertación 
because since the transition it was more worried about governing than being 
connected with the citizenry. This feature of Chilean politics has been previously 
highlighted by Angell (2005) as he stated that political parties in Chile since 1990 have 
mostly been agents of government rather than agents of representation and that that 
has been crucial for attaining high levels of political stability. The evidence suggests 
that this fact is also perceived by youths. However, it is believed that this is a source of 
political disaffection, rather than a positive thing. Political parties, then, would be 
engendering feelings of hostility since, as they are not connected with people through 
authentic mechanisms of participation, common citizens feel parties are not an option 
to defend or represent ideas.  
This feature of Chilean politics was also hypothesised as being a source of political 
disaffection and the empirical date seems to also suggest its accurateness. As it was 
previously argued, since 1990 Chilean democracy has demobilised civil society by 
severely limiting links between formal politics and common citizens (Roberts, 1999). 
This process of demobilisation would explain, then, the lack of spaces for exercising 
political representation that are generating political disaffection among Chilean 
youths. In this sense, it can be observed that Chilean youth’s beliefs coincide with 
previous theoretical ideas developed about the relationship between representation 
and participation, where it was argued that the only way to effectively represent 
people’s wishes is through authentic mechanisms of participation (Urbanati, 2000). 
Chilean youths seem to be aware that people gain political representation when 
representatives’ aims are subject to dialogue with common citizens (Plotke, 1997). 
Therefore, it is possible to state that political disaffection could be reduced if there 
were concrete spaces to participate and to exercise political representation. 
Political Offer  
The last aspect that is relevant to analyse regarding the association between 
problems of representation and political disaffection has to be with the heterogeneity 
of political offers. This issue is relevant to examine, as it has been argued that the 
current Chilean political system is based on the moderation of two similar coalitions 
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and that that situation generates problems of representativeness since with blurred 
ideological profiles sectorial social representation loses strength (Baño, 1993, 
Garretón, 2007). Moreover, some authors have also argued that homogeneous offers 
reduce political support as they generate problems of representation by limiting the 
expression of latent social conflicts (Mouffe, 1993).   
As shown in figure 3.7, controlling for socio-demographic variables and other 
explanatory variables, youth perceptions regarding the political offer given by political 
parties are significantly associated with confidence in both political parties and the 
congress. Those who agree more that political parties do not give voters a real choice 
between alternative public policies have less confidence in political parties and in the 
congress. Moreover, it is also observed that this effect is stronger in the case of 
political parties.  
Figure 3.7 - Fitted probabilities of having confidence in political institutions for Chilean 
Youths (18-29) with different levels of agreements regarding whether there is a real choice 
of alternative public policies57 
 
                  Source: Auditoria a la Democracia, 2010, n: 331. 
The evidence indicates that young people are aware that Chilean politics brings a 
homogeneous political offer regarding relevant issues and that this perception 
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 The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a 
man, aged 23, who is fairly interested in politics, that believes that the congress represent well people´s interests 
and who does not agree neither disagree with the statements “Political parties encourage people to be active in 
politics” and “I don't think that the government cares much what people like me think”. This last variable was only 
used for the calculation of the fitted probabilities regarding confidence in the congress since it was not significantly 
associated with the variable measuring confidence in political parties. 
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generates political disaffection. The qualitative data can deepen the understanding of 
this link, as it is necessary to comprehend why this feature of Chilean democracy is 
being negatively evaluated. By analysing the interviews it can be observed that political 
homogeneity is seen as a harmful thing for many youths as it restricts political 
representation. Youths feel that political options are similar, more because the political 
system forces them to be similar than because there is an agreement based on the 
common good of society.  
"I believe that the fact that they do not feel represented is because, if you see 
traditional political parties, they have administrated a political system for many years 
that if you see it from the economic and social point of view is very similar. Therefore, 
there is a system in which almost all political clusters agree and you see that inequality 
is worse than in African countries. You clearly see that something is failing."  Marcelo, 
member of an ecologist organization.   
"The young man who sits at home because both coalitions are alike feels that there is 
no difference between going to vote for one or for the other. I believe that we really 
do not get to pass on to a person young, which is the difference between voting for a 
deputy of RN or a deputy of the PRSD. Both sides point to the centre holding certain 
points." Raquel, member of the youth division of RN. 
The basis of this situation is attributed to the binominal electoral system. The 
problem is that it reduces political discussion and transforms political activity in a 
matter of marketing rather than in a debate of ideas. Moreover, there is a feeling of 
distrust since it is difficult to believe that everybody agrees on a system that has many 
unsolved problems, such as huge levels of inequality. In this sense, it can be observed 
that high levels of inequality are again perceived as a problem that can be mainly 
explained by the acting of the political class, which reproduces feelings of hostility 
towards the political system.  
The evidence indicates, then, that the homogeneity of the Chilean political system, 
which is principally given by the promotion of a pro-market model by both central 
coalitions, is associated with the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection. This 
therefore confirms the hypothesis that the existence of two moderate coalitions with 
reduced programmatic differences in terms of economic policies is an attribute of 
Chilean politics that generates problems of representation that finally engenders 
feelings of hostility towards the political system.  
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Another relevant issue to highlight is that the homogeneity of proposals is also 
generating political disengagement among some sectors of high-income youths who 
are not very hostile towards the political system. They feel that many things are not 
being played in politics because of the similarity of proposals, and they opt to avoid 
political participation. However, they do not do this because they feel that many things 
need to be changed, but because they are comfortable with the current situation and 
know that nothing will change that much. 
In summary, with the combination of both quantitative and qualitative data it was 
possible to deeply understand the link between feelings of lack of representation and 
political disaffection in the case of Chilean youths. They are politically disaffected as 
they do not feel represented by the political system. This evidence reconfirms the 
statement that perceptions of lack of representation affects citizens’ support for a 
system, as the shallower the connections between elites and the common citizens, the 
less committed the citizens will be to the democratic regime (Luna and Zechmeister, 
2005). Chilean youths do not feel they are being substantively well-represented, being 
problems of policy response, the fact that other interests than those of the citizenry 
are being better-represented, the lack of mechanisms of participation and political 
homogeneity the main issues that would be explaining these representativeness 
problems.  
3.3.2 Feelings of political inefficacy  
The second type of perceptions to be analysed with respect to their associations 
with feelings of political disaffection are feelings of political inefficacy. It was 
previously argued that feeling you cannot influence political processes can determine 
feelings of hostility towards the political system, since by feeling politically powerless 
you are expected to acquire negative sentiments about political objects (Pateman, 
1970, Easton, 1975). Moreover, it was also observed that the way of functioning of the 
Chilean political system is supposedly engendering these kinds of feelings (Epstein, 
2000, Garretón, 2007). In this sense, using both quantitative and qualitative data it is 
necessary to observe how the perception that people are not effective when involving 
themselves in politics is associated with feelings of political disaffection.   
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Figure 3.8 - Fitted probabilities of several indicators of political disaffection for Chilean 
youths (18-29) with different opinions regarding the most effective way people can 
contribute to change things58 59 
 
                      Source: Latinobarómetro, 2008, n: 309. 
The first things to be observed are fitted probabilities of several indicators of 
political disaffection regarding different opinions about the most effective way you can 
contribute to change things. As shown in Figure 3.8, controlling for some socio-
demographic variables and other explanatory variables, there are significant 
associations between youths’ opinions of the most effective way to change things and 
these four indicators of political disaffection. Those who believe that it is not possible 
to contribute to changing things in Chile are visibly more disaffected than those who 
believe you can contribute by voting or by participating in protest movements. 
Moreover, it can be also observed that regarding the probabilities of voting and of 
supporting democracy, there are also significant differences between those who 
believe electoral participation is the most effective way to contribute to changing 
things and those who believe you can contribute by participating in protest 
movements, the latter being the most disaffected.  
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 The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a 
woman, aged 23, from the medium SES and that believes the country is governed for the good of all. For the 
calculation of the fitted probabilities of supporting democracy, the variable that measures the perception regarding 
the biggest beneficiaries of the way Chile is governed was not included since it was not significantly associated with 
the dependent variable.  
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 The distribution of the answers to this question also included a spontaneous answer coded as other means but 
since this category had low frequencies and an unclear interpretation it was not put in the figure although it was 
included in the model.  
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The evidence indicates, then, that the perception that no matter what you do you 
will not be able to produce relevant changes is generating political disaffection, which 
thus supports the hypothesis that Chilean youths are disaffected as the way of 
functioning of Chilean politics has generated feelings of political inefficacy. It is 
relevant to highlight that based on that perception, youth citizens are expressing 
hostility towards the whole spectrum of the political system, including its values, 
processes and institutions.  
Table 3.6 - Distribution of the responses of Latin American youths (16-29) to the 
question: What is the most effective way in which you can contribute to change things?  
 
Another relevant aspect to be discussed is the value young people give to electoral 
processes to change things in Chile. If the distribution of the responses of the 
previously-analysed question is compared with the rest of Latin America, it is possible 
to reinforce the idea that Chilean youths don’t feel they can contribute to changing 
things through electoral participation. As shown in table 3.6, Chile is the country where 
least youths declared that voting is the most effective way to contribute to change 
 
Vote to 
choose those 
who defend 
my position 
Participate in 
protest 
movements to 
demand 
changes 
It is not 
possible to 
contribute to 
change things 
Other   Means 
Venezuela 81% 10% 7% 2% 
Dom. Republic 73% 16% 8% 2% 
Paraguay 66% 22% 9% 3% 
Nicaragua 65% 14% 14% 6% 
Uruguay 65% 12% 14% 9% 
El Salvador 64% 11% 15% 9% 
Argentina 62% 15% 19% 4% 
Costa Rica 62% 21% 11% 7% 
Colombia 58% 19% 22% 1% 
Brazil 57% 29% 11% 3% 
Bolivia 56% 15% 17% 11% 
Mexico 55% 19% 24% 2% 
Panama 55% 17% 13% 15% 
Ecuador 54% 24% 12% 10% 
Guatemala 52% 31% 10% 8% 
Peru 52% 26% 18% 5% 
Honduras 44% 23% 24% 8% 
Chile 42% 11% 37% 10% 
Latin America 59% 19% 16% 6% 
Ranking Chile 18º 17º 1º 2º 
Source: Latinobarometro, 2008, n: 6891 
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things. The counterpart of this is that Chile is the country where most youths stated it 
is not possible to contribute to changing things.  
Perceptions about the ineffectiveness of electoral processes can be also observed 
in Figure 3.9, where fitted probabilities of registering to vote are plotted against 
opinions of the efficacy of formal participation. Controlling for socio-demographic 
variables and other explanatory variables, it is observed that those who believe the 
way you vote can influence what happens in the country have a higher probability of 
registering to vote than those who believe that the way you vote does not have an 
influence. In this sense, it seems even clearer that political disaffection and the belief 
that one is not effective when participating in politics go together in the case of 
Chilean youths.  
Figure 3.9 - Fitted probabilities of registering to vote voting for Chilean Youth (18-29) with 
different opinions regarding how the way you vote influence what happens in the country60
 
                   Source: Auditoria a la Democracia, 2010, n: 331. 
As it was the case with previous analyses, an understanding of the relationship 
between disaffection and inefficacy can be also deepened through the qualitative 
material. Regarding this issue, the main thing observed from the evidence is a strong 
belief about the pointlessness of politics in Chile. Politics is not perceived to be a 
vehicle of transformation, either for personal or societal interests, which makes 
Chilean youths feel that whatever they do things will not be changed. These 
perceptions make young people increase levels of behavioural disaffection. Moreover, 
they are even a source of feelings of hostility towards democratic values.  
                                                          
60
 The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a 
woman, aged 23, from the medium SES and that is fairly interested in politics.  
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"We need to have the capacity to motivate and make people feel integrated with the 
political activity and feel that politics is effectively a way to solve problems. Many 
people think that we have deputies, senators but none are able to solve my issues or 
conflicts." Pedro, member of the youth division of RN. 
"If you are involved in a phenomenon of hopelessness, if you feel that either doing 
something or not doing it will have the same results, obviously it will not matter much 
if we are in a democracy or in an authoritarian regime.  If I feel that by organising 
myself I will not achieve that, I just feel like there is no democracy because in a 
democracy these notions must be balanced." Susana, member of a lesbian 
organisation. 
Young people reject political parties and formal instances of participation, as they 
perceive that the fact that politics is not a space for transformation is explained by the 
existence of a political class that doesn’t have political will, and that many times avoids 
discussing relevant issues. It is felt that although there are several things to be 
changed, these issues are not being approached since politicians do not have the will 
to do it. The main example of this situation is once more social inequality.  
These perceptions are quite related to those analysed in the last section, where it 
was discussed that Chilean youths are disaffected since they perceive that the political 
class prefers to defend its interests rather than those of the citizenry. In this sense, it 
seems a political system that has been described as a space to administrate given 
conditions, rather than as a space to generate struggle for social improvements 
(Garretón, 2007, Moulian, 2002), is also engendering disaffection among the youth 
population by generating the belief that it is not possible to produce changes through 
formal politics. In fact, this link is also perceived by some members of the political class 
from left-wing parties.  
"There is no incentive to vote. Why should a young person register to vote? If you 
finally do not make a substantive change in politics where politics believes again in 
utopias and believes in the need for change, it will be very difficult to motivate young 
people. Because there are also brutal and needed changes." Deputy, ex member of 
the PS. 
"Low confidence in political parties in young people is because in the end, politics is 
not being the vehicle of transformation, nor something that makes sense to them with 
respect to the future." Ex-deputy, member of the PPD.  
Chilean youths and some left-wing politicians perceive that the way Chilean 
politics is functioning is not allowing necessary transformations, and that is why it is 
believed youths generate perceptions of inefficacy that result in feelings of political 
disaffection. The evidence seems to suggest, then, the accurateness of the hypothesis 
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that disaffection is partly generated by a process where formal politics losses its 
meaning based on processes of demobilisation and depolitisation of relevant issues. It 
can be argued, therefore, that Chilean youths’ levels of disaffection have been affected 
by the development of the post-authoritarian CPS, where the gentrification and 
moderation of politics has increased the gap between the citizenry and the political 
system by generating feelings of political inefficacy (P.Silva, 2004, Walter, 2008).  
Electoral system  
Feelings of political inefficacy were also found to be generated by a homogeneous 
political offer produced by the binominal electoral system. In the previous section it 
was discussed that this system is associated with feelings of disaffection, as it limits 
political representation by reproducing similar political offers. It can now be observed 
by the evidence from youths’ perceptions that this system also generates disaffection, 
because the basis of a political system where changes are made with great difficulty 
seems to be this electoral system. This is because it practically delivers all the political 
power in a very predictable form to two very similar coalitions that do not need to 
advocate for significant transformations in order to reproduce their power positions.  
"I feel young people are not charmed by politics because they feel that things will stay 
the same, that it does not matter if this or the other one is governing, why should I 
vote if that one is going to be elected anyway? And this is because of the binomial 
system since you have these so marked blocs and it is very complex to change 
something." Amparo, member of the youth division of the PC. 
"I think that every year Chilean youths are registering less in electoral registers 
because they feel that their voice and their vote will not influence anything. This is 
actually a problem of the binomial system that prevents the emergence of new young 
candidates." Diego ,member of the youth division of the PPD. 
There is, then, a perception that the fact that the CPS does not produce relevant 
changes is somehow explained by the binominal electoral system. Electoral results, 
especially those of parliamentarian elections, are very predictable with this system 
since people practically just ratify candidates proposed by the two main coalitions 
(Arriagada, 1997). This is to generate few incentives for politicians to advocate deeper 
changes and it also excludes other relevant actors or the emergence of new actors, 
which makes the chances to produce relevant transformations even more limited. In 
this sense, it can be observed that one of the main perceptions to engender feelings of 
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disaffection is being generated by the main institution in charge to generate a political 
system based on the convergence of moderate positions (Baño, 1993).   
Internal Influence  
One last thing to analyse regarding the link between feelings of political 
disaffection and perceptions of political inefficacy has to do with how young people 
who participate in political parties perceive their levels of influence within them. What 
is observed in the data is that youths who participate in political parties are, in general, 
advocating more spaces of influence. Although, some of them, especially from right-
wing parties, are pleased with the current situation.   
"You always have to be begging for space. What we obtained in the last time has to do 
with the participation in the decision-making of the Concertación. We took an 
important step in having some impact on macro politics of the Concertación but in 
previous times we have not had that." Eugenia, member of the youth division of the 
PS.  
"If you analyse, you will notice that in the UDI the phenomenon that the directive does 
not take into account the youth division does not happen. The rule is at least one 
youth from the youth division competes in elections for councillors and for the political 
committee as any other person." Ignacio,  member of the youth division of the UDI. 
There is a feeling, then, that there should be more spaces to make youth divisions 
more influential within political parties and the fact that there are few spaces is a 
factor that explains low levels of youth participation among political parties. Youths 
from political parties also recognise, however, that many times youth militants are 
responsible for that since they don’t look for those spaces61. This situation was not 
previously hypothesised as generating disaffection. Therefore, it can be argued as a 
new-found element that seems to be relevant regarding the association between 
feeling that you are not effective when involved in politics and feeling hostility towards 
the political system.  
The link between feelings of political inefficacy and political disaffection was 
understood, then, by combining quantitative and qualitative data. Chilean youths are 
visibly feeling that when you get involved in politics you are not effective in producing 
relevant changes. This is generating feelings of hostility towards the political system, 
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 For a deep analysis of feelings of political efficacy among youth divisions of Chilean parties, see Espinoza and 
Madrid (2010).  
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which confirms to Chilean youths that, as people come to feel politically inefficacious, 
they perceive politics as normalness and tend to become primary subjects to acquire 
negative feelings about political objects (Easton, 1975).  
3.3.3 Perceptions of the internal functioning of political parties 
The third and last type of perceptions to be analysed with respect to its link to 
feelings of political disaffection are perceptions about the internal functioning of 
political parties. In the descriptive analysis of this chapter it was observed that Chilean 
youths perceive that political activity itself has some negative features that generate 
disaffection, such as a lot of in-fighting, bad selections of candidates and a lack of 
transparency. This was described as a new element found that was also determining 
feelings of political disaffection, and it is now necessary to analyse this issue more 
deeply. This would be done mostly with the use of qualitative data.62  
Democratic functioning  
The main issue that arose from the qualitative data is the perception that the 
internal functioning of political parties is not very democratic and transparent. Political 
parties are perceived to be instances where some bad practices take precedence over 
the generation of democratic spaces to participate. With respect to these bad 
practices, it is possible to distinguish a lack of transparency in the processes of 
admission of new militants and in the selection of candidates, an elitist form of 
decision-making and the primacy of party agreements over the wellbeing of society, 
among others.  
"The disaffection that young people have has to do with bad practices. It has to do 
with seeing that parties are not pleasant instances to participate. There is little 
transparency in the admission. The instances of participation are also scarce. For 
example, when in the current political system there is not an institutional possibility to 
compete in primaries." Alfonso, member of the youth division of the PDC. 
"Among political parties there is not even feedback. So, how do you want to have 
more participation of young people in those parties if parties themselves do not open 
elements to enable young people to be interested? Young people will see that they are 
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 This is because those surveys analysed did not have good indicators to measure this type of perceptions.  
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not going to be taken into account. They are the gomas of parties."
63
 Héctor, member 
of a left-wing organisation.  
Political parties are not being perceived as transparent institutions where people 
have spaces to participate and be part of decision-making processes. This is 
particularly affecting young people, since with this form of functioning young people 
are often used to only doing the hard work in campaigns. These bad practices are also 
perceived to be associated with feelings of political disaffection by some members of 
the political class, as they believe that parties are not open spaces for participating, 
which moves young people away from them.  
"Political parties today have not been able to create new spaces because their 
structures are completely elitist. They are made of groups that are enclosed among 
them, which administer electoral quotas and jobs in the government. The militancy of 
parties is largely inactive and those who are involved participate in groups, sects or 
internal clubs." Jorge Arrate, ex-presidential candidate for the non-parliamentary left 
coalition. 
"What I see in the case of young people is that they often enter to a party very excited. 
But often they face the party machineries and that scares them immediately. Within 
parties there are practices that deviate from the sense of broader politics. To fight for 
the position. To use the party as a springboard. To search the space for personal power 
rather than for collective power." Woman, deputy of the PDC. 
Chilean political parties do not appear to be democratic, as the internal functioning 
seems to favour small groups’ interests that do not advocate more democratic 
mechanisms, as that could put their privileged positions at risk. The relevance of this 
situation seems to be something that has not been highly analysed in the Chilean case 
regarding the emergence of disaffection. Several authors have stated that Chilean 
political activity is not as transparent as could be expected since, for example, 
mechanisms for selecting candidates are not very democratic (Ruiz, 2009, Navia, 2004, 
Siavelis, 2002). However, these analyses have not been sufficiently connected with the 
emergence of disaffection and with broader features of Chilean politics. That is why 
this thesis claims that the association between negative perceptions about the internal 
functioning of political parties and feelings of hostility towards the political system can 
be qualified as a new finding that contributes to the debate about the sources of 
political disaffection.  
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 To be a ‘goma’ is a Chilean slang term used to describe people who are subjugated to more powerful people 
regarding the realisation of several duties that these powerful people are not willing to do.    
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Adultcentrism  
Another important effect of the perceived undemocratic and elitist way of 
functioning of political parties, which is particularly affecting the youth population, is 
the reproduction of a political activity marked by a deep adult-centrism. Political 
parties are somehow monopolised by some small groups, where there are no 
transparent mechanisms to participate and to select candidates. Moreover, politicians 
know that youths are not voting. Therefore, a context within parties where youths 
have very few chances to be promoted to become candidates is generated. This is 
linked to feelings of political disaffection, since youth citizens do not see young 
candidates that advocate for interests more similar to theirs. 
"I believe that young people do not feel represented because there are few young 
politicians. Regarding that, the right wing has done it better. They do not see people 
who are similar to them. You are going to have confidence in someone that you see as 
closer to you." Ruben, member of citizen movement. 
"Political parties have been unable to open the doors to young people. We have 
deputies who have been in power for twenty years. These deputies go to re-elections 
indefinitely. Therefore, that might also discourage young people." Ignacio, member of 
the youth division of the UDI.  
 Popular elections often lack young candidates, since with current decision-making 
mechanisms of political parties it is very difficult for a young militant to obtain support 
to become a candidate. This clearly generates hostility among youths towards the 
political system, since they feel less represented with old candidates but also because 
they realise the source of this situation is the proper functioning of political parties 
that do not generate spaces for young people.  
The lack of generational change in the political leadership has been also 
highlighted as a source of youth political disaffection in Chile (Dominguez, 2012). Using 
Pitkin’s concept of descriptive representation (1967), it can be argued that a lack of 
youth descriptive representatives, that is to say, the absence of youth representing 
youth, is to generate political disaffection. This is an important phenomenon since it 
has been argued that descriptive representation is especially beneficial in contexts of 
mistrust and where some interests are uncrystallised, which is clearly the current 
situation of Chilean youths (Mansbridge, 1999).  
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Political Activation   
The last aspect to be analysed with respect to the link between political 
disaffection and perceptions about the internal functioning of political parties is also 
related to how political parties promote the participation of young people. In this 
sense, it can be observed from the data that not only the fact that political machineries 
limit the promotion of youth candidates within the parties is generating disaffection, 
but it is also generated by the fact that the political class is not worried about 
motivating youth political participation. In table 3.7 it is possible to observe some 
fitted probabilities of having confidence in both political parties and the congress 
regarding youths’ opinions of how political parties encourage people to be active in 
politics specified by SES. 
Table 3.7 - Fitted probabilities of having confidence in political institutions for Chilean Youth 
(18-29) with different levels of agreement with the statement "Political Parties encourage 
people to be active in politics" and with different SES64 
 As shown in table 3.7, controlling for some socio-demographic variables and 
others explanatory variables, opinions regarding how political parties encourage 
people to be active in politics are significantly associated with having confidence in 
these political institutions. Those who disagree more with the statement that political 
parties encourage people to be active in politics are those most politically disaffected. 
It can also be observed that this association is stronger for youth from higher SES. 
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 The rest of the variables of the model were fixed to a particular level. The values of the other variables were: a 
man, aged 23, who is fairly interested in politics, that believes that the congress represent well people´s interests 
and who does not agree neither disagree with the statements ‘political parties do not give voters a real choice 
between alternative public policies’ and ‘I don't think that the government cares much what people like me think’. 
This last variable was only used for the calculation of the fitted probabilities regarding confidence in the congress, 
since it was not significantly associated with the variable measuring confidence in political parties.  
 
Probability of having Confidence in  
Political Parties 
Probability of having Confidence in the 
Congress 
Opinion / SES Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Totally disagree 0.51 0.1 0.01 0.36 0.16 0.06 
Disagree 0.53 0.23 0.07 0.41 0.28 0.18 
Neither agree nor disagree 0.55 0.44 0.34 0.46 0.45 0.44 
Agree 0.56 0.68 0.78 0.52 0.63 0.73 
Totally Agree 0.58 0.85 0.96 0.57 0.78 0.91 
Source: Auditoria a la Democracia, 2010, n: 331    
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Those youths who perceive that political parties are not encouraging the 
activeness of common citizens are engendering more feelings of hostility towards the 
political system. With the aid of qualitative data it is also possible to deepen the 
understanding of this link. The main observation from that evidence is that youths 
believe that the political class is not particularly interested in motivating young people 
to participate in politics and that the reasons for that have to do with power interests.  
"I think traditional political parties do not try to encourage greater youth participation 
because they are parties that have voters and not followers. Therefore, they prefer 
that the great mass of young people is not enrolled since they are more or less certain 
to have this electoral roll of twenty years that they know more or less how it behaves." 
Marcelo, member of an ecologist organisation. 
"I do not think politicians try to encourage more youth participation. I think they try to 
discourage that because the logic of power interest has to do with having fewer people 
in politics and moving away those who shine a bit." Cristina, member of an 
organisation that advocates liberal values. 
The main perception is that political parties are not encouraging youth political 
participation, since that will not deliver any power benefit to the political class. On the 
contrary, it is believed that they actually discourage participation since by motivating 
more young people to be politically involved their proper places of power are put in 
danger. Once more, then, the fact that youths are not registered to vote plays against 
them. The political class is used to the existing electoral roll that does not include 
many youths and to encourage youth participation would mean to alter a situation 
that is currently beneficial to them. This lack of interest of encouraging young people 
to be active in politics is also expressed by the fact that politicians do not go to places 
where young people are, in that they do not open spaces for youth participation and 
also by a lack of promotion of youth leadership. These findings then reaffirm what was 
previously established; that Chilean youths are demanding more participation as they 
are aware of the developed theoretical statement that effective representation can 
only be acquired through authentic mechanisms of participation where people can 
express their opinions and pressure their representatives (Plotke, 1997, Urbanati, 
2000).  
This phenomenon is also perceived by some members of the political class from 
left-wing parties. They link that with something that was previously discussed about 
the fact that political parties in Chile have been more focused on governing than on 
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being connected with the citizenry. This situation would affect the encouragement of 
young people to be active in politics since by behaving like that, the space for 
promoting youth leaders becomes weakened as possible leaders are situated in 
governmental positions rather than in positions where they are more connected with 
the civil society.  
"I think parties are not encouraging young people to participate. First I think that what 
happened is that there was less priority for enhancing youth leaders because these 
movements were losing relevance. But a second thing that is very harmful is that 
parties began to encourage more young people for public positions with a professional 
profile rather of social or cultural leaders." Ex deputy of the PPD.   
The fact that political parties do not encourage people to participate can be also 
understood as an effect of a process of social demobilisation, realised by political 
parties since the return to democracy. As it was previously stated, Chilean democracy 
has been described as having an elitist character as the political class intentionally 
demobilised civil society to acquire political stability (Roberts, 1999, Oxhorn, 1994). 
From this evidence it can be observed that these demobilisation processes not only 
provoke disaffection by not generating spaces to exercise political representation but 
also because youths negatively perceive that political parties are entities that do not 
promote participation in order to safeguard power positions.  
It is also relevant to highlight that political elites of several other Latin American 
countries have also undergone processes where they have discouraged the promotion 
of civil participation after democratic transitions and other difficult political contexts. 
For example, Philip and Panizza (2011) argue that one relevant element of the political 
systems of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela in the 1990s was the promotion of passive 
civil societies through the reduction of the ties between formal politics and common 
citizens.  Moreover, they also sustain that this situation contributed to generating high 
levels of political discontent that were later capitalised on by left-wing candidates. For 
instance, it has been argued that Chavez emerged in Venezuela because he was able to 
convince people that he was aiming to include them politically and socially in contrast 
to earlier administrations (McCoy, 1999, E. Silva, 2009). In this sense, it can be argued 
that the relation between disaffection and demobilisation adequately exemplifies the 
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fact that some elements that explain political disaffection are not unique to the 
Chilean case65 . 
In summary, there is clearly an association between youth perceptions of the 
internal functioning of political parties and feelings of political disaffection. This issue 
was not initially hypothesised as a relevant source of this phenomenon, whence it can 
be described as a new finding provided by this thesis. This does not mean, however, 
that it cannot be connected with established hypotheses as the undemocratic 
functioning political parties are evidently also an expression of a political system with a 
large gap between politics and common citizens. These findings also seem to reconfirm 
the fact that Chile seems to have several elements of a partyarchy that would be 
generating political disaffection. Coppedge (1994) argues that some of the main 
elements of a partyarchy are parties that control all nominations of for public office, 
limiting the eligibility to citizens and electoral laws that limit citizens’ choices. Chilean 
youths noticeably perceive that Chilean parties have these same elements, which 
would lead to describe Chilean democracy as having some partyarchic features.  
3.3.4 Merging the three perceptions into a coherent explanation   
After having analysed separately the links between these types of perceptions and 
feelings of political disaffection, it is necessary to develop a coherent explanation that 
merges them and that can also explain why these feelings are being expressed more 
strongly among young people.   
The first thing to argue is that Chilean youths are expressing feelings of hostility 
towards the institutions, processes and values of the political system, basically because 
of the way the political system is connected with the citizenry, and particularly with 
young people. This then reaffirms for the Chilean case Nyew and Zelikow’s statement 
that declines in political support are to be linked to the declining role of political 
institutions as the mediating force between governments and citizens (1997). With 
respect to this issue, one of the main perceptions is that the Chilean political class is 
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 As it was previously stated, the discussion of the uniqueness of the Chilean case regarding the 
association between several political features and the emergence of disaffection will not be something 
highly developed in this thesis due to it has a more limited scope.  
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not showing a real interest in being connected with society, since it is more focused on 
pursuing its own power interests. This disposition of the political class accounts for the 
absence of spaces of connection that limit the representation of certain sectors. 
Moreover, this disconnection is also generating feelings about the usefulness of 
politics, since there is a strong belief that politics is not a vehicle of transformation. 
Based on this limited connection youths do not feel involved and they do not perceive 
that politics is able to produce changes that would benefit the citizenry. These findings 
confirm and deepen the central hypothesis of this thesis, as it was established that 
Chilean youths are politically disaffected due to the way the post-authoritarian CPS has 
generated a large gap between common citizens and politics that is expressed through 
feelings of lack of representation and political inefficacy.  
The findings of this chapter, however, were not only limited to what was initially 
hypothesised. This is because it was also found that these feelings of lack of 
representation and political inefficacy find their counterpart in the internal functioning 
of political parties. It seems that by not being connected with the citizenry, political 
parties have become institutions that are not transparent since the citizenry is not 
exercising any control over them. Moreover, as they are not transparent the capacity 
to generate changes through them is more difficult. Political parties do not generate 
participation spaces or motivate more participation, since they seem to be principally 
focused on obtaining power rather than on improving social conditions of the whole 
population. These situations would generate, then, even more problems of 
representation as their logic of functioning separates them even more from common 
citizens.  
The question that arises now is why the youth population is the most affected 
group by the particular way politics is working in Chile regarding the generation of 
feelings of political disaffection. The answer is not very complex and it has to do with 
the fact that the political class is particularly more disconnected with respect to young 
people. By following the observed logic that politicians try to mainly satisfy their power 
interests, it is possible to argue that since youths are not currently voting, they are less 
appealing to the political class and therefore the political system is even less 
incentivised to generate ties with them. This fact is manifested in fewer spaces for 
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youth participation, lack of relevant youth public polices and a general lack of interest 
in encouraging their activation. All these situations make youths feel even more 
excluded from the political system, since it does not offer them spaces to participate or 
polices related to their interests. Therefore, it is them who most develop feelings of 
lack of representation and political inefficacy. The internal functioning of political 
parties is also to be more negative towards young people since these institutions are 
dominated by powerful groups where youths are by far those with most difficulties to 
develop themselves within these parties. This situation is expressed by fewer young 
candidates and a lack of youth leaders connected with the citizenry.  
The following quotes reflect what has been just stated. It could be argued, then, 
that within a political context of limited political discussion and few ties between 
citizens and the political system, young people are particularly more disaffected since 
they represent one of the most politically and socially excluded sectors of Chilean 
society.  
"These feelings about not being able to influence are obviously stronger among young 
people because they are not taken into account at a societal level. The direction that is 
made for young people by society, the government, whatever, towards youth policy is 
null." Amparo, member of the youth division of the PC. 
"This distance between people and politics is stronger in young people because they 
do not vote that much. That is a very practical thing. If young people in this country 
were forced to vote I guarantee you that the political world would be responsible for 
building bridges. And to speak in their languages. To be attractive." Woman, deputy of 
the PDC.  
The explanation of this particular situation in youth citizens is given by the fact that 
power interests of the political class are not benefited by a connection with the youth 
world. In this sense, it is possible to argue that there is in Chile a very pragmatic 
political class that is quite disconnected from the citizenry, and that it is precisely this 
pragmatism that explains the greater distance between it and young people.  
 3.4 Conclusions  
The main purpose of this chapter was to start developing an explanation for 
current high levels of political disaffection among Chilean youths. To accomplish this 
purpose, abundant quantitative and qualitative data were deeply analysed regarding 
links between feelings of political disaffection and youth perceptions about the 
145 
 
functioning of the CPS. In this sense, the main finding was that Chilean youths are 
highly disaffected because of the way in which the political class is connected with 
them. Moreover, it could be observed that the Chilean political class is perceived to be 
particularly disconnected from young people as they are not useful to it with respect 
to the reproduction of its power positions. This disconnection is to generate political 
disaffection as it engenders feelings of lack of representation and perceptions of 
political inefficacy, and because the internal functioning of political parties is very alien 
to young people. Moreover, it was also found that feelings of hostility towards the 
political system are greater since youths also perceive that these problematic 
situations are the product of a pragmatic political class whose main concern is to 
ensure its own power interests.  
In this sense, it can be argued that the evidence suggests that the central 
hypothesis previously established relating to feelings of lack of representation and 
political inefficacy generated by the particular way of working of the CPS are  
appropriate. It can be also argued that the importance of power issues and the internal 
functioning of political parties are new elements that were found to also be associated 
with the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection.  
 The explanation for such high levels of youth political disaffection is clearly, then, 
a political one. Since its return to democracy Chile has shown good levels of economic 
development and an admirable political stability. However, at the same time there has 
been also a disconnection between the political world and common citizens based on 
several institutional and socio-economic legacies inherited from the dictatorship and 
the form the transition took that defined central features of the CPS. It is precisely this 
disconnection that would be explaining these feelings of hostility towards the political 
system. As it was also observed during the chapter, this account for political 
disaffection largely agrees with several descriptions of central elements of Chilean 
politics that generate disaffection (Garretón, 2007, Angell, 2007 and Moulian, 1998). 
These authors have argued that the main attributes of the post-authoritarian Chilean 
democracy are the existence of a party system based on the convergence of 
moderated positions, the prevalence of a dogmatic adscription to privilege political 
consensus and to not mobilise people and a technocratic style of policy-making based 
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on the pacts of the elites where powerful entrepreneurs have a privileged 
participation. In this sense, the existence of highly politically disaffected youths would 
come to be a consequence of the development of a style of politics based on these 
features, since they are the main source of the disconnection between the political 
class and the citizenry. 
The major contribution of this thesis to the debate about political disaffection in 
Chile is not principally related, then, to new elements that would explain this 
phenomenon, since what was observed mainly reconfirmed and deepened other 
monographic accounts through empirical data. What this thesis is in fact making a 
more relevant contribution to is the explanation of particularly high levels of 
disaffection among young people. The main argument is, then, that the source of these 
high feelings of hostility towards the political system is a large disconnection of the 
Chilean political class regarding the citizenry. This disconnection is affecting the whole 
Chilean population, but it is generating higher feelings of disaffection among young 
people since the political class is even more disconnected with youth citizens. This 
situation is mainly explained by the fact that being connected with youths does not 
bring any power benefit as they are not voting. In this sense, young people are one of 
the most politically and socially excluded groups in Chilean society, which is expressed 
through even fewer political spaces for them, a lack of policies that approach their 
interests and political parties whose internal functioning is rather unfriendly with 
respect to them.  
The second main contribution of this thesis concerning something that has not 
been vastly discussed has to do with the link between political disaffection and two 
new elements. The first is how youths perceive the importance of acquiring power 
among politicians. The evidence suggested youths believe that the Chilean political 
class, on many occasions, opt for favouring their own power interests instead of the 
wellbeing of common citizens. In this sense, it is important to state that political 
disaffection is not merely the product of feelings of lack of representation or political 
inefficacy based on a disconnection between the political world and common citizens. 
These feelings of hostility are also explained by the fact that Chilean youths perceive 
they are not represented or able to produce changes because there is a political class 
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that consciously limits that in order to favour its own interests. The other new element 
found was the importance of the internal functioning of political parties. Chilean 
youths perceive that parties are undemocratic instances dominated by small groups 
whose main interest is to gain power. This would be, then, another relevant expression 
of a large disconnection between formal politics and youths that is also more relevant 
for this group, as undemocratic parties are particularly generating fewer ties with 
young people.  
These two findings describe Chilean democracy as having some elements of a 
partyarchy, which is something that has not been fully described by the literature but 
that can be easily connected to other findings. It seems, then, that as Chilean 
democracy developed institutions that reproduced a style of politics based on a 
disconnection between formal politics and common citizens, the political class started 
to develop very pragmatic attitudes that led to it excessively prioritising the 
attainment of power at any cost. This attitude generates even more disconnection 
with the citizenry as it was observed that youths develop feelings of political 
disaffection when they perceive this situation. Moreover, this same pragmatic attitude 
would be also the base of the explanation of current higher levels of disaffection 
among Chilean youths. 
Another interesting finding is that almost every time youth has to give examples 
about their feelings of disaffection they make reference to Chile’s high levels of income 
inequality. They are of the opinion that inequality is principally a political problem 
since it expresses the lack of will of a homogeneous political class that prioritizes the 
representation of their own interests, generating a sense that is very difficult to change 
things. In general terms, it seems therefore that Chilean youth believe that Chilean 
democracy has not been able to spread the results of a process of successful economic 
development across the population.   
Finally, another interesting issue that could be observed is that there are some 
differences regarding the determinants of political disaffection if they are analysed 
taking into account youth socio-economic levels. It was found that, in general terms, 
feelings of lack of representation and perceptions about the internal functioning of 
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political parties seem to be more relevant for youths from higher SES while feelings of 
political inefficacy more determine the levels of disaffection in the case of youths from 
lower SES. These results, however, could not be fully understood and developed since 
the qualitative data collected did not give clues about them66.  
The main argument of the thesis has been then stated and subsequent analyses 
are to develop it. In this sense, the following chapters aim to deepen this argument 
through the revision of several case studies that emphasise some of its elements. With 
respect to that, a deep analysis of the way in which the CPS has addressed the issue of 
youth public polices will bring a much deeper understanding of the way youths’ 
interests are being represented. Moreover, a case where youths seem to have felt 
appealing with respect to formal politics, as in the presidential candidacy of Marco 
Enriquez-Ominami, can also deepen this argument as it gives clues about what kind of 
formal politics decreases levels of hostility. Finally, an analysis of educational social 
movements that face formal political institutions will show in detail how the CPS works 
regarding the representation of demands and the efficacy of politics.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
66
 This situation clearly represents a limitation of this thesis and at the same time suggests additional analyses to be 
made in future researches. 
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Chapter 4:  Linking Chilean youth political disaffection with the lack of a 
consistent youth public policy 
 4.1 Introduction  
The evidence in the previous chapter suggested current high levels of Chilean 
youth political disaffection are explained by a particularly large disconnection between 
the Chilean political class and young people. At this point, it is necessary to deepen this 
argument more strongly by examining other types of evidences. This is to be done in 
this chapter by profoundly analysing a specific aspect of this disconnection between 
youths and politics to do with the development of a youth public policy (YPP). It has 
already been observed that feelings of political disaffection are associated with a 
perceived lack of representation being a deficiency of the youth public offer one of the 
most relevant issues that explains problems of representativeness. This chapter 
proposes, then, to deepen the understanding of this particular element taking into 
account that this is just one of several aspects of the relationship between youths and 
the CPS to generate disaffection.67   
This chapter intends to analyse, then, how the CPS has addressed the issue of 
offering a youth public policy and its links with feelings of political disaffection under 
the assumption that, by examining one specific aspect of the relationship between 
youths and politics, it is possible to more deeply understand how broader aspects of 
Chilean politics are to generate disaffection. The main argument to be developed is 
that, despite some relevant efforts, since the return to democracy until now there has 
not been a consistent YPP and authentic mechanism through which young people can 
influence the youth public offer. This situation is linked to feelings of political 
disaffection since that strongly affects the representation of youths’ interests. A 
second idea to be elaborated is that this current scenario seems to be explained by the 
fact that youth issues are particularly less relevant to the Chilean political class. This is 
because its pragmatic fashion has limited the representation of youth interests 
because that does not contribute to reproducing politicians’ power positions. This 
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 The lack of public policy is just one element of this negative relationship, with other aspects being, for example, 
the lack of youth leadership and the low influence capacity of youth divisions within traditional political parties. This 
topic was chosen since apart from showing problems of representativeness, it exemplifies well the fact that the 
political class is particularly more disconnected regarding youths as it is very pragmatic.   
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situation seems to also be perceived by young people. Thus, it is also analysed 
regarding the emergence of political disaffection.  
In order to develop these arguments, this chapter is divided into four main 
sections. The first analyses the evolution of youth institutions and several attempts to 
generate a YPP at the beginning of the post-authoritarian democracy. The second 
section asks more specifically if there is currently a consistent YPP and how this can be 
connected with feelings of political disaffection. The third examines how Chilean 
youths are currently being incorporated into the development of public policies. 
Finally, the fourth part is focused on the reasons for this apparent lack of a YPP and 
participatory mechanisms and how these proper reasons can be linked to feelings of 
hostility towards the political system.  
 4.2 The first attempts to generate a Youth Public Policy  
To be able to understand the current link between deficiencies of the youth public 
offer and the engenderment of feelings of political disaffection, it is first necessary to 
comprehend how this issue was addressed at the beginning of Chile’s post-
authoritarian democracy. This is because the development of a YPP was a relevant 
topic of the political agenda at that time, but several events finally truncated its 
implementation, which finally generated the current scenario.  
Before analysing these first attempts it has to be clear what is going to be 
understood as a youth public policy. In this sense, following Eugenio Ravinet’s 
definition, it can be argued that a public policy is "a system that organically integrates 
a speech or social representation to which is preferentially directed, a system of 
information that optimises the quality and transparency of actions and procedures, a 
flow of resources that allows its funding, a regulatory framework that regulates and 
empowers, a system of public communication and information, a group of 
programmatic offers, and institutions or organisational support through which the 
actions are executed" (Ravinet, 2008: 7)68.  
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 This definition seems accurate for this thesis as Ravinet was a former director of the Chilean National Institute of 
the youth (INJUV) and former general secretary of the Youth Ibero-American organisation (OIJ).  
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In simpler terms, to have a youth public policy means the state assumes an 
accurate youth perspective regarding the functioning of the whole public sector 
through its agencies, resources and offers under a coherent design that guides public 
interventions. This situation implies having an intersectorial co-ordination of all public 
institutions that affect young peoples’ lives under the same policy design, based on a 
clear definition of a youth and with strong institutions advocated to that coordination 
(INJUV, 2006). For example, if there was a YPP in a specific country, that would mean 
that if the Ministry of Labor implemented a workers’ training programme it would be 
forced to develop, within that programme, a specific plan to train youths. Similarly, if 
the Ministry of Health developed a programme to prevent diseases among the poor, a 
specific part of that programme had to be focused on the prevention of diseases that 
affects poor youths.  
To have a youth public policy does not mean, therefore, to have some specific 
programmes for the youth but to have a state that has a defined framework that gives 
sense and substance to the programmatic offer and that acts coordinately to deliver a 
consistent public offer. The relevance of that, regarding feelings of political 
disaffection, is that only an articulated state that recognises young people from a 
defined perspective regarding their interests can be truly sensitive to youths’ concerns 
and can create relations of confidence between youths and the political system (Asún, 
2006). In this sense, it is only when the state approaches youth issues in this manner 
that young people are able to perceive a real preoccupation from the political world 
concerning their interests.  
Having made clear what a YPP means, it is now necessary to analyse the first 
attempts to implement that kind of policy after Chile recovered its democracy. In 
relation to that, the creation of the National Institute of the Youth (INJUV) was without 
doubt the first relevant event. This institution was created in the early 1990s to 
generate the bases of a public institution regarding youth issues. One of the main 
arguments of its creation was the payment of the supposed social debt the state had 
to this population, as youths were one of the most affected social groups by several 
policies executed during the dictatorship (INJUV, 2006).  
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With the INJUV already functioning in 1991, the programme of opportunities for 
the youth (PROJOVEN) was launched. This has been highlighted as the best attempt to 
develop an articulated youth public policy, as it included intersectorial boards with 7 
areas and 45 programmes (Dávila, 2001). Moreover, it also intended to be an 
articulated body of sectorial initiatives (INJUV, 2006). These efforts, however, did not 
have continuity. This was particularly the case after 1997, when there was an 
institutional crisis in the INJUV as there were serious accusations of embezzlement of 
funds that resulted in the resignation of its chief authorities. This crisis finally resulted 
in a drastic reduction of its budget that in 1998 was only 44% of the previous year, 
which forced the closure of a number of intervention programmes. Additionally, it also 
made the INJUV reduce its capacity to articulate a public offer, since it lost legitimacy 
within the Chilean state (INJUV, 2006).  
This crisis was so severe that it has been argued it is based on these facts that Chile 
currently has several limitations regarding its youth public offer, as youth institutions 
were never able to fully recover. The last part of the 1990s represented a stagnation 
regarding the development of a YPP when compared to the first part of the decade, as 
institutional initiatives to develop the youth issue were weakened (Dávila, 2001, 
Krauskopf, 2011). The problem is that since this crisis there have never again been 
relevant and concrete efforts to articulate a YPP. From the INJUV itself, it is recognised 
that "since 1997 onwards preliminary efforts and attempts to articulate a consistent 
state policy have been postponed. Thus, the state still lacks a defined youth public 
policy and a clear generational perspective" (INJUV, 2006: 280). 
The crisis of 1997 was clearly, then, a turning point concerning the strengthening of 
the youth public offer. The INJUV reduced its budget and lost power to other public 
institutions. Thus, a clear distancing of public policies regarding young people was 
generated, as there was a drastic retreat of the visible face of youth social policies in 
the public action (INJUV, 2006). The fact that after this crisis the youth public offer was 
never able to fully recover has also been cited as the possible starting point of a vicious 
circle between youths and politics. This is because, as the INJUV lost power, youths 
were less interested in becoming involved in formal politics, which finally generated 
even fewer incentives for politicians to generate an attractive youth public offer.  
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 When youth experts are asked about this crisis it is argued that it took several 
years for the INJUV to recuperate some previous attributes such as increased budget 
and especially levels of legitimacy among the public sector. Moreover, they state that 
the main problem was that when the INJUV was in a better position to initiate deeper 
discussions, the political context was a different one, as young people were numbered 
very few among the electoral roll69. 
 "The initial phase of the INJUV was very rich, where very concrete bases, ideas and 
proposals were established. Then the problem of 1997 with the institutional crisis 
comes. But when you manage to overcome these difficulties you are in front of a 
scenario in which young people were not representing more than 11% in every 
election. Therefore, for the proper political class it was not profitable to have an in-
depth discussion concerning youth public policies." Juan Eduardo Faúndez, former 
director of the INJUV between 2006 and 2010. 
"This started very powerful. It reached its peak in 1996 or 1997. After 1997, when the 
institution had some problems with corruption, they took away the budget, functions 
and programmes from the whole institute. And from there it took a lot to recover 
levels of investment and leadership that the INJUV can have." Eugenio Ravinet, former 
director of the INJUV between 2001 and 2004. 
Those years of a practical obscurantism of the youth institutional framework after 
the 1997 crisis seem to have affected the number of young people who were 
incentivised to be registered to vote. At the same time, these lower rates of formal 
participation affected the perspectives of a more consistent youth public offer when 
the institute was in part recovered, as the political class had fewer incentives to be 
concerned about youth issues.  
When this crisis was overcome there were other attempts to strengthen the youth 
public offer, such as the ‘Action Plan on Youth’ in 2004 that proposed several 
coordinated actions regarding youth (INJUV, 2004) and the Law project that created 
the Ministry of Sport and Youth in order to add political weight to youth issues within 
the Chilean state. There were also some projects to increase the participation of young 
people through the elaboration of public policies such as INJUV’s participative 
dialogues and the youth parliament. However, none of these experiences could be 
successfully implemented.  
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 In 2001 people from 18 to 29 represented only a 13% of the electoral roll. 
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 4.3 Is there currently a consistent Youth Public Policy in Chile? 
The vision of the experts  
After having discussed the historical development of youth institutions since 1990, 
it is necessary to focus now on the current state of affairs of the Chilean youth public 
offer. With respect to that, when several official documents and specific literature are 
analysed it can be observed that there is a complete agreement that nowadays Chile is 
quite far from the development of a consistent YPP (Dávila, 2001, INJUV, 2006, Asún, 
2006, Krauskopf, 2011). The main argument is that Chile lacks a YPP because there is 
no clear definition that guides the efforts of a group of institutions in the promotion of 
pertinent and integrated interventions of the youth population (INJUV, 2006). It is also 
argued that one of the main problems is that the INJUV is only a weak institutional 
support group that has not been able to adequately articulate several youth initiatives. 
The result would be the existence of a programmatic offer that operates in a sectorial 
way and as a function of institutional priorities with low coordination (Reinoso, 2006). 
The current youth public offer has only a sectorial perspective, with no clear vision 
about the youth condition. Youth issues are present somehow in the public agenda. 
However, they are desegregated, disarticulated and without a perspective that starts 
with a political framework (Dávila, 2001). Therefore, public programmes have not 
constituted an integrated and coherent YPP that takes advantage of the synergies 
generated in each intervention (INJUV, 2006). Moreover, there is no law in Chile that 
defines the rights to be safeguarded by the state regarding youths as a specific 
population, which finally generates a situation where the specification of what a youth 
means is subject to the functional spheres that have a sectorial character (Santibañez 
and Zilveti, 2008). 70 
When several experts on the Chilean youth are interviewed, their evaluations are 
accorded to what has been already argued. Both academic experts and former 
directors of the INJUV from both political sectors highlight the fact that Chile lacks a 
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 Regarding this point, it is important to state that Chile has not signed the Ibero-American convention of youth 
rights. There have been some signatures of conventions that include a section on youths, such as the convention of 
the rights of the child that include children up to 18 years old. However, these attempts have clearly not lead to a 
clear definition of the youth condition.  
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proper YPP. Moreover, they also recognise that the Chilean state does not have a 
specific vision of the youth, and that the public offer just consists of unconnected and 
fragmented programmes that are clearly insufficient for an adequate canalisation of 
youths’ concerns. 
"If one checks social policy programmes, all groups of society are captured but young 
people. Today we have many programmes for youths. What happens is that they are 
not coordinated and there are not well-defined sectorial goals. And our goal is to 
orient ourselves to this great public policy." Ignacio Naudón, former director of the 
INJUV between 2010 and 2011.
71
 
"The path that the INJUV has had has been rather erratic to say the least. Therefore, I 
would say the institution is poor, weak and fragmented. In Chile there is no national 
youth policy. There are things that have been tried in a targeted manner. But there is 
not something articulated. It is precarious." Mario Sandoval, coordinator of the 
Centro de Estudios en Juventud of the Universidad Católica Raúl Silva Henríquez. 
Experts also agree on the need to develop a proper YPP, since in the current state 
of affairs youths’ interests are not being adequately attended. It is argued that one of 
the major deficiencies is that the INJUV has been very weak regarding the generation 
of coordinated policies.  
This last point also coincides with some issues highlighted in the literature as Thezá 
(2005) argues that in order to have a YPP, it is first necessary to have strong youth 
institutions able to have a real capacity of coordination in national, regional and local 
dimensions. Moreover, he also states that these institutions need to be developed in a 
context where youths are legally subjects of rights differentiated by their socio-
demographic characteristics as well. Only when there are strong institutions where the 
youth category is legally recognised as a specific subject of rights can the state have a 
coordinated YPP. This is clearly not currently the case in Chile as Asún (2006) states the 
normative frameworks in Chile do not define the youth as a legal category that really 
exists, which is linked to the fact that Chile lacks a YPP, since there is no clear definition 
of the youth that guides institutional interventions.  
Another issue that can be analysed is that youth experts believe that this topic 
has been taken into account less by the Chilean political system. It is argued that when 
you compare youths with several other specific groups of Chilean society such as 
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 When the interview with Ignacio Naudón was conducted he has still the director of the INJUV.  
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women, children and the elderly,  they are the group that has been the most ignored 
regarding the public offer. At the inaugural session of a youth governmental advisory 
in 2010, it was argued that "Chile has an historic debt with its youth. Unlike what 
happens with children, women and the elderly, our country has not advanced into a 
youth public policy. There are programmes, but not a policy that coordinates the 
various fields affecting the youth or that decisively promote their participation" 
(Consejo Asesor de Juventud, 2010). Moreover, it is argued the main consequence 
would be that youths are one of the social groups where several problematic and 
inequalities are stronger. 
A comparison commonly made is that between the representation of youths’ 
interests and womens’ interests, based on the historical development of the INJUV and 
the SERNAM (National Service of the Woman) since the return to democracy. With 
respect to that, Krauskopf argues that "even though the youth thematic emerges with 
power after the dictatorship, it has not received the institutional support that other 
population instances obtained, such as the SERMAM, with ministerial rank. Thus, the 
SERNAM is strengthened in the years of the Concertación while the official youth 
institution has not even been able to implement what the SERNAM achieved since the 
beginning of the post-dictatorship" (2011: 30). 
Currently in Chile there is a public policy for women, but not for youths, which 
seems to indicate that youth issues have been particularly less attended to in Chile. 
This difference means, for example, that if the Ministry of Culture wanted to 
implement a programme to subsidise artistic workshops in shanty towns, it would be 
forced to design a specific part of that programme for women, but not for young 
people. 
One way the evidence can analyse the fact that youths are one of the social groups 
being taken into account less by the Chilean political class is by examining the budget 
assigned to several institutions by the Chilean state in 2011. As shown in table 4.1, 
when the INJUV’s budget is contrasted with comparable institutions such as children, 
women and senior citizen national services, it is observed that the allocated budget of 
the INJUV is significantly lower than the one of the other institutions.  
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Table 4.1 - Budget allocation of several Chilean institutions (2011)  
Institution  Budget (£) 
SENAME (Child National Service) 122.716£ 
IND (National Institute of the Sport) 110.308£ 
CONADI (National Corporation of Indigenous Development) 92.533£ 
National Council of the culture and arts 57.573£ 
SERNAM (Women National Service) 27.223£ 
SENAMA (Senior Citizen National Service) 15.649£ 
SENADIS ( Disability National Service) 15.085£ 
INJUV (National Institute of the Youth) 7.056£ 
Source: DIPRES (2011).  
The INJUV’s budget for 2011 was approximately seventeen times less than that of 
the SENAME, four times less than that of the SERNAM and less than the half of the 
SENAMA. Moreover, it is also observed that institutions in charge of indigenous and 
disabled people have also significantly higher budgets than the INJUV. In fact, the 
comparatively low budget of the institution has been highlighted by the literature as 
one of the main elements that explains current deficiencies of the youth public offer 
and indicates the lack of priority youth issues have had within the Chilean state 
(Krauskopf, 2011).  
This argument can be also deepened by discussing some evidence about objective 
conditions of the youth population. For example, when historic levels of 
unemployment are compared between youths and the rest of the Chilean population, 
it is observed that youths are, indeed, in a less favorable position. As shown in figure 
4.1, in 2009 20% of Chilean youths were unemployed while only 7% of Chilean adults 
had this condition. In 2009 youth unemployment in Chile was almost three times that 
of adult unemployment, and it has consistently been more than double since 1990.  
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Figure 4.1 - Unemployment rates among Chilean youths (15-29) and Chilean adults (30+) 
 
            Source: CASEN (1990 – 2009)  
Moreover, it can also be observed that Chilean youths had in 2009 the highest level 
of unemployment since the return to democracy. Since 1990, youths and adults have 
followed a similar pattern regarding levels of unemployment. However, it can be seen 
that in the last year measured, the growth of youth unemployment was larger.  
The evolution unemployment rates among youths can also be examined regarding 
income quintiles. It can be observed in table 4.2 that youth unemployment is much 
bigger in quintiles with the lowest income as, for example, the level of unemployment 
in the poorest quintile is more than four times the level of the richest quintile.  
Therefore, it is observed that Chile’s problems of inequality seem to be also expressed 
regarding the way youths are incorporated into the labour market.  
Table 4.2 - Rate of unemployment among Chilean youth (15-29) by income quintile 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Total Q1/Q5 
1990 30,4% 16,5% 9,5% 6,5% 6,0% 13,3% 5,1 
1992 23,4% 11,8% 7,6% 5,4% 4,1% 10,0% 5,7 
1994 28,1% 13,5% 9,4% 6,8% 5,3% 12,0% 5,3 
1996 23,0% 10,8% 8,6% 5,5% 3,5% 9,9% 6,6 
1998 39,6% 17,8% 12,6% 9,5% 7,3% 16,8% 5,4 
2000 36,2% 19,5% 13,3% 10,3% 6,6% 17,5% 5,5 
2003 38,8% 20,2% 12,3% 8,9% 7,7% 17,0% 5,0 
2006 33,5% 16,0% 11,0% 8,4% 6,7% 13,9% 5,0 
2009 46,6% 22,6% 15,9% 12,1% 10,5% 19,7% 4,4 
Source: CASEN(1990-2009)  
Another relevant way to analyse levels of unemployment is by examining them 
comparing youths with the whole population in Latin American countries. In figure 4.2 
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between youth unemployment and population unemployment to those with the 
lowest differences. It is observed that Chile is the second-highest country in Latin 
America with the biggest difference between youths and the whole population 
regarding unemployment rates.  
Figure 4.2 - Unemployment rates among Latin American people by age group
 
 Source: The World Factbook (2012).  
This comparative evidence suggests then that, at least regarding unemployment, 
Chile is one of the Latin American countries where youths have comparatively more 
social problems when contrasted with the whole population. Indeed, out of the 
countries analysed Chile is the 11th with most population unemployment and the 
fourth with most youth unemployment. This situation can be also compared 
worldwide since with the same data it is observed that Chile is ranked 72th among 170 
countries regarding population unemployment and 36th among 123 countries 
regarding youth employment. Moreover, these data also indicates that Chile is ranked  
15th out of 115 countries regarding the difference between population and youth 
unemployment favorable to adults. These data seem to reconfirm, then, the fact that 
there is a particular situation in Chile where youths are less socially benefited than 
other groups.  
The last way to analyse this issue is by comparing historical poverty rates between 
adults and youths from 1990 until now. When these data are analysed it is observed 
that since the beginning of Chile’s post-authoritarian democracy there has been a 
relevant gap between both populations favorable to adults. In the last twenty years 
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more evidence to support the statement that youths are one of Chile’s social groups 
living in comparatively worse social conditions.  
Figure 4.3 - Evolution of poverty rates among Chilean youths (15-29) and adults (30+) 
 
 Source: CASEN (1990-2009).  
The data show that youth poverty rates have significantly decreased since 1990 
until today, which seems to indicate that Chile’s good economic conditions, alongside 
the implementation of several social programmes, have been able to reach youths. 
However, it is also possible to deduce that Chile has not been successful with respect 
to specifically improving youths’ social conditions in relation to other groups despite 
the argument that after the dictatorship, one of the most important social debts was, 
in fact, with young people (INJUV, 2006).  
This evidence suggests therefore that young people are a social group within 
Chilean society that is more socially troubled than others. The low budget of the 
INJUV, comparatively higher levels of youth unemployment when contrasted with 
adults and comparatively higher rates of youth poverty seems to be clearly associated 
with the previously discussed fact that youth issues are not being fully approached by 
the Chilean political class.  
In summary, it is observed that there are several deficiencies about the current 
youth public offer in Chile. It is possible to state that these situations are, without 
doubt, affecting the representation of their interests. Regarding this issue, it is also 
interesting to observe that experts themselves have connected these deficits with the 
emergence of feelings of political disaffection. Aravena (2008) argues that the fact that 
Chilean youths are not yet a specific subject of right and they lack consultative and 
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deliberative spaces where they can feel truly represented explains in part their low 
electoral participation and relative skepticism regarding the efficacy of the political 
system. Fernandez and Sepúlveda (2008) also support this idea as they state that 
current low levels of confidence in political institutions among Chilean youths could be 
explained by a lack of strength of youth public institutions, added to a sectorial and 
fragmentary design of certain policies, as that determines an insufficiency to respond 
to current demands of this population. Finally, a proper report of the INJUV also refers 
to this association, arguing that "a significant contribution to the restoration of 
confidence and the realisation of the new democratic promise is given by placing an 
articulated state sensitive to their concerns in front of the youths, equipped with a 
public policy and agents of this policy able to listen to them systematically" (INJUV, 
2006: 285).  
Those authors’ observations and the evidence examined in this section come, 
then, to ratify and deepen previously suggested findings, as it was argued that one of 
the main determinants of political disaffection was a perception of lack of 
representation and that a relevant aspect of these representativeness problems are  
difficulties regarding the current youth public offer. Likewise, these findings seem to 
reaffirm the idea that among young people would be occurring that problems of 
substantive representation negatively affect citizens’ support for the political system 
(Luna and Zechmeister, 2005, Stoker, 2006).72 
The perceptions of the political class  
Having developed the vision of several experts regarding the development of a 
consistent YPP, it is necessary to analyse the beliefs of the Chilean political class 
concerning this issue.  
With respect to that, it can be observed that they largely share the vision of some 
experts. The main vision of the political class, which is shared by members of both 
central political coalitions, is that youth issues are not being currently adequately 
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 It has to be clear, however, that this is just one element of several that would be engendering feelings of hostility 
towards the CPS, and that the lack of youth public policy is an expression of broader elements that determine the 
way of functioning of Chilean politics.  
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approached by the political system. It is also stated that Chile lacks a YPP and that 
institutions dedicated to that have not worked well. This issue is acknowledged by 
deputies of several political orientations, even though they differ with respect to the 
responsibility of the current situation. While deputies of the Alianza argue that the 
ones to be blamed are the Concertación governments, deputies of the Concertación 
inculpate the whole political spectrum.  
"I think there has not been an action on youth. The INJUV was misplaced regarding its 
function. During these years of government by the Concertación there has not been an 
action where public polices can be expressed. There has not been a public policy for 
young people." Woman, Deputy of RN. 
 
"What do we have for youths today? An institutional framework that is extremely 
precarious, with no capacity to respond. This is reflected even if you look at the 
sectorial level in health, educational or labour issues. Youth unemployment in this 
country is very large. The health issue. For example, the issue of teenage pregnancy in 
this country continues rising." Woman, Deputy of the PDC, member of the last youth 
commission of the congress. 
 
"I think that to some extent the issue of youth public polices has been neglected. I 
think that there was an oversight of the Concertación. For example, a public policy that 
actually targeted young people was to broaden the coverage of higher education. 
However, this policy opened the possibility for many young people to enter to higher 
education but it did not address funding needs of these youth." Man, Deputy of the 
UDI. 
Within deputys’ perceptions the impression that the youth public offer has had 
only a sectorial character is also found. Moreover, apart from criticising that way of 
functioning, they are also very critical regarding how specific sectorial policies have 
worked. Examples of that situation include policies related to youth employment, 
health issues and measures related to accessing higher education.73 It is believed that 
efforts made in these areas have failed, which would make the social situation of this 
group even more vulnerable as a specific social category.   
Overall, the evidence suggests that the political class is aware of several social 
problems young people are facing today and that politicians themselves have paid less 
attention to youths’ concerns. There is therefore an agreement between what is stated 
by some experts on the topic and those persons in charge to change this current 
negative situation. Thus, it can be argued that there is self-criticism by the political 
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 This last issue is very important to be highlighted, since solutions to debt problems of university students was one 
of the main demands raised by the 2011-2012 student movement to be later analysed.  
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class, although some politicians prefer to blame their political opponents rather than 
assume their own responsibilities.  
The perceptions of the youth  
Having clarified that both experts and politicians agree that there has not been a 
relevant preoccupation for the issue of youth public policy in Chile, it is necessary to 
deepen the knowledge of this topic by examining youths’ perceptions. Even though it 
was already stated in the last chapter that current high levels of youth political 
disaffection are to some extent explained by this situation, it is relevant to examine in 
greater detail specific perceptions of this issue.  
In figure 4.4 Chilean youths’ perceptions regarding the actions of the government 
with respect to their concerns can be analysed. The first thing to be highlighted is that 
only 13% of youths believe that the Chilean government supports and promotes 
programmes directed to them. As it was earlier stated, there have been several 
programmes for this population in Chile. However, the evidence suggests that it seems 
these interventions have not had a real impact in generating the impression that the 
government is sufficiently worried about youth needs. In fact, according to this same 
survey, only 15% of youths are aware of any governmental project directed at them. 
Therefore, the data indicate that the absence of a state whose actions in relation to 
youths are intersectorially coordinated and based on a defined perspective generates 
the perception that there is not a preoccupation from the political world regarding 
youths’ interests in Chile (Asún, 2006). 
Figure 4.4 - Perceptions of the actions for the youth by the government among Chilean 
youths (18-29)  
         
        Source:  Juventudes Sudamericanas, 2009, n: 552 
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Another interesting observation that can be made from Figure 4.4 is that Chilean 
youths also largely perceive that the political class is aware of their unsolved needs. 
This is inferred by the fact that more than 60% of them declare that the government 
knows youths’ needs but does not do anything. It was previously shown that the 
political class is aware of these problems. It can be observed now that youths perceive 
that, despite politicians knowing their needs, they do not act in order to improve 
youths’ social conditions. In this sense, the evidence indicates that an important 
proportion of Chilean youths perceive that present deficiencies regarding the youth 
public offer are a matter of political will.  
The qualitative material from interviews with politically-involved youths also 
contributes to deepening these analyses. In general terms, it can be observed that 
Chilean youths are of the opinion that from the return to democracy until today there 
has been little progress with respect to having a consistent public offer for this social 
category. The main criticism is directed towards the way the INJUV has worked as this 
is the most visible face of the supposed state preoccupation regarding youths. Rather 
than being perceived as an institution that advocates youths’ interests, the INJUV is 
conceived as a negative entity that has been used to favour some power interests and 
that is worried about irrelevant issues. The main things that youths perceive the INJUV 
has done are some cultural events and the distribution of condoms, which are 
disapproved actions that don’t address real problems in this population.  
"We have had very few public policies concerning young people. The INJUV was the 
great public policy of the Concertación and it is not more than a condoms dealer in the 
summer and a concert organiser in the winter. We do not even have a youth agenda. 
For example, in the government, is there an agenda today?" Raquel, member of the 
youth division of RN. 
"With the governments of the Concertación, there were few advances regarding issues 
of public policy in youths. The INJUV, for example, was an organ to fill positions rather 
than to generate real proposals. Therefore, governments since the return to 
democracy have become almost deaf to youths’ demands." Diego, member of the 
youth division of the PPD. 
 "I don’t know of any major advances that have been made in relation to youths. In 
childhood I could identify more, such as the issue of the nurseries. But if you ask if they 
regulated youth work or not, I don’t know. I think that is the most important thing and 
I have not seen anything concrete." Susana, member of a lesbian youth organisation. 
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There is the perception that in Chile there are relevant issues to be solved 
regarding the youth population, such as unemployment or sexual reproduction 
concerns. Additionally, it is perceived that these themes have not been approached as 
the main institution that should be in charge of that has been allocated to other things 
that are not of real importance. This would make the INJUV an institution that is not 
relevant for the life of youth in a context where this should clearly be the case. 
Moreover, there is also the perception that other specific social groups have been 
benefited more than youths regarding the existing public offer. These situations make 
them feel unrepresented as they are aware there is not a real preoccupation from the 
political world with respect to their interests. 
Current problems regarding the youth public offer are also perceived by some 
youths as being connected with feelings of political disaffection. It is believed that, as 
there is a lack of policies directed to them, young people do not have incentives to 
incorporate themselves into the political process. The CPS would not be visualising 
youths’ demands and that would explain, to some extent, the present low levels of 
youth political involvement in formal instances.  
"I think the explanations for low voter turnout rates of young people have to do with 
the incentive to participate. I think that today that has mainly to do with the fact that 
policies towards young people hardly exist. There is not a visualisation of youth 
demands that will make young people more involved." Hugo, member of the youth 
division of the PC. 
"This rejection of parties is expressed because traditional parties have not exactly 
made a policy to the youths. For example, the INJUV is virtually nonexistent in young 
people’s lives. You can find people who got some tickets through the INJUV or who 
went to get condoms to the INJUV. People who are organised because of what the 
INJUV delivers regarding public policy are marginal." Mariano, member of a left-wing 
youth organisation. 
Apart from incentives regarding the participation in electoral processes, the 
evidence indicates that the lack of youth public polices is also connected to feelings of 
hostility towards the political system by the fact that youths perceive that those 
responsible for the current situation are the existing political parties. These political 
institutions are rejected as youths believe they should have a more active role in order 
to have a youth public institutional framework that is present in young people’s lives, 
through the development of relevant public policies.  
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The fact that it seems that the current public offer is not sufficiently significant to 
positively alter youths’ lives can be also reaffirmed with the help of some quantitative 
data. In the 2009 national youth survey executed by the proper INJUV, it was asked if 
youths knew of or had heard about the INJUV. Moreover, those youths who were 
aware of the INJUV were further asked what it was. As shown in figure 4.5, more than 
half of Chilean youths have not even heard about this public institution and 14% of 
them only know its name. It can therefore be stated that almost 70% of young Chileans 
are not even aware of the existence or the role of the institution that is supposedly in 
charge of the development and coordination of the youth public offer, which indicates 
that it is not being relevant regarding youths’ lives.  
Figure 4.5 -  Knowledge of the INJUV and its functions among Chilean youths (15-29) 
 
 Source: INJUV, 2009. n: 7570. 
Another way to observe the fact that youth issues have not been adequately 
approached by the CPS is through an analysis of youth perceptions about the 
significance of public actions regarding the improvement of their social conditions. In 
this context, it can be observed in figure 4.6 that when Chilean youths are asked about 
the most important options to improve their lives only 4.2% referred to government 
policies.   
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Figure 4.6 - Distribution to the answers of the question "Which of the following options is 
the most important to improve your life?" among Chilean youths (18-29) 
 
        Source: Survey Juventudes Sudamericanas, 2009, n: 552 
Almost 85% of respondents stated that personal or familiar efforts are the most 
important thing to improve their lives and even a change in the economic system was 
more mentioned than government policies. This evidence indicates then that among 
Chilean youths there is clearly the perception that within the current environment 
public policies are not relevant to enhancing their life conditions. This perception is 
undoubtedly given by a context where the political world has done very little to 
generate a consistent youth public offer, which finally engenders feelings of hostility 
towards the political class.  
The last type of analysis to be made regarding youths’ perceptions about the 
current Chilean public offer is related to what youths would expect to have if the 
Chilean state was truly worried about their needs. When politically-involved youths are 
asked about these issues, it is observed that they largely agree with idealistic views 
about a YPP previously discussed. When youths’ perceptions are analysed the evidence 
suggests they would like each state institution that affects youths’ lives to have specific 
policies regarding this population, which would put them in similar positions of other 
more socially-benefited groups, such as women. Moreover, they highlight that the 
INJUV should be the institution in charge of coordinating these actions by working 
together with all these state institutions and that important members of these 
institutions should be young.  
"I imagine the INJUV visiting the labor minister to say that youth employment needs to 
be addressed in a specific way. The INJUV should be the link between state institutions 
and youth issues. But in any of the activities they organise, they do not do that." 
Pedro, member of the youth division of RN. 
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"The INJUV should have a compulsory work in student unions and organisations. To 
have a connection coordinated with these agencies where the INJUV can have an 
effect in terms of youth policies. The INJUV should be constantly reviewing educational 
reforms. The incentive to do sports. The issue of the food given in schools. The labor 
ministry too." Mariano, member of a left-wing youth organisation. 
With respect to the kind of policies they expect, youth highlight that labour, 
educational, sporting and health policies specifically targeted toward youths are the 
most important issues. In this sense, they also criticise that current policies developed 
by the INJUV, such as the organisation of free concerts, do not tackle relevant issues 
and that there should be a change of approach. Finally, youths also underline that 
these coordinated policies should always promote the direct participation of young 
people being one example of that the implementation of youth participative budgets.  
In summary, when the evidence provided by youths’ perceptions is analysed, it 
becomes evident that they are conscious of current deficiencies of the youth public 
offer, and that their awareness is associated with the generation of political 
disaffection. They believe that the Chilean state is not offering enough programmes 
and actions directed to youths, which generates a context where what is done is not 
relevant to young people’s lives. This setting is what finally generates feelings of 
hostility towards the political system, as youths feel they are not being substantively 
represented. These feelings seem to be increased as young people believe that the 
main responsible of this scenario is the proper political class. In this sense, it can be 
argued that this new evidence also supports the statement that problems of 
representativeness originated by current deficiencies of the youth public offer is a 
factor that could engender feelings of disaffection among Chilean youths, and that 
would also explain particularly higher levels of disaffection in this social group.  
 4.4 Has the Chilean state incorporated young people into the development of 
public policies?  
 Another issue that merits discussion regarding the relationship between feelings 
of political disaffection and a lack of a consistent YPP has to do with the participatory 
mechanisms being offered to youths regarding the development of several public 
programmes. This analysis is quite relevant, as it has been argued that the 
incorporation of youths in the generation of public policies itself strengthens the 
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democratic system (Krauss, 2008) and that in order to build citizenry, it is necessary to 
have a youth participation with a binding character (Krauskopf, 2008).  
When the literature about this topic is analysed with respect to the Chilean case, 
the main impression is that the incorporation of young people has been also very 
problematic. Aravena (2008) argues that Chilean youths lack consultative and 
deliberative instances where they can feel represented. Moreover, Espinoza (1999), 
after analysing several youth programmes in detail, sustains that the main problem of 
youth public policies in Chile has been the lack of the incorporation of the citizenry in 
their formulation and implementation. This situation would be very negative in the 
Chilean context, since it would not help to reduce the distance between youths and 
the public sphere.  
The analysis of the interviews with experts on Chilean youth reconfirms these 
accounts. The main argument is that youth participation in the development of public 
policies in the national, regional and local levels has been very limited and 
unsystematic. Young people have not had a real capacity of influence, as the few 
programmes that have been executed have been done with a top-down approach. 
Experts also recognise the necessity of modifying this way of acting for an approach 
where polices are developed with the proper youth since, only when they are part of 
the construction of public policies, are these policies truly accurate to youth reality.  
 "The participation of young people has not been consistent and there have not been 
also appropriate legal or political tools to make this link between social youth 
organisations and the public policy." Juan Eduardo Faúndez, former director of the 
INJUV between 2006 and 2010. 
"Young people have not had any impact on policy development. Politics continues to 
be a politics of experts in Chile. For example, the youth associativity law was never 
intended to be passed. Politics is always made from above. It is not made from below." 
Raúl Zarzuri, director of the Centro de Estudios Socio-Culturales. 
"The paradigm that we want to break is that it is no longer enough to make policies for 
young people. You have to make politics with young people. And that requires a 
challenge to the government, which is to really listen to young people but with a 
slightly more binding attitude than the one that has traditionally been adopted." 
Ignacio Naudón, former director of the INJUV between 2010 and 2011. 
 It is also argued that the local level is where there has been more capacity of 
incidence but that some relevant efforts have not prospered. Moreover, the 
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responsibility of the current scenario is perceived to be given in part by a lack of 
relevant laws that can incentivise youth participation. With respect to this issue, it is 
highlighted that at the beginning of the 1990s there was a youth associativity law that 
that was not finally approved by the congress. 74 
Many of the interviewed experts make reference to this law having diverse 
opinions. The former director of the INJUV, Juan Eduardo Faúndez, for instance, argues 
that by not approving this law the youth institutional framework started with a basic 
error. This is because without this law the INJUV did not have power to involve itself in 
the youth social fabric. This denied youth organisations that had an important role in 
returning to democracy an institution that was functional to their interests. Other 
experts, such as Mario Sandoval, state that even though this law had been approved it 
would not have fomented the organisation of the youths since they tend to be more 
informally organised. 
When politically-involved youths are asked about their participation in the 
development of the youth public offer, their perception is also a negative one as they 
believe they have not been incorporated into the development of policies. It is 
perceived that there are not currently relevant spaces to systematically participate in 
the elaboration of public policies that would come to solve youths’ social needs. This 
situation is perceived as being very harmful, since polices designed by experts who do 
not take them into account are finally impositions that do not accurately represent 
youths’ realities. They advocate for real mechanisms of participation to be applied 
systematically and with a deliberative capacity that allows them to be part of decision-
making processes.  
"Youth inclusion in these public policies is limited as well. One can observe that there is 
not real participation in society. Systematic participation of representative groups 
regarding youths. The few groups that exist, in addition to issues regarding university 
and secondary students, are developed after the emergence of specific situations." 
Alfonso, member of the youth division of the PDC.  
"I don’t want a post-doctoral expert to come and talk about drugs to young people. I 
want a person who has that training but that makes young people themselves 
diagnose their problems and solutions themselves. To be a tool for young people and 
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 The youth associativity law was a project presented to the congress in conjunction with the law that created the 
INJUV at the beginning of the 1990s that intended to promote youth participation by establishing stronger 
relationships between formal youth organisations and youth institutions.  
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not someone who comes to impose a solution or his own vision." Darío, member of an 
educational organisation. 
It is observed, then, that youths demand more participative mechanisms that 
would challenge a technocratic style of policy-making where experts decide public 
issues without discussing their decisions with members of civil society. This was in fact 
one of the hypothesised attributes of present Chilean democracy that would be 
generating a disconnection between common citizens and politics (Huneeus, 2003). 
Moreover, it was also observed in the previous chapter that this element of Chilean 
politics is being criticised by youths and that it generates political disaffection. It is now 
possible to observe, with this new evidence, that a relevant example of the association 
between the predominance of a technocratic policy-making style and the 
engenderment of feelings of disaffection is expressed in youth criticisms towards the 
way they are incorporated in the generation of public policies specifically directed to 
them.  
Last to be analysed in this section are experts’ and youth’s evaluations of several 
instances that attempted to incorporate Chilean youths into the development of public 
policies, as there have been some failed efforts to do that. Some of the most relevant 
attempts that can be highlighted are the 2004 regional and local youth plans, the 
youth parliament and youth participative dialogues. Some of these initiatives even 
continue now. Nevertheless, they have been heavily criticised as they have not 
permitted a real incorporation of young people because they have suffered from a lack 
of continuity and have not had a binding character (Krauss, 2008). 
Youth experts state that the participatory mechanisms that have attempted to be 
implemented have not been successful as they have been merely symbolic, with no 
real capacity of influence. Furthermore, it is argued that these experiences, in fact, 
worsen youths’ perceptions of politics as they feel frustrated when issues they have 
been asked about fail to exert any impact or influence.  
"There were in Chile youth dialogues and such things. I believe that the kind of 
participatory things that have been made here are a boomerang. It goes against the 
long run because they ask young people to voice their views and then they do nothing 
with them." Dina Krauskopf, ex director of a youth programme of the FLACSO. 
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"There was a youth parliament in Chile, and other local initiatives. But these things did 
not have any interference as they have had in other countries, particularly among Latin 
America. These experiences have not been significant." Raul Zarzuri, director of the 
Centro de Estudios Socio Culturales. 
Among politically-involved youths interviewed, there were some who had 
participated in some of these attempts. Their perceptions were also very negative, the 
main critical point being the fact that these instances were merely symbolic and young 
people who participated there had a null capacity of influence. Both the youth 
parliament and participative dialogues are perceived as instances where nothing is 
achieved in terms of influencing public policies.  
"I was a member of the youth parliament, but the decision-making power was zero. 
The parliament had no real attribution. Only on paper. It would have been better to 
have more participation in the real chamber in commissions of the youth field." 
Ignacio, member of the youth division of the UDI. 
"These participatory dialogues are a permanent déjà vu. Rather than making policies 
from youth discussions we are in eternal diagnoses. After the dialogues everything is 
archived. In fact, I asked, in the last dialogue, the person of the municipal youth 
department and to the regional director of the INJUV about things that were not so old 
from last year and they had no idea." Marcelo, member of a youth ecologist  
organisation.  
It is observed, then, that those youths who had some participative experience do 
not positively evaluate them, as they do not feel it was possible to achieve anything. 
This clearly engenders feelings of political inefficacy among them, as they empirically 
experience a situation where they decide to be politically involved in formal 
mechanisms of participation, but they finally perceive that their participation is useless 
as nothing concrete is achieved because their opinions are not truly taken into account 
to generate youth policies.  
In summary, the evidence suggests that the Chilean state, apart from having a poor 
youth public offer, has not actively incorporated young people into the few 
programmes that have been executed. This situation is perceived by youths since they 
claim for more participation, as this is the only form that would finally bring more 
appropriate public policies. Likewise, the lack of authentic mechanisms of participation 
can be clearly linked to feelings of political disaffection as youths criticise this state of 
affairs and ask for more participation spaces. These findings also agree with previous 
observations in the sense that lack of mechanisms of participation regarding the 
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development of youth public policies can be described as a relevant expression of a 
demobilised society whose style of politics is mostly based on a technocratic style of 
policy-making (P.Silva, 2004). These features were previously observed to be 
generating disaffection, as youths argue that it is partly because of them that their 
interests are not being substantively represented. One relevant expression of this 
association would be, then, a lack of real spaces to influence the youth public offer, 
which also indicates that youths’ perceptions about this issue also demonstrate they 
are aware of the relevance of having authentic mechanisms of participation to make 
their wishes effectively represented (Urbanati, 2000). 
 4.5 Why Chile has lacked a consistent Youth Public Policy and real 
mechanisms of participation? 
Having observed from the evidence that Chile currently lacks a consistent YPP and 
participative mechanisms, and that youth issues are particularly less attended within 
the Chilean context, it is necessary to understand the reasons behind this situation. 
Furthermore, it is also relevant to observe how these reasons can be associated with 
the emergence of feelings of political disaffection too. The issue to be analysed in this 
section is that it seems current deficiencies regarding the youth public offer are mainly 
explained by the fact that the Chilean political class does not have an interest in them 
since they are not enrolled on the electoral registers.75 In this sense, the main factor 
explaining the current scenario would be a political one. Youth issues are not politically 
relevant for present politicians regarding the reproduction of their power positions, 
which prevents them from developing an attractive youth public offer. This situation is 
perceived by youths themselves, which would be contributing to the enlargement of 
feelings of hostility towards the political system.  
One way to observe evidence about this issue is through youth experts’ 
perceptions regarding the main obstacles that have existed in Chile concerning the 
developing of a YPP. What is principally stated in the interviews is that current 
deficiencies are undoubtedly explained by a problem of political weight that youth 
issues have had within the Chilean political system. At the same time, this lack of 
                                                          
75
 It was already shown in chapter two that that only 23% of Chilean youths from 18 to 29 years are currently 
registered to vote. 
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political weight is explained by the fact that young people in Chile are not registered to 
vote, which makes them almost irrelevant to the political class.  
"In Chile the political class does not care about young people because youths do not 
vote. The greatest numbers of voters are in other age ranges and naturally these are 
the priorities that legislators and the government have when they do their job. By not 
being political subjects they are not an asset in generating policy proposals, political 
speeches and political stories. Eugenio Ravinet, former director of the INJUV between 
2001-2004. 
"The political class never cared about the youth issue as youth do not vote and they 
are not politically profitable. It is much more profitable one hour dedicated to elderly 
projects than an hour dedicated to youth projects. And so there is not an interest to 
put an eye on the youth institutional framework." Ignacio Naudón, former director of 
the INJUV between 2010 and 2011. 
The political irrelevance of youth for the political class generates a scenario where 
those in charge of youth institutions have a low capacity to improve the current 
situation. Relevant changes need the political will of both the government and the 
congress. However, in the present context this will does not exist, as young people are 
not a priority because improving their social conditions does not bring the power 
benefits that the preoccupation for other groups, such as the elderly, can bring. This is 
a phenomenon that seems to happen in other countries too. However, the fact that 
Chile is one of the countries worldwide where young people formally participate less, 
and where there is a very pragmatic political class that is aware of that situation, leads 
to the generation of an scenario where youths’ interests seems to be comparatively 
less taken into account.  
That youth issues are not politically prioritised, as they do not vote, can be also 
reflected by the fact that there have been several accurate diagnoses and plans 
regarding the precarious youth public offer, but there has not been enough political 
weight to implement them. It is owing to this situation that in recent years several 
administrations of the INJUV have prioritised the generation of political conditions to 
have more weight within the public state apparatus instead of the design of youth 
plans.  
"In 2004 I had to analyse and study the proposal of a national youth plan and 
intersectorial boards. And if you ask me what was in the paper it was very consistent, 
perfect, reasonably, applicable. But they lacked political power to implement that. 
Therefore, my political objective as INJUV director was precisely to create the 
conditions to make the youth issue have a specific value for the different sectors. And 
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from here comes the idea of the creation of the youth undersecretary within the 
ministry of youth and sport." Juan Eduardo Faúndez, former director of the INJUV 
between 2006 and 2010. 
An important example of failed plans where there was an accurate diagnosis was 
the ‘Action Plan on Youth’ in 2004. This plan proposed several actions to be executed 
regarding the youth public offer, based on coordinated actions of several public 
institutions concerning the youth to advance towards the consolidation of a network 
of opportunities for young people (INJUV, 2004). However, these proposals were never 
fully applied and lacked continuity, mainly because of a matter of political weight as 
public institutions involved in the plan did not give due importance to it.  
 It is based on experiences like this one that those in charge of youth institutions 
have decided to focus mainly on the creation of political conditions to be able to 
implement several plans. The most important illustration of that has been the law 
project of the ministry of sport and the youth. This project was the main matter 
discussed during the special youth and sport commission of the deputy chamber of 
2008. It was presented during Bachelet’s administration (2006-2010) and its main 
objective was to substitute the INJUV for a youth undersecretary in order to give more 
political power to the youth institutional framework. This project, however, was not 
finally approved, and according to some of the interviewed experts, the proper lack of 
interest on youth issues by the political class would explain its rejection. 
 Several deputies from both central political coalitions that participated in this last 
youth commission were also interviewed and their visions can contribute to 
understanding the interest the political class has regarding young people. In relation to 
this issue, the evidence suggests that several deputies recognise that, in general terms, 
Chilean politicians do not give importance to youth issues as they are not registered to 
vote. Moreover, it is argued that the proper functioning of the last youth commission 
in 2008 clearly expresses these negative attitudes.  
"When we formed the youth commission I had a rejection in the room. They said that 
it was not necessary. And the result was that while we were heading the commission, 
it was very hard to get required quorums. The commission did not work. And this year 
the elderly commission was formed. They had an extraordinary report. They listened 
to all groups of grandparents. Therefore, you have in the political class a very high level 
of pragmatism. If you vote and you are relevant for my election I am going to be 
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worried about you and you will be subject of rights." Woman, Deputy of RN, member 
of the last youth commission of the congress. 
"We formed the elderly commission this year. And it was straight ahead established as 
permanent commission. No one objected. In contrast, regarding the youth 
commission, it was very hard to form it. There were a lot of objections. We even had to 
insist that the commission’s deputies come so they can give us quorum to function. 
That shows the importance given to the youth subject." Woman, Deputy of the PDC, 
member of the last youth commission of the congress. 
Based on the statements of some deputies who have tried to generate proposals 
for young people, it can be observed more clearly that this social category has not 
been benefited with a relevant public offer since they are not relevant to the political 
class because they are not voting. This situation becomes quite clear when the 
development of special commissions for the youth and the elderly are compared. This 
is because this last instance seems to have worked much better, and generated better 
proposals, mainly because there is a pragmatic political class that knows almost all 
elderly people are registered to vote and the generation of proposals for old people 
contributes more to the reproduction of their power positions.  
This pragmatism of the Chilean political class is also perceived by some young 
people, as it can be observed that among politically-involved youths there is the 
perception that youth public policies are not being developed, mainly because the 
political system itself is not interested on them.  
"Apathy among young people is provoked because nothing is offered because they are 
not pressured by anyone. So it is like a vicious cycle that never ends. There is nobody 
to pressures you, and as you do not see yourself pressured, you are not going to 
generate public policies either." Martin, member of the youth division of the PC. 
"The percentage of young people enrolled is extremely low. Politicians move 
themselves with votes and if there are not votes there is no festivity. As there is no 
festivity, how I am going to be willing, as a government, to invest a large budget in the 
youth issue if my market does not vote. They are not part of future elections. And for a 
politician that is important, as this issue is gained with votes." Hugo, member of the 
youth division of the PPD. 
An interesting thing that is observed from the interviews is that there is a 
perception that a vicious circle emerges regarding the development of youth public 
policies. This circle would work in the following way: as there are not youth public 
policies, young people do not register themselves to vote, and because they do not 
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vote they become even less relevant for the political class, which finally makes young 
people have even fewer incentives to electorally participate.  
Youths also perceive that this situation has an opportunity to be reverted with the 
approbation of a new form of registration where all citizens are automatically 
registered and voting is voluntary in the next municipal elections in 2012. However, it 
is considered that the pragmatism of the political class will not necessarily end with 
this situation as it is believed that only if new calculations estimate policies for young 
people are politically relevant  will politicians be interested in that issue.76 
Another way it can be observed that Chilean youths perceive this pragmatic acting 
of politicians is by linking what was developed in this section with some arguments 
previously discussed. In the previous chapter it was clearly shown that young people 
do not feel represented as they believe politicians normally favour their interests over 
the interests of the country. Moreover, in this chapter it was previously observed that 
most Chilean youths believe politicians know their needs but that they do not do 
anything about them. Therefore, it can be inferred from the evidence that Chilean 
youths perceive that their concerns have not been approached, since there are 
problems of political will and the explanation of that has to do with the low benefits 
the development of youth policies bring to the political class.  
The awareness of this situation can also be connected to the emergence of feelings 
of political disaffection. This is the case as it was also previously observed that feelings 
of political disaffection are partly explained by the fact that young people believe their 
interests are not being represented, since politicians prefer to favour their own 
interests. The lack of a consistent youth public policy is without doubt a clear example 
of that situation, since the data indicate the political class has left aside youths’ 
concerns in order to favour their own power interests. Thus, the lack of a consistent 
YPP and mechanisms of participation can be argued to be associated with feelings of 
hostility towards the political system, both because youths’ interests are not being 
substantively represented and since young people perceive these problems are the 
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 In fact, as it was indicated in chapter two, the municipal election seems to have not changed this scenario, as new 
rules did not imply higher levels of youth electoral participation.   
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result of the erratic actions of the political class. In this sense, it is possible to state that 
the observed problems of the current youth public offer can be understood as relevant 
expressions of more general attributes of Chilean democracy that generate 
disaffection. This is because they express both highly-discussed representativeness 
problems of Chilean politics (Garretón, 2007) and problems linked to a pragmatic and 
partyarchic acting of the Chilean political class that has, as one of its main driving 
principles, the reproduction of its power positions under any circumstances.  
One last thing to be stated regarding the reasons that explain current deficiencies 
of the youth public offer, has to do with the origins of the described vicious circle. It 
was stated that because young people are not electorally participating, the political 
class has not been worried about them. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 90s 
almost 90% of Chilean youths were registered to vote. In this sense, an inquiry about 
what happened in that period, and how, afterwards, this vicious circle took place, 
emerges. Without intending to give an absolute answer, it is argued here that it seems 
the previously discussed corruption crisis that the INJUV experience in 1997 was a 
determining factor in the beginning of the vicious circle. This is because it has been 
argued that before the crisis there were the most serious attempts to develop a YPP in 
Chile, and that after it, it has been very difficult to recuperate youths institutions’ 
previous budgets and high levels of legitimacy within the Chilean state.  
 4.6 Conclusions  
The revision of the way the Chilean political system has approached the issue of a 
youth public policy fits in the objective of this thesis, as it develops a specific aspect of 
the currently problematic relation between young people and politics that is 
generating feelings of political disaffection. A lack of substantive representation is one 
of the main factors that explain these feelings of hostility and within these problems of 
representativeness the absence of a consistent youth public offer constitutes a central 
element. With respect to that situation, this chapter revealed that the Chilean state 
currently lacks a consistent youth public policy, the main problems being a weak 
institutional youth framework and an unclear definition of the youth condition to 
make this social category a preferential subject of action. Moreover, it could be 
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observed that there are also not relevant mechanisms of participation through which 
the youth can be actively incorporated into the development of the youth public offer. 
Additionally, it was concluded that one of the main reasons that would explain these 
current deficiencies is a pragmatic acting of the Chilean political class that does not 
itself electorally benefit from generating youth proposals, as young people are not 
currently formally participating.  
Young people perceive these problems since it was observed that they consider the 
youth public offer to be insufficient, and that there are not authentic mechanisms of 
participation. This is associated with the generation of feelings of political disaffection 
as it creates problems of representation and political inclusion because when there is 
not an attractive public offer they can feel part of, incentives to be politically-involved 
decrease. Moreover, sentiments of hostility towards the political system are also 
engendered since youths also perceive these deficiencies are mainly explained by a 
lack of political will of the political class. They consider that politicians are aware of 
their needs and that they are in a worse condition when compared with other social 
groups, but that they do not approach their concerns since that does not bring them 
power benefits. In this sense, it could be observed that the current scenario does not 
only generate political disaffection because of the existence of material lacks but also 
because these lacks are perceived to be the result of a reprehensible acting of 
politicians.  
The central relevance of this chapter is, then, that it examines an issue that express 
several attributes of Chilean democracy connected to the engenderment of political 
disaffection, which finally deepens previous findings about the sources of these 
phenomena. Even more relevant is the fact that it illustrates two of the main new 
contributions that this thesis is providing to the debate regarding political disaffection 
in Chile, that were described in the previous chapter.  
The first contribution is that Chilean youths are particularly more disaffected 
among the Chilean society since the political class is especially disconnected from 
young people because it cannot electorally profit from them. With respect to that, 
having a precarious youth public offer that is noticeably inferior to other specific social 
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categories, such as the elderly or women, demonstrated more deeply that young 
people are one of the most politically and socially excluded groups in Chilean society. 
In this sense, even though this exclusion can be observed in more aspects, such as the 
internal functioning of political parties that is particularly reticent to young people and 
the lack of youth leadership, this chapter was able to profoundly develop which is 
perhaps the greatest expression of the higher disconnection young people are 
currently facing.  
The second previously-discussed contribution that was illustrated and deepened 
through this chapter has to do with the link between feelings of political disaffection 
and the way young people perceive the relevance of attaining power among 
politicians. It was previously stated that Chilean youths believed that, on several 
occasions, the political class opts to favouring its own power interests rather than 
those of the citizenry, which was described as a partyarchic attitude. Regarding that 
issue, this chapter described a clear example of this situation. It suggested that current 
deficiencies of the youth public offer are mainly explained by the fact that Chilean 
politicians have consciously given less relevance to that issue because they cannot 
favour their power interests by doing that since it is known that the proportion of 
young people presently registered to vote is very low.  
One last aspect to be highlighted is that this chapter also brought some evidence 
about a new kind of politics that could be emerging among Chilean youths. This is the 
case since the evidence suggested that, apart from demanding a relevant youth public 
offer, young people are also calling for more participative mechanisms. It was 
observed that youths believe the only way to make their interests truly substantively 
represented is by directly participating in the elaboration of several public policies. 
These observations, then, reinforce previous findings sustaining that a more 
participative political system would decrease youths’ political disaffection levels. 
Moreover, they can also be understood as a youth critique towards Chile’s current 
technocratic way of policy-making.   
In summary, it can be argued that the evidence obtained regarding current 
deficiencies of the youth public offer solidly fits with the general argument being 
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developed in the thesis. This means current deficiencies of the youth public offer have 
to be understood as an expression of a political class that is disconnected from the 
citizenry, and whose acting is marked by high levels of pragmatism that go beyond the 
youth field. What was analysed in this chapter is therefore only one of several 
manifestations of representative difficulties currently affecting the whole of Chilean 
society based on several features that have dominated Chile’s post-authoritarian 
politics. This disconnection is without doubt greater regarding young people. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be lost from sight that this is a phenomenon that involves the 
whole Chilean population and that what was described in this chapter is only one of 
several expressions that specifically contribute to the explanation of higher levels of 
disaffection among young people. 
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Chapter 5: The presidential candidacy of Marco Enriquez-Ominami and 
the emergence of the Partido Progresista; understanding an attractive 
phenomenon to politically disaffected Chilean youths 
 5.1 Introduction  
The Chilean presidential election of 2009/2010 generated a relevant political 
break, since the triumph of Sebastían Piñera brought to power the first democratically-
elected president from a centre-right wing coalition after almost fifty years. Moreover, 
it also represented the end of twenty years of apparently successful governments of a 
centre-left wing coalition. This event, however, was by no means the only relevant 
political phenomenon of those elections. The emergence of the young presidential 
candidate Marco Enriquez-Ominami (ME-O) also deeply shocked the Chilean political 
scene. By appealing to a very critical discourse about the Chilean political class, ME-O 
obtained 20.1% of votes, which made him one of the most successful independent 
presidential candidates of Chilean political history. Additionally, after the elections   
ME-O and his main collaborators were able to found a new political party that is 
currently progressing well with its legalisation.  
The success of this candidate has been highlighted by many authors as a critical 
response to the functioning of the Chilean political system.77  One of ME-O’s central 
claims was to develop a "new way of doing politics”, and soon after his decision to be a 
presidential candidate he was labeled as the ‘díscolo’ candidate. 78 To this effect, it is 
argued that the adherence he obtained was an indication of support for political 
renewal in a context of high levels of political disaffection. Moreover, it has also been 
underlined that he was particularly appealing to young generations, not only because 
of his youthful appearance but also since he has been one of the biggest demanders of 
political changes (Bunker and Navia, 2010, Osorio and Schuester, 2010).  
ME-O’s discourse was mainly based on critical postures concerning the 
performance of Chilean politics, which allowed him to engage people who were 
                                                          
77
 Even though M-EO did not get even a quarter of votes it merit calling his candidacy successful due to its 
independent character in a heavily-institutionalised political system.  
78
 To be a ‘díscolo’ means to be a disobedient person who does not behave meekly. In political terms, to be a 
‘díscolo’ candidate means to be a candidate who behaves rebelliously by criticising traditional political structures.  
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dissatisfied with politics. In this sense, to examine the reasons for the success of the 
candidacy and the formation of this new political party is quite relevant for the 
purposes of this thesis, as it deepens analyses of the sources of political disaffection. It 
was previously observed that current levels of disaffection are mainly explained by a 
particularly large disconnection between the Chilean political class and young people, 
produced by a particular style of doing politics. In this context, this chapter comes to 
complement this argument by analysing a particular case where a political project that 
criticised that specific style of politics seemed to have gained relevant support among 
young people. 
This chapter’s main assumption is, then, that through the understanding of the 
achievements and limits of ME-O’s candidacy and the emergence of the Partido 
Progresista (PRO) it is possible to comprehend more profoundly the current damaged 
relationship between young people and formal politics. By studying that, it is possible 
to obtain evidence about three specific aspects of this negative relationship. First of all, 
using Mouffe’s distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’, it contributes to the 
discussion about whether Chilean youths are rejecting the current political system or 
broader issues. Secondly, it allows the identification of reasons for such high feelings of 
hostility towards the political system. Finally, it permits the understanding of the type 
of formal politics that can be appealing to young people. 
In order to develop these arguments, this chapter is divided into five sections. The 
first describes ME-O’s antecedents and the emergence of his candidacy. The second is 
about the reasons that made him an attractive candidate to young people. The third 
examines the importance of social networks to the development of the candidacy. The 
fourth analyses the emergence of the PRO. Finally, the last part discusses the limits of 
these phenomena.  
 5.2 ME-O's antecedents and the emergence of the ‘díscolo’ candidacy   
Antecedents 
Marco Enriquez-Ominami is a filmmaker who was only 36 years old at the time of 
the 2009 elections. He has always been linked to the Chilean political world. His 
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grandfather was the first president of the PDC in Chile. His father, Miguel Enriquez, 
was killed by the Chilean dictatorship in 1974 as he was the main leader of the 
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). After the coup d'état he was exiled to 
France, where his mother married Carlos Ominami. In exile ME-O was adopted by 
Ominami, who strongly influenced him politically as he was an important leader of the 
Concertación. 
ME-O returned to Chile by the end of the dictatorship, joining the youth division of 
the Socialist Party (PS). After having studied at the University of Chile, where he 
participated in university politics, he returned to France to complete other studies. 
Following his second return to Chile, he started working in several projects related to 
his profession as a filmmaker that helped him to gain some media visibility. He 
directed well-known television series and founded ‘The Clinic’, a famous weekly left-
wing newspaper. Moreover, he also worked in several political campaigns of the 
Concertación and made films and documentaries. In 2004, he married Karen 
Doggenweiler, one of the most famous Chilean television presenters, which also 
helped him to increase his popularity.  
In 2005 ME-O presented himself as a deputy candidate for the PS, obtaining the 
first majority. As a deputy he participated in several commissions and 193 projects. 
Among them, it is possible to highlight projects about political reforms that have not 
been successfully approved until today, such as the establishment of participative local 
budgets and the instauration of recall referendums (Rendición de Cuenta 
parlamentaria diputado Marco Enriquez-Ominami Gumucio, 2010). Another aspect to 
be highlighted is that during his period as a deputy, he already showed some 
dissatisfaction with the actions of the Concertación that made him vote against some 
law projects proposed by this coalition.79 This saw ME-O and other Concertación 
deputies labeled as the ‘díscolos deputies’. In relation to that, one of their most 
significant demands was always to have more transparent processes of candidate 
selection (El Mercurio, 2009a, Osorio and Schuester, 2010).  
                                                          
79 
The main example of that was his disapproval of the LGE, the new educational lay approved after the student 
movement of 2006.  
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The emergence of the candidacy  
The race to select the presidential candidate of the Concertación started in early 
2009. By that time ME-O was part of the PS, and had shown some signs of his willing to 
be a potential candidate. The Concertación, however, had decided to hold a primary 
election just between the ex-president Eduardo Frei (PDC) and José Antonio Gomez 
(PRSD). These primary elections were executed on April 2009, based on a very peculiar 
system. Elections were initially going to be held in two regions and if one candidate 
won by a difference of 20% or more in one, he would be claimed as the winner. This 
mechanism was heavily criticised, since chosen regions were those where Frei had 
more prospect of winning (Castiglioni, 2010). As expected, the election was won by 
Frei with a difference that was greater than 20% in a process with a very low rate of 
participation. These primaries were then labeled as the ‘primarias truchas‘80 as they 
were seen as a procedure where the Concertación only wanted to be viewed as 
democratic, but where the candidate was selected by party leaders (Bunker and Navia, 
2010).  
Although this was the Concertación’s official selection procedure, while these 
events were taking place there was a parallel presidential race. ME-O and Jorge Arrate, 
two members of the PS at that time, were expressing their intention to be candidates 
of the Concertación more powerfully. These desires were expressed, for example, in a 
letter signed by 279 PS militants asking the party leadership to hold a primary election 
between ME-O and Frei (La Nación, 2009). Nevertheless, the PS central committee 
decided to support Frei without more consultations. This situation provoked the 
resignation of both alternative candidates to the PS, which had to find new 
alternatives. While Arrate was later proclaimed as the candidate of the Juntos 
Podemos Más coalition, ME-O initiated his independent candidacy (Bunker and Navia, 
2010). 
 ME-O resigned from the PS in June 2009. Later on, he proclaimed his independent 
candidacy with a very critical discourse of the Concertación’s political leaders. He 
uploaded a video to YouTube where he stated: "this is a painful but necessary act in 
                                                          
80 
In Chilean slang ‘trucho’ means something fake and tricky.  
186 
 
response to the decision of the party leadership of the Concertación and the PS to 
stifle competition and debate of ideas within the coalition.”81 As ME-O was now an 
independent candidate, he had to collect 36,000 signatures before a notary. After a 
couple of months’ campaigning he was able to gather more than 63,000 signatures, 
which allowed him to register his candidacy on 10 September of 2010 (Bunker and 
Navia, 2010). He was due to compete against Frei, Arrate and Piñera. 
The candidacy’s support started to grow even before his determination to be an 
independent candidate. However, this decision was clearly appreciated by the public. 
As shown in figure 5.1, ME-O’s vote intention was increasing during 2009. While in 
May and June he had a vote intention close to 15%, this percentage was increasing 
after he started his campaign as an independent candidate. He attained around 20% of 
the votes a month after his candidacy was already officially inscribed.  
Figure 5.1 - Evolution of ME-O vote intention among those who are registered to vote 
        
During his campaign, ME-O continued with a very critical vision of the whole 
political system with a special emphasis on the vices of the Concertación. Therefore, he 
began to obtain support from diverse minor political parties such as the humanist and 
the ecologist parties and several movements such as ‘Movimiento Unificado de 
Minorías Sexuales’, ‘La Surda’ and ‘Red progresista’. Based on the support of these 
organisations, a new political coalition called ‘Nueva Mayoría Para Chile’ was formed. 
This coalition supported ME-O’s candidacy and presented several candidates for the 
parliamentary elections. None of them was elected though (Osorio and Schuester, 
2010). 
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 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=khkNkbD4qpc.  
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ME-O's proposals and his bases of support  
The campaign’s proposals were fairly heterogeneous with respect to the type of 
public ME-O wanted to appeal to. The main cores were proposals linked to centre-left 
views, but he also proposed measures associated with a right-wing vision. It cannot be 
argued that he was proposing extremely radical changes. His government programme 
had three main subjects. The first was about democracy as the central theme for 
development. Concerning this subject, he proposed a new political constitution, the 
reformulation of the binominal system and a law for youth quotas. Moreover, reforms 
regarding gender issues and sexual minorities were also part of this first subject. The 
second subject was about the state and a new social pact. The main proposals were 
the improvement of public education and a tributary reform. Finally, the third subject 
was about sustainable development where the protection of water resources, and the 
development of an energetic policy with a special emphasis on non-conventional 
renewable energies, were the main proposals. This last point was represented by the 
rejection of the Hidroaysén project (Programa de Gobierno Marco Enriquez Ominami, 
2009). 
In any case, the campaign’s main pillar was the need to change the functioning of 
Chilean politics. For example, the opening paragraph of his programme states: "We are 
going to refresh politics, we will establish a new way of doing politics (…). We will risk 
for an active and true participation of people, getting the government and its 
authorities closer to the citizenry" (Ibid.). By criticising the performance of the political 
system, he then attempted to appeal to politically-disaffected people. Based on the 
same premise, he also tried to be diverse in his proposals and to avoid classic political 
categorisations. For instance, he never argued he was a left-wing candidate, but that 
he was a progressive candidate. Yet, he incorporated people linked to right-wing ideas 
in the campaign. The biggest example of this situation was his main economic adviser 
Paul Fontaine, who even joined Piñera’s campaign after the first round. This situation 
led him to propose some measures linked to a right-wing economic vision, such as 
privatising the 5% of CODELCO in order to get more efficiency and transparency.82 Due 
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 CODELCO is the biggest state-owned Chilean copper company and no other candidate had ever proposed to 
privatise a part of it.  
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to this heterogeneity, it has been argued that his bases of support were very diffused, 
with no clear support niches, which lead him to attract people annoyed with politics 
from several sectors (Bunker and Navia, 2010).  
In summary, ME-O was a candidate with a very strong political background whose 
popularity can also be attributed to his proximity to the media. He emerged as a 
candidate whose main critical views were about the functioning of Chilean politics 
after having been the victim of this apparently undemocratic acting. In this sense, he 
intended to appeal to politically-disaffected people based on a diverse discourse that 
seems to have generated a diffuse base of support. 
 5.3 Why did ME-O appealing to young people?  
After describing the emergence of this candidacy and its main proposals, it is 
necessary to observe what the evidence suggests about the specific reasons that made 
him an appealing candidate for this group. This is done by presenting evidence from 
more general arguments to more specific ones.    
5.3.1 The need for youth descriptive representation  
The first issue that contributes to comprehending ME-O’s attractiveness is the fact 
that he was a young candidate. At the time of the elections he was 36 years old. 
Moreover, his youthful appearance was also more relevant as other candidates were 
much older than him.83 ME-O’s age is highlighted both by young voters and young 
militants of the PRO as an important reason for supporting him. The attractiveness of 
being a young candidate is explained by the fact that this gave him an innovative and 
vital image that was closer to the youth generation. He was young and as such acted as 
having some youth habits, using a specific language and expression forms that called 
the attention of young people. Moreover, it is also highlighted that he has a biographic 
history that is closer to the youths’.   
"Marco uses many young idioms in his language. So, I feel that is why he quickly 
synchronised with young people. And he did not look forced. Frei was once in a public 
event dancing the dance of the nose. It was ridiculous, pathetic, sad. While Marco was 
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By the time of the elections Piñera was sixty years old, Frei was 67 and Arrate was 68.  
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able to sit in any university forum and fill the classroom. You had a guy who spoke 
their language. They felt part of his generation." Eduardo, PRO militant.  
"I think my biography was far more interesting for young people than Frei’s. My own 
actions and my inheritance play a role. Many factors play a role. That is to say, Miguel, 
Karen, my movies, my language, my errors. I think that with young people there was a 
dialogue in that sense."ME-O. 
 ME-O recognises the role that his antecedents played in generating youth support, 
highlighting how his habits, the closeness to the media and even his mistakes 
generated a closer relationship. Moreover, it is also underlined that the fact other 
candidates were much older than him helped to emphasise his youth status.   
The second factor that explains the importance of being a young person has to do 
with the significance that young people attribute to political renovation. Chilean 
political activity is currently marked by a profound adultcentrism where several people 
have been in power for many years. In this context, ME-O would come to break that 
logic as he is a young face, but also since it is believed that he would work with 
younger people in his potential government. 
"ME-O was attractive because many times politicians have repeated their places in 
Chile. There are people who have been deputies for four periods. There are ministers 
who have participated even since Allende’s or Frei Montalva’s  governments. Then, to 
renew politics is essential today. Because politicians who have been in power for forty 
or fifty years are often out of context and they use strategies and practices that Chile 
has to leave behind. Political personalism. To share out certain positions. To generate 
proposals within four walls." Vicente, PRO militant. 
"It was appealing that he was so young and that he was there representing the youth. 
Above all he is a politician. However, I think he would have had a cabinet a little bit 
younger and closer to original ideas”. Carolina, voter. 
ME-O represented, to some young people, the introduction of new young faces in 
formal politics. He is seen as a renovator of Chilean politics. This situation is valued, 
since it introduces ideas that are beneficial to youths’ interests but also because it 
challenges bad practices of political parties such as political personalism and 
exclusionary ways of decision-making. In this sense, as he is young, it is believed that 
he has not been stained yet by some rejected features, which would make him able to 
contest current power structures.  
The fact that ME-O was attractive because he was young reaffirms and deepens 
previous findings as it was previously observed that one of the reasons that explains 
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current high levels of youth political disaffection is a lack of political renewal. This is 
also one relevant reason that allows us to understand particularly higher levels of 
hostility among youths. Therefore, it can be argued that this new evidence 
demonstrates with a particular case how the reproduction of an adult-centred style of 
politics based on some partyarchic practices is rejected by youths as they value MEO’s 
youthfulness precisely because that challenges current undemocratic partys’ practices.  
This evidence also allows us to infer that Chilean political system requires higher 
levels of youth descriptive representation (youths representing youths) in order to 
reduce political disaffection. Descriptive representation has been highlighted by many 
authors as a relevant attribute to be developed in a democratic regime (Dovi, 2002). 
This argument can be used in the case of Chilean youths, especially if the current 
context is taken into account. Mansbridge (1999) argues that descriptive 
representation is particularly relevant in contexts of mistrust and where some interests 
are uncrystallised. This is clearly the case of Chilean youths as it was already shown 
that they do not trust politicians and that their interests have been particularly left 
aside. Hence, it is possible to claim that if better connections are to be made between 
youths and politics the introduction of younger representatives is clearly an important 
step to be taken. 
5.3.2 The break with the way of doing politics       
ME-O’s main criticism was about a way of doing politics that he believed to be very 
negative for Chilean democracy. This critical posture was also very relevant to appeal 
to young people, and particularly to captivate politically-disaffected youths. In this 
sense, this section illustrates how these criticisms were relevant to gaining youth 
support.  
The first step to developing this issue is to examine evidence to observe if ME-O 
actually was more attractive to disaffected people to test the assumption that those 
who reject the way of functioning of Chilean politics were more captivated by this 
candidate. In table 5.1 it is possible to observe ME-O’s vote intention according to both 
age group and two indicators of political disaffection. It is observed first that that ME-O 
was more attractive to young people than for adults both in disaffected and not 
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disaffected people. This would indicate therefore that he was also attractive to non-
disaffected youths, which might be explained by image and age, as developed in the 
previous section. 
Table 5.1 - ME-O vote intention according to age group and indicators of political disaffection 
 
 
 
 
It is also possible to observe that for the whole of the Chilean population, ME-O 
was without doubt more appealing to politically-disaffected people. His vote intention 
was much higher among people who are not registered to vote and those who do not 
have confidence in political parties. Therefore, it can be argued that he appealed more 
both behaviourally and attitudinally disaffected people. Moreover, it is also observed 
that among the disaffected he has more support from youths since the highest vote 
intention is among youths who do not electorally participate and distrust political 
parties.84 
"I have always had a very anti-politics discourse. But with ME-O, I said I am voting 
because it is a proposal that sounds good. I think young people truly saw something in 
these discourses that they had to rely on. If you did not have confidence in politicians 
you have to have confidence in someone who was saying coherent things." Rosario, 
voter.  
As evident in the interview quote, ME-O seemed to be a good alternative for some 
people who had high feelings of hostility towards the political system. For example, 
youth confidence in political parties in Chile is currently extremely low and among 
those distrustful youths, this candidacy obtained more than a third of vote intention. It 
seems then that a relevant portion of disaffected youths were willing to trust 
politicians after hearing a critical discourse concerning the political class.   
                                                          
84
 Another relevant data that is not shown in the table is that, according to this same survey, ME-O obtained among 
politically disaffected youths almost the double the votes of Frei and a similar percentage to Piñera (CEP, 2009).  
 
Non-
Registered 
Registered 
Do not Have 
Confidence 
Have 
Confidence 
Youth (18-29) 35,8% 27,9% 35,1% 24,6% 
Adults (+30) 31,3% 17,4% 19,0% 11,0% 
Total 31,3% 18,7% 23,4% 15,3% 
Source: CEP, October 2009 n: 1505. 
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The criticism to the "duopoly partyarchy” 
ME-O criticised several elements of the functioning of Chilean politics. Among 
them, his claim that politicians are dominated by power interests that restrict the 
achievement of substantive changes was without doubt one of the most attractive. He 
heavily condemned the existence of a ‘political duopoly’ composed by the 
Concertación and the Alianza that had monopolised political power, avoiding the 
emergence of political forces both inside and outside these coalitions. Additionally, he 
argued that this situation is especially represented by strong party leaderships that 
have constantly opted for power arrangements in detriment of substantive proposals 
in order to maintain certain privileges. 
"The big problem in Chile is that it is governed by a duopoly. They make laws against 
‘díscolo’ people so other forces do not emerge. They negotiate things. And the 
education law floats. Health floats. And tax reform is momentary. To change the 
binomial does not suit the one or the other. No one does relevant things. We were 
going to break that duopoly and steal from both sides." Cristian Warner, general 
secretary of the PRO. 
When interviews are analysed it can be observed that youths’ strongest critiques 
are associated with these power-issues, and that ME-O represented a relevant change 
regarding this political scenario for them. He was perceived as a new political force 
who showed politicians power does not necessarily only have to be shared among 
these two coalitions and that electoral results could be less predictable. Indeed, the 
candidacy was seen as a break with respect to a monopolisation of politics that is 
perceived highly negatively by Chilean youths.  
"I was interested in ME-O because he is a young person who came to break the 
scheme in the chessboard of politics. I liked him because deep inside he was a way to 
demonstrate to politicians they had gained nothing. To tell them that power is not 
among you, and that nothing was fixed before the elections. Deep inside it was a 
protest vote." Rodrigo, voter. 
"If you look at older politicians, they are very scared about new proposals. And that is 
also why they get stuck. They are scared of these changes because they don’t know 
what will happen. And I think ME-O would have dared. Just because he was someone 
who was just getting into politics, or who was not so soaked with this issue of power." 
Carolina, voter. 
The evidence indicates that Chilean youths reject a way of doing politics controlled 
by power interests that, among other things, limits the emergence of new leaderships 
and that has postponed the execution of several significant initiatives. It is considered 
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that politicians, in order to reproduce their power positions, normally opt to maintain 
a status quo that needs to be modified. In this context, ME-O represents a relevant 
change for several youths as they feel he would encourage substantial changes. Youths 
perceive that any person who decides to carve out a political career would inevitably 
become dominated by a logic where power attainment is always prioritised. In this 
sense, the fact that ME-O is young helps to make him more credible as he has not had 
the chance yet to get involved in this logic.  
The specific rejection of the Concertación 
A second issue to be developed has to do with MEO’s specific criticisms towards 
the Concertación. He criticised the whole Chilean political spectrum. However, as his 
candidacy was mostly based on centre-left wing proposals he represented a positive 
change, especially to some people who were initially attracted to the Concertación but 
who were now dissatisfied with this coalition. In fact, according to a survey executed a 
couple of months before the elections, ME-O obtained 50% of vote intention among 
youths who declared a left-wing leaning while Frei obtained just 24%  (CEP, October, 
2009).  
When the interview material is examined it can be observed that power-related 
criticisms that appealed ME-O’s young voters are particularly more focused on the role 
of the Concertación. In this regard, it is noticed that ME-O absorbed high levels of 
disenchantment with respect to this coalition. This is explained by the fact that his 
main proposals came from a similar political view, but also as the Concertación has 
been the greatest contributor regarding the engenderment of feelings of hostility 
towards the political system among ME-O’s adherents. In this sense, it is believed that 
he will not reproduce the same negative practices of this coalition.   
"ME-O gave a new face to the left because he is from the centre-left, recycling the 
vices of the Concertación after twenty years in office. Vices such as not allowing young 
people to advance. Like the proper ME-O. To continue for twenty years with the same 
people that it was already proven that they had their time. It is deep inside to embrace 
power and not leave it." Alejandro, voter. 
"I believed it when Bachelet spoke about the citizenry government. And that is why 
Marco embodied again for me the feeling that was calling my attention. The 
Concertación absolutely disappointed me. The education agreement that Bachelet 
made was a disgrace. Education ends up being the icing on the cake of the 
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Concertación process, that having parliamentary majority at times did not push for 
major reforms. Bachelet should have embodied that leap. But that didn’t happen." 
Eduardo, PRO militant. 
Among these negative practices the following can be highlighted: to have party 
leadership that makes all decisions without taking into account the opinion of ordinary 
party members or common citizens; to reproduce an adult-centric style of politics; and 
to be concerned mainly about the attainment of power to the detriment of people’s 
wellbeing. This last point is the most criticised, as it is believed that during the 
Concertación’s governments many more substantial reforms should have been 
accomplished. Young people argue that this coalition failed regarding the fulfillment of 
relevant promises, and that it is not credible anymore. One of the main examples is 
education reforms, where all governments of the Concertación, and especially that of 
Michelle Bachelet, are heavily criticised by some youths.85 Based on those criticisms, to 
vote for ME-O seemed to have represented in itself a criticism to the acting of the 
Concertación for some youths. He is more credible, and it is expected the he will 
substantively represent them in a much better way.  
One last relevant aspect to be highlighted is the fact that ME-O attracted people 
who were dissatisfied with Bachelet’s performance. Bachelet also built her leadership 
by counteracting traditional parties. She was seen as a fresh and alternative leader 
against the continuity of the prevailing order, as she took distance from the 
establishment of the Concertación by presenting herself as someone who was closer to 
common citizens than to the political class (Tanaka, 2008). In fact, one of her main 
promises was to develop a ‘citizenry government’ that would encourage more citizen 
participation. These promises, however, seem to have not been accomplished 
according to some of ME-O’s young voters, since they were clearly disappointed about 
these issues. Therefore, ME-O represented somehow an alternative for political 
change for some people who witnessed how someone who they believed to be a 
significant alternative to the negative state of affairs of Chilean politics did not fulfill 
her promises.  
 
                                                          
85
 Let’s remember that during Bachelet’s administration (2006-2010) an educational social movement emerged and 
that it was seen as an opportunity to make important reforms. This episode will be analysed in the next chapter.  
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The significance of political guts   
The last point to be developed regarding how ME-O’s criticisms of the way of doing 
politics appealed to young people has to do with his resignation from the 
Concertación. As it was previously described, ME-O resigned from the PS after the 
party imposed Frei’s candidacy. The evidence suggests that this was extremely valued 
by young people. This was due to this empirically embodying MEO’s main criticisms of 
the political class (especially towards the Concertación) about the monopolisation of 
politics based on the prioritisation of power interests. He was therefore seen as a 
consistent candidate who showed political guts to have revolted against the coalition 
where he initiated his political career.  
"Another thing that attracted me was ME-O’s political history. He wanted to be in the 
Concertación’s primaries and he was left aside due to a circle of power that said that 
the PDC has to have a candidate. That shows that the Concertación also has a closed 
circle of power, that there is political quoting and that it is not possible to come out 
from there. Then ME-O came to break the board." Alejandro, voter. 
"The political act of divorcing from the Concertación was the most powerful political 
act that motivated many of us to participate. To not go for a candidacy that would 
probably have secured his re-election as a deputy or maybe even as a senator." 
Vicente, PRO militant.  
Some of ME-O’s voters were highly disaffected with respect to the Concertación, 
which made him an appealing candidate as he heavily criticised this coalition. 
However, what seems to have made several youths truly believe him seems to have 
been the fact that he was consistent with his positions. His resignation proved to 
young people that he was not in politics only for political power since to have 
continued in the Concertación would have at least guaranteed him a position as a 
deputy. Thus, they perceived that he was different from other members of the political 
class whose main interest is to acquire power. Moreover, as young people had also 
experienced the non-fulfillment of promises for political change from a traditional-
party candidate like Bachelet, an outsider alternative became even more valued. 
In summary, the evidence indicates that ME-O’s political criticisms were very 
relevant in appealing to young people. His critique’s central element, which was 
especially directed at the Concertación, was condemning a way of doing politics where 
two similar coalitions are principally worried about acquiring power. In this context, 
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ME-O was perceived as a valued alternative for several youths who were rejecting 
these political practices. Likewise, this section also demonstrated that Chilean youths 
would be more attracted to formal politics if politicians did not generate the 
perception that they are just there to gain power. Moreover, it also indicates that 
being young and not coming from classic political parties are helpful elements in 
making politicians more credible to disaffected youths.  
These results can be also connected with previous findings. To this effect, it can be 
argued that ME-O’s appealing features regarding his political criticisms are in 
accordance with some youths’ perceptions that were previously observed to be 
generating political disaffection. This is because it was formerly remarked that youths 
who perceive that there is a homogeneous political offer and that the political class’s 
main interest is to reproduce its power positions develop feelings of hostility toward 
the political system. In relation to the first issue, the fact that ME-O was able to attract 
youths as he was perceived to be a break from a political duopoly indicates more 
strongly that Chilean youths reject the fact that Chilean democracy has a homogenous 
offer that excludes some discussion topics such as the promotion of a different socio-
economic model (Posner, 2008, Angell, 2007). On the other hand, the observed 
relationship between MEO’s support and his condemnation of the indiscriminate 
search of power brought solid evidence to reassert one of this thesis’s new 
contributions, that is to sustain that there is an association between political 
disaffection and partyarchic attributes of Chilean democracy. This is because this new 
evidence showed, with concrete examples, youths’ rejection of certain political 
practices that limit their substantive representation.   
5.3.3 The attractiveness of the proposals 
Going beyond the fact that ME-O was primarily appealing as he was representing a 
break with a form of doing politics, it is also important to highlight some specific 
proposals that were relevant to get youths support. Among them, this section specially 
put emphasis on proposals about a tributary reform, some measures related to post-
material values and several initiatives regarding political reforms as those were the 
most highlighted by the interviewed people.  
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 Tributary reform  
One of the most relevant of MEO’s proposals was the realisation of a tributary 
reform. He was the only candidate to propose this in the first round, and the evidence 
indicates the initiative attracted several voters. ME-O argued that a tributary reform 
was needed, proposing to increase taxes to companies in 30%, to increase mining 
royalty and to reform the heritage law. It intended to rise public spending in 8% in 
2010.  
 Among youths’ supporters this reform was highly valued, principally because 
nobody else pushed for it. Therefore, it seems that he was marking a break regarding 
substantive propositions too. It is believed that ME-O did not only have a 
groundbreaking discourse, but that he was also materialising his criticisms through 
innovative and significant initiatives. 
"I thought the programme was different, that there were real groundbreaking 
proposals, for example, the tributary reform. This seemed quite interesting and 
revolutionary because the rest of the candidates were the same. It was to perpetuate 
the current system." Cristina, PRO militant. 
"The tributary reform was attractive to me because for years no one proposed it. And 
that is to directly point to the solution of the inequality in Chile. An educational 
discourse of the Concertación or the right is not credible, because for twenty years 
they remained the same. The two  protect the business issue. Both are dedicated to a 
free market without discussing and criticising the system. And the system is bad 
because Chile is still unequal." Alejandro, voter. 
By proposing this reform, young people perceived that ME-O was challenging a 
status quo that the other two coalitions were protecting. This is a status quo that 
promotes, without any critiques, a neoliberal socio-economic model that principally 
benefits businessmen. It is believed that it is necessary to challenge this model, as that 
can contribute to reducing inequality levels. Moreover, it is considered that both the 
Concertación and the Alianza are very similar regarding proposals that perpetuate this 
pro-business system, and that they are not credible when they promote its 
transformation since they do not have tangible proposals to do that. In this context, 
ME-O becomes credible as he proposes concrete measures to change central pillars of 
a system that generates inequality by inhibiting a more even distribution of Chile’s 
economic development results.   
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The fact that ME-O was attractive through proposing this reform also extended the 
understanding of specific elements of Chilean politics that seemed to be engendering 
feelings of political disaffection analysed in chapter 3. It was shown there that youths 
who perceive that the interests of powerful people are preferably represented and 
that the political offer is very homogeneous are rejecting more formal politics. In this 
sense, these findings deepen previous observations as the tributary reform was 
believed to both breaking with a homogeneous political offer and limiting powerful 
interests. These measures seemed then to have been appealing since they confronted 
a technocratic style of politics based on the reproduction of a neoliberal socio-
economic model that characterises Chilean society that is being rejected by Chilean 
youths (Rindfjall, 2009). To this effect, this experience suggests also that disaffected 
youths can be attracted by formal politics when they see concrete measures that 
contest a scenario that benefits powerful interests and that at the same time makes a 
difference concerning the current political offer.    
Post-materialist proposals  
Among ME-O’s proposals highlight too some that are linked to the emergence of 
post-materialist values. These are proposals that are associated with an emphasis on 
quality of life and self-expression that emerge when societies reach a better standard 
of living (Inglehart, 1990, Dalton 2006). The candidacy had several proposals of this 
type related to gender, sexual minority issues and environmental protection, and they 
seem to have attracted a great number of voters. In fact, they were supposedly key to 
attracting some liberal right-wing youths who were dissatisfied with the Alianza as it 
has always had a very conservative vision regarding value issues.86  
The interview material indicates that post-materialist proposals such as gay 
marriage, abortion, greater protection of the environment and even initiatives against 
drug prohibition were very relevant for some youths to support ME-O. They were 
significant as these topics had not been part of the Chilean political agenda. Thus, they 
are perceived as somehow breaking the existing homogeneous political offer. 
                                                          
86
 This fact that right-wing youths supported ME-O can be shown by the fact that approximately a third of his 
supporters voted for Piñera in the second round.  
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Moreover, these proposals are also valued because they are linked more specifically to 
youths’ interests.  
"ME-O spoke about many things that other candidates also spoke but they were 
‘pantallas’.
 87
 For example, what happened with Piñera in the case of civil unions and 
gays. In contrast, I think he would have made great changes in the field of opposite-sex 
couples concerning gender issue, in terms of women's development, and sexual and 
reproductive rights." Carolina, voter.  
"It was attractive that deep inside not only the typical topics are tackled since existing 
politics were addressed, like health, education, inequality, and so on. But he took into 
account issues such as sexual minorities, anti-prohibition concerning drugs and 
abortion." Luisa,  PRO militant. 
It is believed that when other candidates make references to these issues they just 
do so to obtain more votes and will not truly encourage these types of measures. 
Within this context ME-O appears convincing, since youths believe he is more 
actualised and that his actions are much more legitimate. This is the case, for example, 
as he was one of the few politicians who opposed the Hydroaysén project since it 
started.    
 When these findings are compared with results of previous chapters, it cannot be 
argued this time that they are in accordance. In fact, it was previously shown that 
there is not a significant association between value orientation and indicators of 
disaffection. This might be suggesting that post-material proposals were not relevant 
by themselves in attracting disaffected youths, but they could have attracted them 
since they also represented a break from a homogeneous political offer. It could also 
suggest that there is in fact a section of youths that will be less politically disaffected if 
these issues are a relevant part of the agenda, as Inglehart and Dalton have argued. 
This maybe the case, for example, of liberal right-wing youths who are not identified 
with current right-wing parties. These suggestions, however, would require further 
testing.   
Political reforms  
The last proposals to be highlighted are political reforms. They were also key 
regarding ME-O’s support, as they were the main expression of the already-described 
                                                          
87 
To be a “pantalla” means that you try to be seen in a way but you are not really like that.   
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criticisms of a way of doing politics. ME-O proposed several political reforms, from 
changing the constitution and the binominal system to having mandatory primaries 
among political parties. These reforms were supposed to be the bases for breaking a 
‘duopoly partyarchy’ as they would challenge the current monopolisation of politics 
and would have allowed the emergence of new forces, both within and outside 
traditional parties.  
Data from the interviews accounts for the relevance of these proposals, since it is 
observed that among some youth voters political reforms were very attractive. The 
most highlighted one is the reform of the binominal system, as it is perceived to be 
crucial in order to challenge a political duopoly that limits the generation of proposals. 
Other underlined proposals are the execution of primaries among parties. Moreover, it 
is argued that proposing these reforms was necessary if ME-O wanted to be consistent 
with his criticisms of the political class. 
"There were several packages of proposals that were attractive to me.  Mainly those 
reforms to the political system. The binomial system. To face the whole situation to 
break with political leaderships. For example, with the primaries that had to be made 
for the presidential elections or primaries within parties themselves." Vicente, PRO 
militant.  
"Political reforms were attractive to me because deep down, governments have been 
a duopoly for over thirty years. What ME-O proposes with respect to the binomial 
system is necessary to beat the legitimacy crisis of political parties. Much of the public 
debate that it is being developed is because decisions are being taken without 
consulting people. These reforms attract people who want to get involved and have 
something to say." Rosario, voter.  
These measures are also valued since they are central to further advancements on 
social matters. Additionally, it is believed that these political reforms are necessary to 
overcome current political partys’ crises of legitimacy that is explained by the fact that 
they make decisions without incorporating the citizenry. Youths believe that current 
social conflicts express a necessity to include common people in the decision-making 
processes. Thus, ME-O was attractive to them as he was proposing concrete measures 
to generate more participation. 
The attractiveness of political reforms also agrees with previous findings. In fact, 
its requirement is very consistent with the perception that the political system is 
deficiently connected with the citizenry. ME-O proposed these measures and obtained 
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support from disaffected people. Therefore, that indicates that these types of 
initiatives can be relevant if levels of youth political disaffection are to be decreased. 
Moreover, these proposals’ appeal also reaffirms that one relevant element of a 
supposedly new way of doing politics that could be emerging among Chilean youths is 
the existence of authentic mechanisms of participation, and that youths are aware of 
the need of participative instruments to improve their capacity to be better 
substantively represented (Plotke, 1997).  
To sum up, this candidacy had several proposals that appealed to young people. 
These measures were diverse, and all of them somehow contributed to deepening 
previously-developed arguments about the main sources of political disaffection. 
Figure 5.2 summarises the main issues that explain ME-O’s youth support and how he 
can be differentiated from other candidates. This figure is based on a multiple 
correspondence analysis that uses several categorical variables to generate a two-
dimensional representation of their relationships. The variables included in this figure 
were vote intention, a couple of indicators of political disaffection, opinions of the day-
after pill and type of government and a statism index.  
Figure 5.2 - Multiple correspondence analysis of candidates’ vote intention and several other 
indicators among Chilean youths (18-29) 
 
   Source: UDP (2009a) n: 355 
Looking at the figure, it is observed that its first dimension is clearly defined by 
political position in terms of left and right wing, and that the second dimension mainly 
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measures feelings of political disaffection. Within this representation, it is observed 
that ME-O is located at the centre regarding the first dimension and that is the closest 
candidate to the disaffected people pole in the second dimension. He is the closest 
category to people who are not registered and do not have confidence in political 
parties. Moreover, he is also near to those who approve of the day-after pill and who 
prefer governments who ask people. Regarding levels of statism, he is close to high 
and medium levels. With respect to the other candidates, it is observed that Piñera has 
a clear cluster of support based on right-wing people who advocate governments that 
act fast without asking people, that are against the day-after pill and that prefer low 
levels of statism. On the other hand, Frei and Arrate are linked to left-wing youths who 
are not politically disaffected.  
 This figure reaffirms, therefore, that ME-O was especially attractive to disaffected 
youths as a candidate and that his bases of support are given by a variety of issues. 
Moreover, it also indicates that he was not only a candidate who appealed to left-wing 
youths as his proposals attracted people identified with the whole political spectrum.  
 5.4 The role of Social Networks 
Having analysed the main substantial reasons that explain this candidacy success, it 
is necessary to examine another element that helps to understand ME-O’s support. 
This is the case in the relevance that social networks such as Facebook and Twitter had 
for the development of the campaign, and how their use was also significant in order 
to attract youths.  
The influence of digital media for promoting political participation has been 
highlighted by several authors. Kobayashi et al. (2006) argue that through experiences 
of social exchange and support among online communities, people nourish social trust 
that finally can enhance both online and offline political participation. Gil de Zuñiga 
and Valenzula (2010) argue that online conversations provide useful tools for the 
proliferation of civic engagement, since they generate informational utility and as they 
also have mobilising effects among discussants. Dalton (2008) sustains that internet 
activism is a very relevant manifestation of an engaged-type of citizenship that 
stimulates political action through more expressive and participatory norms. Finally, 
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particularly regarding the use of social networks for political campaigns, Hanson et al. 
(2010) argue that newer forms of social media offer an opportunity for political 
communication that can affect political cynicism.  
The qualitative material brings relevant information regarding the relevance that 
digital media had for ME-O’s campaign. First, it is observed that people that 
participated in the campaign strongly highlight that social networks were very relevant 
in gaining youth support. This is because these tools are very close to them so they 
facilitated communication. Young people normally use digital media. Therefore, ME-O 
became attractive as he was closer to the youth world because he spoke their 
language and used their platforms. Through these means he was able to be closer to 
young people through innovative means. For example, it is highlighted that ME-O 
himself managed his Twitter account. Moreover, it is argued that the digital strategy 
was also successful because people in charge of it were young.   
"It was a little bit unavoidable to use digital media because there was no money at the 
beginning. I think that clearly helped. I mean, because we spoke youths’ language. We 
used their platforms. The campaign was led by young people. I mean, everybody who 
was working was younger than thirty years old." Javier Sajuria, responsible of the 
digital strategy of the campaign.  
"What we did very well was to take advantage of the youth attribute. The proximity to 
digital media. With Facebook and Twitter. They were the most popular tools in that 
minute and served us very well in communicating. There was a mix of innovation and 
good knowledge of these tools, because they were comfortable for our generation. 
The media was not covering us. So, we used digital media." Cristian Warner, general 
secretary of the PRO. 
It is also argued that these means were relevant since the campaign had few 
resources and because traditional mass media did not sufficiently cover this candidacy 
in order to protect other interests. In this sense, the use of social networks was also a 
necessity given the independent character of the campaign and the fact that it was 
criticising a status quo that is normally defended by traditional media.  
Youth voters also stress the relevance of social networks. It is emphasised that 
these forms of communication are closer to young people and that situation made   
ME-O more attractive. Moreover, it is stated that the use of Facebook, Twitter and 
websites also showed the groundbreaking character of the candidacy that was 
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expressed in its critical discourse. This is because he was one of the first politicians 
who used these mediums, which projected him as being innovative.  
"I work in the social field and I see the power that social networks have. ME-O moved 
in that way and it was very useful. And that also reflects that he had another vision, 
because the others would not have thought about it or would have thought about it 
later. Instead, he used it in the moment and it was useful." Carolina, voter.  
"The use of social networks was very important to attracting youths. In fact, if you 
compare the resources of the candidacies, Marco’s campaign was made with one-third 
of the others, or maybe less. Digital media were extremely important. I mean, 
Facebook campaigns: everyone was there. Twitter, the websites. This was also another 
step in the emergence of the candidacy that made it different. That was one of the 
greatest reasons young people also got hooked." Cristina, PRO militant.  
The use of social networks was also appealing to young people, as it showed a 
more open and transparent form of campaigning. Through digital media people had 
more access to information about proposals and campaign activities. Likewise, these 
social mediums increased opportunities for expressing opinions and having greater 
participation. Finally, youths also highlight that the use of these media was 
particularity relevant for a campaign that did not have plentiful economic resources.  
All in all, the fact that ME-O was particularly appealing to young people is also 
attributed to the use of social networks in his campaign. The fact that campaign ideas 
were discussed online had the expected mobilising effect, as it clearly offered new 
opportunities for political communication in a context dominated by high levels of 
disaffection (Gil de Zuñiga and Valenzula, 2010, Hanson et al., 2010). Moreover, the 
use of these means was in accordance with other elements of ME-O’s discourse, such 
as promoting a more active citizenry, as both situations are part of an engaged type of 
citizenship (Dalton, 2008). The evidence suggests, then, that if formal politics is to be 
more attractive to younger generations, apart from having engaging proposals it is also 
necessary to use innovative means to inform these ideas.  
 5.5 The emergence of the ‘Partido Progresista’ 
Given the success of the candidacy, at the end of the presidential campaign in 
December 2009 it was decided that the best option to develop the political project was 
to found a new party that embodied the main criticisms and proposals made during 
the campaign. In May 2010 the party was finally named Partido Progresista (PRO). 
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After that, the party initiated a signature collection to officially register in the electoral 
system (La Tercera, 2010). To April 2012, the party is officially registered in six of 
Chile’s 15 regions. For example, it was already registered in the Metropolitan Region 
with more than 15,000 militants.  
When important members of the PRO party leadership are asked about the success 
concerning the incorporation of youths, it is recognised that it has been a long and 
difficult process. Nevertheless, they argue that they have been successful and that 
there are good future perspectives. One of the main difficulties has been that young 
people are highly skeptical about the concept of political parties because current 
parties are perceived very negatively. In this context, the PRO attempts to be 
perceived as an institution that promotes democratic and inclusive logics as a response 
to the negative actions of traditional parties.  
"We have been very successful in attracting young people to participate. I think there 
is an effort concerning proposals. I think there is a tremendous opportunity to do 
things differently. And we have shown perseverance that will reap rewards. The 
functioning of parties is a promise that we must fulfill, though. Internal elections are an 
example of democracy." ME-O. 
"We have a tremendous challenge because we have to break the barrier with respect 
to parties. And young people are the most unbelieving. But we are extremely confident 
about that. So it's like making them part of a new project. I mean, building forms that 
are democratic, participatory. For example, we made the decision not to have a youth 
division in the party because young people are a perspective that must be inserted into 
the different areas of the party’s decision-making." Alejandra Botinelli, vice-president 
of education and culture of the PRO.  
The PRO, for example, has promoted the idea that all elections within the party 
have to be democratic. Moreover, it was established that the party would not have a 
youth division in order to better incorporate youths in all decision-making spheres. 
These attributes are believed to have been crucial in engaging young people since they 
highly value instances where decisions are taken in a more horizontal way through 
authentic mechanisms of participation. In this sense, it is argued that several youths 
have become re-enchanted with the idea of parties.  
When youth militants of the PRO are asked about their main motivations for 
participating in this new party, it can be observed that they are in accordance with 
what was argued by members of the party leadership. In fact, it is stated that its main 
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attraction is that it is a very democratic situation where they feel part of decision-
making processes as it has authentic mechanisms of participation. These aspects are 
particularly valued when they compare the PRO with the functioning of other parties. 
They consider that other parties are not democratic since they are dominated by 
restricted groups and because they have very limited spaces of participation. Thus, the 
PRO becomes more appealing to them since it does not reproduce these negative 
logics.  
"You really live here something that does not happen in other parties. I mean, the 
democratic story. Everything is democratic here in the assemblies. This clearly 
distinguishes it from other parties. I think that's the difference to speeches and 
programmes. In practice that differentiates us a lot." Cristina.  
"I had not militated in other parties because I knew they were completely dominated 
spaces and that I had to hang on some leadership to be within a circle of decision-
making. Marco understands that there should not be a youth division because youths 
are removed from the decision-making area. And that is the guarantee that young 
people are not the labor of a future campaign but political actors of a transformation 
process." Eduardo. 
Young people value that decisions are not made between few people but that 
everybody in the party is able to participate and elaborate proposals. This is also the 
reason for appreciating that the PRO is self-managed, since that permits that 
everybody has to work equally and that there are not external economic pressures 
regarding some specific decisions. Specifically regarding youth participation, it is also 
highlighted that there is not a youth division but that there are quotas to include 
youths in decision-making spaces. Young militants of the PRO believe that this is a 
good measure, since it avoids what happens in other parties where youth divisions are 
mainly the party labour. In this sense, it is perceived that within the PRO there are 
much more horizontal relationships where everybody is capable of listening to each 
other. Finally, they underline that the fact that it is a new party helps to make it more 
credible, since as everything has to be built discussion is enriched and the participation 
of all is needed.  
The evidence indicates, therefore, that the PRO has been successful in gaining 
youth militants by criticising the functioning of traditional parties through the 
implementation of more democratic functioning forms. These are features that have 
been highlighted among the literature, as Navia (2004) and Siavellis (2005) have 
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argued that processes of candidate selection among traditional Chilean parties had 
been very undemocratic since the return to democracy. Moreover, it can be observed 
that these findings also fully agree with one of the main new contributions of this 
thesis, that is, the observation of the association between political disaffection and an 
undemocratic internal functioning of parties. It was previously shown that traditional 
parties engender disaffection as they are controlled by logics of power that make them 
undemocratic, adult-centered and discouraging regarding the activation of people. In 
this sense, reasons given by PRO’s youth militants to participate in this party deepen 
this argument since they criticise traditional parties based on similar motives as this 
party is perceived as a transparent and democratic instance where they will not be 
excluded. This indicates, therefore, that some youths will be less politically disaffected 
if political parties worked differently in the sense of being more democratic with 
authentic mechanisms through which young people could participate and express their 
opinions. 
This evidence also indicates that in a supposedly new way of doing politics that is 
emerging among youths the figure of political parties is not to be automatically 
rejected. Although parties are currently highly criticised and new parties find several 
difficulties in attracting new militants, it is observed that these institutions could play a 
relevant role in the future if they worked differently. As it has been argued in this 
thesis, Chile is a party democracy (Garretón, 2007) and that seems to have been the 
base of MEO’s decision to canalise his support through this political form rather than 
by the establishment of a social movement or other type of organisation. In this sense, 
the fact that PRO’s youth militants appreciated democratic forms of functioning seems 
to indicate that a reformulation of current party logics could both reduce levels of 
political disaffection’s and make parties a relevant element of an emerging new way of 
doing politics that generates much more public support.  
 5.6 The limits of the candidacy   
Until now it has been shown that ME-O was an appealing candidate that 
particularly attracted disaffected youths. However, his critical discourse could clearly 
have been much more successful as he obtained only 20.1% of votes. Moreover, this 
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presidential election could not provoke a massive registration of young people. For 
example, the percentage of registered youths with respect to the whole youth 
population only passed from 20 to 23 %. What is more, the experience of other Latin 
American countries indicates that in contexts of high levels of political disaffection, 
anti-establishment candidates have been able to obtain power (Levitsky, 1999, Tanaka, 
2008, and Philip and Panizza, 2011). For instance, Philip and Panizza (2011) argue that 
a key element that explains the electoral success of current presidents of Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Ecuador is that they were able to capitalise political discontent by 
challenging partycracies founded on the moderation of political antagonisms, the 
retrenchment of the state given by the implementation of market reforms and the 
deactivation of civil society. In this sense, it is necessary to reflect also in relation to the 
main situations that limited the success of a candidacy that emerged in a comparable 
context88.  
Institutional limits 
Some of MEO’s greatest limitations are related to institutional rules that define 
Chilean electoral processes. Among them, the most relevant one seems to have been 
the enrollment system. At the time of the 2009 elections, voting was compulsory 
where once one voluntarily registered to vote. This limited success since, those most 
affected by a system that reduces incentives to participate are clearly those disaffected 
with formal politics. This could be due to, for example, people felt attracted by a 
candidate for one election but they do not know what will happen in subsequent 
elections, so they do not want to be forced to vote eternally89. Based on that 
argument, the proper party leadership of the PRO argues that if there had been 
automatic enrollment and voluntary voting ME-O would have obtained more votes90.  
                                                          
88
 Evidently the Chilean context also differs in several elements comparing with other Latin American countries. The 
similarities and differences between Chile and other Latin American countries in relation to contexts that produces 
crisis of representation will be developed more deeply in subsequent chapters. 
89
 This is actually one of the arguments given by ME-O’s voters when they are asked why he did not obtain more 
support among disaffected people.  
90
 This system was in fact recently changed for one that establishes automatic enrolment and voluntary voting.  
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This speculation can be tested somehow with data from surveys regarding vote 
intention including both registered and non-registered people. Table 5.2 shows that if 
the whole population had voted ME-O would indeed have obtained more support.  
Table 5.2 - Vote intention for the 2009/2010 Chilean presidential election 
In fact, taking into account the sampling error of these surveys and the fact that 
among those who stated that they do not vote or that they could vote null ME-O 
would have probably obtained more votes, it could be possible that under a different 
enrollment system ME-O would have been elected as Chile’s president. Even though it 
is difficult to believe that with this different system everybody would have voted, at 
least these data indicate that different institutional rules would have produced more 
favorable results for this candidacy. 
Another institutional limitation that ME-O had was the long space of time that 
existed between elections and registration deadline. Presidential elections were held 
on the 13 December 2009 while people were only able to register to vote until 13 
September. The fact that people were only able to register three months before the 
elections particularly affected ME-O, since he was the candidate who tried hardest to 
appeal to disaffected people. The most vibrant stage of the debate occurred in these 
three months but many people who felt attracted to ME-O in the closing stage of the 
campaign did not have the chance to officially support him. Moreover, let’s remember 
that ME-O officially registered his candidacy on 10 September. Therefore, there were 
only three days between him being an official candidate and the deadline for 
registering, which clearly affected his chances of gaining more support.   
 
  First Round   Second Round  
Piñera Frei ME-O Arrate 
Other (null, 
do not 
vote, etc.) 
Piñera ME-O 
Other (null, 
do not vote, 
etc.) 
Registered 36,3% 25,7% 18,7% 4,5% 14,9% 40,1% 37,1% 22,8% 
All population 35,6% 23,9% 22,1% 4,2% 14,2% 39,9% 39,6% 20,5% 
Source: CEP, October 2009 n: 1505 
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The limits of his political discourse  
Beyond institutional limits, it is also possible to observe that ME-O’s discourse 
somehow limited his success as he was not able to appeal to a relevant group of 
youths who are very critical regarding the functioning of Chilean politics. This situation 
is identified when politically-involved youths that did not support this candidacy are 
asked about him. Although some of them highlight the emergence of the candidacy as 
a positive thing since it challenges a reprehensible political class through a valiant and 
consistent performance, it is observed that it generated large repulsion as well. This 
situation occurs mainly among youths associated with left-wing political positions who 
claim that ME-O’s candidacy was not attractive as his proposals were not found to be 
weighty and consistent. In this sense, it is argued that he was attractive to young 
people principally because he had an appealing youthful image that was well 
communicated, but that there were no substantive contents beyond that image. They 
argue that this situation is expressed in the fact that his coalition did not obtain any 
place in the parliament and that few people registered to vote for him.  
"I think ME-O is not serious and that his appeal was more superficial. He had no 
weight. He had different advisers from several sides. How can you manage to have a 
political project if there is a Russian salad? At some point he also seemed attractive to 
me. Fresh air, generating debate. To be challenging. And deep inside, instead of saying 
what it is expected to say he says the opposite. I think he had a good communicational 
management but he lacked substance." Patricia, member of an organisation that 
promotes public health.  
"ME-O can be seen as something closer. But it is an image. It is no more than that. 
Some people saw an option in ME-O. But I don’t see that the penguins (secondary 
students), university students, popular youth, are interested in ME-O. It can be seen 
like that but if you look deeper and see the real possibilities that this person had there 
are not fundamental changes either." Dario, member of an educational collective. 
More specifically, the consistency of his proposals is criticised by the fact that there 
were people from different political positions in his campaign, which ultimately 
resulted in a diffuse and heterogeneous offer that did not approach well several 
relevant social matters. An example of that is the critical position among some youths 
regarding the proposal to privatise a portion of CODELCO. It is also stated that within 
the current Chilean political context dominated by high levels of political mobilisation, 
ME-O would not be a relevant alternative to a great majority of the participants of 
these demonstrations. It is believed that he is appealing to several youths but mostly 
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to those who are not sufficiently politically-involved or not that disaffected regarding 
the functioning of the Chilean political system. Other criticisms he received are that his 
project is too personalistic, that he was not consistent with his criticisms after 
supporting Frei’s candidacy in the second round, and that he was not truly approaching 
youth issues91.  
MEO’s discourse limited his success. He was not able to capitalise political 
discontent among several disaffected young people with more radical left-wing 
political positions. In this sense, it could be argued that in order to obtain the support 
of those people it would have also been necessary to deepen more left-wing proposals 
such as openly rejecting Chile’s neoliberal socio-economic model. Despite proposing 
some redistributive measures, ME-O was not an anti-neoliberalism candidate as in 
other electorally successful political projects of Latin America. This helped him to get 
the support of several people. However, at the same time it seems it also generated 
the rejection of several other disaffected people.   
 5.7 Conclusions   
This chapter main’s objective was to analyse the sources of success of both the 
presidential candidacy of ME-O and the development of the PRO in order to 
understand more deeply current negative relations between youths and the Chilean 
political system. The main findings were that central reasons youths give for 
supporting ME-O are considerably accordant to what was previously found to be 
generating political disaffection among youths. Those who supported this new political 
project were very critical about the functioning of Chilean politics and these criticisms 
were very similar to perceptions previously observed to be associated with feelings of 
hostility towards the political system. In this sense, ME-O’s success can be described as 
another expression of Chile’s current crisis of political representation. He represented 
a significant alternative for several youths and the understanding of that situation 
contributed significantly to deepening the argument about why Chilean youths are 
                                                          
91
 Regarding this last issue it can be highlighted that within ME-O’s programme there is no reference to the 
development of an intersectorially-coordinated youth public policy, although it was previously shown that this 
measure would help reduce political disaffection. When members of the PRO are asked about that situation they 
recognise there is a deficit.  
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politically disaffected. Moreover, it is also important to highlight that this chapter also 
deepened this thesis’s new contributions about Chile’s sources of political disaffection 
since it brought new evidence about youths’ perceptions that politicians are mostly 
worried about their power interests and that there is an undemocratic internal 
functioning of political parties.  
The comprehension of ME-O’s success also reaffirmed the fact that Chilean youths 
seem to mostly be rejecting a form of doing politics and not ‘the political‘. The fact that 
a critical discourse about Chilean politics could attract several youths demonstrates 
that they are not less politically involved because they are not interested in the 
wellbeing of society but because they are just rejecting how formal politics is currently 
being executed. What is more, results also indicate in which way a different style of 
doing politics would be more appealing to youths. It is observed that young people 
would be much more attracted to formal politics if: a) they perceived that politicians 
are not only interested in attaining power but in substantively representing people, b) 
there were more youth politicians, c) there were proposals that generated more 
participation and that limited powerful interests and d) there were more transparent 
and democratic parties. 
Another relevant contribution of this chapter is that it also deepens the argument 
about the reasons that make Chilean youths especially more politically disaffected 
than the rest of Chilean population. With respect to the issue, it was previously stated 
that as youths are not relevant to reproducing politicians’ power positions, they are 
one of the most politically and socially excluded groups of the Chilean political system 
and consequently one of the most disaffected ones too. In this sense, ME-O’s 
candidacy corroborated this statement as it showed empirically how a project led by 
youth leaderships, that had as one of its main concerns the specific incorporation of 
young people and that even used means that were closed to this group was able to 
engage disaffected youths. One of the campaign’s proposals was to generate quotas to 
have more youth representatives. Moreover, within the new party one important rule 
is the avoidance of having a youth division. In this sense, it can be argued that this 
political project tried to somehow break a system that is particularly reticent about the 
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inclusion of young people, which seemed to have heavily contributed to obtaining 
youth support.  
The analyses of this candidacy’s support could reaffirm and deepen, therefore, 
several propositions previously developed about the relationship between youths and 
politics. There are several elements that explain MEO’s support, such as his political 
criticisms, his youth condition and his policy preferences. Regarding this issue, the data 
analysed in this chapter do not allow us to distinguish the most relevant reason that 
explains this candidacy support among youths.92 However, it is important to highlight 
that all elements discussed have something in common. This all points to the fact that 
there is a disconnection between Chilean politics and common citizens, which is, 
according to this thesis’s main hypothesis, the main source of current high levels of 
youth political disaffection. In this sense, it can be claimed that the evidence discussed 
about this case study could verify previously-established hypotheses that explain the 
phenomenon being studied.  
One final thing that is worthy of reflection has to do with the limits of this 
candidacy. It was shown in this chapter that ME-O could have been more successful, 
but that he was limited by both institutional rules and his own discourse. Concerning 
this issue, if more favourable conditions to generate support among disaffected youths 
are to be considered it is not possible to find straightforward directions. A different 
enrolment system would have clearly benefited ME-O. However, regarding his political 
discourse, it is not quite clear what would have produced more attraction. This is 
because the main criticism regarding his discourse is that he had a diffuse and 
heterogeneous offer based on diverse advisors. Hence, a project more linked to left-
wing proposals and more critical of Chile’s neoliberal model could have brought him 
more support. This situation, however, would have probably reduced ME-O’s support 
from other people. Thus, it could be stated that ME-O was somehow entrapped in a 
similar situation of what Przeworski (1985) called "the dilemma of electoral socialism”, 
                                                          
92 
This would require the execution of a representative survey with MEO’s voters, which was not doable in the 
context of this thesis.  
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since both the maintenance and the modification of his discourse would have 
produced similar results93.  
What is intended to be argued through this last reflection is that ME-O’s political 
project by itself is quite far from being the answer to current problems of youth 
political disaffection in Chile. Just a portion of disaffected youths trusted politicians 
again with the emergence of this candidacy and this new party. In this sense, this 
phenomenon showed part of the path to reduce high levels of disaffection by 
demonstrating that new forms of doing politics would definitively engage more young 
people. Nevertheless, this new alternative is clearly not the only one that is going to 
unravel this problem. This situation requires further analysis and that is why the 
following chapters that analyse the emergence of two social movements put a special 
emphasis on which other political forms can attract disaffected youths.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
93 
This dilemma makes reference to a situation where social democratic parties participate in electoral processes. In 
that situation they seek allies in other classes by diluting their class appearance. However, as that action dilutes the 
party’s programmatic positions manual workers become alienate. Therefore, parties are finally condemned to 
minority status. 
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Chapter 6: The emergence and fall of the 2006 ‘pingüino movement’: 
illustrating a way of doing politics that generates political disaffection 
 6.1 Introduction  
For most people it would have been very difficult to imagine that, only a few 
weeks after the beginning of Michelle Bachelet’s government (2006-2010), a massive 
social movement would have paralysed the country. Since the return to democracy in 
1990, Chile has not witnessed substantive social mobilisations but there have been 
quite high levels of political stability based on a highly-institutionalised party system. 
Nevertheless, in May 2006 a strong movement composed of secondary school 
students shocked the stable Chilean political system. By demanding high quality 
education, the so-called ‘pingüino movement’ was able to challenge Chile’s status quo 
by forcing the formulation of a new educational constitutional law.94 
The study of the emergence and fall of this movement can significantly deepen the 
understanding of the existing negative relationship between youths and formal politics 
in Chile. The evidence of previous chapters indicated that Chilean youths are 
disaffected as the current Chilean way of doing politics generates a disconnection 
between the political class and common citizens. Therefore, the examination of a 
particular case study where young people’s demands were channelled and 
materialised in policy outcomes brings a good opportunity to exhaustively analyse this 
way of doing politics. This is particularly the case since the way demands were 
absorbed by the political system has been highly criticised by students and some 
political actors. They argue that the final agreement was just reached among the 
system’s supporters, which would imply the way the movement was ultimately treated 
was just an expression of ‘politics as usual’ (Burton, 2012).  
The analysis of this case study generates, then, relevant evidence of a situation 
where young people developed perceptions that are connected to the engenderment 
of political disaffection. To be more precise, the way the movement was channelled 
can demonstrate through a relevant example how perceptions of lack of 
                                                          
94
The movement was named as the ‘pingüino movement’  because of the black and white uniforms of secondary 
students.  
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representation, political inefficacy and about an undemocratic functioning of political 
parties emerge and produce feelings of hostility towards formal politics. Moreover, the 
examination of this case study can also contribute to the discussion about whether 
Chilean youths are just rejecting a way of doing politics or if they are mostly apathetic. 
Finally, it also brings evidence about new political forms that can attract Chilean 
youths.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first describes the functioning of the 
Chilean schooling system and its main problems. The second analyses the emergence 
of the movement regarding the conditions that favoured its emergence in relation to 
the movement’s political opportunity structure, framing processes and mobilising 
structures. The third examines the negotiation process and the obtained final 
outcomes. Finally, the last part analyses the main limitations of the movement and 
how they can be associated with the emergence of feelings of political disaffection.  
 6.2 The Chilean Schooling System  
The pillars of the Chilean schooling system  
The first thing to understand about Chile’s schooling system is that it was 
generated under the military dictatorship in accordance with a neoliberal model of 
society that the regime tried to implement. The whole educational system was 
reformed during the military government and its changes can be understood as one of 
many market reforms implemented under this administration (Garretón, 2007). At the 
beginning of the 1980s Pinochet reformed the schooling system based on two main 
pillars: a new model of financing founded on a voucher system and a new model of 
administration based on a decentralisation process (Cornejo, 2006).  
Regarding the first pillar, in the new system the state, rather than continuing 
funding schools directly, was going to indirectly financially support schools by assigning 
resources to students. Inspired by Milton Friedman’s concept of the voucher system, 
the idea was that schools would receive financial support based on their number of 
students (Taylor, 2006, Cox, 2005). The system was founded, then, with the objective 
of introducing market competition mechanisms among schools, as now they had to 
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compete for students in order to receive state subsidies (Cornejo, 2006). These 
changes were supposed to improve education quality since an informed demand about 
the quality of schools would make parents select the best schools and avoid the worst 
ones, which would generate pressures on teachers, directives and school 
administrators (Cox, 2005).  
The second pillar of these reforms had to do with significant changes regarding 
school administration. In a process known as the ‘municipalisación’, the main change 
was that schools passed from being administrated by the Ministry of Education to 
being administrated by municipalities. The Ministry of Education just maintained its 
functions regarding the determination of curriculums and textbooks, the delivery of 
technical supervision and the evaluation of the system (Ibid.). 
These decentralisation processes were also accompanied by the entry of private 
providers. This situation generated a new category of state-subsided private schools 
that also receive public funding through the voucher system (Matear, 2007). These 
new providers were able to select students and could be profit-oriented institutions to 
establish primary and secondary schools (Taylor, 2006, Burton, 2012). This system 
generated three types of primary and secondary schools: municipal schools financed 
by state vouchers and administrated by municipalities, state-subsided private schools 
that are also financed by state vouchers but that are privately administrated, and paid 
private schools that do not receive state subsidies (Donoso, 2010). 
All these reforms were finally consolidated through a new educational framework 
law (Ley Orgánica Constitucional de educación, LOCE) that was passed on Pinochet’s 
last day in office in 1990. Moreover, when this law was passed it was established that 
any future amendments to these reforms were to be subject to a very high quorum in 
the parliament (Matear, 2007)95. 
After the return to democracy, governments of the centre-left coalition 
Concertación have reformed education. However, these transformations have 
maintained central pillars of the 1980s reforms, and they have in some cases even 
                                                          
95
 Any constitutional law needs 4/7 of approval in both chambers of the parliament in order to be changed.   
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deepened them (Cox, 2005, Cornejo, 2006). These reforms have had five big elements: 
an increment of public education spending, a curricular reform, an improvement in the 
teaching profession, the establishment of the full-school day (Jornada escolar 
completa, JEC), and the articulation of few focalised programs to improve education 
equity and quality. These reforms have not challenged the market principles by which 
this system is founded (Ibid.). In fact, the most substantive reform to the current 
system was the establishment of the shared funding in 1993, which reinforced the 
relevance of market mechanisms of coordination. This reform allowed parents to 
contribute a complementary sum of money to state-subsided private schools in order 
to provide schools with extra resources to invest in improving the quality of education 
(Matear, 2007).  
The main results of the system 
These educational reforms have brought about several changes. The most 
important is that education has passed from being mostly administrated by public 
institutions to being administrated by private institutions. For example, according to 
the MINEDUC (2008), from 1980 to 2008 municipal school’s enrolment passed from 
78% to 44%, while subsidised private schools passed from 15% to 48%. These changes 
have generated both positive and negative results. On the one hand, they have 
increased coverage. However, problems regarding the quality and equity of education 
have not been solved. 
With respect to coverage, it has been significantly increased regarding primary and 
secondary education (Cox, 2007, Cornejo, 2006). Cox (2007) argues there has been a 
substantial movement of the opportunity structures and that the most important 
changes affect the lower 40% of Chilean income distribution. For example, secondary 
education coverage on the first quintile passed from 73% to 88% between 1990 and 
2003. These improvements have been also accompanied with advances concerning 
schools’ infrastructure and equipment (Cornejo, 2006).  
These improvements, however, have not come with enhancements to education 
quality and equity. With respect to quality, it has been argued that it has not improved, 
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as there is a stagnation of standardised tests results in maths and languages (Cornejo, 
2006, Colegio de Profesores de Chile, 2006, OPECH, 2006).  
In relation to equity, it has been stated that this is one of the main troubles of the 
system. The main indicator of this is that significant differences between the three 
types of schools, with respect to performance in standardised tests, have remained 
and they have even increased a little bit (OPECH, 2006). For example, as shown in 
figure 6.1, school achievement is highly associated with students’ socio-economic 
levels when results of the national standardized test in maths are analysed among 
fourth grade primary students. Moreover, it is observed that socio-economic 
differences have continued with the passing of years. In this sense, one of the main 
criticisms towards Chile’s current schooling system is that it reproduces existing high 
levels of social inequality. To this effect, the schooling would be then an important 
field where one of the most relevant problems of Chilean society is reproduced.    
Figure 6.1 - Math SIMCE results by SES and year among fourth grade Chilean primary 
students
 
Source: SIMCE (2006). 
Hand in hand with these high levels of inequality arises another relevant problem: 
current high levels of social segmentation of the education system. This phenomenon 
has been named as the ‘educative apartheid’, which means that Chile has set an 
educational offer that is differentiated for each segment of society since families of 
similar income levels have been grouping in the same types of schools (Cornejo, 2006). 
This process is partly given by the fact that subsided private schools are able to select 
students. Moreover, it has been increased by Aylwin’s reform that allowed subsidised 
private schools to charge fees to students (Redondo, 2009, Matear, 2007). That is why 
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the OECD has argued that Chile’s educational system is consciously structured for 
social classes, which fosters original inequalities among students (OECD, 2004).  
In summary, in recent decades the Chilean education system has suffered several 
reforms, with mixed results. With respect to the solutions to these situations, there is 
not an agreement but there are quite diverse proposals. On the one hand, there are 
people who defend the current system, arguing that the main solutions have to do 
with modifying teachers’ status and giving more autonomy to schools. In a middle term 
position, there are people who, despite agreeing with current pillars of this pro-market 
system, plead for more state control. Finally, there are those who argue that the 
current system must be strongly modified as they oppose the existence of for-profit 
state-founded institutions stating that public education should be much more 
prioritised.  
 6.3 The emergence of the ‘pingüino movement’  
6.3.1 A brief description of the events  
Bachelet had just taken power in March 2006, and a few weeks later mobilisations 
started in a public school of Lota, a small city to the south of Santiago. Several students 
were protesting against serious infrastructure failures that provoked water filtrations 
in what was later named as the ‘aquatic school’. Since then, the political climate was 
different, and that initial event was the fuse that lit the fire (Domedel and Peña y Lillo, 
2008). 
On 26 April the first massive demonstration took place in Santiago. Within a few 
weeks, these actions started to become more regular, bigger and with a high number 
of arrested students (Ibid.). The initial demands were about having free school 
transport and a free university selection test. However, as the movement became 
stronger more substantive demands such as the modification of the JEC and the 
derogation of the LOCE emerged. At the same time, protesters were already fully 
organised in the coordinator assembly of secondary students (ACES) (Henríquez, 2007). 
On 10 May one of the largest demonstrations occurred in several cities and ended in 
the arrest of 1042 students (La Tercera, 2006). This situation meant a turn in students’ 
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strategies that saw them pressuring authorities by occupying schools rather than by 
marching on the streets (Gerter and Ramos, 2008).  
Occupations started on 19 May in a context where more substantive demands 
started to take more relevance. In these circumstances, the fact that Bachelet’s 
reference to the conflict in her first public account on 21 May only criticised some acts 
of vandalism and did not bring any solutions to students’ demands engendered 
students’ grievances (Domedel and Peña y Lillo, 2008). Afterwards, the conflict started 
to grow as there were also some failed discussions between students and 
representatives of the ministry of education. Moreover, massive demonstrations 
continued. On 30 May, 250 schools participated in a national strike that counted on 
the support of between 600,000 and one million people (El Clarín, 2006). That is when 
the government reacted, announcing measures to channel students’ demands in a 
televised public speech on 1 June. These measures included the solution of almost all 
specific demands and the creation of an Advisory Commission on the Quality of 
Education to analyse problems of educational regulatory frameworks. After these 
announcements, actions to be taken were highly discussed in the ACES. Mobilisations 
finally stopped on 9 June, with students expecting to have their demands represented 
in this new commission (Henriquez, 2007). 
6.3.2 The Political Opportunity Structure (POS) of the movement   
The first thing to consider to understand the emergence of ‘pingüino movement’   
is the POS the movement faced when it emerged. In Tarrow’s terms (1994), this means 
to analyse how changes in several dimensions of the Chilean political environment 
encouraged thousands of secondary students to use collective action. This section 
discusses two relevant situations that seemed to have lowered mobilisation costs: 
Bachelet’s ‘citizen government’ discourse and the inexperience of government’s new 
faces.  
Bachelet won the presidency due to, among other things, her promise to build a 
new and more participatory style of politics. She proclaimed to build a citizens’ 
government (Valenzuela and Dammert, 2006). In this sense, she distanced herself from 
the classic establishment of the Concertación as she wanted to be perceived as 
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someone who was closer to common people rather than to the political class (Tanaka, 
2008). For instance, she promised to create participatory advisory councils that would 
include broad sectors of civil society (Aguilera, 2007). This discourse was a change 
regarding previous presidents, and it is associated with the emergence of the 
movement since it lowered collective action costs. This is because students perceived 
the political system was opening up some spaces for participation. Therefore, they 
appreciated this new proposed style of doing politics. However, at the same time they 
wanted to take advantage of it in order to pursue their demands.  
"The citizen government was also useful as a credit. This message that Bachelet was 
expecting a citizen government without knowing what that was. Precisely because she 
never imagined what a citizen government was when she was faced to what it really 
was is that they were so disturbed. And later they obviously forgot about the citizen 
government." Julio Isamit, spokesperson of the movement in 2006. 
The fact that Bachelet’s citizen government discourse intensified the strength of 
the movement indicates that these measures attracted Chilean students. Moreover, it 
shows that the POS does not have to be necessarily more open to increase social 
mobilisations. Chilean students did not have to wait until the system truly increased its 
access to lower their mobilisation costs since mere pledges for greater spaces 
activated them as they felt in a position to demand more participation. Protesters did 
not necessarily believe that Bachelet was going to develop a more participative 
government. However, their high expectations about having a more participative form 
of governing seem to have strengthened mobilisations as they wanted to see an 
immediate implementation of this discourse.  
The second political change that influenced the emergence of the movement has 
to also do with having a new president in power. Although social movement specialists 
argue that shifts in ruling alignments increase mobilisations (Tarrow, 1994), in this case 
having a new president of the same coalition did have an impact on the emergence of 
the ‘pingüino movement’.  
In April 2005 there were secondary student mobilisations demanding similar things 
to those in 2006. These mobilisations, however, were rapidly absorbed through 
negotiation tables between student representatives and people from the ministry of 
education that ended up on a document that had the support of some authorities of 
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the ministry (Carrasco, 2007). The problem is that when students wanted to continue 
discussing these proposals with the new authorities in 2006, they realised that 
previous agreements were not recognised, which engendered their grievances.  
"There is no transfer of accumulated intelligence from the ministry teams that 
previously worked with youth leaderships. This infuriates the student leadership. They 
had been about to sign, or have signed, some agreements in December 2005 and in 
April 2006 they found out that the ministry with which they had dealt before had no 
idea. There were no documents. Everything had to start all over again. That was a 
great reason to confront and protest." Cristian Cox, educational adviser to the 
Concertación, member of the educational committee of 2006 
The encouragement of collective action, given by fact that new educational 
authorities were not aware of previous agreements, was even greater since new 
people who were dealing with students were politically inexperienced. The new 
minister of education was Martin Zilic, a doctor member of the PDC with not much 
previous political experience. This situation made him unequipped to manage the 
conflict. Students took advantage of that situation, which contributed to overwhelm 
the conflict (Interview, Cox, 2011, Interview, Stevens, 2011).  
6.3.3 The Framing Processes of the movement 
A second issue to be analysed regarding the emergence of the movement involves 
the collective processes of interpretation, attribution and social construction of the 
movement (McAdam, et al., 1996). This is examined through the understanding of the 
demands of the movement, how these demands were spread to obtain greater 
support and the way the movement identified those responsible for the current 
situation.  
With respect to the demands, the main belief that shaped the movement in order 
to mobilise people was that the quality of Chilean education was really low, which was 
expressed both through problems of infrastructure and the quality of teaching. This 
dichotomy defined the two main core elements of students’ demands: short-term and 
long-term agendas. The short-term agenda consisted of several specific demands such 
as having free transportation, free university enrolment tests (PSU) and the 
improvement of schools’ infrastructure. The long-term agenda, on the other hand, 
included the derogation of the LOCE and the revision of the JEC and the 
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municipalisation process (Henríquez, 2007).  Moreover, all these problems were also 
interpreted as part of an unequal and unfair system since it was believed that these 
deficiencies were the expression of a very uneven opportunity system (Interview, 
Orellana, 2011).   
The integration of both agendas was perhaps the most challenging situation that 
the leaders of the movement had to face concerning framing processes. This is 
because for most students it was easier to visualise short-term agenda problems 
rather than long-term ones. Student leaders were aware of that situation, and that is 
why they opted to strategically promote short-term demands in the first stage to later 
encourage the long-term agenda issues.  
"The short-term agenda topics are issues that turn people on. So, those issues allowed 
us to generate a lot of people on the streets. And then when that was done we started 
the second stage that was to begin to put deeper issues." Cesar Valenzuela, 
spokesperson of the movement in 2006, member of the PS.  
"The short-agenda was created to add people. What motivated to make the secondary 
movement? It was not the school transportation pass. It was the poor quality of 
education.  How did the movement start? By complaining for the school transportation 
pass and PSU's scholarships." Julio Isamit, Spokesperson of the movement in 2006. 
Student leaders knew that the most effective way to mobilise people was by 
framing problems related to specific situations in the first place. However, that was 
just a first stage to increase the strength of the movement to be able to have a higher 
capacity to achieve the long-term agenda. Once students were already mobilised, the 
ACES intended to make students aware that current problems of the educational 
system were given by several regulatory frameworks that needed to be modified. For 
example, during schools’ occupations there were students in charge to explain the 
deficiencies of the LOCE.  
By understanding the long-term agenda it is also possible to observe the 
movement’s diagnostic framing. With respect to that, students were always very clear 
that the responsibility of the bad quality of education lay with the existing educational 
frameworks. That is why they claimed for the derogation of the LOCE, the revision of 
the JEC and an alteration of the fact that public schools are administrated by 
municipalities. They sustained that education was very unequal and of a low quality 
because of reforms made during the dictatorship that implemented a new 
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administrative and financing system. For example, the municipalisation process was 
criticised since there are not efficient mechanisms to ensure that resources are 
effectively delivered to municipal schools (Propuesta de trabajo de estudiantes 
secundarios de la RM, 2005).   
Despite having a clear diagnostic framing, the student movement did not have a 
homogeneous position regarding the modifications the educational system needed. In 
Benford and Snow’s terms (2000), the movement was not able to generate a coherent 
prognostic framing where alternative sets of arrangements were proposed to solve the 
problem. Students were unable to deliver a coherent proposal regarding specific 
modifications that the LOCE and other laws needed in order to improve the quality of 
education. The ACES had students from several political positions. Therefore, a specific 
agreement regarding these issues was very difficult to be achieved96. 
"Proposals were never specific. We said ‘end the LOCE’. And the right-wing says ‘end 
the LOCE’. And the socialist were saying ‘end the LOCE’, more state and the 
continuation of state-subsided private schools with more control. Then the more left-
wing said ‘everything to the state’. However, the vision of the movement was a more 
statist one because we were an absolute majority." Cesar Valenzuela, spokesperson of 
the movement in 2006, member of the PS.  
"The movement was more left-wing, but it never fully defined itself. It was defined 
only after mobilisations, when they sat on the advisory board. We were not able to 
agree on a document with the educational proposal secondary students wanted." Juan 
Herrera, spokesperson of the movement in 2006, member of a colectivo social. 
Although there was never a full proposal, the main direction of the movement was 
clearly in favour of more state control within an educational context dominated by 
market principles. That is why it has been argued that it was an expression of anti-
neoliberal mobilisations (Cornejo et al., 2007). For example, one of the most relevant 
frames that inspired and legitimated the actions of the movement was the opposition 
to the existence of for-profit state-subsided schools since the current system should 
not generate business opportunities (Interview, Orellana, 2011). A proper proposal of 
secondary students from the Metropolitan Region argues that "The only requirement 
to open a school is to be of legal age, which means that many providers are in the 
educational field only to obtain economic benefits" (Propuesta de trabajo de 
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 This situation was going to change once the movement joined the educational commission after the end of 
mobilisations when they formed a coalition with other social sectors and presented concrete proposals.   
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estudiantes secundarios de la RM, 2005). Moreover, it is argued that the cause of the 
current problem is the LOCE as it introduces education within the free market logic 
(Ibid.).97 
6.3.4 The Mobilizing Structures of the movement  
The last issue to be analysed concerning the understanding of the emergence of 
the ‘pingüino movement’ is the mobilising structures that they had. This intends to 
understand how their ways of engaging in collective action determined the fate of 
mobilisations (Mc Adam et al., 1996). More specifically, this section mainly analyses 
the organisational form of the movement and particular tactical repertories they used.  
In relation to the first aspect, the first thing to state is that students were organised 
through the coordinator assembly of secondary students (ACES). This national 
organisation was composed by people from schools’ student councils and members of 
‘colectivos sociales’98 (Cornejo et al., 2007). Moreover, several participants, and 
especially some of its main spokespeople, were members of traditional Chilean 
political parties from the whole political spectrum (Henríquez, 2007).99 
The most relevant organisational aspect of the ACES was its democratic character. 
Having an assembly as a permanent instance of discussion, where everybody was able 
to express an opinion, allowed the installation of a horizontal dynamic within the 
movement. Agreements and decisions were always taken in the assembly, and were 
constantly checked. In this sense, assembly representatives were just bearers of a 
collective mandate (Cornejo et al., 2007).  
This evidence indicates then that students’ perceptions of what a representative 
should do regarding the mandate/independence controversy are closer to the delegate 
                                                          
97
 It is also important to highlight that the support for statist measures introduced by the movement seemed to be 
also backed by the whole Chilean population. According to a survey executed while the movement was taking place 
73% of respondents agree that Chilean schools should be administrated by the Ministry of Education (CEP, 2006).   
98
 A ‘colectivo social’ is a small social organisation that works independently from parties.  
99
The fact that many leaders came from youth divisions of traditional political parties seems to be incoherent with 
the argument of this chapter. However, it is necessary to highlight that the existence of these kinds of leaders 
seems to represent the existence of partyarchic practices that intend to co-opt social groups (Coppedge 1994) 
rather than the support for traditional parties. Moreover, it is also important to indicate that disaffection was not as 
high as it is now when this movement emerged, and that experiences like this one heavily contributed to generate 
more disaffection.   
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view than the trustee one (Pitkin, 1967). Moreover, it shows too that students were 
also aware of the relevance common people’s participation has regarding achieving 
substantive representation (Plotke, 1997). 
When the interview material is analysed it can be observed that the democratic 
nature of the movement was very relevant to getting the support of secondary 
students. By having horizontal and democratic mechanisms of decision-making where 
the opinion of majorities was always respected the movement was able to attract 
more people to participate. Common students were able to feel that they were truly 
part of the resolutions of the movement as they perceived that their opinions were 
taken into account. 
"We tried to make students feel part of the movement, and part of the resolutions and 
discussions. And that led us also to replicate democratic systems in most of the schools 
and assemblies. That was very important, because it made each ‘penguin’ feel they 
were part of this movement and that they had a voice." Pablo Orellana, participant of 
the commission in 2006, member of the PC. 
"There was a process. The decision of the majority was always taken. Organising like 
that was attractive because everyone participated somehow. There were always 
representatives. But they were only representatives." Vanessa, student leader in 
2006. 
Beyond students’ demands, the evidence suggests the proper forms of 
organization that the movement developed were crucial to obtaining support. This 
situation can evidently be connected to the sources of current high levels of political 
disaffection among Chilean youths as it brings evidence regarding which political forms 
attract youths. As it has been observed during the whole thesis, Chilean youths are 
disaffected since they reject an elitist style of doing politics based on a disconnection 
between the political class and common citizens. In this sense, the fact that youths 
were attracted by a movement because it had a democratic way of functioning with 
horizontal and participative logics indicates that if formal politics in Chile boasted 
these same characteristics, it would be able to attract many more young people. 
In Pitkin’s terms (1967), students were attracted by a style of politics where 
substantive representation was performed based on the inclusion and participation of 
people. According to students, representatives were merely people who had to 
communicate what was decided in the assemblies without having autonomy to decide 
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what they believed was best for the movement. Jenkins (1983) argues that 
decentralised movements are effective regarding the mobilisation of resources since 
these structures also attempt to embody ideals to be replicated as models for 
emulation. Chilean students do not argue that the reasons behind these logics were to 
attempt to replicate this model. However, it is possible to infer from the evidence that 
they would like to have these logics replicated in Chilean politics and that if that was 
the case, Chilean youths would be clearly less politically disaffected. 
One last issue to be analysed regarding the organisation of the movement is its 
impact on the public opinion regarding the image of young people. In relation to that, 
students argue that the fact they were able to democratically organise and discuss 
with authorities in order to demand several changes showed public opinion that 
Chilean youths were not apathetic. Students believe that the rise of the movement 
shocked adults who had believed that since the return of democracy Chilean youths 
"no estabán ni ahi" (they were not even there).100 
"The student movement was the basis to establish that young people were actually 
there. That they had interests and ideals. And that they were willing to sit at a table to 
discuss and to dialogue with authorities. It was a major change of direction when 
youth sat at a table and could begin to discuss." Isaac Stevens, student member of the 
commission in 2006. 
Students perceive that the movement was able to demonstrate that Chilean youths 
were indeed interested in the fate of society as they had interests and ideals they 
wanted to materialise. Thus, it is argued that this generation somehow broke with an 
old discourse as it showed Chilean youths do want to participate and contribute to 
improving social conditions of the Chilean population. In this sense, it is observed that 
the proper existence of this movement contributes to reaffirming the statement that 
Chilean youths, using Mouffe’s concepts (1993), seem to be rejecting formal politics 
rather than ‘the political’.   
A second aspect to be developed regarding the relation between mobilising 
structures and the emergence of the movement are the specific tactical repertories 
the movement used to pursue their demands. Secondary students mainly used 
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 ‘No estar ni ahí’ is a Chilean expression that means that you are not interested in anything. This expression has 
been used to indicate that Chilean youths are apathetic in the sense that they don’t care about public issues.  
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conventional forms of collective action since their main forms of protest were marches 
and occupations. Marches were used mostly at the beginning of the movement when 
thousands of students gathered in several cities across the country (Domedel and Peña 
y Lillo, 2008). However, they generated a significant problem, since the spread of the 
movement also increased repressive mechanisms of policemen authorities that ended, 
for example, with more than 1,000 arrested students on a march on 10 May (La 
Nación, 2006). 
The high number of arrested students made the movement lose control over the 
circumstances as well as some support, especially from students’ parents. In this 
context, it was decided to change collective action forms from marching on the streets 
to occupying schools, as that would put more pressure on authorities and generate 
more control and support.  
"When we saw that a thousand people were arrested in each demonstration I asked 
the assembly to occupy schools. That was fundamental since there was no control in 
the streets. That was the strongest strategy and that caused the greatest impact 
among society in terms of credibility." Cesar Valenzuela, spokesperson of the 
movement in 2006, member of the PS, quoted in Gerter and Ramos (2008). 
Students were aware, then, that the fate of mobilisations was determined by the 
mobilisation structures through which they were organising, and that is why they 
changed their tactical repertories to focus on school occupations rather than on 
marches. They realised that, in order to legitimise their demands, they needed more 
support from both students and common citizens, and that is why they opted to 
modify their action repertories.   
Once students were occupying schools they developed several strategies to expand 
their demands such as the ‘days of reflection’. In these days students gathered to 
reflect on educational matters so everybody was able to understand what they were 
demanding (Domedel and Peña y Lillo, 2008). Additionally, they held national strikes 
that had a lot of support. For example, the most significant one on 30 March paralysed 
250 schools (El Clarín, 2006). Occupations also put more pressure on governmental 
authorities since they prevented school administrators from obtaining state vouchers, 
which finally provoked the installation of negotiation tables between the government 
and students (Interview, Calderón, 2011).  
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One last element to be analysed concerning mobilising structures is the utilisation 
of virtual platforms to mobilise students. In 2006 social networks were not popular, as 
both Facebook and Twitter had not yet emerged. However, during the development of 
the movement students were able to disseminate information through the internet, 
mostly by e-mail and the use of Fotolog, a website where individuals upload pictures 
and people can comment on them. These platforms were used among students to 
spread information regarding future mobilisations and what was happening among 
occupied schools. For example, the Fotolog website of the Instituto Nacional, one of 
the most relevant schools of the movement, received nearly 200,000 visits during the 
first week of June 2006 (Domedel and Peña y Lillo, 2008).  
 6.4 The negotiation processes and the subsequent policy outcomes 
The emergence of the Presidential Advisory Commission on the Quality of Education 
After more than one month of massive mobilisations, Bachelet decided to take 
action. It was on 1 June 2006 when she announced several measures concerning both 
the short-term and long-term demands. On the first issue, she promised to deliver 
more than half a million new lunches to the schooling system, improvements regarding 
the use of the school transportation pass and PSU scholarships for every student who 
needed them. In relation to the long-term agenda, she established a Presidential 
Advisory Commission on the Quality of Education to generate a consensual vision 
concerning several educational issues with the participation of students, experts and 
several other social actors (Henriquez, 2007).   
These measures generated a lot of discussion within the movement since there 
was not an agreement regarding the actions to be taken after these announcements. 
For example, they provoked the resignation of Cesar Valenzuela, one of the main 
leaders of the movement member of the PS (Domedel and Peña y Lillo, 2008). 
Students were not totally certain of the capacity this commission will have in relation 
to the fulfilment of their demands. That is why they asked that students should be the 
50% - plus one - of the commission and that it should be a binding mechanism. 
However, both proposals were rejected by the government (Donoso, 2010). Finally, 
after a second national strike on 5 June, which was rejected by moderate sectors of 
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the assembly, students decided on 9 June to participate in the commission since if they 
had not joined it the movement would have lost too much legitimacy.   
The fact that the political system responded to the emergence of this movement 
by fulfilling several short-term demands and by creating a new commission indicates, 
then, that the movement was able to modify the political agenda. Moreover, the 
formation of this commission can also be understood as the creation of new political 
opportunities by the movement (Tarrow, 1994). Although Bachelet had previously 
developed similar commissions, this was the first one that included civil-society 
members who were directly demanding substantive changes (Aguilera, 2007). 
Therefore, it can be argued that students were able to force the establishment of new 
political mechanisms to solve social conflicts, which means that, at least in its first 
stage, the way this situation was to be channelled would not be an expression of  
‘politics as usual’.  
The composition and functioning of the commission  
The commission had 81 members. It worked from June 2006 to December 2006 
with the idea to discuss several postures to be stated in reports due to highlight both 
agreements and disagreements. Their members included participants of social 
organisations such as university and secondary students and representatives from 
teacher unions, experts and policy-makers associated with think tanks linked to all 
political sectors, educational providers and civil servants (Burton, 2012). 
Although there were members from several organisations, the great majority were 
experts and policy-makers linked to both central coalitions. According to Aguilera 
(2007), from the 81 members 31 of them were university academics, from which 16 
had a PhD degree. Moreover, from all members 52 were party militants, with only four 
of them members of parties that did not belong to the Concertación or the Alianza. 
Finally, civil society organisations were mainly represented by 14 students, six 
education workers’ representatives and two representatives from parent 
organisations.  
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Despite the fact that members of the commission were very diverse, soon after 
discussions begun it was possible to identify three main postures: the ‘Bloque Social’ 
(Social Block), the Concertación block and the Alianza block (Burton 2012). The Bloque 
Social was composed of secondary and university students and members of social 
organisations such as teachers’ unions and parents’ representatives. The other two 
blocks were formed principally by policy-makers and experts linked to each of these 
coalitions.  
The Bloque Social was against state-subsidies for profit-schools, student selection 
and shared funding. Moreover, they advocated a stronger state role. They proposed, 
for example, to significantly increase requirements for schools providers and to modify 
the municipalised system (Burton, 2012, Carrasco, 2007). The Concertación block had 
differing positions on for-profit schools and it advocated the regulation of selection 
processes. Additionally, a stronger state role was supported even though the 
municipalised system was not intended to be changed (Burton, 2012). Finally, the 
Alianza block defended for-profit schools and selection, advocating a weaker state role 
in order to have greater school autonomy (Burton, 2012, Velasco, 2006).  
All these proposals were discussed during the commission’s sessions, where there 
was an initial agreement on the need to replace the LOCE. However, the features of 
the new educational framework were not instantly agreed. In this context, the main 
tension regarding the reaching of agreements that emerged was between a more 
technocratic pro-market discourse of policy-makers and experts linked to the 
Concertación and the Alianza and the discourse of the Bloque Social that embodied the 
vision of the movement and other social groups (Donoso, 2010).  
In this scenario, although the commission also included representatives of civil 
society, the debate was mostly based on technical discussions. This situation limited 
the capacity of the Bloque Social to pursue its propositions as it did not have the 
necessary tools to counter-argue experts’ ideas. Likewise, the fact that the pro-market 
experts that dominated discussions were also the builders and principal supporters of 
the current educational model constrained even more the success of the Bloque 
Social’s proposals.  
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"In much more technical issues it was pretty hard for us. After that we saw further the 
possibility of trying to transcend our raised demands. When we were talking about 
quality we made contributions. But the cheese was cut somehow between these other 
people that were there. The experts. They were the builders of an old educational 
system." Pablo Orellana, secondary student participant of the commission in 2006, 
member of the PC. 
"In the commission we were not going to get anything because the policy of the 
Concertación's governments is merely of co-optioning social demands. They are 
possibilities to co-opt the demands. To convert its meaning. To take problems and give 
them a solution in market terms." Juan Herrera, secondary student member of the 
commission in 2006.  
The way of functioning of the commission opposed then these two groups (experts 
and members of the Bloque Social) with the positions of technicians linked to the 
Concertación and the Alianza prevailing among discussions. This made students realise 
education was not going to be changed in the way they wanted. 
It can be argued, based on this evidence, that the fact the main opposition 
observed in the commission was between these two groups indicates the manner this 
conflict was channelled. It also illustrates several attributes of Chilean politics that 
were previously discussed as being associated with the engenderment of political 
disaffection. Chile has been described as having a homogeneous political offer based 
on two similar coalitions that favour a pro-market socio-economic model, which have 
finally weakened partys’ ideological profiles (Posner, 2008, Baño, 1993). Moreover, it 
has also been argued that it has developed a technocratic style of policy-making that 
mostly excludes civil-society members as parties tend to demobilise citizens (Huneeus, 
2003, P. Silva, 2004). To this effect, when the functioning of the commission is 
analysed, these two attributes can be clearly observed because what seems to have 
finally prevailed was the experts’ visions, which were supported by members of both 
central coalitions and rejected by participants of social organisations.  
When experts are asked why the vision of the Bloque Social did not prevail and if 
they think students felt frustrated with the way of functioning of the commission, they 
argue that the situation was predictable because experts are those who have to make 
decisions; they are the specialists who have researched these issues and who have 
greater knowledge. 
"Students are not mature enough. They have not made studies. It was good to put the 
issue on the table. But it is different to discuss public policies with children and youths. 
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Therefore, it is not that their opinion is not listened to. Their opinions are probably 
going to be a minority because they are not people who have much to say about the 
institutional vision of public policy because they are clearly users and that is their 
vision." Carolina Velasco, member of the commission in 2006, representative of a 
think tank of the Alianza.  
"The commission is a change where students became offside. Their voices remain an 
extremely important element of the whole council but throughout the process they 
lived it with discipline but with frustration because they have little voice. Because they 
are not experts. They changed the agenda but when you start policies adults and the 
institutions they represent stay" Cristian Cox, member of the commission in 2006, 
former educational adviser of the Concertación.  
For experts of the Alianza, the fact that students were able to decide on 
educational matters was imaginable since those who are direct beneficiaries of social 
services don’t have much to argue regarding public policies. On the other hand, 
experts from the Concertación sustain that although students’ feedback can be 
relevant, their efficacy to pursue changes is low since public policies are eventually 
generated by experts.  
It is observed, then, that the vision of some experts of both coalitions regarding the 
way public policies are to be decided are fairly similar as they seem to support a 
technocratic style of policy-making. The commission, therefore, seems to ultimately 
become a space of technical discussion where visions from system supporters 
prevailed in detriment of more radical criticisms of several social sectors. To this effect, 
it can be stated that although this commission incorporated social sectors, its way of 
working finally replicated the technocratic and homogenising way of doing politics that 
Chile adopted since the return to democracy where common citizens are not able to 
generate relevant inputs and where market visions seems to prevail (Rindfjall, 2009).  
As it is observed, this technocratic style of policy-making was negatively evaluated 
by members of the Bloque Social as they were aware that it limited the achievement of 
their proposals. This situation generated a lot of frustration, and that is why only a few 
days before the submission of the final report the Bloque Social decided not to 
subscribe to it. The reasons given were that their visions were not sufficiently 
represented in this document as it imposed the postures of those who were 
supporting the current educational system mostly based on market principles.  
 "The committee was a democratic body. But those who always win imposed their 
positions. We decided not to sign the document. We also made public the proposal of 
235 
 
the Bloque Social that was given to the public opinion with the idea that it was to be 
hopefully discussed in a social congress that could define policies." Jorge Pavéz, 
former president of the teacher's union, member of the commission in 2006. 
"The Bloque Social resigned since our social positions were not registered in the core 
document. That was logical because somehow we were not the majority. But we knew 
deep inside that within society were the great majority that had generated 
mobilisations that had challenged the educational system. Then, of course, it was 
violent for us. It was brutal." Pablo Orellana, secondary student member of the 
commission in 2006, member of the PC. 
The Bloque Social expected to have this kind of document since they were only a 
minority within the commission.101 However, in spite of this, it was necessary to 
express their discontent as they believed that within Chilean society as a whole, their 
visions represented a majority. Based on that fact, they decided to socialise their own 
specific proposal in order to discuss it with broader sections of society.  
Lastly, the final report only suggested consensus on several issues that did not 
challenge the main pillars of the educational system. Among other things, it proposed 
the continuation of public and private education, the need for greater participation of 
students and their families in school management, measures to encourage teachers to 
remain in their positions, more state funds, the end of arbitrary forms of 
discrimination, and modifications to the state’s institution to supervise the educational 
processes (Burton, 2012).  
The resulting policy outcomes 
With the submission of the final report, Bachelet asked a group of experts of the 
Concertación and several ministers to generate an educational law proposal. This new 
proposal was presented in April 2007 and it suggested the replacement of the LOCE. 
This new law presented several changes, such as the creation of the Education 
Superintendent to regulate the functioning of state-subsidised private schools and the 
limitation of selection processes. Additionally, it pushed for-profit schools receiving 
state funding to become not-for profit institutions (Gerter and Ramos, 2008). This 
proposal was highly contested by members of the Alianza and even by several 
politicians from the Concertación. Among these criticisms, the prohibition of for-profit 
                                                          
101 
This was the case because the commission intended to express consensus visions, but when that was not 
possible it distinguished the most representative opinions regarding their participants.   
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state-subsidised schools was the most disapproved issue (Interview, Velasco, 2011, 
Interview, Valenzuela, 2011). In this sense, since the emergence of this proposal it was 
known that its approval was not going to be possible as it needed 4/7 of quorum in a 
context where the parliament was completely dominated by members of both big 
coalitions and with no representative of the Bloque Social (Donoso, 2010). 
The rejection of this law made the Alianza generate an alternative proposal. This 
proposal finally forced both coalitions to create a small committee only formed by 
politicians and experts of both coalitions in order to discuss a final law. This committee 
finally reached an agreement on November 2007, called the ‘Agreement for the 
Quality of Education’ (Libertad y Desarrollo, 2007). The agreement was presented in a 
press conference where several politicians of both sectors, and some students, raised 
their hands and proclaimed that a new educational law (LGE) was to be promulgated. 
Moreover, a document signed by presidents of the main Chilean political parties was 
presented, explaining the main changes of the law. That document stated that the 
agreement reached between the Chilean government, the Alianza and the 
Concertación will allow Chile to advance in a clear and determined way to a high 
quality education for everyone (Gobierno de Chile, Alianza, and Concertación, 2007).   
The LGE included several modifications to the LOCE without questioning the main 
pillars of the pro-market educational model though. It established a new supervisory 
agency in charge of regulating educational quality and a new curricular structure to 
elevate education quality. Moreover, it defined new mechanisms to guarantee the 
efficiency and transparency of the whole educational system, such as increasing 
requirements for school administrators and new norms to regulate discriminatory and 
arbitrary selection processes. Additionally, it was also stated that school funding was 
to be increased by 15% and that it was necessary to keep and develop a mixed system 
of education (Ibid.). This law was finally passed in the congress on 18 March 2009 in a 
session that had numerous protest manifestations from several social sectors (El 
Mercurio, 2009b).  
The LGE was well-assessed by the Alianza and by the majority of members of the 
Concertación, who highlighted that it was an important step towards improving the 
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quality of education (Libertad y Desarrollo, 2007, Interview, Cox, 2011). However, it 
was rejected by the secondary movement and the whole Bloque Social due to its lack 
of substantive changes and the way it was finally generated.  
In relation to substantive aspects, it was criticised that it would not prevent schools 
from being profit-oriented and that it failed to provide a greater state role regarding 
the supply of public education (Burton, 2012). Even though some members of the 
Bloque Social recognise there are some improvements, the general position is a very 
critical one. It is stated that the law does not change an educational system where the 
main pillar is the existence of private educational providers, which made them argue 
that in several aspects the LGE is the same as the LOCE.  
"It is the same thing. There were no changes. It is exactly the same. I do not think there 
is a change. I think no one was satisfied with the results obtained in 2006." Vanessa, 
student leader in 2006. 
"The new law goes against the desire of the mobilisation. The feeling of the movement 
was to appeal for more state. The new law says the state cannot solve the problem, 
and that it is unconstitutional. Therefore, the only solution in terms of Chilean policies 
is market to everyone. There are no social rights in Chilean policies. There are subsidies 
to the demand." Juan Herrera, secondary student member of the commission in 
2006. 
Students were very critical as they would have liked for the new law to establish an 
educational system that prioritised above all the existence of high-quality public 
education without the presence of private providers that are able to profit with public 
funds. In this sense, some of them also establish a critique to Chile’s neoliberal socio-
economic model, as it is believed education is just one expression of a model where 
the supply of public services is dominated by market principles. In this sense, it is 
observed that students and other important members of civil society did not feel 
represented by final policy outcomes. In Pitkin’s terms (1967), it can be stated that the 
LGE did not substantively represent students since in a context where they were 
clearly capable of action and judgment they objected to what was done in their names.  
Beyond substantial criticisms, the evidence also suggests that the way the law was 
finally discussed was highly rejected by students and several social sectors. It is argued 
that it was very negative to observe that the emergence of a huge movement where 
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several youths showed they were not apathetic finished in an agreement between 
classic political players that excluded other relevant social actors.  
"The way the law was passed was perhaps the most relevant thing regarding the 
rejection of the LGE. When you see that a great movement comes down with a 
negotiated agreement between the Concertación and the Right within four walls 
shaking hands. It was tremendous. That generated a very powerful rejection towards 
the political class. They see that their idea of democracy does not work. Civil society 
could say something but everything was cooked elsewhere." Pablo Orellana, 
participant of the commission in 2006, member of the PC. 
The main frustration was to realise that the conflict was finally solved through a 
traditional way of doing politics where homogeneous political elites discuss between 
them without taking into account the positions of broader social sectors. This situation 
is associated with the generation of feelings of political disaffection as students 
empirically experienced how democratic ideals of substantive representation and 
inclusive participation are not applied to Chilean politics. It is perceived that despite 
civil-society members are capable of generating proposals everything is ultimately 
decided by the same dominant actors.  
To this effect, the evidence about the way decisions were finally taken also 
indicates that the manner this conflict was approached illustrates Chile’s classic way of 
doing politics based on agreements between homogeneous elites (Ruiz, 1991). It could 
be argued, therefore, that the LGE represented one of the most recent expressions of 
Chile’s ‘Democracy by agreement’. Moreover, the fact that students rejected this way 
of acting by claiming more inclusive and participative ways of decision-making 
indicates also which political forms can attract disaffected youths.   
 6.5 The limitations of the movement and the engenderment of political 
disaffection  
As it was already observed, the final outcomes from negotiation processes 
generated feelings of political disaffection among students for the resulting policy 
changes, as well as for the mechanisms used to solve the conflict. This link, however, 
can be much more deeply analysed through the proper perceptions of students 
regarding several situations that limited their success.  
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The lack of elite-mass congruence  
Without doubt the main limitation the movement had regarding the consecution of 
deeper changes was that the vision of the Chilean political class concerning education 
was very different to that of the movement. Students opposed an educational system 
based on market principles, while the majority of Chilean politicians supported the 
current system. In this context, what students perceived to be the most negative issue 
is that a relevant portion of a centre-left coalition supported a system based on right-
wing principles. They believe that behind their defeat there is a problem of political 
representation, in the sense that what authorities think does not agree with the beliefs 
of relevant sectors of Chilean population. 
"Students can continue to be unhappy because their proposals were never accepted 
by authorities as they had no place in the political spectrum. The movement could not 
get representation in the discussion with parliamentarians. This lack of 
representativeness causes political apathy. Even though they have ideas they cannot 
lead them to the public table. The movement demonstrates significant problems of 
political representation. It shows serious deficiencies that democracy has that have not 
been corrected." Isaac Stevens, student member of the commission in 2006.  
Problems of representativeness are connected to the engenderment of feelings of 
political disaffection since students reject the notion that, despite having relevant 
ideas, they could not be accurately expressed because they do not coincide with 
politicians’ positions. It is believed that their positions should be represented in the 
political spectrum, as the role of politicians is to truly express what society thinks. In 
this sense, it is observed that students conceive representatives as delegates bound by 
common people mandates, but finally observe that Chilean representatives are 
principally trustees who act freely regarding people’s representation (Pitkin, 1967). It is 
this discrepancy what generates their rejection. Thus, it can be argued that the 
secondary movement showed, through a specific case, Chile’s problems of political 
representation that were previously found to be associated with feelings of political 
disaffection. 
The representation of other interests 
A second issue that limited the success of the movement, according to student’s 
perceptions, was that members of the political class did not represent the movement’s 
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interests in order to represent other personal interests. What students and members 
of the Bloque Social state is that this lack of elite-mass congruence is given by the fact 
that politicians defended their own interests many times. Among these privileged 
interests it is possible to distinguish between the representation of economic and 
power–related interests. 102 
On the first issue, it is observed that students feel that several politicians did not 
have the will to change the current system since they had economic interests that they 
would lose to substantive changes. It is argued that as several politicians were owners 
of private state-subsidised schools, they did not have the will to change a system that 
was economically benefiting them.  
"The Concertación is supposed to be against market education systems. There are 
always personal interests when they make a decision like that one. We knew that 
many people who were voting for the law had schools. Both the Concertación and the 
right. It was a personal interest of theirs. I think that is the most influential thing." 
Vanessa, student leader in 2006. 
"The economic interests of both the right and the Concertación are very close. 
Personal Interests. Interest in the universities. Interests in the schooling system with 
subsidised private schools. Interest in the Catholic Church. Therefore, the chance of 
generating a situation that means to effectively start in a different way with a different 
development model once again was frustrated." Jorge Pavéz, former president of the 
teachers’ union, member of the commission in 2006. 
Students argue that they knew members of both coalitions owned private state-
subsidised schools. Therefore, they perceive that relevant criterions to decide how to 
change the education system were politicians’ proper interests, which made them 
reject the actions of the political class. For example, it was perceived that right-wing 
politicians and members of the PDC would not accept that schools linked to the 
Catholic Church were not able to select students and to profit, as that would have 
significantly affected their personal interests. 
A second type of interest students perceived to be prioritised to the detriment of 
their demands, which is specifically linked to the Concertación, is about power issues. 
                                                          
102
 It is not possible to really know the reasons behind politicians’ decisions. However, just the fact that students 
believe that makes these opinions relevant. As it was previously stated, this thesis works under the assumption that 
it does not matter whether some perceptions are correct or not since incorrect perceptions do have concrete 
consequences. In this case, it does not matter if students are right or not about arguing that politicians decided 
based on their personal interests since whether that was true or not these perceptions generates disaffection in any 
case.  
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It is believed that the governing coalition of that time could have tried to push for 
more changes in favour of students’ demands, but that they did not do so to defend 
their own political interests. What students argue is that the Concertación should have 
taken advantage of the movement as that could have allowed the promotion of 
educational changes of the kind the coalition was supposed to be interested in. 
Students feel the Concertación did not support the movement as it was perceived as a 
threat to their capacity to govern and to the stability of the political system itself.  
"The Concertación got scared at the beginning. And they began to lower the level of 
support for the movement. The government was starting and Bachelet’s capacity to 
govern was still being doubted. Therefore, they had to somehow try to protect at all 
costs what the government was doing. Although there were areas of the Concertación 
that agreed with some students’ views, they could not adhere expressly to them 
because they first needed to improve the image of the government." Julio Isamit, 
spokesperson of the movement in 2006. 
"The government should not have waited for that commission. President Bachelet 
should have taken advantage of the social mobilisation and not created the council 
that dilated everything. That was absurd. And that is a mistake of the government that 
is being paid for until today." Cesar Valenzuela, spokesperson of the movement in 
2006, member of the PS. 
Students believe that it was because the Concertación tried to rapidly solve the 
conflict in order to preserve political order that they avoided the generation of the 
level of conflict that support for the movement would have created. Moreover, it is 
argued that this moderate and conflict-avoiding performance was even more 
necessary, as there was a new government that needed to demonstrate its capacity to 
generate governance. In this sense, it is perceived that this kind of performance 
severely limited the success of students’ demands, which made students reject the 
actions of the political class. 
Students rejected, therefore, that both economic and power interests of the 
political class were prioritised since that limited the consecution of more substantial 
changes. This situation also empirically exemplifies previous findings about elements 
that would be generating disaffection, as it was formerly observed that one relevant 
perception of young people associated with feelings of political disaffection is the idea 
that politicians often opt to represent their own interests instead of those of the 
citizenry. In this sense, it can be observed that the resolution of the ‘pingüino 
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movement’ shows the existence of this particular attribute of Chilean politics and how 
students reject it. 
The demobilisation of the movement  
The last issue to be described regarding the limitations of the movement that 
generated political disaffection is the fact that students perceived that the movement 
was demobilised by the Chilean political class. This process is related to the fact that 
politicians tried to solve the conflict rapidly to preserve political stability. What the 
supposed demobilisation process shows is that the lack of support for the movement 
was not only reflected in politicians’ moderate positions but also in their actions. In 
this sense, the political class was perceived to have demobilised the movement 
through their students’ militants.  
The relation between the movement and traditional parties was always a complex 
one. Problems started when the movement became stronger and members of 
traditional political parties realised that several leaders were militants of their parties. 
Some students perceive that in that moment some politicians, especially from the 
Concertación, tried to control the movement by influencing their militants through the 
realisation of private meetings where they were pressured to moderate their positions 
in the pursuit of a more stable political environment. Moreover, it is argued that these 
influences successfully weaken the movement as they generated several divisions 
among students.  
"The influence that parties began to make was seen when they realized they had 
leaders in the assembly. They started to influence in a super important and perhaps 
grotesque way. They began to invite them to have dinners. To invite them to senators’ 
flats to negotiate. To see if it was possible to put down the movement with the aim to 
weaken it because it was hurting the image of Bachelet’s government." Isaac Stevens, 
student member of the commission in 2006. 
"It is almost certain that Valenzuela’s decision to resign was a political decision from 
the PS, and particularly from Escalona. Escalona was the leader of the PS and therefore 
he was within a traditional structure where finding solutions of this nature are 
unfortunately quite common. And they are generally rejected by common people who 
see parties with great suspicion because they stopped supporting what militant 
students have rightfully assumed as a generalised demand to enter to moderate. They 
were in office and it was not possible to create an image of chaos in the first year of 
Bachelet’s government. Jorge Pavéz, former president of the teachers’ union, 
member of the commission in 2006. 
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The greatest example of the way the political class intended to demobilise the 
movement perceived by students was the resignation of Cesar Valenzuela, who was 
one of the main spokesperson of the movement. He was member of the PS and he 
resigned after Bachelet announced the creation of the educational commission. He 
argued that he was never pressured by the PS and that he took that decision because 
of health problems of his mother (Interview, Valenzuela, 2011). However, several 
students and other members of the Bloque Social distrust his version as they perceive 
that his decision was strongly influenced by the leadership of the PS that forced him to 
resign in order to demobilise the movement to strength Bachelet’s capacity to govern. 
Moreover, it is also argued that the fact that currently Valenzuela is the president of 
the youth division of the PS, and is very close to Escalona, generates more doubts 
regarding his version of events.  
The evidence suggests therefore that students perceived that the movement was 
limited as the political class tried to weaken it in order to pursue their own political 
interests. This situation was highly rejected by students and it is a good example also 
of partyarchic practices of the internal functioning of Chilean parties that intend to 
reproduce politicians’ power positions that were previously found to be sources of 
political disaffection. These events clearly evidence one central element of a 
partyarchy according to Coppedge (1994) that is the co-option of social organisations. 
Moreover, this situation also brings evidence about the continuity of some classic 
practices of post-authoritarian Chilean politics that also generate disaffection. Since 
the return to democracy, Chile has been highlighted as having a demobilised civil 
society that is the basis of a stable political environment (P. Silva, 2004, Roberts, 1998). 
In this sense, the way the movement was faced by the political class demonstrates that 
this manner of acting is still a relevant element of Chilean politics precisely because 
parties tried to demobilise the movement in pursuit of political stability.  
 6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter’s main objective was to analyse the emergence and fall of the 2006 
‘pingüino movement’ in order to illustrate through a specific case study how the way 
of functioning of Chilean politics affects the relationship between youth and formal 
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politics. This movement generated an important political impact, as it resulted in 
several policy outcomes such as the generation of a new constitutional educational 
law, the establishment of a new educational supervisory structure and the increment 
of the requirements for schools administrators. Therefore, the analysis of these 
mobilisations brought a good opportunity to see how Chilean politics works. In this 
context, this chapter’s main finding was that, despite some initial variations, the 
manner in which students’ demands were absorbed finally accurately reflected the 
style of politics that Chilean democracy has developed since the transition in 1990. It is 
based on these evidences that the ‘Agreement for the Quality of Education’ was 
described as one of the latest expressions of Chile’s ‘Democracy by agreement’.  
The way the Chilean political system faced this social conflict illustrated several 
elements of a way of doing politics that were previously observed to be relevant 
sources of youth political disaffection, which came to reconfirm several hypotheses 
initially developed about this phenomenon. Starting from more general issues, it 
exemplified the perception that there is currently an important disconnection between 
the political class and the citizenry. This was expressed by the fact that during 
negotiations the main opposition was the one between civil society representatives 
and the political class. While social figures demanded the substantive representation 
of their demands through the participation of broad sectors of society, the majority of 
the political class advocated a technocratic style of doing politics, despite having 
initially incorporated civil society. As it is expressed in the following quote, this way of 
solving conflicts has been an historical element of Chilean politics, and it was applied 
once more in the case of the ‘pingüino movement’.  
"These commissions are very typical of Chilean democracy. That has to do with the 
way the transition was made that generates a group of political elites or experts that 
somehow supplant the citizenry. That is may be one element that has generated the 
crisis of parties and youth disaffection. With the 2006 movement it is again an issue of 
lords. There are parties that all they do is to negotiate these representatives that do 
not represent much. This would be expressing a limitation of democracy." Juan Garcia-
Huidobro, president of the commission in 2006, former educational adviser of the 
Concertación.  
As has been thoroughly discussed, one of the main aspects of Chile’s post-
authoritarian democracy to have decreased common people’s political support is that 
politics is mostly based on elite’s agreements that follow a technocratic style of policy-
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making with very limited citizen input (Rindfjall, 2007,Camargo, 2007). This is a style of 
politics that has been used, for example, to make decisions about highly criticised 
projects as Santiago’s new transportation system (Transantiago) and the development 
of hydro-electric power plants in the south of Chile (Hydroaysén) (Navia, 2009, Mira, 
2011). To this effect, the evidence suggests that this type of politics was also 
reproduced by the way students’ demands were channelled, which therefore 
increased even more levels of hostility towards the political system.  
The handling of this conflict also reflected several other specific elements of 
Chilean politics related to problems of representation, efficacy and the functioning of 
political parties that were previously found to be associated with the engenderment of 
political disaffection. Students vociferously claimed their demands were not taken into 
account since parliamentarian parties have homogeneous and moderate positions that 
did not represent them. Moreover, according to students’ perceptions it also 
negatively evaluated the fact that their demands were not represented, as the 
economic and political interests of the political class were given priority. Finally, they 
also disapproved that the political class tried to demobilise the movement in the 
pursuit of a more stable political environment. In this sense, it can be argued that the 
analysis of this case study could effectively reaffirm and deepen previous findings 
about sources of political disaffection.  
Another important issue to be highlighted is that the canalisation of students’ 
demands followed Chile’s classic style of doing politics although there were some 
differences compared with the resolution of other problems. Because Bachelet’s 
citizens’ government speech and the fact that the educational commission 
incorporated members of civil society, several people thought a different way of doing 
politics was emerging. Nevertheless, the evidence suggested that this was not the 
case. Despite an initial opening of the political opportunity structure, the way the 
conflict was solved and its final outcomes can be argued to be a new expression of 
‘politics as usual’ within the Chilean context. These facts then reproduced, and 
probably even increased, current high levels of disaffection as youths could observe 
that despite some promises of changes nothing truly happened.  
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Another important thing to be argued is that the analysis of this movement also 
brought important evidence to indicate that Chilean youth are not apathetic and that 
other political forms would attract them. The movement deeply showed Chilean public 
opinion that youths are very interested in the fate of society as they wanted to 
improve the education of the whole Chilean population. Moreover, it also 
demonstrated that they are just rejecting the current way Chilean politics is being 
executed. Students were captivated by Bachelet’s citizen government speech and they 
developed a very democratic and participative internal organisation whose main 
attribute was to understand representatives mostly as delegates. These situations, in 
conjunction with several students’ criticisms of the way the conflict was solved, 
strongly suggest that if Chilean politics developed more inclusive mechanisms of 
participation that finally lead the political class to substantively represent citizens, 
current high levels of political disaffection would be significantly reduced.  
One last issue to be developed, which is related to the fact that this movement 
demonstrated that Chilean youths are not apathetic, is the fact that this movement 
also showed that the Chilean population seems to be currently looking for new forms 
of political representation. Chile has been historically highlighted as a party democracy 
with political parties being Chile’s only form of political representation (Panizza, 2009). 
In this sense, although party members initially played an important role regarding the 
movement development, the evidence deeply suggested that Chilean citizens are 
starting to look for new mechanisms of representation as they perceive that traditional 
parties are not currently effectively representing them. To this effect, the ‘pingüino 
movement’ can be cited to express Jácome’s (2011) statement that social protests 
emerge when closed political agendas with little flexibility make institutions lose their 
capacity to respond to different social sectors’ demands.  
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Chapter 7: The 2011-2012 student movement; the mobilisation of 
politically disaffected youths? 
 7.1 Introduction  
Sebastian Piñera’s second year in office had not started as calmly as he would have 
expected. Several protests against the increase of gas prices in Magallanes, and 
massive marches against the installation of thermoelectric plants in Patagonia, marked 
the first months of 2011. However, these demonstrations were to be the beginning of 
a more politically active year. This is because the most massive social movement of 
recent Chilean political history emerged in early May 2011. Composed of both 
secondary and university students, this movement was able to shock Chile's political 
scenario by demanding an educational system that prioritises the role of the state 
rather than that of private providers. Likewise, it also politically positioned itself more 
widely than previous movements as it demanded political and economic reforms as 
well. Moreover, students were extremely critical of the Chilean political class as they 
blamed it for the current state of affairs. In this sense, it has been argued that these 
mobilisations represented the politicisation of former passive feelings of unrest (Mayol 
and Azocar, 2011). As Mayol argues, "the student movement and all movements that 
have arisen afterwards gave back Chile the opportunity to do politics" (2012b: 15).  
The empirical evidence of previous chapters suggested Chilean youths are highly 
disaffected because of a notable sense of disconnection with the political system. 
What is intended to be shown in this final chapter is that Chilean youths have become 
more expressive of their feelings of political disaffection. This chapter aims, therefore, 
to analyse the emergence and development of this movement and its political and 
social implications. Moreover, the main characteristics of a supposed new way of doing 
politics that would be emerging among young people are also discussed. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first describes Chile's higher 
education system and the situation of current students. The second analyses the 
emergence of the movement with regard to its political opportunity structure, framing 
processes and mobilising structures. The third examines how disaffected youths are 
becoming more active and the main implications of that situation. Finally, the last 
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section analyses the emerging way of doing politics that young people would be 
expressing through this movement.  
 7.2 The Chilean higher education system (1980-2012) 
This section describes the origins and development of Chile's current higher 
education system. Even though this movement was also composed by secondary 
students, this section only discusses the university system because the main pillars of 
the schooling system were already described in the previous chapter.  
The foundations of the system  
The origins of the present Chilean university system lie in the reforms introduced 
in the 1980s by Pinochet's government. Until 1980 there were only eight universities. 
Two of them were state-owned with 65% of total enrolment, and the rest were 
nominally private but with almost all their funding provided by the public sector 
(OECD, 2009). In 1981 significant reforms were applied to this system. The educational 
offer was liberalised to incorporate new private providers and regional campuses at 
public universities were transformed into local universities. Moreover, universities 
established prior to the reforms (named as traditional universities) continued to 
receive direct support from the state. This was, however, proportionally lower than in 
previous decades, which made public education no longer free (Beyer, 2000).  
According to Brunner (1997), these reforms generated a predominantly market-
oriented system. They permitted the creation of new self-financed private universities, 
professional institutes (IP) and technical training centres (CFT) with minimal 
requirements for their establishment. Moreover, they also forced the traditional 
system to adopt a more entrepreneurial attitude. Thus, the adoption of a market 
model was in accordance with the overall free market pro-privatisation ideology of the 
military government (Ibid.). 
One of the most important changes introduced by this system is that it almost 
transferred the entire cost of studying from the state to students (OECD, 2009). The 
government only introduced a set of competition-enhancing mechanisms to allocate 
fiscal resources, with a limited amount of public funding to be regularly transferred to 
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traditional universities. Moreover, for low-income students of state supported 
universities a loan programme was established. In relation to new private providers, 
they were not initially allowed to obtain state support (Brunner, 1997).   
After the return to democracy, the system did not significantly change. Private 
provision continued to grow, albeit at a lower rate, as there were more regulations for 
the establishment of private providers (OECD, 2009). Moreover, in 2006 a system to 
evaluate universities to accredit them was created. The same year another important 
reform was the implementation of a new university loan system called ‘the loan with 
state’s guarantee’ (CAE). This system allowed students from both traditional and new 
private accredited universities to receive loans from banks with the state as their 
guarantee (Ibid.). 
The situation of current Chilean students  
Based on the reforms just described, Chilean youths are currently experiencing 
three main phenomena: a) the existence of greater opportunities to become university 
students, b) high levels of debts, and c) the delivery of a low-quality education for 
some students.  
Concerning the first issue, the most noteworthy result of these reforms has been 
the significant increase in the number of Chilean students in higher education. In 1990 
there were 245,000 undergraduate students, while by 2007 there were more than 
678,000. This has meant the percentage of coverage for the 18-24 age group increased 
from 16% in 1992 to 34% in 2006 (OECD, 2009). This increment occurred principally 
among private universities, as their students multiplied by more than ten. To this 
effect, it is claimed that Chilean higher education changed from being an elite system 
to becoming a mass one (Ibid.).  
The flip side of the coin has been the transferring of educational costs from the 
state to families. Currently, families have to pay 83.7% of higher educational costs, 
which makes Chile the Latin American country with the highest percentage of private 
spending in higher education as a percentage of the GDP (Ibid.). This situation is also 
applicable to public universities. Chile is the only country in Latin America with high 
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public university fees and one of the few nations in the world where students pay 
more than USD 1000 a year in these institutions. Additionally, the few grants given 
depend on students’ scores on the university selection test and they only cover 63% to 
70% of fee costs, which forces students to obtain loans either from the state or private 
institutions (Ibid.).  
Due to the above, with this system Chilean families have experienced very high 
levels of debts as their incomes are not normally enough to pay for education costs. 
According to Mayol (2012b), 22% of family income is on average spent on education by 
Chilean families, which is the highest percentage among OECD countries. On average, 
each Chilean student obtains a degree with a debt of US$ 40,000. Moreover, 40% of 
students do not finally obtain the degree (CIPER, 2012a). One of the main problems is 
that university loans such as the CAE have had high interest rates. This problem has 
also affected middle class families that are unable to obtain neither public loans nor 
funding from the CAE. They have to resort to alternative loans such as the CORFO 
(Corporation of production promotion) loan system that charges up to 9% of annual 
interest rates and that, for example, can transform an original debt of US$ 22,200 into 
a debt of US$ 55,500 (Ibid.).  
Debts problems have become more dramatic in recent years, as many students 
who received the CAE implemented in 2006 are starting to finish their studies. 
According to Rojas (2012), about 300,000 university students (a third of total students) 
are currently in debt to private banks because of the CAE. Many of them are not able 
to pay, either because of their low income, unemployment or desertion. One of the 
main student criticisms has been precisely directed towards this system as it generates 
huge levels of debts that have only benefited the financial banking system. The CAE is 
based on a system where people receive loans from banks with higher interest rates 
than public loans (6% against 2%) and the state is the endorsement. Moreover, banks 
are able to sell the treasury a percentage of the credits with an extra charge based on 
their estimations of students’ payment capacities (CIPER, 2012b). This system has 
generated high costs for the state, as in the last five years it had to pay 2091 US$ 
million dollars because of desertion and interest differences from CAE loans (Rojas, 
2012). Additionally, it has brought benefits to private banks, as in the same period they 
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obtained profits of 313 US$ millions dollars after selling low capacity students’ loans to 
the state (CIPER, 2012b).  
Alongside these debt problems, another negative phenomenon Chilean youths 
experience is that, as there are few regulations to establish universities, there are 
several low-quality private institutions that do not contribute to the country's 
development. The liberalisation of Chile's higher education system heavily increased 
the number of universities and students. However, it is believed that this growth has 
been inorganic, as education has not been conceived on the basis of the needs of 
national development because new universities mainly offer degrees following market 
criteria and not Chile's priority areas (Sanhueza, 2011). As Mayol states: "Chile does 
not have today an educational project but there is something very different: it has 
been built an education industry. As such, that industry has looked for the expansion 
of the educational market and it has proceed in accordance with anyone that plays 
with prices in a market goods" (2012b: 55).  
One of the main criticisms regarding the expansion of the education market is that 
low quality is partly explained by the fact that higher education institution owners 
have been able to obtain economic benefits from educational services. In Chile CFTs 
and IPs can be profit-oriented, while universities are not legally authorised to profit. 
This has not meant, however, that universities have not obtained profits. In fact, a 
recent report from a special commission of the Chilean deputy chamber concluded 
that seven universities do not accomplish the legal requirement of being not-for-profit 
educational corporations (La Tercera, 2012b). In relation to this topic, Mayol argues 
that it is difficult to believe some institutions do not profit as in recent years an 
American company bought two Chilean universities for 26 and 37 US$ million 
respectively (2012b).  
Rojas (2012) argues that it is because this system delivers good-quality education 
for some and low-quality education for many others that high inequality levels are 
finally reproduced. This is because students from poor families go to municipal schools 
and their only chance to study is to go to one of the private universities of doubtful 
quality that make businesses and profit with their debts. One of the main recent 
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examples of a low-quality university is the Universidad del Mar, which has more than 
15,000 students and campuses in 15 cities. This institution was heavily questioned 
after its dean resigned in May 2012, arguing it was a priority for the university to pay 
the rent over workers’ salaries and pension contributions (Mayol, 2012b). After a 
couple of months of investigation, the National Educational Council decided to cancel 
the university’s legal status as it abandoned its university project, and because of 
problems with the management of certain degrees and irregularities regarding the 
election of the executive board (EMOL, 2012).  
In summary, in recent years Chilean youths have experienced better opportunities 
to access higher education. Nevertheless, they have also felt that these opportunities 
are not as good as expected since many have high debts and degrees from low-quality 
universities, which has generated several grievances among them. To this effect, what 
the evidence suggests seems to be in accordance with the statement that Latin 
America's crisis of representation are partly explained by the limitations of 
conservative modernisation projects that generate greater expectations that are 
unable to be accomplished (Filgueira et al., 2011). One of the main examples of this 
situation is education. Although these projects have brought improved education 
access, that has not meant improved occupational opportunities or a more evenly 
distributed education quality (Ibid.). This is precisely what seems to be happening in 
Chile, as it is argued that students have realised Chile's central social integration 
promise is not truly being an effective means for upward mobility (Mayol, 2012a).  
 7.3 The emergence of the student movement   
7.3.1 The Political Opportunity Structure (POS) of the Movement   
The right-wing coalition in power  
To understand the emergence of the student movement, it is first necessary to 
understand the POS in which it developed itself. In respect to that, the main change of 
the Chilean political environment that could have encouraged youths to use collective 
action was having a new coalition in power. Since 1990 Chile was governed by a 
centre-left coalition. This situation changed in 2010 as a right-wing coalition lead by 
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Sebastian Piñera took office. Tarrow (1994) argues that one dimension that can 
encourage collective action is a shift in ruling alignments because that creates 
uncertainty and encourages challengers to exercise power that induce elites to 
compete for support outside the polity. In this sense, it is necessary to analyse this link.  
When the evidence is analysed it can be observed that having a right-wing 
government did have an impact on the emergence of the movement. However, it was 
not in the sense of Tarrow’s statement. This is because students rejected the whole 
Chilean political class, arguing that both coalitions were very similar in terms of their 
political offer. Therefore, it was not the case that students were encouraged to use 
collective action as a result of having elites competing for support.  
"We do not make the difference between the Concertación and the Alianza. We were 
governed by the Concertación for twenty years. Piñera now has four years at most.  
And he will not solve everything. I mean, we make criticisms of the whole political 
class, 100%" Daniela Isla, secondary leader of the CONES during 2011. 
"The right-wing in power activated many more people who had not previously raised 
their voices in order to support certain sectors of the left. This year they raised their 
voices more loudly. Therefore, the catalyst that was that the right-wing government 
had won provoked a lot of support for the student movement." Rodrigo Rivera, 
secondary leader of the CONES during 2011.    
Some youths believe having a right-wing government had an impact. However, it 
was not because the movement found more support among political elites, but 
because people who previously prevented themselves from participating in public 
demonstrations because of feelings of political loyalty were now free to openly express 
their discontent. It is stated that some students became more politically active when 
Piñera took office, as they had previously avoided participating in social movements 
when the Concertación was in power, since they had sympathy for this coalition.  
Another aspect of the POS to be analysed has to do with the availability of new 
influential allies who can act as acceptable negotiators (Tarrow, 1994). The fact that 
the Alianza was governing and the Concertación was the opposition seemed to have 
determined the fate of the movement as the Concertación tried to act as an ally of the 
movement. Nevertheless, students believe the main effect of this coalition's support 
was not about directly facilitating negotiations. They argue that the new role of the 
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Concertación contributed to the development of the movement since by not being in 
power they had neither the will nor the capacity to demobilise the movement.  
"Concertación governments always sought the co-optation of social movements. Now, 
there was a whole political sector from the Concertación that was useful for the 
conflict. The state administration's political spheres did not have the ability to 
generate consensus or to co-opt leaders of the mobilisation. The majority of leaders 
did not belong to political groups determined by parties too." Reacaredo Galvez, 
university leader of the UDEC during 2011. 
"The action of the Concertación was opportunism. There were twenty years in which 
they privatised a lot the education system. The Concertación had more of a leading 
role at the end of mobilisations. But that happened in an opportunistic way. Nataly 
Espinoza, university leader of the PUC of Valparaiso during 2011.  
As it was also observed in the previous chapter, students perceived that one of the 
reasons for the failure of previous movements was that the Concertación had the 
capacity to demobilise them in order to obtain political stability. In this case the 
Concertación did not do that and the Alianza did not have the capacity do to it, which 
facilitated having an opener and stronger movement. This situation did not mean, 
however, that students felt close to the Concertación. The evidence indicates that they 
believe they could take advantage of this situation but that the Concertación was still 
to be rejected as they did not have the will to make more substantial reforms in 
previous governments. In this sense, they interpreted their actions only as a sign of 
opportunism.  
Police repression  
Another relevant element of Chile's POS that had an impact on the level of use of 
collective action among youths is the high levels of policy repression that the 
movement experienced. Della Porta (1996) states that protest-policing is an important 
barometer of the political opportunities available for episodes of collective action. She 
argues the level of repression can either favour or obstruct the development of social 
movements depending on the popular support for both elites and challengers (Ibid.). 
Regarding the Chilean case, the evidence suggests that based on the high popularity of 
students’ demands, high repression levels contributed to the development of the 
movement by fuelling youths’ grievances.  
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Repression was mainly executed during this movement through mechanisms to 
disperse protesters through the evacuation of occupied schools and universities. This 
fact has been highlighted by several reports that argue that during social 
manifestations the attitude of the police has been very repressive. The 2011 UDP 
Human Rights Report argues that when facing social movements the state has 
"justified and supported the disproportionate use of force by policemen as well as the 
indiscriminate use of dissuasion techniques" (UDP, 2011b: 80). Moreover, this report 
also questions several control practices such as people's illegal detention and the 
introduction of infiltrated polices within protest activities (Ibid.). Reports also criticise 
the fact that the government presented a new law to toughen penalties and give more 
power to the police since it is considered that this measure limits people's rights to 
express their opinions (UDP, 2012b).  
Students themselves have criticised these actions as a public declaration of the 
main organisation of university students states that: "We express too our deep worry 
about a government that has turned a deaf ear to our demands, responding every time 
with more repression, both physic and through the media" (CONFECH, 2011). The most 
relevant expression of students’ rejection occurred on 4 August of 2011. That day 
students organised two demonstrations in Santiago, which the government did not 
authorise. The result was that people who showed up were brutally repressed and 
many people were detained. After these events Camila Vallejos (one of the main 
leaders of the movement) called for a ‘cacerolazo’103 via Twitter, to be held at 9pm 
that day to express people's rejection to these repressive measures (Mayol, 2012b). 
The response was massive, as thousands of people from several cities used their pots 
and pans that day to complain about these repressive actions and demand better 
education (Pulgar, 2011). These events demonstrate, then, that repressive actions 
encouraged the use of collective action among Chilean people. Using Della Porta's 
argument (1996), this situation can be explained by the fact that when repression 
occurred elites were very unpopular, while challengers had a lot of support.  
 
                                                          
103
 A ‘cacerolazo’ is a disruptive repertoire where people bang pots, pans and other utensils to call for attention.  
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The effects of the 2006 experience  
One last aspect of the POS to be analysed is the influence of the 2006 experience. 
When leaders of the current movement are interviewed it is observed that the 2006 
‘pingüino movement’ had an important impact on the development of this new 
movement. In this sense, this experience can be analysed as a dimension of the 
Chilean political environment that encouraged the use of collective action, as most 
students experienced those mobilisations either by having directly participated in, or 
by studying those events. 
When the qualitative material is analysed, it is observed that 2011 students 
perceive the results of the 2006 movement as an expression of a rejected way of doing 
politics, and that the dissolution provoked by the results of that movement was an 
important factor that explains the strength of the 2011 movement. Students believe 
that on that occasion they were deceived by the political class as politicians made 
them believe their demands were supposed to be represented. However, eventually 
that did not happen, which generated feelings of disillusionment and powerlessness.  
"There was not an achievement in 2006, but rather they put the finger in the mouth 
making up a law for another. From that event came the need to require real changes. 
Therefore, it became necessary for each student to realise that we are able to change 
a country." Laura Ortiz, secondary student leader member of the ACES during 2011. 
"This movement is so explosive and permanent because previous events gave us a hint 
of disappointment and helplessness. We felt overlooked. The need for more direct 
participation is the product of 2006 because we felt decisions were made behind 
closed doors. We summed experience about how to stand against institutions. We 
learned not to trust in politicians who promise you everything." Laura Palma, 
university student leader of the Universidad de la Serena during 2011. 
The 2006 experience was also relevant as it demonstrated to youths that they 
were able to paralyse a country in order to demand substantive changes. Students 
believe that in 2006 students were too naïve as they believed that through the 
mechanisms offered by the political system they would be able to achieve their 
demands. Students argue that from these previous experiences they learned several 
lessons about how to deal with political authorities, and that the application of those 
lessons contributed to the strength of the movement.  
257 
 
As Camila Vallejos argues, if the political class had intended to find a similar way to 
solve the conflict like the one in 2006: "it will only help to intensify social mobilisations. 
Because they will no longer face a numb society. Today Chile has changed and this 
time it will not allow the future of our country to be agreed between four walls" 
(Vallejos, 2011). Students have therefore learned from past experiences, which made 
reject Chile's classic way of doing politics. Among these lessons, the primary one was 
not to blindly trust the political class any further, but to demand direct participation. 
Moreover, it was also learned how to deal with attempts to demobilise the movement. 
Students argue that the capacity of avoiding co-option based on the 2006 experience is 
responsible for such high levels of support, which is expressed by the fact that new 
leaders were not principally members of traditional political parties, as in during 
2006.104 
7.3.2 The framing processes of the movement  
The second issue to be examined in relation to the emergence of the movement is 
its framing processes, that is to say, the "collective processes of interpretation, 
attribution and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action" 
(McAdam, et al., 1996: 3). These processes are analysed by understanding the 
movement's demands in terms of how students interpreted their needs and those 
attributed as being responsible for the current situation.  
In terms of the demands, the movement argued that the current Chilean 
educational system was in crisis and that it needed to be changed in order to improve 
high levels of inequality. Students had a much clearer prognostic framing than previous 
movements since from the beginning of mobilisations an alternative set of solutions to 
the problem were proposed. They argued that there: "was an urgent need to restore 
education as a social and universal human right that must be guaranteed by the 
Chilean constitution, and that is structured according to a new national system of 
public, free, democratic and quality education organised and financed by the state at 
                                                          
104
 As noted in the last chapter, the main leaders of the Pinguino movement belonged to political parties from the 
whole Chilean spectrum. In 2011 only few leaders were part of the PC, but the majority of them were independent 
or part of non-traditional left-wing organisations. The evidence shows that this change can be attributed to some 
lessons learned from the 2006 movement.  
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all levels" (Mesa Social, 2011). Students interpreted, therefore, that current problems 
of Chilean education are explained by the lack of a good public educational system. 
Thus, they were against the market-oriented educational model instituted during the 
dictatorship. In fact, one of the main demonstration's slogans was "It will fall down. It 
will fall down. Pinochet’s education”.  
Concerning primary and secondary education, students wanted to finish the 
process of municipalisation and create a new national system of public education 
under the Ministry of Education. In this new system, funding was not to be defined by 
vouchers but all schools would receive a fixed contribution, which would finish with 
the shared-funding system where state-subsidised schools charge students. Moreover, 
they claimed that any type of profit-oriented activity had to be eliminated from 
schools that receive state funding (Ibid.).  
In relation to higher education, it was criticised for growing in an explosive and 
unregulated way. They disapprove its expansion was not the product of a national plan 
of development but the result of an inorganic growth that has delivered a 
heterogeneous quality that responds to market logics (Ibid.). To strengthen public 
education, it was proposed to substantively increase state support for traditional 
universities. Moreover, students called for new systems of scholarships and funding in 
order to finish unsustainable families’ debt levels. It was proposed that, in order to 
advance towards free education, a system of scholarships for students from the 70% of 
lower income families must be promoted. Additionally, it was suggested that there 
must be a loan-system for students from the 30% of richer families from non-for-profit 
universities, which would eliminate the CAE and the role of banks within the funding 
system. Students also stated that private universities aiming to receive state funding 
must be accredited, guarantee the principle of free association and expression, ensure 
and promote the existence of student unions, be transparent regarding the use of 
funding resources and have a total absence of profit (Ibid.).  
Students therefore advocated the strengthening of public education and a more 
rigorous control over private providers as they believed the educational system could 
not be principally market-oriented. Thus, it can be argued this was an anti-neoliberal 
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movement. These kinds of mobilisations have taken part in several parts of Latin 
America, which has been described as a regional wave of anti-neoliberal mass 
mobilisation (E.Silva, 2009). In this sense, the 2011-2012 Chilean student movement 
can be somehow understood as part of the same wave.  
Students argue they could obtain greater support from families by framing the 
problem through the argument that people have high levels of debts because there is 
a market-oriented system where education is traded like any other commodity, and 
where some people are illegally profiting from it. They state that, since students 
framed education problems in a simple way, families could feel identified with these 
problems since they are daily experiencing the incapacity of responding to market 
logics.     
"When we speak about free education, it is primarily something that reaches all 
families. We are seeking to establish that education should not be considered a 
commodity. We also achieved a lot of support among students’ families since these are 
cross-cutting demands. Because we criticise how debts happen and how mechanisms 
for financing education are generated." Reacaredo Galvez, university student leader 
of the UDEC during 2011. 
It is observed therefore, using Benford and Snow's (2000) terms, that one relevant 
diagnostic framing of the movement was to blame the excessive and sometimes 
abusive role of private education providers, and that this strategy could expand the 
movement's support.  In fact, it has been argued that one of the most interesting thing 
of these mobilization was to have broken with the corporative character of students 
struggles in order to claim for more universal demands with a transverse sense 
(Azócar, 2013).  
Blaming a market model was not, however, the main diagnostic framing of the 
movement. Through the analysis of the evidence it is observed, too, that students also 
argue that the responsible of current educational deficits is the presence of a non-
representative political system that has not had the will to change the current system 
in order to represent the citizenry. That is why they also argue that protests express 
both important criticisms towards a political and economic system and youths’ needs 
to participate in a different kind of system.  
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"The reason people have been mobilised is not that much to do with the issue of 
education. It has to do with the collapse of a political system in which education is 
included. With the collapse of a political system that is not representative. 
Mobilisations are a way of expressing the need to participate that young people have 
in a kind of politics that it is not this one." Alfredo Vielma, secondary student leader 
of the ACES during 2011. 
It is based on these beliefs that students were able to broaden their demands. To 
this effect, once the main educational demands described above were well-known by 
the Chilean population, students started to argue that education problems were just 
one expression of the current political and economic Chilean model. Based on that 
idea is that students’ prognostic framing also included the realisation of significant 
economic and political reforms. Concerning economic reforms, they advocated for a 
more universalistic role of the state, rather than a subsidiary one, to not only have 
better education but also improve public services concerning health, transportation, 
pensions and housing. To facilitate that, students proposed the realisation of a tax 
reform and the re-nationalisation of natural resources, principally copper deposits  
70% currently controlled by private companies. These proposals are based on the 
belief that the increment of the state’s role is the only effective way to reduce current 
high levels of social inequality (CONFECH, 2011). 
These economic criticisms were commonly framed in terms of the faults of a 
neoliberal socio-economic system. This system is understood as a model where the 
distribution of public services is based on market logics controlled by private providers, 
where everything is traded and can be bought by paying a price, which finally benefits 
only a small number of people. Students believe that this neoliberal system is 
responsible for the current negative situation as it is based on a system where 
education and other public services are understood only as commodities and not as 
social rights what finally reproduces current high levels of inequality. As a university 
student leader argues: "It is not just the problem of education. This movement 
questioned how wealth is distributed in Chile. The existence of a subsidiary state 
where companies are those that command the country. We proposed plenty 
alternatives to financing things through the re-nationalisation of natural resources and 
a tax reform. All that has to go with a reform of the political system, since today the 
majority cannot influence decision-making processes" (Interview, Espinoza, 2012).  
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The evidence reaffirms, therefore, the previous statement that this movement can 
be understood as part of a regional wave of anti-neoliberal mobilisations. Several 
other authors have also highlighted this issue. Pulgar (2012) states that the 2011 
student movement is anti-neoliberal since it again discusses the role of the public 
sector regarding social rights and criticises the excessive role given to the market. 
Mayol (2012b) has a similar vision as he argues that students challenged the fact that 
the most important thing of several fields, such as education, pensions and transport, 
is the creation of markets that ultimately only benefit powerful people who gain 
economic profits from them.  
With respect to political reforms, students criticised that political decisions are 
currently only a mandate of a minority in Chile, which led them to demand several 
reforms such as the requirement of a more representative electoral system, effective 
mechanisms of citizen participation and the establishment of a new constitution. 
Students argue that they became conscious about the importance of these types of 
reforms principally as a lesson of the 2006 movement as they feel students were 
strongly limited by the way political institutions worked at that time. In this sense, the 
evidence suggests that students realised the lack of substantive representation is also 
explained by a particular political model.  
7.3.3 The mobilising structures of the movement  
The last issue to be discussed concerning the emergence of the movement is the 
mobilising structures it used. This intends to understand how the mechanisms students 
used to engage in collective action contributed to the fate of the movement (McAdam 
et al., 1996). This is done by analysing student organisations and the tactics used to 
obtain support to achieve their demands.  
As it was already stated, this movement was formed by both secondary and 
university students. In order to represent the interests of these students, there were 
several organisations. Concerning secondary students, there were two main 
organisations: the CONES and the ACES. The main ideological difference was that to be 
part of the ACES you were not allowed to be part of traditional political parties, which 
was established to avoid instances like the one in 2006 where parties demobilised the 
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movement (Interview, Ortiz, 2012). Beyond these differences, however, the demands 
of both organisations were very similar, which made them soon after mobilisations 
began to join forces (Interview, Rivera, 2012). 
University students, on the other hand, were organised through the CONFECH. 
This organisation is formed by representatives of student’s unions from the 25 
traditional universities across the country. Even though students of non-traditional 
private universities also supported some students’ demands, the CONFECH led all 
negotiations and activities. The CONFECH worked in conjunction with both ACES and 
CONES when they presented proposals and organised activities. The association of 
these three organisations and other groups of workers, teachers and parent 
organisations was called the "Mesa Social por la Educacion" (Colegio de Profesores, 
2011). Each organisation was independent and had democratic mechanisms of 
decision-making where every student had the capacity to give their opinion. In this 
context, student representatives had to respect every decision made during the 
assemblies (Interview, Espinoza, 2012).   
Students’ democratic organisation indicates that through this movement students 
also demonstrated that they understand representatives mainly as delegates rather 
than as trustees (Pitkin, 1967). Moreover, it also shows that they were aware of 
Plotke's (1997) statement that only when political aims are subject to dialogue 
between representatives and the represented do people truly gain political 
representation, which shows that students’ forms of organisation had a relevant role. 
In fact, several authors have highlighted the importance of the way the movement 
organised itself. Pulgar (2011) argues that one of the most relevant elements of this 
movement was the learning of participative democracy. This is because through the 
democratic practices executed within schools and universities thousands of students 
were able to receive a very democratic political formation that could lead to a long-
term cultural change where citizens are much more committed regarding social 
wellbeing. Segovia and Gamboa (2012) also highlight the movement's organisation as 
they state that during 2011 students showed a better capacity of collective action and 
good leadership, which heavily contributed to increasing the support for the 
movement.  
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In terms of the movement's tactical repertories, the most emphatic actions were 
conventional forms, such as the occupation of schools and universities and public 
demonstrations (Tarrow, 1994). According to the organisers, the most massive 
demonstration was on 30 June 2011 where more than 200,000 people in Santiago and 
400,000 in the country participated (Cooperativa, 2011). However, the most relevant 
repertoires introduced by students were what was called ‘the new ways of 
mobilisation’. These were specific and innovative activities organised by the ‘Mesa 
Social’ to spread students’ demands, which can be understood as disruptive forms of 
mobilisation created by the movement to achieve their collective purposes (Tarrow, 
1994).  For example, on 24 June 2011 more than 4,000 students dressed as zombies 
danced to Michael Jackson’s song ‘Thriller’ in front of Chile’s government palace in 
order to symbolise the death of public education (El Mostrador, 2011). Other relevant 
activities were the 1,800 hours for the education, where hundreds of students ran 
without stopping around the government palace demanding free and public education, 
and the ‘besatón’, where thousands of students kissed their partners for 1,800 seconds 
in eleven cities in the country (La Nación, 2011a, La Nación, 2011b)105. 
When students are asked about the role of these new forms of mobilisations, they 
unanimously state they were very relevant in order to position their demands and to 
obtain more support, especially from older people. They argue that the movement was 
forced to develop these new tactical repertories since they were not able to obtain 
support through conventional ways of engaging. This is because massive 
demonstrations were always informed in the news, increasingly highlighting the 
disturbances made by a few people, rather than the massiveness of these actions. As 
Azócar (2013) argues, the relevance of these new ways of doings politics is given by the 
fact that they were very creative and imaginative, which permitted the captivation of 
normally distant mass media that were finally forced to show positive aspects of 
mobilizations.  
By conducting these activities students were able to show the rest of society that 
they were not vandals but conscious students whose main desire was to improve 
                                                          
105
In these activities the symbolic number was 1,800, as according to students the cost of financing education is 
1,800 US$ million.  
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education, which significantly increased societal support for their claims. Moreover, 
students also state that these new ways of mobilising were relevant to obtaining more 
support from students themselves, as some of them were afraid of participating 
through conventional forms as they were more dangerous because of police 
repression.  
"New forms of mobilisation were one of the greatest icons of these mobilisations. It 
was a very creative movement. These different forms, such as the ‘Thriller’ for 
education and the ‘besotón’ were entertaining forms with which families could feel 
more empathy than with a hoodie throwing stones. People said these guys are dancing 
for education. They are more committed." Rodrigo Rivera, secondary leader of the 
CONES during 2011. 
The evidence indicates therefore that these innovative activities were crucial for 
expanding the range of support for the movement, which was relevant to pressurising 
the political class as it showed that the whole of Chilean society was demanding better 
education. Thus, it can be argued that these new disruptive forms fulfilled their role of 
broadening the circle of conflict by expressing the movements’ determination, as 
Tarrow (1994) argues.  With respect to family support, students also argue that it was 
stronger during 2011 as families were more powerfully experiencing debt problems 
since their sons were starting to pay credits obtained through the CAE (Interview, 
Espinoza, 2012).  
One last element of the mobilising structures to be examined is the use of social 
networks to spread information about the movement. Students argue that the use of 
social networks such as Facebook and Twitter were extremely relevant to the success 
of the movement as they helped spread information and keep students informed. All 
public activities were principally announced through these social networks, which 
allowed students to increase the number of participants.  
"Many of our demonstrations were also promoted through alternative media like 
social networks. And they allowed us some massiveness. Mass media are highly co-
opted by the political class. So, sometimes it was only displayed what they wanted and 
not necessarily what the student movement wanted. That is when a lot of alternative 
media such as TV channels from different student unions emerged." Nataly Espinoza, 
university leader of the PUC of Valparaiso during 2011.  
Another important issue highlighted by students is that the use of social networks 
was even more relevant in the Chilean context. This is because they believe that in 
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Chile, all formal media such as television, newspapers and the radio are controlled by 
groups that are against students’ demands. In this context, social networks were a way 
to counteract the information students found to be inappropriate. That is why, for 
example, several student unions launched television channels to inform society about 
the activities of the movement to show they were not criminals and to generate 
debate in the community, which seems to have contributed to increasing the 
movement’s support. In this sense, it can be observed that in accordance with 
McCarthy and Zald's vision (1972), the 2011 student movement demonstrated the 
importance of the proper dynamics and tactics taken by participants to obtain more 
societal support and deal with several constraints they faced.  
 7.4 The expression of a crisis of representation through the political activation 
of disaffected youths  
After having analysed the evidence about factors explaining the emergence of the 
2011 movement, it is necessary to deepen the argument that this movement 
expressed the existence of a crisis of political representation within Chilean society. 
This section intends to do that by developing the idea that this movement represented 
the political activation of numerous previously passive disaffected youths and by 
analysing the implications of this situation 
The activation of the youths 
One way it can be tested whether the movement represented the activation of 
politically-disaffected youths is by observing if students’ political criticisms, and also 
their behaviours, match previous findings about current sources of political 
disaffection. Concerning this issue, it is observed that when students are asked about 
what they believe the movement showed regarding the relation between youths and 
politics, they state that it demonstrates that youths are highly politically disaffected. 
Moreover, the evidence also indicates that students’ main political criticisms coincide 
with the evidence of previous chapters.  
Students argue that the movement demonstrates a discontentment with the 
political system, and that current parties are rejected since youths do not feel 
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substantively represented by them as they have distanced from them. Additionally, 
they believe the movement also expressed a critique of the current elitist ways of 
decision-making, the fact that politicians prioritise the representation of their own 
interests and that there are not generational changes among politicians.  
"This movement has shown youth discontentment with the current institutional 
framework. Many youths have argued they no longer feel represented by these 
institutions. There is also a progressive distancing concerning representation through 
political parties. In fact, students have preferred to organise in other forms, such as 
independent organisations or groups." Reacaredo Galvez, university student leader of 
the UDEC during 2011. 
"The movement has shown that young people are tired of politics made between four 
walls that claim to represent citizens but that ultimately represent their own interests. 
It has also shown it is necessary to make a generational change to make politicians 
realise that the vast majority of young people are not interested in politics today 
because they are interested in real changes." Rodrigo Rivera, secondary student 
leader of the CONES during 2011.  
The evidence also indicates that students’ behaviours expressed their feelings of 
hostility towards the political system. For example, they rejected the presence of 
traditional party leaders during several marches and asked to be part of every 
commission or meeting relating to their demands. In fact, one of the most relevant 
slogans of demonstrations was: "the people united, advance without parties". 
Students also argue that the youths’ discontentment could be also observed in the 
type of organisations students joined to protest for their demands. This is because, 
even though there were several members of the PC among leaders, the majority of 
students preferred to organise themselves through independent organisations.  
Based on the fact that students’ criticisms exceeded negative evaluations of 
specific educational policies as they criticised the acting of the whole political system, 
it can be argued that they were expressing low levels of diffuse support rather than 
specific support (Easton, 1975). That is to say, students’ judgements express not only 
feelings of dissatisfaction with specific policies but enduring negative evaluations of 
what the Chilean political system represents, which would indicate that the 
mobilisation of several youths was indeed a more active expression of previously 
passive feelings of political disaffection.  
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Quantitative data also support the argument that the student movement 
represented the political activation of formerly passive disaffected youths. It is 
observed in the figure below that protests started in a period where both central 
political coalitions, as well as the Government and Piñera’s political approval, were 
very low. 
Figure 7.1 - Evolution of indicators of political approval among Chilean people (18+)
 
       Source: Adimark (2010-2011). 
As shown in Figure 7.1, since October 2010 there was a clear downtrend among 
these four indicators that intensified after the emergence of the movement in May 
2011. These levels of approval are very low, which implies that during the student 
conflict people were highly politically disaffected. Additionally, they also demonstrate 
that the conflict increased levels of hostility towards the political system. 
The relevance of these low-support values become even more critical when 
compared with the population support for the movement. It is observed in Figure 7.2 
that in every age group students’ demands were supported by more than 85%, which 
indicates a relevant difference regarding what was observed concerning political 
institutions’ support.  
Figure 7.2 - Students' demands support among Chilean people (18+) by age group
 
      Source: CERC (2011). 
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The qualitative material also brings relevant data to comprehend this apparent 
process of political activation since it is observed that students themselves are aware 
of this process. They believe the movement obtained a lot of support since youths 
became more conscious of both several injustices they were experiencing and the 
power organisation. Students argue that when they realised the importance of 
organising themselves to directly demand changes they were able to spread this 
feeling to the rest of society. They also state that this consciousness-raising is also 
explained by the fact that individuals feel more need to participate in a political system 
that excludes people. As a movement leader (Cristóbal Lagos) states: "Student 
mobilisation was the point where Chilean society woke up. There was a reinvigoration 
of discontent. It generated a new space to protest. Many people started to see it was 
necessary to organise to protest for what they believed to be fair" (The Argentinean 
Independent, 2011). In this sense, students highlight that one of the movement's main 
achievements was to have increased the population's levels of consciousness and 
promote a different educational and political-economic model.  
The process of consciousness's awareness that Chilean society seems to be 
currently experiencing has been also analysed by Chilean literature. Mayol (2012b) 
argues that in 2011 politics resuscitated in Chile as the student movement reclaimed 
the public space as its sphere of debate. According to Mayol (2012a), 2011 
represented the political processing of feelings of unrest that had previously been left 
aside and that could now be discussed. Rojas (2012) has a similar argument as he 
states that the movement generated consciousness of the neoliberal model's 
weaknesses and deficits of Chile's political transition. He adds that this process "is the 
product of an accumulation of unrest and social dissatisfaction, of the frustration 
provoked by a speech that promised personal success but that actually ended in 
deception, indebtedness and fraud (Ibid, 14). 
Mayol (2012a) argues that one way to evidence this activation in Chilean society is 
given by the fact that during 2011 complaints against market abuses increased in 
almost every aspect. For example, complaints against privately-administrated 
highways increased by 10% during 2011 and injunctions due to the rise of health plans 
from private insurers (ISAPRES) increased by 284% . This author claims that because 
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youths were on the streets criticising an educational model common people assumed 
those actions carried sense and that any citizen was able to change certain things. In 
this sense, it is argued that after the student movement Chilean citizenry woke up in 
order to advance towards having more participation as it had the capacity to rebuild 
Chilean politics (Mayol, 2012b).  
 It is observed, therefore, that the 2011-2012 student movement can be 
understood as an event where sentiments of unrest could be politically expressed. To 
this effect, the evidence indicates that the Chilean Student movement cannot be only 
attributed to the fact that revolutionary movements bring youths an idealistic 
rationale to break with several traditional structures and to the inherent character of 
this age group of being more transgressor (Lipset, 1966, 1968).  These conditions could 
perfectly have played a role in the case of this student movement. However, the 
evidence is quite clear about showing that their activation was an expression of deep 
discontent rather than just a manifestation of rebellion attitudes typical of youth.  
Another relevant finding derived from the evidence is that these political 
expressions were also able to spread to other sections of Chilean society. To this 
effect, what seems to currently be happening in Chilean society matches with 
Macpherson's statement (1976) about how to reach a more participatory democracy. 
He argues that in elitist democracies there is a vicious circle where low participation 
and social inequality come together. One way of breaking that circle to achieve a 
participatory democracy is to look for loopholes. A loophole takes place when some 
groups become more aware of the cost of political apathy, which encourages other 
groups to become more active. In this sense, it can be argued that the 2011-2012 
student movement is currently a loophole in Chilean democracy since it has 
encouraged people to demand more participation and substantive changes within a 
context of high levels of social inequality, which, according to Macpherson, would 
indicate the existence of favourable conditions to advance towards a more 
participatory democracy that could finally also reduce inequality.  
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The implications of youth activation  
After developing the idea that the emergence of the student movement implied 
the activation of important sectors of Chilean society, it is necessary to analyse the 
main implications of that. This is done by discussing what students believe about the 
movement's impact on the development of Chilean democracy, and by examining 
Chilean politicians’ and scholars’ interpretations of the consequences of current facts.  
Regarding students’ perceptions, the evidence indicates that they believe the 
movement expressed the crisis of a political model. Students state that by questioning 
several features of Chilean politics and proposing political reforms they evidenced that 
there is currently a crisis between formal politics and common citizens, which would 
be demonstrating that Chile's political model is collapsing106. As a secondary student 
organisation document claimed: "After the last few months Chile will not be the 
country where a powerful few define the destiny of the majority. The model the 
Concertación and the Alianza defined of what they believed was best for the country 
has been broken" (ACES, 2011). Due to the expression of this crisis, students also 
believe that after the movement the political scenario will significantly change as it will 
force the incorporation of social actors. 
"The movement has shown the crisis of the relationship between young people and 
Chilean politics. We believe this political model has expired. It expired in the same way 
traditional parties did. This year the crisis of the political class was demonstrated, 
which was reflected in our political demands, such as having a popular constituent 
assembly." Alfredo Vielma, secondary student leader of the ACES during 2011. 
Students also indicate they are aware that this political model is an inheritance of 
the dictatorship as they argue the movement demonstrated current political 
deficiencies originated with the social contract established during the transition. 
Moreover, they also highlight that not only the student movement expose the collapse 
of this model since this was also shown in other mobilisations during 2011, such as the 
anti-Hydoraysén movement and several other regional movements. This is because all 
these mobilisations also demanded more political inclusiveness through the 
                                                          
106
 What students understand as the current political model is mainly the existence of two coalitions that make all 
decisions by elite consensus without incorporating and representing the citizenry. This matches significantly with 
classic accounts of Chilean democracy (See Moulian, 1998, Angell, 2007 and Rindefjall, 2009).  
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empowerment of civil society. Finally, students also state that it is important to reveal 
the crisis of this political model as it is one of the main limitations regarding the 
implementation of substantive social and economic reforms.   
When Chilean political debate is examined, it is also possible to observe that an 
important part of the Chilean political class also recognises that the movement 
revealed the existence of a crisis of representation. In fact, the emergence of the 
movement itself generated an important discussion regarding the need for political 
reforms to strengthen Chilean representative democracy. Politicians admit that the 
quality of politics is being questioned, as people do not perceive that traditional 
political institutions have the capacity to substantively represent their demands, which 
would explain that many of them prefer to demand things directly on the streets.  
"The majority of Chileans believe that traditional democratic institutions are not able 
to absorb, channel and process citizens’ demands efficiently in the economic and social 
issues. Deep down, we face a crisis of representation of our democratic institutions. 
The best way to solve this political and social crisis in order to avoid the emergence of 
a populist or delegative democracy, Chavez-style, is by strengthening representative 
democracy." Patricio Walker, member of the PDC, quoted in La Segunda (2011).  
"It is urgent to revitalise our democracy. To make it more participative and closer to 
people's needs, that is looking on the streets for what they don't find in their 
representatives today. It is essential to draw a road map that allows us to restore the 
credibility of our political institutions in the short term." Cristián Larroulet, Minister 
Secretary General of the  Presidency during Piñera's government, quoted in La 
Tercera (2011).  
Politicians argue that this crisis has to be solved as it could lead to threatening 
situations such as an irreversible rupture between politics and the citizenry or the 
instauration of populist regimes. That is why the Chilean political class proposed, after 
the movement, several political reforms such as the change of the electoral system, 
the existence of more democratic candidate-selection processes and the instauration 
of plebiscites and popular law initiatives. Politicians believe this crisis can be internally 
solved by these reforms as they will be able to demonstrate to common citizens that 
politics can be more inclusive and participatory. These kinds of reforms have been 
furthered by almost all political parties, and only members of the UDI have been more 
reticent regarding these measures. For example, one relevant (and joint) proposal was 
presented by the PDC and RN, which was an important novelty as these parties belong 
to different political coalitions.  
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Finally, when Chilean academics debate the main implications of the emergence of 
this movement and the subsequent activation of other sectors of Chilean society, it is 
possible to identify three main positions: a) those who argue there is not a political 
crisis, only increased probabilities of suffering deceptions, b) those who argue Chile is, 
above all, experiencing a crisis of political representation, and c) those who argue that 
alongside this political crisis, Chile is also experiencing a crisis of its neoliberal socio-
economic model. These three positions will be described first in order to discuss what 
the evidence of this thesis can contribute to this discussion.   
Concerning the first position, its main representatives are Oppliger and Guzmán 
(2012). They argue the 2011 events do not represent a generalised feeling of unrest 
within Chilean society, as the majority’s wish is not to make substantive changes to 
Chile's political and economic model because there is no indicator to support the 
supposed Chilean crisis. They state that Chile has a very stable and democratic political 
system with solid institutions. In this sense, current protests, rather than challenging 
the social order, would only be expressing the correct functioning of a democracy 
where people express demands and representatives try to accomplish them. 
Moreover, these authors also claim there is no crisis, and that the Chilean economic 
situation is better than ever, as Chile has recently experienced great achievements 
regarding GDP increase and poverty reduction. 
What would explain the protests, according to this position, would be the higher 
expectations of Chileans, generated by the satisfaction of certain basic needs that have 
seen more aspirations and therefore more probability of deceit. This would imply then 
that, rather than being against a market-oriented model, Chilean people would only be 
demanding its improvement to avoid certain wrongful behaviours. Finally, these 
authors also argue that Chile is not suffering a crisis since the supposed high levels of 
discontent are similar to those in previous years, when nobody was talking about a 
crisis. In this sense, it is argued that if there is some unrest this might be explained by 
the lack of public order and bad political management experienced during the conflict, 
or because people believe Chile will not continue advancing if some proposed left-wing 
measures are implemented (Ibid.).  
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The second position contradicts the first one, arguing that Chile is indeed currently 
facing a political crisis whose solution would imply the implementation of several 
political reforms. These authors’ main reasons for the statement are the indicators of 
high levels of political disaffection, such as low electoral participation and low 
confidence in political parties. In this sense, it is argued that 2011 protests would be a 
manifestation of this political crisis as they express a generalised rejection of the 
Chilean political class. Some representatives of this vision are Huneeus (2011), 
Garretón (2011) and Salazar (2011). 
All these authors believe the movement has demonstrated that the political model 
inherited from the dictatorship is collapsing, and that it has to be modified to 
strengthen Chilean democracy. Huneeus (2011) states there is a crisis of 
representation since this movement's impact is precisely explained by some limitations 
of the Chilean political system. Moreover, he claims that this model could be internally 
improved if political reforms to generate confidence to empower both people and 
institutions are promoted. Garretón (2012), for his part, argues too that there is a 
political crisis in Chile. He states that this crisis is based on a political model created by 
the dictatorship that generates a political draw to ensure an economic and social 
model that is rejected by the citizenry. Coinciding with Huneeus, he also states that, to 
overcome this crisis, both traditional political actors and the citizenry are needed since 
the central issue regarding the transformation of the political model is the 
reconstruction of the relationship between politics and the citizenry.  
Finally, Salazar (2011) also agrees that there is a crisis of representation. However, 
he is not that optimistic regarding the role that classic political figures can play in the 
reformation of Chilean democracy. This is because he argues that people have started 
to self-represent themselves without taking into account political parties, which would 
imply that these institutions will not be that relevant in a: "new citizen and civic culture 
that is slowly emerging in front of a model that is in crisis" (Ibid.).  
The third and last position agrees with the second one about a possible crisis of 
representation. However, it is also stated that Chile's current socio-economic model 
would be in crisis. The most relevant author concerning this perspective is Mayol 
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(2012a, 2012b). He states that the 2011 student movement and its subsequent 
consequences expressed the end of Chile's market society's legitimacy (Mayol, 2012a). 
This is because with the movement the role of the market could be again politicised as 
students demonstrated and questioned its abuses after several years in which the 
market was a zone of pain. As Mayol argues, this politicisation process challenged "the 
neoliberal articulation between economy and society (...). So, the internal logic of the 
Chilean economic model fell apart; it is cracking" (Ibid, 160).  
The main expression of the legitimacy crisis of Chile's market model would be that 
numerous sectors of Chilean society have expressed their opposition to profit-oriented 
activities within several fields such as education, health and pensions (Mayol, 2012b). 
This position is also supported and deepened by Rojas (2012) as he argues that Chile 
"is attending today to a terminal disease of the neoliberal model that left almost 
everything in the hands of the market and private providers. (...) The current crisis, 
brewed in the past, is the product of the exhaustion of this model, since the market 
has not been able, by itself, to take out the country from underdevelopment." (109).  
Having explained these three positions it is necessary to discuss what the evidence 
suggests. First, regarding the existence of a crisis of political representation, the 
evidence analysed throughout thesis has strongly suggested that Chile is indeed facing 
a political crisis, which is especially strong within young people. This crisis is not only 
given by having thousands of people on the streets but because Chilean people have 
quite high levels of political disaffection, as observed in chapter two. Moreover, the 
evidence of other chapters also indicated that Chilean people are very hostile to the 
current way of doing politics and they would be interested in formal politics if it 
worked differently. Finally, the data of recent surveys have also supported the idea 
that there is a political crisis that goes beyond the student movement. For example, a 
survey conducted by the CERC in 2011 indicated that 75% of Chileans want to reform 
the current constitution. Moreover, another survey indicated that 56% of Chileans 
believe that plebiscites are a good way to decide on important political issues 
(Auditoria a la Democracia, 2012).107 In this sense, it is not possible to agree with 
                                                          
107
 The support to this mechanism was also demonstrated by the high audience that the symbolic educational 
plebiscite organized by the "Mesa Social" in 2011 had as 1.422.442 persons voted (LaNación, 2011).  
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Oppliger’s and Guzmán's (2011) perspective since there is clearly a general level of 
political discontent in Chile, which is an indicator that supports the statement that 
Chile is facing a political crisis.  
The evidence also allows us to refute some specific Oppliger and Guzmán 
propositions. They argue there is not a crisis since current levels of discontentment are 
similar to levels from previous years and that it might be explained by other 
phenomena. Concerning the first issue, it is necessary to argue that the fact that 
Chileans had similar levels of unrest in previous years does not indicate the lack of a 
crisis, but that at that time discontentment had not yet found political expression. This 
chapter has developed the argument that 2011 events represent the activation of 
previously passive feelings of political disaffection, which would invalidate these 
authors’ arguments. With respect to other possible explanatory sources, those 
statements cannot be reaffirmed since the examined evidence has not indicated that 
there is disaffection because Chile lacks public order or because of the possible 
execution of left-wing proposals that can hinder Chile's development path.  
In relation to the accurateness of the proposition about the crisis of Chile's socio-
economic model, it is not possible to give a straightforward answer. Even though it was 
observed that the 2011 student movement did challenge Chile's neoliberal model, it is 
not possible to argue from that evidence that the vast majority of the Chilean 
population are of the same opinion. Thus, it is also necessary to analyse perceptions 
about market economy to see if the anti-neoliberal backlash observed in the 
movement can be also extended to the whole population. This issue is also very 
important to analyse as it has been argued that Chile's neoliberal model is the 
substantive principle of Chile's political model (Ruiz, 1991, Durán 2006). 
In table 7.1 it can be observed some Chileans’ opinions that can shed light on their 
vision about market-oriented socio-economic models. Regarding educational issues, 
the evidence suggests that Chileans do not have pro-market orientations. More than 
two thirds disagree with having profit-oriented universities, although they deliver 
good-quality education and about half of them believe that private universities and 
state-subsidised schools should be taken into public ownership. These data also 
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coincide with what was observed in another recent survey that indicated that 80% of 
Chileans are against profit-oriented universities and schools (CEP, 2011).  
Table 7.1 - Perceptions about market economy among Chilean adults (+18) 
 Table 7.1 also indicates that Chileans are more statist-oriented regarding other 
social fields, which would support the statement that there is discontent regarding 
Chile's neoliberal socio-economic model. 61% of them would prefer public 
transportation to be administrated by a state-owned company rather than current 
private companies while only 21% of them privatised Chile's biggest state-owned 
company, the mining company CODELCO. These data are also coherent with what was 
found in other surveys, since 79% of Chileans support the increase of taxes for those 
who earn more in a CERC survey executed in 2011.  
The fact that Chileans are mostly unsatisfied with a market-oriented economy can 
also be examined by comparing Chile with other Latin American countries using a 
survey executed two years before the emergence of the movement.  
The evidence from table 7.2 indicates that Chile and Argentina are the Latin 
American countries whose populations show most discontent concerning market-
oriented socio-economic models. Chile is the country where most people (64%) 
declared that private companies should be more regulated. Moreover, 66% of Chileans 
are dissatisfied with the privatisation of public utility companies (the second-highest 
percentage) and 52% of them disagree that the privatisation of state companies has 
been beneficial to Chile (third-highest percentage), which ratifies previous data that 
suggested Chilean people are not principally market-oriented but that they are 
demanding more state control.  
 
 % 
It does not matter that universities profit as long they deliver good-quality education. 31% 
All private universities should be taken into public ownership. 52% 
State-subsidised private schools should be taken into public ownership. 49% 
Public transportation should be in the hands of a state company.  61% 
CODELCO should be privatised 21% 
Source: UDP (2012). 
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Table 7.2 - Perceptions of market economy among Latin American people (+16)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chileans seem therefore dissatisfied with the socio-economic model developed in 
the country in recent decades. This criticism was also observed in previous chapters 
that indicated several youths believe Chile's high inequality is generated by a market-
oriented model. All these examined data, however, cannot get to the conclusion that 
one of the movement's repercussions is to take Chile's neoliberal model to a terminal 
disease as Rojas (2012) argues, as that would imply much more relevant 
transformations that are not currently happening. To this effect, the evidence agrees 
more with Mayol's (2012a) statement that there is a legitimacy crisis of Chile's market-
oriented model. Nevertheless, some repercussions highlighted by Mayol are also 
difficult to confirm, which would be only testable if more empirical research on this 
specific issue is done.   
 
Believe that private 
companies should 
be more regulated 
It is dissatisfied with 
the privatization of 
public utility 
companies 
Disagree that the 
privatization of state 
companies has been 
beneficial to the 
country 
Chile 64% 66% 52% 
Argentina 64% 62% 58% 
Nicaragua 60% 67% 45% 
Costa Rica 58% - - 
Honduras 56% 49% 40% 
Panama 54% 57% 40% 
Uruguay 50% - - 
Mexico 50% - 44% 
Peru 49% 59% 48% 
El Salvador 44% 51% 47% 
Colombia 41% 53% 47% 
Bolivia 41% - - 
Guatemala 40% 54% 50% 
Paraguay 38% 47% 40% 
Dom. Republic 34% 59% 52% 
Brazil 33% 41% 31% 
Ecuador 32% 45% 53% 
Venezuela 28% - - 
Latin-America 46% 55% 46% 
Chile Ranking 1st 2nd 3rd 
Source: Latinobarometro (2009).      
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 7.5 An emerging way of doing politics?  
This chapter's last section delves into the apparent emergence of a new way of 
doing politics among Chilean youths since that has also been argued as being one of 
the main consequences of the emergence of the movement. 
On analysing the qualitative material it is observed that students argue that, 
despite there being no specific proposal, the movement demonstrated an emerging 
way of doing politics. Its central idea is that everybody’s opinion has to be taken into 
account through a much more horizontal decision-making system. Students also state 
that the political organisation of society has to start from small communal spaces to 
exercise a truly popular sovereignty where they highlight the need to create territorial 
organisations and strengthen classic organisations such as workers’ and students’ 
unions, neighbourhood associations and centres for parents.  
"We want politics once again to be a means rather than an end. That you really can do 
politics with the citizenry and not behind its backs and that everyone has at least the 
power to participate and give opinions. The background of this social movement is that 
people are clamouring for more spaces for democratic participation where their 
opinions are really taken into account." Rodrigo Rivera, secondary leader of the 
CONES during 2011.  
"One central thing around participation is to strengthen community spaces such as  
neighbourhood associations, student unions and centres for parents and grandparents. 
To make proposals that emerges within a space of dialogue. To promote the 
horizontality of decision-making processes. To decentralise decision-making processes 
too." Laura Palma, university student leader of the Universidad de la Serena during 
2011. 
The fact that students believe participation has to be executed through specific 
organisations generates the question of what the role of political parties should be 
within this supposed new way of doing politics. The evidence suggests that students do 
not automatically discard the role of parties as relevant institutions and that they only 
disapprove the way current parties are functioning. They recognise that if parties had 
more horizontal and participative ways of decision-making, they could be attracted to 
them.108 
                                                          
108
 This finding coincides with previous findings of M-EO's candidature chapter, as it was shown there that several 
youths have felt attracted by a new party that intended to apply more democratic and inclusive logics.  
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"There is no questioning of the political party as an organizational form. The 
movement questions current political parties precisely because of their vertical forms 
of making politics. When the central committee makes all decisions and then they go 
down to its militants throughout Chile and there is not a space of collective 
construction." Nataly Espinoza, university leader of the PUC of Valparaiso during 
2011.  
"Political parties are stigmatised. So, I think that the political model that we need to 
have during this time has to do more with a movement. It is about a movement of 
popular participation. Like the broad social movement in Bolivia. I mean, where all 
have opinions. Where there is not a group of nominees that chooses for others." 
Alfredo Vielma, secondary student leader of the ACES during 2011. 
It is also observed that although students do not reject political parties as valid 
organisational forms, they believe that if new parties emerge or if existing ones are 
reformed they will find several barriers to becoming legitimised. Students state that in 
the current context of high levels of disaffection, a better option could be to develop 
social movements that can incorporate people in much more democratic ways. It is 
further argued that in today’s scenario, political parties are also not useful, as they do 
not have the capacity to support current processes of organisation based on territorial 
organisations with horizontal and flexible logics.  
It can be seen therefore that students are not demanding a radical way of doing 
politics, and that their positions can still be defined as part of a representative 
democracy. Coinciding with Plotke’s position (1997), they promote representative 
democracy but including common citizens through effective mechanisms of 
participation. Urbanity and Warren (2008) also argues that representation is not 
possible without representatives who are connected with representing through spaces 
of participation, as this is the only way to reflect common people's interests. This is 
exactly what students seems to be demanding as they believe that within the current 
Chilean political model there are no spaces to participate as decisions are made just by 
few people through a technocratic style of policy-making.  
The evidence suggests then that there is a similar political vision among students 
based on the promotion of more participative mechanisms and the organisation of 
common citizens. However, this does not mean there have not been differences 
between them. One relevant expression of that occurred during the 2012 municipal 
elections as students (specially secondary ones) differed in their opinions of this 
280 
 
process. On the one hand, the ACES promoted abstention with the campaign "I do not 
lend my vote". It was argued that: "the indifference of politicians and businessman 
against the people's demands has shown that elections are a mechanism that worsens 
the quality of life" (yonoprestoelvoto.cl). On the other hand, the CONES reacted with a 
counter-campaign called "I fight, participate and decide" that promoted people's 
electoral participation as they believed that youths must be central political figures, 
which implies to get involved in every necessary space (CONES, 2012).  
This divergence evidences that the capitalisation of political discontent is 
something that does not have a unique recipe since some youths are clearly more 
willing to support traditional actors than others. This is also shown by the fact that 
while some student leaders such as Camilo Ballesteros (runner-up in the last mayor 
election in Estación Central and potential deputy candidate) have developed political 
careers within traditional parties, other ones, such as Giorgio Jackson, have developed 
their own political organisations. Jackson, for example, created ‘Revolución 
Democrática’, an organisation that currently has more than 5000 members and which 
recently proclaimed him as their deputy candidate.  
In summary, it is observed that the 2011 movement also expressed the emergence 
of a new way of doing politics. The evidence suggests students have clear ideas about 
how they want politics to be executed as they promote more participation and the 
empowerment of civil society. In this context, political parties would be only 
considered as valid representative mechanisms if they worked very differently, which 
generates a lot of uncertainty about how political discontent could be capitalised since 
the citizenry is expecting significant changes and not just cosmetic measures. These 
findings also confirm that Chilean people are looking for new forms of political 
representation that go beyond parties, which is an important novelty as political 
representation has been historically monopolised by parties in Chile (Panizza, 2009).  
 7.6 Conclusions  
This chapter's central aim was to go beyond the central objective of this thesis and 
examine an event where it seemed that previously passive youths started to express 
their discontent in a much more active way. To this effect, the evidence strongly 
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suggested that the 2011 movement can be understood as the maturation of feelings of 
political disaffection. This is because these mobilisations had a much more political 
character as they questioned Chile's political-economic model and proposed some 
guidelines for the establishment of a new model. It is also important to highlight, 
however, that this situation could not have happened if contextual conditions had 
been different. In fact, the process through which youths became more active was 
clearly accelerated by the context where the movement emerged. Several conditions 
such as having a right-wing government, high police repression, previous experiences 
and the ability to generate innovative forms of mobilisations that expressed broader 
demands were fundamental to politicising Chilean youths.  
The main relevance of this activation is without doubt that it intensified a crisis of 
political representation among Chilean society, as the political model established 
during the dictatorship is now being more concretely and powerfully challenged. This 
fact is recognised by students themselves and some scholars who argue the old model 
is finishing its cycle and that a new way of doing politics should emerge. Politicians 
were also found to be aware of the need for political change, although they do not 
recognise there is a crisis of the Chilean political model. In any case, beyond the 
diversity of opinions, this chapter's evidence strongly suggested that the model of 
democracy that Chile inherited from the transition, and that has continued almost 
intact after more than twenty years, is being severely put into question.  
The chief features of this model have been described as a moderate party system, 
an adscription to privileged political consensus and a technocratic style of policy-
making based on the elite’s pacts and a market economy (Moulian, 1998, Garretón, 
2007, P.Silva, 2004 and Rindefjall, 2009). These are precisely the attributes that are 
currently being challenged. Youths are demanding more spaces of participation and an 
increase of the state role, which goes against the spirit of the current consensual and 
technocratic model. To this effect, it can be argued that this political model could be 
living on borrowed time. Its future, however, is very difficult to predict at this time.  
Another relevant finding related to the crisis of Chile's political model was that it 
was possible to observe that this movement also challenged the neoliberal socio-
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economic model that Chile has developed since the 1970 and that there are high levels 
of dissatisfaction concerning central features of this socio-economic model within the 
whole population. This would imply that Chilean people are not only rejecting the main 
rules of the current political model but also one of its central substantive principles. 
Despite these findings, however, the evidence examined was not considered sufficient 
to conclude that this model is in crisis, as that would require more research.  
This does not mean, however, that important sectors of Chilean society are not 
disappointed with this model since it was observed that many of them are against it as 
it reproduces high levels of social inequality and since it has not been successful in 
truly generating opportunities. In fact, it can be argued that education led social 
protests precisely because it expressed more strongly the failures of a system that 
promotes social integration through market mechanisms. As Mayol argues (2012b), 
education was the centre of the social mobility promise, which was demystified when 
it was evident that it was also the epicentre of an injustice. To this effect, current 
discontent evidences that Filgueira et al.'s (2011) argument that incorporation crises 
occur when conservative modernisation projects cannot provide legitimate 
representation as they fail to deliver policies able to synchronise collective 
expectations and individual needs would also be suitable for the Chilean case.  
In summary, the movement and its subsequent repercussions had important 
impacts within Chilean society. The direction of future changes is quite difficult to be 
forecast at the moment, however. One evident thing is that they will be determined by 
the success of several actors that will try to impose their positions. On one hand, the 
traditional Chilean political class will certainly try to internally reform the political 
model in a moderate way in order to safeguard their power positions. On the other 
hand, mobilised people will try to make more substantive reforms. The success of this 
last group will only be possible, however, if they are able to capitalise on existing 
discontent through political organisations willing to compete for formal power 
positions.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
The present research profoundly analysed youth political disaffection in Chile. 
Based on plentiful quantitative, qualitative and archive material collected about the 
relationship between youths’ perceptions of the way of functioning of the Chilean 
political system and feelings of political disaffection, it was possible to identify the 
main sources of this phenomenon. Moreover, derived from this same evidence this 
thesis could also describe some elements of a new way of conceiving politics emerging 
among Chilean youths. At this point, it is necessary to close this thesis by developing 
some reflections regarding these findings and their main implications.   
In order to accomplish the above, this chapter is divided into three sections. The 
first consists of a synopsis of the main findings of this study and some suggestions for 
further research. The second discusses the relation between having high levels of 
political disaffection and the main features of post-authoritarian Chilean politics. 
Finally, the third section closes this thesis by relocating Chile within the Latin American 
region. 
A synopsis of the main findings   
The central question examined through this dissertation was the contradiction 
between the high levels of economic and political development of Chile's post-
authoritarian democracy and its elevated levels of youth political disaffection. 
Furthermore, this study was also focused on two specific issues: the understanding of 
youths’ higher disaffection levels and the examination of a new way of doing politics 
emerging among young people in Chile. In order to complete these objectives, this 
thesis utilised a political sociology approach as it examined how certain political 
phenomena generate disaffection focusing on society-level processes through the 
analysis of people's perceptions of their relationships with formal politics. 
Based on the examined evidence, the first thing to argue is that the main account 
for current high levels of youth political disaffection in Chile is a political one. The data 
suggested that, despite Chile's political and economic achievements of recent decades, 
Chilean people perceive that the political class has gradually distanced itself from 
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common citizens. Moreover, the evidence also indicated that this process has been 
especially strong regarding young people. This distancing was identified by observing 
that feelings of political disaffection are founded on youths’ negative perceptions of 
the functioning of the Chilean political system. In relation to that, it was found that 
there are three type of perceptions from which these feelings emerge: perceptions of 
lack of representation, feelings of political inefficacy and negative evaluations 
concerning the internal functioning of political parties. Additionally, these three issues 
were also found to be intersected by the perception that Chilean politicians are very 
pragmatic as they regularly prioritise the obtainment of power benefits rather than the 
representation of common citizens’ interests.  
These findings suggest, therefore, that youths are not electorally participating or 
that they have low confidence in central political institutions since there is a great gap 
between them and the political system. This was initially observed in chapter three, 
where the association between youths’ perceptions and the engenderment of political 
disaffection was directly analysed through quantitative and qualitative material. 
Afterwards, these findings were deepened through the analysis of several case studies 
that illustrate some of the situations that generate disaffection.  
For example, chapter four showed that the lack of a youth public policy expresses 
Chilean democracy's representativeness problems and the existence of a political class 
that excessively prioritise the reproduction of power positions. The analysis of MEO's 
candidacy in chapter five also deepened previous findings as it showed that reasons for 
supporting this independent candidacy significantly matched previously observed 
sources of political disaffection. For instance, it reconfirmed the importance of 
increasing levels of youths’ descriptive representation within more democratic and 
participative parties in order to reduce disaffection. Finally, the examination of the 
2006 ‘pingüino movement’ in chapter six illustrated how the application of Chile's 
classic way of doing politics generates disaffection as the way this movement's 
demands were absorbed accurately expressed problems of political inefficacy and lack 
of representation within Chilean politics.  
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With respect to the first specific objective, the examined evidence could also bring 
relevant contributions. The main finding was that youths are more politically 
disaffected since the gap between politics and youths is larger than the one between 
politics and other groups. Moreover, it was also observed that this larger gap is 
explained by the existence of pragmatic politicians that generate few ties with youths 
as they cannot electorally profit from them because most youths do not vote. This 
larger gap was expressed through several aspects, such as problems of the youth 
public offer, the lack of youth leaderships and having parties whose internal 
functioning is particularly hostile to the incorporation of young people.  
This association was also observed through several chapters. The direct analysis of 
the relationship between political disaffection and youths’ perceptions of chapter 
three suggested that young people feel they are one of the most politically and socially 
excluded groups within Chilean society. Chapter four also contributed to this 
discussion as it demonstrated that the lack of a youth public policy is one of most 
relevant examples of this larger gap between youths and politics explained by the 
existence of a pragmatic political class. Finally, chapter five also showed this situation 
as it illustrated how a political project guided by young politicians, that used several 
means closer to this group and that had specific proposals to increase youths’ political 
inclusiveness, was particularly successful in attracting disaffected youths.  
Finally, regarding the second specific objective, the evidence could also bring 
relevant insights about a supposed emerging way of doing politics among youths. In 
relation to this issue, chapter two suggested that Chilean youths are not principally 
apathetic but are just rejecting the current way of functioning of Chilean politics. This 
finding was confirmed through the analysis of several case studies where some 
elements of an emerging way of conceiving politics were also observed. The main 
finding was that youths are demanding the active participation of citizens regarding 
the implementation of public policies. This finding is particularly relevant since it 
opposes one of the core elements of Chilean post-authoritarian politics: the 
technocratisation of decision-making processes (Rindfjall, 2009). To this effect, the 
evidence suggests that youths believe that it is only through active participation that 
they can be substantively represented, which indicates that their perceptions coincide 
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with some theoretical reflections about the existence of a virtuous circle between 
participation and representation (Plotke, 1997).  
The vital role assigned to participation was also observed in chapter four as it 
showed that youths are demanding authentic mechanisms of participation for the 
development of youth public policies. Moreover, this was illustrated too in chapters six 
and seven as the analyses of the two social movements highlighted the importance 
students give to participation, both regarding the way internal decisions are taken and 
how they expect to negotiate with authorities.  
Other elements of this way of conceiving politics were observed in chapter five as 
the analysis of the perceptions of ME-O's supporters indicated that youths would have 
more political support if politicians were more worried about the representation of 
people's interests and if there were younger politicians within more transparent and 
democratic parties. Finally, some elements of an emerging way of doing politics were 
also observed in a specific section of chapter seven, which analysed the 2011 
movement as the activation of previously passive feelings of political disaffection. This 
evidence was in accordance with previous findings as it suggested youths are 
demanding more participation through the strengthening of several social 
organisations. Another relevant finding was that the rejection of formal politics has led 
several youths to start looking for new ways of political representation beyond political 
parties, which can be highlighted as an important novelty of current mobilizations. To 
this effect, it seems that if parties are to have a future significant role they should 
drastically change their current logics of functioning.  
The uniqueness of present-day social protests concerning their relation with 
formal politics can be illustrated by comparing these events with other moments of 
Chilean history marked by high levels of political discontent.  For example, the triumph 
of Salvador Allende in 1970 undoubtedly represented the culmination of feelings of 
social discontent of important sectors of Chilean society. However, those expressions 
were quite different from present-day manifestations. While the “Unidad Popular” 
(UP) project (1970-1973) was guided by two left-wing traditional parties (PS and PC), 
contemporary mobilizations emerged mostly independently of these institutions and 
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critical of the whole political class. Moreover, it can be also argued that what is 
happening nowadays is more ground-breaking than previous events. The UP project 
came to radicalize a model of development that Chile had been already implementing 
in the last decades (Salazar and Pinto, 1999), while present mobilizations’ demands are 
not easily accommodated within existing Chilean political programmes. Whereas 
Allende followed a member of the Christian Democratic Party who also promoted the 
strengthening of the state’s role and popular participation (Eduardo Frei Montalva 
(1964-1970)), current protests call for the reinforcement of the public sector during a 
right-wing government that succeeded four centre-left governments that largely 
reproduced a pro-market development model.  
It is observed, therefore, that the evidence brought important findings regarding 
all the questions initially raised by this research. To this effect, it is necessary to 
highlight the main contributions of these findings to the Chilean debate about the 
sources of political disaffection. In relation to that, it is possible to argue that the first 
important contribution was to have empirically tested several monographic 
descriptions about Chilean democracy. As it was observed during the whole thesis, 
many of the obtained findings coincided with classic descriptions of post-authoritarian 
Chilean politics. For example, problems of representativeness and efficacy have been 
highlighted by several authors, who argue that it is because of Chile's technocratic way 
of policy-making and its elitist and homogenising manner of doing politics that 
common citizens do not feel able to produce political impacts or to be substantively 
represented (Moulian, 1998, Garretón, 2007). In this sense, findings about the 
association between perceptions of lack of representation and political inefficacy and 
feelings of political disaffection verified this thesis's central hypothesis.  
Other interesting contribution was to have found new elements associated with 
the engenderment of feelings of hostility towards the political system. The importance 
of the internal functioning of political parties and perceptions about the prioritisation 
of power attainment of the Chilean political class have not been highly discussed issues 
in Chilean literature. Thus, the association of what were named as partyarchic 
practices of Chilean democracy and the generation of political disaffection can be 
argued to be one of the main new contributions of this thesis.  
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Another relevant contribution is related to the reasons that make Chilean youths 
more disaffected than other groups in Chilean society. This issue had not been highly 
discussed within Chilean literature and this thesis could also brought relevant findings 
regarding that by having found, for example, that youths are more disaffected because 
several partyarchic practices had led Chilean politicians to generate even fewer ties 
with them.  
Finally, the last main contribution has to do with having developed a very up-to-
date debate about Chilean politics. This study could successfully connect the 
phenomena under study with the most recent political events since it brought an 
account of the 2011 mobilisations coherent with the main argument of the thesis. To 
this effect, to have shown through empirical data that this movement represents the 
activation of feelings of disaffection and that there is an emerging way of conceiving 
politics are, without doubt, relevant contributions to the Chilean political debate. 
Moreover, it can be also considered a relevant contribution to have evidenced in the 
last chapter that the Chilean population seems to be also calling for a new socio-
economic model that can reduce current high levels of inequality, which evidenced 
that Chileans’ discontentment seems to be not only directed towards the main rules of 
the political model, but also towards one of its main substantive principles. 
One last point to explore in this section is that of recommendations for further 
research. The first suggestion has to do with the last described contribution. In several 
chapters of this thesis it was observed that there is a discontent with Chile's socio-
economic model. This was shown, for example, by the fact that there is a criticism 
towards the technocratic way of policy-making associated with this model, that ME-O 
was attractive because he proposed a tributary reform that focused on reducing social 
inequality, that the analysed social movements advocated increasing the role of the 
state and because it was also observed that there is an objection to a market-oriented 
model within the whole Chilean population. However, due to the scope of this thesis, 
the analysed evidence was too general and not sufficient to develop more consistent 
statements. That is why one recommendation for further research would be to more 
deeply analyse why Chilean people are discontented with this model and the main 
implications of that situation.  
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Other suggestions are to deepen the study of other situations that illustrates that 
youths are being more politically and socially excluded than other groups. One 
example could be to research how the internal functioning of political parties includes 
youths comparing with other groups. Other interesting suggestion could be to more 
profoundly study the relations between sources of disaffection and SES. The 
quantitative material of chapter three suggested that some perceptions affect people's 
political disaffection levels differently, according to their SES. This evidence, however, 
could not be developed in this thesis with the collected qualitative material. Thus, one 
relevant suggestion would be to qualitatively study those perceptions distinguishing by 
the social origin of the subjects of study. Finally, one last recommendation is to keep 
analysing new youths’ political expressions using the same theoretical frameworks of 
this thesis in order to have a better comprehension of how youths’ discontentment is 
to be politically capitalised upon.  
Political disaffection as a consequence of Chile's post-authoritarian political system 
Having clarified that youth political disaffection is explained by a disconnection 
between youths and the Chilean political system, it is suitable to discuss why Chilean 
democracy generated such large gaps. In relation to that question, what the evidence, 
alongside several scholars’ reflections suggested, is that this situation is principally 
produced by the particular development of Chile's post-authoritarian political system. 
That is to say, the evidence indicated that it is mainly based on the central attributes of 
Chilean politics, such as having a moderate and homogeneous party system, a 
technocratic style of policy-making and a general political style based on processes of 
demobilisation and depoliticisation (Rindefjall, 2009, P. Silva, 2004, Camargo, 2007) 
that there is a large disconnection between Chile's civil society and its political class. 
This is the case as almost all types of perceptions associated with political disaffection 
were found to be the product of specific attributes of Chilean democracy, which would 
imply therefore that the modification of the Chilean political system could significantly 
contribute to reducing current high levels of youth political disaffection.  
What is intended to be argued through this reflection is that the Chilean case 
successfully illustrates how certain political designs can generate more legitimacy 
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problems than others. During the military government and the democratic transition, 
the Chilean political system suffered drastic reforms that heavily restructured the 
relationship between politics and society (Garretón, 2004, Huneeus, 2003). This 
political model has persisted almost intact until nowadays as, for example, Chile 
presently has the same constitution and electoral system that was established in 1980. 
This thesis argues therefore that the current disconnection between politics and 
society is precisely the product of this political model since it was deliberately 
constructed to generate a political system whose central element is not people's 
political inclusion, but their dissipation in order to increase the political system's 
governance capacity.   
Another observation that can be established is that the Chilean political system has 
not generated a close relationship between common citizens and politics since its main 
institutions have reduced incentives to do so. For instance, a predictable electoral 
system clearly reduces politicians’ motivations to be connected with the citizenry and a 
party law that does not advocate more transparency evidently discourages parties to 
promote people's participation. It seems therefore that one relevant mechanism 
through which current political institutions have reduced connections between people 
and politics is by increasing politicians’ pragmatism levels. One relevant example of 
that was examined in this thesis by showing that the lack of a youth public policy is 
principally explained by the existence of politicians that are not worried about that 
issue. To this effect, it seems accurate to argue that since the return to democracy 
Chilean politicians have become more pragmatic, which has finally enlarged their 
detachment from common citizens. 
As it was discussed in the introductory chapter, having high levels of political 
disaffection has several negative implications. Philip (2003) argues that in a 
consolidated democracy its political institutions have to be seen as legitimate by the 
public, which implies that people's behaviours and attitudes are supportive of the 
regime. Moreover, Putnam et al. (2000) state that political processes are damaged 
when people distrust political authorities and stop using formal channels of 
participation as that reduces their capacity to be heard. This means therefore that 
what is currently happening in Chile is clearly not positive and that some measures are 
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urgent in order to modify this situation. In relation to that, due to the importance that 
this thesis has given to the role of political institutions regarding the generation of 
political disaffection, the main recommendations to increase people's political support 
are evidently given by the reform of the Chilean political system.  
Regarding some relevant reforms to be made, the examination of the evidence 
about an emerging way of conceiving politics bring several suggestions. First, it is clear 
that having authentic methods of participation through which common citizens can 
express their needs would reduce disaffection, as youths are aware of the importance 
of participation to achieving higher levels of representativeness. These would have to 
be mechanisms that worked together with existing social organisations in conjunction 
with other democratic methods of consulting, such as local and national plebiscites 
that make people feel they have a relevant political impact. In the same way, a new 
party law that established clear mechanisms to define candidates through binding 
internal elections and that defined specific quotas for youth candidates would clearly 
contribute to modify youths’ negative visions regarding the functioning of these 
institutions. All these specific reforms, however, would have to be also delimited 
within a more democratic context given possibly by the instauration of a new political 
constitution and a new electoral system. This means, for example, that it is not worth 
reforming parties or having plebiscites if there is still an electoral system that limits 
political representation by homogenising ideological differences.  
The realisation of some political reforms, however, cannot be seen as a panacea to 
reducing disaffection. In fact, the cases of Venezuela in the late 1980s (Coppedge, 
1994) and Bolivia in the early 1990s (Tanaka and Vera, 2011) indicate that the 
execution of moderate political reforms in contexts of crisis of representation does not 
necessarily solve the problem, but that it can even worsen it by empowering 
disaffected people. For example, by the mid-1980s, Venezuelan politicians realized 
that political discontent was increasing and decided to reform the political system in 
order to increase people’s participation. However, it has been argued that these 
reforms were not effective since traditional politicians did not intend to truly empower 
people but only to moderately reform the political system in order to create the 
impression of change with the aim of safeguarding their power (Coppedge, 1994).  
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What is intended to be argued is that if disaffection is to be reduced in Chile, 
political reforms have to be significant and promote a genuine inclusion of the 
citizenry, and that a bunch of rather tepid reforms promoted only within the system 
would clearly not be enough. For instance, the evidence suggested that the figure of 
the political party itself is something that Chilean people are not sure to continue 
supporting even though they are reformed. In fact, it was observed that people have 
started to look for new forms of representation. This reinforces, therefore, the 
statement that the Chilean public, and especially its youths, will be very demanding in 
their evaluations of measures adopted to deal with the current crisis of political 
representation.  
In summary, it is observed that important problems of Chilean politics are 
generated by the political model elaborated during the military government that has 
continued practically intact until nowadays. Despite these problems, this model has 
been vastly acclaimed by some authors as it has produced high levels of political 
stability and economic development (Angell, 2007, Scully, 1995). Indeed, the 
discrepancy between these problems and achievements was what originated this 
research. Thus, after having analysed all the evidence it is necessary to reflect about 
this issue too.  
To this effect, what can be hypothetically suggested is that it seems that, rather 
than being a contradictory expression of Chile's achievements, the existence of high 
levels of disaffection might be just the flip-side of the coin of these accomplishments. 
This political model was intentionally designed to reproduce a political system isolated 
from common citizens. Hence, it can be argued that Chile's high levels of political 
stability are precisely given by its capacity to reproduce a political model disconnected 
from the citizenry as that reduces social pressures and allows the uncritical application 
of certain policies that principally benefit economic and political elites.  
This hypothesis finds its support on Huber and Stephen's (1997) analyses. They 
argue that democracies are surviving: "because they are deficient, particularly in the 
dimensions of equal protection of civil and political rights and in the capacity for 
participation of lower classes" as that reduces elite's threat perceptions by maintaining 
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the unchallenged position of their projects (1997: 11). These authors highlight the 
Chilean case, a in Chile: "the capacity of subordinate classes to participate effectively in 
the political process and make demands for material benefits was weakened, which in 
turn has kept any potential threat to bourgeois interests extremely low" (Ibid, 12). 
Roberts (2011) also supports this point as he argues that Chile's social-liberalism 
approach has helped to maintain political and economic stability, but at the price of 
abandoning commitments for far-reaching changes. In this sense, it is appreciated that 
certain social and political deficits that engender disaffection in Chile, rather than 
being qualified as contradictory outcomes, could be better defined as coherent 
elements of the same process that has produced some political and economic 
achievements.  
This last reflection allows also the suggestion of a hypothetical consideration of the 
relationship between stability, growth and inequality. Chilean democracy seems to 
indicate that both high economic growth rates and elevated levels of social inequality 
are necessary conditions to develop stable political systems. Following the Chilean 
case, it appears that elites feel their interests are safeguarded when they secure high 
growth levels, much of it concentrated at the top of the income scale. Thus, it seems 
the stability of Chilean democracy is based on the fact that its political and economic 
elites have prevented a more equitable income distribution, which has been facilitated 
by the elitist character of the Chilean political system. 
This reflection finds support on Przeworski’s statement that social equality is not 
an inherent element of democracies since in these regimes “Morally based arguments 
for redistribution or abolishment of property were marginal and ephemeral” (2009: 
21). To this effect, the existence of stable democracies with high levels of inequality 
observed in Chile and in other Latin-American countries seems to be in line with what 
is expected of democratic regimes. To Przeworski’s argument, however, it could be 
added that unequal stable democracies seem to coexist also with elitist political 
systems that prevent people’s empowering that could demand a more equal income 
distribution.  
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Relocating Chilean democracy within the Latin-American region  
One last thing to be discussed is Chile's relocation regarding the Latin American 
context. As it has been argued during the thesis, significant political crises have taken 
place in almost every country in the region. In fact, before the 2011 movement some 
scholars were discussing why Chile has not had strong protests similar to those one of 
other countries in the region. In relation to that, Oxhorn (2009) argued that it is 
difficult for the left to mobilise opposition to neoliberalism in Chile since the country 
has developed successful policies that have resulted in significant socio-economic gains 
for the majority. Navia (2009) also supports this argument as he states that Chile 
shows that when neoliberalism is complemented with some policies that promote 
social and economic inclusion, the emergence of strong popular challenges is inhibited. 
Based on all the evidence examined in this thesis, it can be argued that these analyses 
were proven to be wrong. Without doubts Chile's social improvements have 
contributed to a more peaceful social environment. However, current high levels of 
political disaffection and the significant challenge to the neoliberal model led by the 
2011 student movement clearly indicate that it cannot be argued that Chile had 
previously lacked strong protests since people were satisfied.  
Based on recent events, therefore, the query changes from asking why Chile has 
not had protests to debating why Chile took so long to have protests. In relation to 
that debate, the evidence of this thesis alongside the analyses of other Latin American 
cases can make a relevant contribution. Chapter seven indicated that current protests 
are the product of the maturation of feelings of unrest that were capable of being 
much more actively expressed given some new conditions such as having the right-
wing in power or students’ better organisational capacities. Going beyond these 
specific conditions, what can be also hypothetically argued is that this same 
disconnection between politics and society that generates disaffection is also 
responsible for the prevention of earlier protests. 
 This is because Chilean society has been historically used to channel their 
demands through political parties, as parties are the only valid mechanism of political 
representation (Panizza, 2009). In this sense, given the disconnection between the 
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political system and common citizens, it was clearly a very hard process for Chilean 
society to organise itself to demand changes almost totally independently from 
traditional political parties. As Chilean society was used to count with the support of 
parties to organize and demand substantive changes, it seems reasonable then that it 
took a long until we could see Chilean society again on the streets since it had to do it 
without the help of one of its central historical ally. 
The Chilean case demonstrates, therefore, how several political factors are 
decisive in shaping outcomes generated by certain social conditions. This is also shown 
through other Latin American cases, which can contribute to generating some 
suppositions about the future of Chilean democracy. For example, Philip and Panizza 
(2011) argue that the success of radical projects in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador are 
the product of the crisis of a model based on the moderation of political tensions, the 
retrenchment of the state and the demobilisation of civil society, which would imply 
that Chile could follow a similar path. To this effect, Venezuela during the 1990s is 
perhaps the country that has more in common with present-day Chile. Prior to Chavez' 
government (before 1998) Venezuela had a stable democracy within a favourable 
economic situation and the political system was dominated by two similar coalitions 
that were negatively perceived by many less advantaged groups as they had excluded 
them from the country’s social development (Coppedge, 1994).  
These similarities, however, do not necessarily indicate that there are high odds of 
having a “Chilean Chavez” soon in Chile. Despite some correspondences, there are also 
relevant differences. Living conditions are significantly better in Chile now than in 
Venezuela in the 1990s. Moreover, the current Chilean political system is much more 
institutionalized as a result of the 1980 constitution, which clearly reduces the chances 
of having an anti-system candidate able to capitalize on political discontent.  
The evidence of other countries also supports the statement that it is difficult to 
believe that Chile will follow the Venezuelan path. Political crisis in the region has also 
led to the emergence of other quite different projects, such as when Fujimori in Peru 
took advantage of a weakened and unrepresentative political class in order to 
implement an authoritarian right-wing regime (Levitsky, 1999). Moreover, the 
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Uruguayan case, a country that has also  been compared to Chile, shows that 
discontent can be controlled through institutional channels when the elite is 
renovated, as occurred with the emergence of Frente Amplio (Chasquetti and Buquet, 
2004).   
It can be observed therefore that other Latin American countries also demonstrate 
the relevance of certain political factors regarding the resolution of political crisis as 
similar social situations have produced very different outcomes. Chile has similarities 
with the cases where more radical projects emerged since important parts of society 
are rejecting a similar political and economic model. However, Chile also shares with 
Uruguay the fact of having one of the most stable democracies of the region, which 
suggests that Chile could have the capacity to solve this crisis internally. To this effect, 
it is clear that the fate of Chilean politics is somewhat very difficult to predict at this 
time, as it will depend on numerous political factors and the behaviour of several 
actors in a process that is currently taking place. The only clear thing is that, whatever 
these changes are, if they are to reduce disaffection they should clearly prioritise the 
inclusion of youths as they are the ones leading expressions of discontent, since they 
are one of the most politically and socially excluded sectors of Chilean society.  
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Appendix 1: Regression Models including significant associations and 
alternative explanations 
a) Models done with data from the Latinobarómetro Survey: 
Electoral Participation:  
Binary Logistic Regression Model for Electoral Participation in Chilean Youth (18-29)
109 
 
Confidence in Political Parties 
 Binary Logistic Regression Model for Confidence in Political Parties in Chilean Youth (18-29)
111
 
 
 
                                                          
109
 The dependent variable is based on the question that asks whether you voted or not in the last presidential 
election where 1 means that you voted and 0 that you didn’t vote.  
110
 For all the presented p values *  means that the association is significant at the 99% level of confidence, ** 
means that the association is significant at the 95% level of condicence and *** means that the association is 
significant at the 90% levl of confidence.  
111
 The dependent variable is based on a recording of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means 
that you have confidence in political parties and 0 that you don’t have confidence.  
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Benefit of a few Powerful Interests 5.951 384.171 0.006*110 
Most effective way to change things 
          Protest_Movements -0.458 0.632 0.404 
         Impossible to Change -1.915 0.147 <0.000* 
         Other Means -2.039 0.130 0.015** 
Value Orientations 
       Postmaterialist 0.760 2.139 0.332 
       Mixed 0.521 1.684 0.209 
Social Capital 0.005 1.005 0.990 
SES x Benefit of a few Powerful Interests -3.200 0.041 0.001* 
Control Variables 
SES 1.689 5.413 0.050** 
Age 0.317 1.373 <0.000* 
Gender 0.204 1.227 0.615 
Constant -11.686 0.000 <0.000 
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Benefit of a few Powerful Interests -0.936 0.392 0.036** 
Most effective way to change things 
         Protest_Movements 0.208 1.232 0.715 
        Impossible to Change -0.853 0.426 0.135 
       Other Means -0.503 0.605 0.548 
Value Orientations 
      Postmaterialist 0.705 2.024 0.394 
     Mixed 0.900 2.460 0.067*** 
Social Capital -0.749 0.473 0.099*** 
Control Variables 
SES -1.228 0.293 0.020** 
Age 0.154 1.166 0.011** 
Gender -0.297 0.743 0.490 
Constant -2.037 0.130 0.286 
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Confidence in the Congress 
Binary Logistic Regression Model for Confidence in the Congress  in Chilean Youth (18-29)
112 
Democracy Support 
Binary Logistic Regression Model for Democracy Support in  Chilean Youth (18-29)
113 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
112
 The dependent variable is based on a recoding of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means 
that you have confidence in the congress and 0 that you don’t have confidence.  
113
 The dependent variable is based on a recording of a three alternative question regarding political regime´s 
preference where 1 means that you support democracy and 0 that you don’t support it.  
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Benefit of a few Powerful Interests 4.237 69.206 0.019** 
Most effective way to change things 
         Protest_Movements 0.081 1.084 0.853 
        Impossible to Change -1.297 0.273 <0.000 
       Other Means -1.787 0.167 0.007* 
Value Orientations 
       Postmaterialist -0.453 0.636 0.435 
      Mixed -0.127 0.881 0.693 
Social Capital -0.287 0.750 0.364 
SES x Benefit of a few Powerful Interests  0.081 0.003* 
Control Variables 
SES 1.278 3.591 0.085*** 
Age 0.011 1.011 0.791 
Gender -0.267 0.766 0.381 
Constant -1.542 0.214 0.427 
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Most effective way to change things 
         Protest_Movements -0.815 0.443 0.059*** 
        Impossible to Change -1.219 0.296 <0.000 
       Other Means -1.036 0.355 0.038** 
Value Orientations 
       Postmaterialist 0.407 1.502 0.452 
      Mixed -0.062 0.940 0.827 
Social Capital 0.468 1.597 0.092*** 
Control Variables 
SES -0.012 0.988 0.969 
Gender -0.085 0.918 0.027** 
Age -0.163 0.849 0.548 
Constant 3.021 20.515 0.017 
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b) Models done with data from the Auditoria a la Democracia Survey: 
Electoral Registration 
Binary Logistic Regression Model for Electoral Registration in Chilean Youth (18-29)
114
 
 Confidence in Political Parties 
Binary Logistic Regression Model for Confidence in Political Parties in Chilean Youth (18-29)
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114
 The dependent variable is based on the question that asks whether you are registered or not to vote where 1 
means that you are registered and 0 that you are not registered.  
115
 The dependent variable is based on a recoding of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means 
that you have confidence in the congress and 0 that you don’t have confidence. 
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Interest in Politics -0.934 0.393 <0.000* 
Efficacy of Voting 0.854 2.349 0.016** 
Corruption (PP) 0.515 1.674 0.048** 
Internal Efficacy 0.085 1.088 0.566 
Control Variables 
SES -1.587 0.205 <0.000* 
Age 0.153 1.165 <0.000* 
Gender -0.015 0.985 0.958 
Constant -0.136 0.873 0.933 
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Interest in Politics -1.071 0.343 <0.000* 
Lack of a real public policy choice (PP) -0.521 0.594 0.016** 
Activism Encouragement (PP) 2.395 10.973 0.007* 
Representation of interests (Congress) -0.812 0.444 0.002* 
SES x  Activism Encouragement (PP) -0.700 0.497 0.051*** 
Corruption (PP) -0.392 0.675 0.198 
Internal Efficacy 0.117 1.124 0.559 
Control Variables 
SES 2.548 12.779 0.040** 
Age 0.120 1.128 0.019** 
Gender -0.183 0.833 0.619 
Constant -5.155 0.006 0.160 
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Confidence in the Congress 
Binary Logistic Regression Model for Confidence in the Congress in Chilean Youth (18-29)
116 
Democracy Support 
Binary Logistic Regression Model for Democracy Support in Chilean Youth (18-29)
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116
 The dependent variable is based on a recoding of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means 
that you have confidence in the congress and 0 that you don’t have confidence. 
117
 The dependent variable is based on a recording of a three alternative question regarding political regime´s 
preference where 1 means that you support democracy and 0 that you don’t support it.  
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Interest in Politics -0.459 0.632 0.017** 
Representation of interests (Congress) -0.558 0.573 0.009* 
Lack of a real public policy choice (PP) -0.323 0.724 0.050** 
Activism Encouragement (PP) 1.875 6.523 0.008* 
Government Indifference -0.230 0.795 0.071*** 
SES x  Activism Encouragement (PP) -0.581 0.559 0.040** 
Corruption (PP) -0.331 0.718 0.166 
Internal Efficacy 0.028 1.028 0.856 
Control Variables 
SES 1.833 6.255 0.050*** 
Age -0.042 0.958 0.274 
Gender 0.394 1.484 0.151 
Constant -1.065 0.345 0.709 
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Corruption (PP) 0.382 1.466 0.052*** 
Government Indifference -1.079 0.340 0.037** 
SES x  Government Indifference 0.321 1.379 0.119 
Internal Efficacy -0.110 0.895 0.329 
Control Variables 
SES -1.537 0.215 0.025** 
Age -0.054 0.948 0.099*** 
Gender -0.299 0.741 0.185 
Constant 6.200 492.927 0.003 
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Appendix 2: Regression Models with only significant associations 
b) Models with data from the Latinobarómetro Survey: 
Electoral Participation 
 Binary Logistic Regression Model for Electoral Participation in Chilean Youth (18-29)
118 
Confidence in Political Parties 
Binary Logistic Regression Model for Confidence in Political Parties  in Chilean Youth (18-29)
119
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 The dependent variable is based on the question that asks whether you voted or not in the last presidential 
election where 1 means that you voted and 0 that you didn’t vote.  
119
 The dependent variable is based on a recording of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means 
that you have confidence in political parties and 0 that you don’t have confidence.  
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Benefit of a few Powerful Interests  6.252 519.155 0.002* 
Most effective way to change things 
             Protest_Movements -0.603 0.547 0.225 
             Impossible to Change -2.287 0.102 < 0.001* 
             Other Means  -2.379 0.093 0.001* 
SES x Benefit of a few Powerful Interests -3.206 0.041 0.001* 
Control Variables  
SES 1.875 6.522 0.021* 
Age 0.255 1.290 < 0.001* 
Gender 0.454 1.575 0.230 
Constant -10.554 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Benefit of a few Powerful Interests  -0.763 0.466 0.051*** 
Most effective way to change things 
             Protest_Movements -0.049 0.952 0.925 
             Impossible to Change -1.157 0.315 0.028** 
             Other Means  -0.080 0.923 0.888 
Control Variables 
SES -1.175 0.309 0.013** 
Age 0.091 1.095 0.075*** 
Gender 0.211 1.234 0.577 
Constant -0.982 0.375 0.555 
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a) Models with data from the Auditoria a la Democracia Survey: 
Electoral Registration 
Binary Logistic Regression Model for Electoral Registration in Chilean Youth (18-29)
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 The dependent variable is based on a recoding of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means 
that you have confidence in the congress and 0 that you don’t have confidence.  
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 The dependent variable is based on a recording of a three alternative question regarding political regime´s 
preference where 1 means that you support democracy and 0 that you don’t support it.  
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 The dependent variable is based on the question that asks whether you are registered or not to vote where 1 
means that you are registered and 0 that you are not registered.  
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Benefit of a few Powerful Interests  3.976 53.291 0.025** 
Most effective way to change things 
             Protest_Movements 0.101 1.106 0.808 
             Impossible to Change -1.117 0.327 0.001* 
             Other Means  -0.897 0.408 0.071*** 
SES x Benefit of a few Powerful Interests -2.445 0.087 0.004* 
Control Variables  
SES 1.157 3.180 0.110 
Age 0.035 1.036 0.371 
Gender -0.282 0.754 0.332 
Constant -2.100 0.122 0.267 
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Most effective way to change things 
             Protest_Movements -0.758 0.469 0.070*** 
             Impossible to Change -1.361 0.256 < 0.000* 
             Other Means  -1.153 0.316 0.010** 
Control Variables  
SES -0.049 0.952 0.866 
Age -0.094 0.910 0.013** 
Gender -0.292 0.747 0.256 
Constant 3.740 42.081 0.001 
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Efficacy of Voting 0.832 2.298 0.012** 
Interest in Politics -0.807 0.446 0.000* 
Control Variables 
SES -1.457 0.233 < 0.000* 
Age 0.155 1.168 <0.000* 
Gender 0.084 1.088 0.757 
Constant 0.547 1.729 0.692 
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 The dependent variable is based on a recoding of a 4 item scale of confidence in two categories where 1 means 
that you have confidence in the congress and 0 that you don’t have confidence. 
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 The dependent variable is based on a recording of a three alternative question regarding political regime´s 
preference where 1 means that you support democracy and 0 that you don’t support it.  
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Interest in Politics -1.024 0.359 <0.000* 
Representation of interests (Congress) -0.931 0.394 <0.000* 
Lack of a real public policy choice (PP) -0.445 0.641 0.024** 
Activism Encouragement (PP) 2.863 17.511 0.001* 
SES x  Activism Encouragement (PP) -0.932 0.394 0.006* 
Control Variables 
SES 3.225 25.147 0.005* 
Age 0.066 1.068 0.163 
Gender -0.254 0.776 0.463 
Constant -5.703 0.003 0.094 
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Interest in Politics -0.503 0.605 0.006* 
Representation of interests (Congress) -0.514 0.598 0.011** 
Lack of a real public policy choice (PP) -0.283 0.754 0.075*** 
Activism Encouragement (PP) 1.771 5.880 0.010** 
Government Indifference -0.250 0.779 0.043** 
SES x  Activism Encouragement (PP) -0.521 0.594 0.062*** 
Control Variables 
SES 1.615 5.028 0.079*** 
Age -0.021 0.980 0.583 
Gender 0.350 1.419 0.188 
Constant -1.844 0.158 0.502 
Variables B Exp(B) P value 
Corruption (PP) 0.411 1.508 0.036** 
Government Indifference -1.183 0.306 0.022** 
SES x  Government Indifference 0.361 1.434 0.079*** 
Control Variables 
SES -1.661 0.190 0.015** 
Age -0.050 0.951 0.122 
Gender -0.282 0.755 0.211 
Constant 6.038 419.092 0.003 
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